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INTRODUCTION
The surface of the earth has an area of approximately
190 million sq. miles, 58 million sq. miles of which are
land and 132 million sq. miles are sea.^^^ Thus,
approximately, seventy one per cent of the globe is
(2 )covered by water.
It is worth pointing out that one of man's enduring 
enterprises in the use of the sea has been fishing. In 
addition, the sea has been exploited as a highway for 
exploration and an important means of transport. It 
follows that, from ancient times the sea has represented 
a source of food, energy and transport; and of danger to
those communities which feared attack from pirates and
(3) enemies.^
For hundreds of years, it has been suggested that
substantial wealth lies on the seabed and many have dreamt
of accumulating this imagined wealth. However, only
recently has it been realized that, not only could those
dreams come true, but also that the visions of submarine
riches were vastly underestimated. Perhaps the unknown
resources of the sea are much greater than those which
(4)have already been discovered.
(1) Report of U.N. Special Committee on Geographical 
Disadvantage - Comprehensive Proposal for Accommodation 
of Geographically Disadvantaged Countries: Third 
UNCLOS, Committee II. Reproduced in Ocean Dev. Int.
Law; Vol. 3, No. 2, 1975, p.183.
(2) Papadakis, N. "The International Legal Regime of 
Artificial Islands", 1977, p.16.
(3) Bowett, D.W., "The Law of the Sea", 1967, p.l.
(4) Luard, Evan, "The Control of the Seabed", 1974, p.3, 
Auguste, Barry B.L., "The Continental Shelf: The 
Practice and Policy of the Latin American States, with 
Special Reference to Chile, Ecuador and Peru. A study 
in International Relations", 1960, p.32; The European 
Continental Shelf; Gas Finds Pose Problems for EEC", 
Common Market, 1965, July, Vol. 5, p.148.
Geologists have located great reserves of minerals
r 5 )beneath the waters of the continental shelf. Deposits
of several types appear on the continental shelf of the
world for example phosphorite, glauconite, colcareous
shell, sand, gravel, oil and gas.^^^ Moreover, it has
been scientifically proven that the continental shelf
contains not only huge mineral reserves but also biological
and fishery resources and deserves particular attention in
(7 )order that they may be fully discovered and utilized.
The other side of the coin is just as interesting.
In the second half of the twentieth century a vast new
world is opening up to man due to technological advances:
the exploration and exploitation of the seabed and subsoil
(8 )beneath the sea at great depth is becoming a reality.^
(5) Brown, E,D., "Deep Sea Mining: The Legal Regime of 
'Inner Space*”, YBWA, 1968, Vol. 22, p.165; Barry 
Frank J., "Oil and Gas Interests on the Shelf" In 
Alexander, L.M., ed: Law of the Sea; International 
Rules and Organization for the Sea. Proceedings of the 
Third Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 
1968, 1969, p.225.
(6 ) Mero, John L ., "The Mineral Resources of the Sea, 1965, 
pp.53 et seq., Theberge, N. Bartlett, Address in the 
Proceedings of the John Bassett Moore Society of 
International Law Symposium and the American Society
in November 16, 1974, In International Law of the Sea 
and the Future of Deep Seabed Mining, Edited by Joyner, 
Christopher, 197 5, p.4,
(7) Borchard, Edwin, "Resources of the Continental Shelf", 
AJIL, Vol. 40, 1946, pp.53 et. seq.
(8 ) Juda, Lawrence, "Ocean Space Rights: Developing U.S. 
Policy, 1975, p.l; Auguste, op.cit., Ref.(4)at 1,
pp.37,38. It is most likely that no industry had faced 
greater technical problems in dealing with the sea than 
the offshore oil industry. However, since 1934 a number 
of improvements in technique and the introduction of a 
completely new method of oil exploitation made it 
possible to extract oil from the subsoil by way of 
installations built into the sea. Drilling platforms 
were built on poles in the sea in comparatively shallow 
waters. The oil can be taken by tankers to the oil 
refineries, but loading from an installation into a
Contd...
On the other hand, the swift development of nations
lear
(10)
(9 )which require more minerals,^ make it c  that
reserves of such a nature must be sought.
This change certainly introduces new areas of
(11)potential conflict or cooperation. Thus in recent
years, the law of the sea has attracted great attention. 
Although until recently nobody worried about the legal 
status of the seabed,the principle of the freedom of the 
sea has now suffered considerably. The jurisdiction of 
coastal States over waters adjacent to their coasts 
presents new problems. The width of the territorial sea, 
for example, has become a point of debate. The acceptance 
of the legal regime of the continental shelf causes many
(8 ) contd.
floating object has technical disadvantages. See 
Luard, op.cit., Ref. (4) at 1,pp.6-23; Mero, op.cit.. 
Ref. (6 ) at 2, p.98; Gotlieb, Allan and Charles 
Dalfen, "National Jurisdiction and International 
Responsibility: New Canadian Approaches to Internat­
ional Law’,’ AJIL, 1973, Vol.67, pp.237 et. seq.
(9) The demand for oil and other forms of energy for 
example, is increasing so fast that total demand for 
them is expected to double in this decade. Thus, all 
possible sources must be exploited. See Luard, op. 
cit., Ref. (4) at 1, pp.6-23. It may be cited that 
Secretary Ickes of the U.S.; noting the dwindling 
production from land drilling for oil believes that 
the continental shelf may replenish these reserves.
In an interview he is quoted as saying:
"The continental shelf may well be the site 
of our last totally unexplored great domestic 
source of petroleum".
See Borchard, op.cit.. Ref. 7 at 2, p.53; The New 
York Times, November 4, 1945.
(10) Auguste, op.cit.. Ref. (4), at 1 , pp.37-38.
(11) Juda, op.cit.. Ref. (8 ) at 2 , p.l; Beesley, J.A., 
"Some Unresolved Issues on the Law of the Sea",
N.R.L., 1971, Vol. 4, p.635.
difficulties, and also the increasing possibility of 
exploiting the seabed and subsoil at greater depths has 
entailed quite a number of new uncertainties. Obviously, 
the changing realities have made it imperative to alter 
the structure of the rules of law pertinent to the 
subject.
In 1949, the U.N. admitted that advancement in 
technology was giving man greater confidence to work on 
the seabed, which in turn reflected the unsuitability of 
the existing legal framework. To fulfil this demand, 
the General Assembly asked the ILC to take up the question 
of the law of the sea. Having studied, and worked on a 
programme, the ILC submitted a report on the subject to
C I Q  )
the General Assembly.^
In 1958, the first Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS 
I) was held in Geneva, Switzerland, Two important topics, 
amongst many others, were to be dealt with by the 
conference: to develop a precise breadth of the territorial
sea and to determine the rules governing the continental 
shelf. Whilst the question of the width of the territorial 
sea could not be resolved, a convention on the continental
shelf was a d o p t e d . ________________________________________
(12) Lissitzyn, Oliver J., Forward to Juda, op.cit.. Ref.
(8 ) at 2 , p.v.
(13) YBIL, 1949, p.278; Juda op.cit.. Ref. (8 ) at 2 , 
p p .36-40.
(14) Juda, op.cit., Ref. (8 ), at 2, pp,46-58; The 
European Continental Shelf, op.cit.. Ref. (4), at 1 , 
p.148; Smetherman, Bobbie B. and Robert M.
Smetherman, "Territorial Seas and Inter-American 
Relations: With Case Studies of the Peruvian and U.S. 
Fishing Industries", 1974, pp.22-24; Ratiner, Leigh S.,
"United States Oceans Policy: An Analysis", J. Mart.
Law Com., 1971, Vol. 2, No. 2, p.226.
Once again in the second Law of the Sea Conference 
(UNCLOS II), held in 1960, the question of the width of 
the territorial sea was not resolved and the Conference 
broke u p .^
However, many factors have led the General Assembly 
of the U.N. to call a third Law of the Sea Conference 
(UNCLOS III) which to date has convened eight sessions. 
Among these factors are; the new claims and policies of 
many States with respect to jurisdiction over adjacent 
areas of sea and also the increasing awareness of the 
vast economic importance of the resources of the sea 
offered by improved methods of exploitation and stimulated 
by the rapidly growing need for such resources due to 
the world-wide population explosion.^
The foregoing obviously reflects the importance 
associated with the simple concept of "the sea". An even 
more controversial issue, among others in this area of 
international law, is the question of delimiting marine 
boundaries. This is simply because exercising the rights 
vested in a State requires the limits of areas falling
(15) Dean, Arthur H ., "The Second United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea; Response" AJIL, 
1961, Vol. 55, pp,675-680; Garcia-Robles, Alfonso 
"The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea", AJIL, 1961, Vol. 55, pp.669-675.
(16) Burke, William T., "Comments on Current Inter­
national Issues Relating to the Law of the Sea", 
NRL, 1971 July, Vol. 4, pp.661-662; Qda, Shigeru, 
"The Extent of the Territorial Sea - An Analysis
of the Geneva Conferences and Recent Developments", 
JAIL, No. 6 , 1962, p.7.
6within this jurisdiction to be defined.
As to the justifications for this choice of topic, one
may not be surprised, having realized all the many aspects
adduced above, that the subject "marine boundaries" is
the object of this study. Additionally it is obvious
that the present day is a time of exceptional activity in
the reform of the law of the sea. The third
justification for this choice of topic is the increasing
understanding of the vast economic importance of the
natural resources existing in the Arabian Gulf, as will be 
( 17 )seen. And fourthly Iraq is uniquely suitable for a
case study of this kind, not only because of the short 
frontage of her coastline which no doubt greatly affected 
the delimitation of her marine boundaries, but also 
because such a subject is of the utmost importance for a 
nation such as Iraq, whose fate and prosperity are so
/ T O  \
closely connected with the sea.^
It must be emphasized, however, that this thesis is 
concerned solely with canvassing the question of 
continental shelf and territorial sea boundaries. The 
problems raised by the present thesis have been examined 
in their own context, which is strictly that of delimit­
ation. Other questions relating to the general regime 
of territorial sea and continental shelf have been 
considered for that purpose only.
(17 ) See below chapter (4 ) ,
(18 ) Al-Muhana, F.R. "Freedom of Passage Through Straits 
with Particular Reference to the Strait of Hurmoz", 
Ph.D. Thesis submitted to the University of 
Baghdad, 1978, pp.4-6.
7It must be remembered that in a work of this nature, 
which is simply concerned with the study of the delimitation 
of territorial sea and continental shelf boundaries in 
general, as well as with those of a particular state, an 
essential consideration is that of exercising discretion 
in limiting the factual details of the subject. Extensive 
coverage of relevant details may be necessary in certain 
circumstances, whereas in others a brief reference which 
best illustrates the point will suffice. Every case, 
therefore, will be treated according to its merits in the 
following two parts.
The first part examines the question of territorial 
sea and continental shelf limits in three chapters. The 
second part explores the boundaries of the Iraqi 
territorial sea and continental shelf. Prior to that an 
introductory description of the Arabian Gulf, with which 
that part deals, serves to set the stage for all that 
follows.
PART ONE
THE LIMITS OF COASTAL JURISDICTION: DELIMITING
TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARIES
For centuries international law jurists have been 
confronted with the question of determining the territorial 
jurisdiction of coastal States over waters adjacent to 
their shores,. In brief, the general consensus of 
opinion and practice in modern times has transferred its 
support from the theory of mare clausum to that of mare 
liberum. In other words, from a belief that areas of 
the high seas could be appropriated by particular nations, 
to an idea that the high seas are free and open to all 
for all purposes.
However, it is now firmly established as an 
unarguable premise, that the high seas cannot be
(O )
appropriated by any one or group of States.^ ^
On the other hand another opposing movement, 
advocating the exclusive rights of States in waters 
immediately adjoining their coasts, has come to be more 
obviously recognised. This surely amounts to stating 
that it is almost universally agreed, and is generally
(1) Knight, H. Gary "The Law of the Sea: Cases:
Documents and Readings" 1976-1977 ed., pp.13-23; 
O'Connell, D.P. "The Juridicial Nature of the 
Territorial Sea", BYBIL, Vol. 45, 1971, pp.305-347. 
Dean, Arthur H., "The Second Geneva Conference on 
the Law of the Sea", AJIL, Vol. 54, 1960, pp.756-762.
(2) Bishop, William W ., "General Course of Public 
International Law", Hague Recueil, Vol. 115, 1965, II, 
p. 297; Knight, ibid., pp.13-32 ; Goedhuis, D ., "The 
Changing Legal Regime of Air and Outer Space" ICLQ,
Vol. 27, 1978, p.577; Dean, ibid., pp.756-762.
accepted, regardless of changes over the centuries, that
all coastal States are entitled to exercise sovereign
rights, subject only to rules of international law, on
limited areas of the sea which are adjacent to their 
(3 )shores.^  ^ These zones over which comprehensive,
exclusive authority is exercised and h o n o u r e d , a r e
called the "territorial sea".^^^
Furthermore, at the present time it is generally
recognized in international law, as will be explained
l a t e r , t h a t  coastal States enjoy not only sovereignty
(7 )over their land territories and territorial seas, but 
also certain rights beyond this marginal belt. Under­
lying this view is the belief that although the high seas 
are res communis, there is nothing to impede exploration
(3) See O'Connell, op.cit.. Ref. (1) at 8 , pp.303-383.
(4) The sovereignty of a coastal State over its terri­
torial sea is limited by permitting a right of 
innocent passage for foreign ships. See Brown,
E,D. "The Exclusive Economic Zone: Criteria and 
Machinery for the Resolution of International 
Conflicts Between Different Users of the EEZ",
Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 4, No. 6 , 1977, 
p.329; Daintith, T.C. and others, "Oil and Gas Law", 
1975; Reprinted with Corrections 1976, Part One,
p. A.201; Colombos, C. John, "The International Law 
of the Sea", 6 th Revised ed. 1967, p.87; Morris,
Joseph W . ; "The North Sea Continental Shelf: Oil and 
Gas Legal Problems", Int. Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1968, 
p.192.
(5) The term "territorial sea" is preferable to the 
expression "territorial waters", as the latter was 
sometimes taken to include internal waters and 
territorial sea combined. See Whiteman, H,, Marjorie 
M., Digest of International Law, 1965, Vol. 4, p.2. 
Brownlie, Ian "Principles of Public International 
Law", 1973, p.181; Shukairy, Ahmad "Territorial and 
Historical Waters in International Law", Palestine 
Monographs, No. 24, p.21.
(6 ) See below p.133.
(7) While a State enjoys sovereignty to the full extent 
over its land territory, this sovereignty over its 
territorial sea is limited by international law. For 
further details see Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (4) at 9 p.329
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and exploitation of particular parts of the submarine 
areas. However, this exploration and exploitation must 
not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as 
high seas, or that of the air space above those waters.
This part is devoted to a study of the boundaries of 
the territorial sea and continental shelf and 
falls into three chapters. In the first chapter it is 
necessary to begin by considering the question of base­
lines from which maritime zones are measured. In chapter 
two the outer limit of the territorial sea and the 
continental shelf will be examined. Consideration is 
given to the delimitation of marine boundaries between 
opposite and adjacent states in chapter three.
CHAPTER ONE 
BASELINES
First, mention must be made of the fact that the 
matter of establishing baselines from which the territorial 
sea of each coastal State is measured, is the key to the 
delimitation of all maritime boundaries. To demonstrate 
this, it may be sufficient to state the following;
1. The location of the baseline determines the maximum 
edge of the internal waters of the State concerned.
2. It also represents the inner limit of the territorial 
sea from which the outer limit is measured. It is 
thus clearly vital in judging whether or not certain 
adjacent waters are within the territorial sea of a 
particular State. Irrespective of the breadth of the 
territorial sea, the movement of the baseline further 
seaward means that parts of the sea, which would 
otherwise have been considered territorial sea, become 
internal waters of the littoral State. Consequently 
the territorial sea would be measured from a line 
further seaward thus carrying the territorial sea into 
parts of what would normally have been considered to be 
a high sea.  ^^  ^
3. It serves indirectly to determine the other marine 
areas such as the contiguous zone.
( 1 ) McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke, "The Public 
Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International 
Law of the Sea", 1962, p.306; Knight, op.cit., Ref.
(19) at 8 , p.137.
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4. Finally, the inner limit of the continental shelf and
the international seabed area depends, to some extent
( 2 )on the location of the baseline.
Therefore, it appears that the baseline is of great
importance, as its placement is fundamental in the process
of determining how far the maritime boundaries of the
coastal state extend, as well as what form of jurisdiction
(3 )each belt is subject to.
Having begun with this very brief discussion, it is 
worth stating that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the words "shore" and "coast" were frequently 
mentioned along with the cannon shot-rule, since they 
were adequate. An exact baseline was, if not irrelevant, 
unnecessary, in view of the fact that the extent of the 
territorial sea depended on the location of ’the cannon 
itself.(  ^ But, having called for a specific limit of
territorial sea, the need for an exact point or baseline
for measurement arose.^  ^ ^
Drawing baselines, however, is a matter upon which
( 2 ) Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref. ( 5) at 9, p.137.
( 3 ) Namely whether the coastal State exercises sover­
eignty or sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploration and exploitation. Ibid., p.138.
( 4 ) See below pp. 71 et seq.
( 5 ) This is important particularly in certain areas
where the rise and fall of tide is great, as in 
the Bay of Fundy. See Swarztrauber, Sayre A.,
"The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas, 1972,
p.218.
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inconsistent views have been expressed in the past.^^ ^
In general, the low-water line rule has been the 
prevailing state practice up until the present time.
It was hence incorporated in the basis of discussion for 
the 1930 "Hague Conference". No, 6 of the said basis ran 
as follows:
"Subject to the provisions regarding bays and 
islands, the breadth of territorial waters is 
measured from the line of low-water mark along 
the entire c o a s t . ^
Despite the inclusion of the above provision in the 
basis of discussion, the conference adjourned without 
adopting any provision in this respect and the baseline 
question was left unsolved.
However that may be, it is to be observed that in 
spite of the prevalence of the low-water line rule, 
drawing baselines is not so clear cut as may be thought. 
Had all coasts of States been nicely formed, sharply cut 
or gently rounded, without any distinctive or special 
configuration, it would have been easy to establish a
( 6  ) For example, although the U.S. and the U.K. were in 
agreement on a three-mile limit of the territorial 
sea, they could not agree on a rule in accordance 
with the drawing of the baseline which should have 
been established. Ibid; for further details see 
Knight, op.cit., Ref. ( 1 ), at 8 , pp.159-160.
( 7  ) It was adopted in 1812 in the case of the Kingdom of 
Denmark and Norway. In 1909 when Italy adopted 
this rule it had been recognized by all the maritime 
states. Swarztrauber, ibid., p.218,
( 8 ) League of Nations, Basis of Discussion, p.30.
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satisfactory baseline and consequently determine what areas
of the sea were within the territorial sea of any particular
S t a t e . ^  But unfortunately shores are so varied in
aspect that no single article in any legal document can
cover the variations in the configurations of the hundreds
of miles of coastline found throughout the world.
Moreover, man-made construction of coastlines adds another
difficulty to the problem. Moreover, the perspectives of
coastal inhabitants, which may significantly affect
community policies in delimitation areas of the sea, are
no less varied.
The establishment of a baseline, therefore, is
usually affected by two types of factors: geographical
( 12)and predispositional.
At any rate, problems concerning baselines lie
/13 )
principally in three main categories:^
I - The natural baseline is variously called the shore­
line, the low-tide line or the low-water mark.
II - The line separates internal waters and territorial
sea in ordinary indentations into the coastline, 
such as bays, river mouths and estuaries, that is to 
say, in cases where it serves as an artificial 
coastline for the purpose of delimiting territorial 
sea.
(9 ) Knight, op.cit.. Ref. ( 1 ) at 8 , p.135.
( lo) Smith, H.A., "The Law and Custom of the Sea", 3rd ed., 
1959, p.9. Smith states that hundreds of incidents 
have arisen at sea because of the difficulties of 
drawing baselines.
(11) Knight, ibid., p.136.
(12) McDougal and Burke, op.cit., Ref, (1) 11 , p.307.
(13) Boggs, S., Whittemore, "Delimitation of Seaward Areas 
under National Jurisdiction", AJIL, Vol. 45, 1951, 
p,251.
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III - The legal situation of islands, which means that
baselines are affected by islands and which islands 
are to be ignored, if any, in delimiting 
territorial seas.
These problems will be our concern in the following 
sections.
Section One 
The Natural Baseline
I . The General Rule
It may be useful at the outset to note that in 
drawing the line enclosing internal waters and thus 
providing baselines from which marine boundaries are 
measured, the generally recognized rule, if coastlines are 
fairly regular in the sense that they are neither deeply 
indented nor fringed with islands, is that the line of 
low-water mark follows exactly the indentations of the 
coast.
Not only the Hague Conference, as noted above
supported this rule, but the ILC also preserved it in its
draft, and in the words of the Geneva Convention on the
( 15 )TSCZ, it is the normal baseline. Even where shallow
(14) Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref. (5), at 9, pp.137-141; 
Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. (4), at 9, p.113; Boggs, 
op.cit.. Ref. (13), at 14, p.251. However, since 
the area between the low-water mark and the high- 
water mark is usually neither extensive nor 
servicable for purposes other than navigation in 
inland water, this question has not caused great 
controversy. For further details, see Knight, op. 
cit.. Ref. (1), at 8 , p.154.
(15) McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke, "Crisis in 
the Law of the Sea, Community Perspectives versus 
National Egoism", YLJ Vol. 67 (1), 1957, p.576.
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indentations arise, as on many coasts, such as Start Bay 
in the English Channel, it is agreed to ignore them in 
establishing a baseline. ^
II. The Straight Line Rule
Accordingly difficulties appear only when shores
diverge from what is considered "normal" and exhibit a
great variety of physical features such as indentations,
(17 )shoals and rocks,^ as in Norway, Greece or Western 
( 18 )Scotland. It is important for practical reasons in
the latter cases, namely coasts with special configurations,
to enable the State to have full jurisdiction over these
waters which are substantially enclosed within its land 
( 19 )territory,^  ^ Therefore, in such localities, the rule
of straight baseline joining appropriate points may be 
employed.
III. The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case^^^^
The question of drawing baselines was considered by
( 2 1 )the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.
Confronted by the map of Northern Norway, with its "rock
(16) Because indentations are significant only when they 
do affect the outer limit of the territorial sea.
See Smith, op.cit.. Ref. (10) at 14, p.9.
(17) Those which vary in their sizes, shapes etc. See 
McDougal and Burke, op.cit., Ref. (1 ) at 11, p.307.
(18) Smith, op.cit., Ref. (10) at 14, p.9.
(19) Ibid,
(20) ICJ Report, 1951, p.116.
(21) Ibid., Bishop, William W., "Judicial Decisions" AJIL, 
Vol. 46, 1952, pp.348-370.
17
rampart" "Skjaergaard"^^^^ of islands, islets, rocks and
reefs, forming a network of fjords, bays and indentations,
the ICJ was asked by the two governments to pronounce on
the validity of: (a) the method employed for the
determination of the Norwegian Fisheries Zone; and (b)
the definition of the Norwegian baseline by the application
( 23)
of a straight baseline rule.
In its judgement, the Court held that it had no 
difficulty "in finding that, for the purpose of measuring 
the breadth of the territorial sea, it is the low-water 
mark as opposed to the high-water mark, or the mean between 
the two tides, which has generally been adopted in the 
practice of States. This criterion is the most favourable 
to the coastal State and clearly shows the character of 
territorial waters as appurtenant to the land territory".^^ 
The Court noted that the parties were agreed as to this 
criterion, but that they differed as to its application.
The Court, however, announced ttat it was under an 
obligation to decide whether the relevant water-mark was 
that of the mainland or the "skjaergaard". It stated
(22) A Norwegian term meaning literally rock rampart and 
embracing the various islands, islets, rocks and 
reefs. Bisbop, ibid.
(23) On July 12, 1935, the Norwegian Government had issued 
a Royal Decree defining the limits of Norwegian 
territorial sea. The Decree employed the straight 
baseline rule connecting 48 specified points of the 
headlands of mainland, islands, and isolated rocks, 
irrespective of the length of the lines drawn between 
each of two points. Of the baselines, 25 were more 
than ten miles in length and some of them were much 
more. The three longest being 44, 40 and 39 miles 
respectively. The outer limit of the Norwegian terri­
torial sea was drawn four miles from these baselines 
by parallel lines. The U.K. Government did not contend 
with the right of Norway to have a four mile terri­
torial sea. She also abandoned her protest against the 
trace parallel method. See ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.125- 
128, 129.
(24) Ibid., p .128.
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that the skjaergaard constituted a whole with the main­
land. Consequently, it decided that the outerline of 
the skjaergaard should have been considered in the process 
of delimiting the Norwegian territorial sea. In the 
court’s view, this was justified by "geographic factors" 
as well as "economic interests peculiar to a region, the 
reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by 
long usage".
By a vote of 10 to 2, therefore, the court in 
principle upheld the Norwegian system. It decided that 
"the method employed for the delimitation of the fisheries 
zone by the Decree of July 12th, 1935 was not contrary to 
international law".^^^^ Moreover, by eight votes to four, 
it held that "the baselines fixed by the said Decree in
application of this method are not contrary to international
(28)
l a w v ( 2 7 )
However, it is intended to examine the Judgment
(25) Ibid., pp.128-133.
(26) Ibid., p.143.
(27) Ibid. Two of the Judges, Sir Arnold McNair and Judge 
Read, the Canadian Jurist , elaborate dissenting
opinions. Judge Hackworth, concurred in the operative 
part of the Judgment due to the existence of an 
established historic title, but offered no opinion. 
Judge M, Hus Mo, while accepting the general principle, 
was unable to agree with its application in certain 
specific cases. Ibid., pp.144-206.
(28) It would appear that since the court dealt with a 
unique geographical configuration of coastline being, 
as the court repeatedly stressed, exceptional (ibid. 
pp.133, 135), no exaggerated importance should be 
given to its findings. The Judgment therefore, has 
not to be interpreted as having created any new 
principles governing the delimitation of the 
territorial sea.
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only in so far as it is pertinent to the subject. In 
this respect, it is to be noted that the essential point 
in the judgment is the approval of the straight baseline 
rule as applicable, not solely across bays, but also 
between islands, rocks and penetrating sea belts lying 
inter fauces terrarum, subject only to certain general 
conditions. The court stipulated that in order to 
establish a straight baseline that line "must not depart 
to any appreciable extent from the general direction of 
the coast".
Certainly, the last phrase is the most important 
condition to apply to the straight baseline rule as it 
gives the key to the decision, although other criteria are 
laid down. Having said this, it must be admitted 
meanwhile that the admissions of the court itself are not 
entirely precise. A very good example which may be given 
of such imprecision is "the more or less close relationship 
existing between certain sea areas and the land formations 
which divide or surround them",^^^^ and the question as 
to whether such areas are correlated to the land mass in 
such a way as to be sufficiently considered as interior 
waters.
IV. The Geneva Convention
As was noted above, the ILC sought to adopt the 
general principle of the "low-water mark" in its draft.
It did so, and the Geneva Conference approved it formally
(29) ICJ Reports, 1951, p.133.
(30) Ibid., p.133.
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in 1958. The normal baseline from which the limit of 
the territorial sea is measured, is in the words of the 
Geneva Convention of 1958 on the "TSCZ","the low-water 
line along the coast". Article 3 of the Convention runs 
as follows;
"Except where otherwise provided in these articles 
the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of
the territorial sea is the low-water line along
the coast as marked on large scale charts
officially recognised by the coastal State".
Additionally, in the light of the 1951 judicial
precedent, the ILC recommended permitting a coastal State
to depart from the general principle, namely the low-water
mark. The Commission had permitted coastal States under
particular circumstances to delimit their territorial sea
(32 )
according to the straight baseline rule. This
recommendation was also approved by the Geneva Conference.
In such cases, the convention permitted the drawing of a
baseline by joining appropriate points on the coast and
measuring the territorial sea from this line. Article
4(1,2) of the Geneva Convention provides that:
"1. In localities where the coastline is deeply 
indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe 
of islands along the coast in its immediate 
vicinity, the method of straight baselines 
joining appropriate points may be employed in 
drawing the baseline from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured.
(31) Brownlie, Ian, "Basic Documents in International 
Law", 2nd ed., 1972, p.79.
(32) See YBILC, 1952, Vol. II, pp.32-33; YBILC, 1953, 
Vol. II, p.65; YBILC, 1954, Vol. II, p.3.
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"2. The drawing of such baselines must not 
depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast, and the sea 
areas lying within the lines must be 
sufficiently closely linked to the land 
domain to be subject to the regime of 
internal waters".
In this connection it may be noted that, as drawing
baselines according to the straight baseline rule involves
converting belts of high seas into territorial sea, the
Geneva Conference thus resisted all attempts made to
expand this rule, in such a way as to apply it in cases
where only slightly irregular coastlines existed.
Article 4 of the Convention therefore stipulates the
essential prerequisites for the employment of the straight
baseline rule in certain localities, namely where the
coast is deeply indented, or where there is a fringe of
islands.
Finally, it is pertinent to note that both the ILC 
and the Geneva Conference sought to introduce a maximum 
length for a single baseline between any two particular 
points, however such attempts were unsuccessful.
V . Rules Emerging From UNCLOS III
The UNCLOS III has considered the question of base­
lines. The "Informal Composite Negotiating Text"^^^^
(33) Brownlie, op.cit.,Ref. (31), at 20, pp.79, 80.
For the perspectives of articles 3 and 4 of the Geneva 
Convention on the "TSCZ" see Knight, op.cit.. Ref.
(1) at 8 , p.138. For further details, see ibid., pp. 
170-174.
(34) Dean, Arthur, H., The Geneva Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, in the "International Law in the 
Twentieth Century, Ed. by Gross Leo, 1969, p.315,
(35) Ibid., pp.314-315.
(36) The latest version of the draft Articles of the 
UNCLOS III, hereinafter "ICNT".
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which has been produced in the sixth Session of the
Conference, admits the general rule in drawing baselines
namely the low-water mark. Article 5 of the ICNT which
is identical to Article 3 of the 1958 Convention on the
TSCZ provides that :
"Except where otherwise provided in the present 
Convention, the normal baseline for measuring 
the breadth of the territorial sea is the low- 
water line along the coast as marked on large- 
scale charts officially recognized by the 
coastal State".
However, in spite of the fact that the principle
adopted in Article (5) has been universally accepted in
the practice of States, a few simple shortcomings in that
text have been observed. Firstly, not every State
produces official charts. Merchant ships' captains
probably use charts produced by their own national States
( 38 )or sources other than the coastal State concerned.
Secondly, there is no indication in the text to serve 
as a guide to ascertaining whether the baseline referred 
to in Article (5) is that of the cartographic depiction on 
the chart, or the actual coastline configuration.
Thirdly, for several reasons, even though sounds are based
(37) ICNT, A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1 p.21.
(38) These charts may vary considerably from the national 
charts. See Hodgson, Robert D. and Robert W. Smith, 
"The ISNT (Committee II) a geographical perspective". 
Ocean Dev. Int. Law, 1976, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.225-229.
(39) Coastal charts become out-of-date quickly, and even 
such a highly developed State revises its charts 
only on a 2 to 3 year schedule. See ibid., pp. 
228-229.
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upon low-water, coastal charts depict the high-water
line,(^^) and although "approach" or "harbour" charts
show the low-water line, they are of little use because
(41 )
they cover only small areas of the coast.
Returning to the UNCLOS III, this Conference will show
that exceptional cases justify the application of other
rules by reason of geographical circumstances, economic
interests and historical perspectives. This was expressly
admitted by the ICNT. Article 7 (i) provides that:
"1. In localities where the coast line is 
deeply indented and cut into, or if there is 
a fringe of islands along the coast in the 
immediate vicinity, the method of straight 
baselines joining appropriate points may be 
employed in drawing the baseline from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured".
Here again, although this provision followed the 
pattern of international practice, in one respect at least 
the text may be criticised. Language of this kind, it 
appears, can only lead to coastal States using the text 
to further extend their territorial seas by the enclosure 
of all islands or all coastal indentations with straight 
baseline systems. The enclosure of true interior waters 
within the baseline, requires the development of more 
restrictive criteria for their delimitation by providing 
a maximum length for any single baseline between any two 
points.
(40) This is because it is deemed to be steadier and of 
greater use to the mariner as visual identification 
of position at a particular moment, ibid.
(41) Ibid.
(42) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1, p.22.
Section Two 
Artificial Coastlines
A further point worth mentioning is that the straight 
baseline rule, which was outlined earlier, is not the sole 
deviation from the general principle governing the 
drawing of baselines, namely, the normal baseline (shore 
line). Here it is necessary to stress that coasts 
throughout the world are not the same, as sometimes there 
are bays or outerworks of harbours and so forth. It is 
reasonable, therefore, for such exceptional cases to be 
considered as making up portions of the shore. It is 
thus permitted to employ artificial baselines for certain 
coastal conditions such as bays, historic bays, harbours 
et cetera, to close off internal waters from the 
territorial sea, and to serve as a baseline from which to 
determine the latter.
However, in a work of this nature, which is not 
simply concerned with the study of baselines, it is outside 
our realms either to consider every aspect of such cases, 
or to state in detail the international legal regime 
governing each, beyond indicating briefly some of these 
problems. The following discussion will be devoted to an 
examination of the subject, concentrating on principles as 
regulated by the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of 
the Sea.
(43) Colombos, op.cit., Ref. ( 4) at 9 , pp.113-191.
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I . Bays
It may be observed that one of the most controversial 
problems regarding the delimitation of the territorial sea 
is that of bays. Since the earliest days of the concept 
of territorial sea, writers have considered the problem 
of bays, but this term is so indefinite that they have 
never agreed upon its precise d e f i n i t i o n . I t  may 
be added that this concept has been applied in various 
senses in common usage.
It does not seem necessary to repeat what has been 
said in this respect and may be sufficient to note that 
in the early nineteenth century, it was generally assumed 
that bays could be regarded as inland waters, at the point 
where the length of the line drawn across the mouth of the 
bay narrowed to a distance not exceeding the double width 
of the permissible territorial sea.^^^^ Partisans of 
the three mile limit of territorial sea reckoned that 
only when the mouth of a bay narrowed to ten miles, could 
it be closed off.^^^^ This limit was adopted by both 
the Anglo-French and the North Sea Fisheries Conventions 
of August 2, 1839 and May 6 , 1882 respectively.
(44) ”A bay is a subordinate adjunct to a larger body of 
water; a penetration of that larger body into the 
land; a body of water between and inside of two 
headlands^. See Knight, op.cit., Ref. ( 1 ) at 8 ,
p . 195.
(45) For further details see Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref. ( 5 ) 
at 9, pp.207-219.
(46) Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref. ( 5) at 12 , p.222.
(4 7 ) The U.K. argued in her note to the Yugoslav Govern­
ment of May 5, 1949 that only the six-mile limit or, 
exceptionally, the ten-mile limit could be recognized. 
See Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref.( 5), at 12, pp.118-123
(48) See Article (2) of the Angle-French 1839, The Stati^ 
Revised, 3rd ed. , Vol. 4, pp.651,652; A r ^ c l e  2 of the 
North Sea Fisheries Convention, The Statu& Revised,
Contd.,.
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a . Hague Conference of 1930
In any case, the problem of bays was given exceptional
consideration at the Hague Conference held for the
codification of International law in 1930. The ten-mile
bay baseline rule was framed by the preparatory Committee
in a basis of discussion, as follows:
"In the case of bays, the coasts of which 
belong to a single State, the belt of territ­
orial waters shall be measured from a straight 
line drawn across the opening of the bay. If 
the opening of the bay is more than ten miles 
wide, the line shall be drawn at the nearest 
point to the entrance at which the opening 
does not exceed ten miles.
The above text clearly reveals, as the Committee 
noted, that the aforementioned definition missed the mark 
in not showing precisely what was meant by the term
(48) contd.,.
3rd ed., Vol. 10, p.867. However, both of the 
Conventions were denounced, since the parties have 
adopted the European Fisheries Convention of March 9, 
1964. Article 6 of the latter Convention provides 
that : "Any straight baseline or bay closing line 
which a contracting party may draw, shall be in 
accordance with the rules of general international law 
and in particular with the provisions of the Convention 
on the "TSCZ" opened for signature at Geneva on 29th 
April 1958." Miscellaneous No. 11, 1964, Cmnd, 2355.
(49) League of Nations, Basis of Discussion, p.31; LN Doc. 
C.230 M.117. 1930, V, p.11.
(50) In this connection, it was commented: "it is agreed 
that the baseline constituted by the sinuosities of 
the coast should not be maintained for every bay. The 
suggested exception, however, contemplates, not a 
mere curvature of the shoreline, but an indentation 
presenting the characteristic features of a bay, 
showing in particular a well-marked entrance and a 
certain proportion (which it will be for the confer­
ence to fix) between the breadth of such entrance, and 
the depth of the indentation". See League of Nations, 
Basis of Discussion, p.31; Swarztrauber, op.cit., Ref.
( 5 ) at 12, p.224.
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Several proposals were made to state what was meant
by the term "bay", with rules for incorporating certain
bays into inland waters. However, it appears to suppose
that the failure of the conference to reach an agreement
on rules for measuring marginal sea, was the reason for the
C 51 )rejection of these proposals,
b . The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case^ ^
The ICJ had occasion to consider the rules of
international law governing the drawing of baselines in the
( 53 ')case of bays. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
the world court pointed out that "although the ten-mile 
rule has been adopted by certain States both in their 
national law and in their treaties and conventions, and 
although certain arbitral decisions have applied it as 
between these States, other States have adopted a different 
l i m i t " . T h e  Court thus rejected in the above case 
the view that the ten-mile rule was generally applicable.
In the words of the Court: "Consequently, the ten-mile
(51) The German Delegation, for example, proposed to 
measure the maximum depths of a bay in proportion to 
its breadth from headland to headland. The British 
Delegation proposed taking into account the ratio 
between average depth and breadth by measuring the 
area. Subsequently, the British and German Delegat­
ions withheld their amendments and voted for the 
American proposal. The American proposal avoided 
’The definition of such words as ’bay’ and ’estuary’
in a geographical sense". It simply undertook "to 
determine when an indentation of the coast is 
sufficiently great to regard the waters within the 
indentation as national waters, which are to be 
separated from territorial waters by a straight line 
drawn across the entrance". See Boggs, S. Whittemore, 
"Delimitation of the Territorial Sea", AJIL, Vol.24, 
1930, p.550.
(52) ICJ Reports, 1951,p.ll6.
(53) Ibid.
( 5 4 )  I b i d .
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rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of 
international law” .^^^^ The Court decided that "the ten- 
mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against 
Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to 
apply to the Norwegian coast",
c. The ILC
Next the ILC undertook to lay down the conditions 
that must be satisfied for indentations or curves to be 
regarded as bays. Although it is useful, it is also 
inconvenient to cover all the formulas adopted by the ILC. 
Additionally, despite the obvious differences in those
( 57 )formulas, nevertheless basic similarities can be found;
Encouraged by the above reasons, it is intended to quote
only the pertinent provision that was set forth in the
final draft which ran as follows:
"1. For the purpose of these articles, a bay is 
a well-marked indentation whose penetration is 
in such proportion to the width of its mouth as 
to contain landlocked waters and constitute more 
than a mere curvature of the coast. An 
indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a 
bay unless its area is as large as, or larger 
than, that of the semicircle drawn on the mouth 
of that indentation. If a bay has more than 
one mouth, this semicircle shall be drawn on a 
line as long as the sum total of the length of 
the different mouths. Islands within a bay shall
(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid.
(57) See for details YBILC, 1952, Vol. II, pp.25, 34;
YBILC, 1953, Vol. II, pp.57, 67; YBILC, 1954, Vol.
II, p.4; YBILC, 1955, Vol. II, p.36.
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be included as if they were part of the water 
area of the bay.
2. The waters within a bay, the coasts of which 
belong to a single State, shall be considered 
internal waters if the line drawn across the 
mouth does not exceed fifteen miles measured 
from the low-water line.
3. Where the mouth of a bay exceeds fifteen 
miles, a closing line of such length shall be 
drawn within the bay. When different lines of 
such length can be drawn, that line shall be 
chosen which encloses the maximum water area 
within the bay.
4. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to 
so-called ’historic’ bays, or in any cases 
where the straight baseline system provided for 
in article 5 is applied.’’^
d . The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1958
and the Geneva Convention on the ’TSCZ’
Attention must now be drawn to the Geneva Conference 
of 1958 on the law of the sea. It was suggested at the 
Conference that the "bay" could be regarded as internal 
waters if the length of the line drawn across its mouth did 
not exceed the double width of the permissible territorial 
sea. This proposal was defeated with the adoption of the 
Soviet delegate’s proposal for a 24-mile rule on the 
grounds that such a rule would put all States on an equal 
footing concerning bays regardless of the width of their 
respective territorial seas.^^^^ Thereupon, the
(58) Report of the ILC covering the work of its eighth
Session 1956, U.N, Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 11th Sess,
Supp. No. 9(A/3159), pp.15-16, YBILC, 1956, Vol.II, 
pp.268-269.
(59) UNCLOSI,Official Records, Vol. Ill, p.32.
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conference made just one amendment to the ILC’s draft by- 
increasing the fifteen-mile bay baseline to twenty-four 
miles, and approved the rest of the article in purport. 
Article 7(1-4) of the Convention on the TSCZ runs as 
follows:
"1. This article relates only to bays the 
coasts of which belong to a single State.
2. For the purpose of these articles, a bay 
is a well-marked indentation whose penetration 
is in such proportion to the width of its 
mouth as to contain landlocked waters and 
constitute more than a mere curvature of the 
coast. An indentation shall not, however, be 
regarded as a bay unless its area is as large 
as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle 
whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth 
of that indentation.
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of 
an indentation is that lying between the low- 
water mark around the shore of the indentation 
and a line joining the low-water mark of its 
natural entrance points. Where because of the 
presence of islands, an indentation has more 
than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn
on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths 
of the lines across the different mouths. Islands 
within an indentation shall be included as if 
they were part of the water area of the 
indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks 
of the natural entrance points of a bay does not 
exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be 
drawn between these two low-water marks, and the 
waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as 
internal waters.
(60) UNCLOS I, Official Records,Vol.II,p.133. The
definition of a bay provided for in article 7 is 
criticized on the grounds that the specification for
Contd...
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Moreover, as a logical extension of the provision
included in Article 7(4), paragraph 5 of the same Article
stipulates that:
"5. Where the distance between the low-water 
marks of the natural entrance points of a bay 
exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline 
of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within the 
bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum 
area of water that is possible with a line of 
that length.
Clearly, the latter text is applicable in cases in 
where the entrance of a bay exceeds twenty four miles.
In these cases, the straight baseline shall be established 
at the point nearest to the entrance where the distance 
between facing coasts does not exceed twenty four miles 
so as to confer upon all the waters from the baseline 
landwards, the status of interior waters.
Conclusion
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that 
apart from the historic bays which have been excluded from 
the general rules of the regime of bays according to 
Article 6(7) of the Convention of 1958 on the "TSCZ", the 
convention is applicable to all bays belonging to a single 
S t a t e , p r o v i d e d  that the straight baseline rule is
(60) contd,..
the ratio which the bay must be, is difficult to 
reconcile with the real configuration of most of 
the bays throughout the world. For further details 
see, Strohl, Mitchell P., "The International Law of 
Bays", 1963, p.56.
(61) UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. II, p.133.
(62) It is worth indicating that there exists no develop­
ment in the conventional international law to be 
applied in a bay bordered by two or more States. See 
Strohl, ibid., pp.55, 369-398.
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not employed to delimit the territorial sea of the State 
concerned. In addition, the provision not only defines 
the bay but also stipulates that the degree of penetration 
has to be closely intimate with the land and not a mere 
curvature of the coast.
Exactly the same picture emerges from the UNCLOS III. 
Article 10 of the ICNT on bay closing lines is apparently 
identical to the language of Article 7 of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the TSCZ.^®^^
II. Historic Bays
Reference should be made at the outset to the fact 
that the legal status of historic bays, such as Chesapeake, 
Delaware and F o n s e c a , i s  an exception to the general 
rules of law applicable to bays. It is perhaps 
appropriate to state that the term "historic bays" is 
designed to refer to claims made by certain States who 
"have considered for a long time certain large bays 
penetrating their coasts, ipso facto, constituent parts of 
interior waters, and that these claims have been either 
explicitly or tacitly recognized by other States".
Historic waters are also defined as "waters over which the 
coastal State, contrary to the generally applicable rules
(63) It might be useful to point out that the straight 
baseline rule provided for in Article 4 is not the 
same as that of the straight baseline rule applicable 
to bays according to Article 7 of the Convention. The 
latter is a type of normal baseline. See Jennings, 
R.Y., "General Course on Principles of International 
Law" Hague Recueil, Vol. 121, 1967, II, p.378.
(64) See the text of the Article UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 
10/Add. 1, p.33.
(65) Bishop, op.cit.. Ref. (2), at 8 , p.303.
(6 6 ) Smith, op.cit., Ref. (10), at 14, p.14,
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of international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, 
and over a substantial period of time, exercises sovereign 
rights with the acquiescence of the community of States" 
There is further the fact that although, the special 
regime of historic bays has been recognized, disputes, as 
far as their exceptional nature and the requirements for 
their formation are concerned, have always existed. It
is to be noted that the origin of the exceptional 
character of historic bays, is, for example, in dispute. 
Some writers are of the opinion that such claims are based 
on prescription. According to Jessup, claims to such 
large belts of water are validated by international 
practice and usage. Opposition to this rests on the 
contention that historic bays are merely illustrative of 
habit of maritime States. Hyde rejects the idea of 
prescription because claims over historic bays are 
generally and initially neither adverse to other States 
nor considered wrongful by other states.
The above is not the only controversial matter.
Rather,the various factors which, in their entirety 
contribute towards the establishment of the coastal State’s 
right over historic bays, are also debatable.^ T h e  
constitution of an historic bay in general may be summed 
up as follows :
1. The State’s authority over the claimed maritime area 
has to be exercised effectively and continuously.
(67) Knight, op.cit.. Ref. ( 1), at 8 , p.210.
(6 8) See ibid., pp.210-216.
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2. The inseparability of the bay from the coastal State 
by reason of its undisputed economic and strategic 
importance to the coastal State concerned, is the 
second factor.
3. The non-existence of international maritime lanes in 
the bay.
4. The basis which leaves much room for dispute in the 
question of historic bays, is that the territorial 
sovereign should have exercised sovereignty over the 
bay for a sufficiently long period of time.^^^^
However, the ILC reserved the concept of historic
bays in its draft and that was approved by the Geneva
Conference of 1958 which embodied the notion in article
7(6) which runs as follows:
"The foregoing provisions shall not apply to 
sorcalled 'historic' bays, or in any case where 
the straight baseline system provided for in 
Article (4) is applied".
(69) This factor is opposed on the grounds that newly 
independent states would ipso facto never be able 
to claim historic bays. See Knight, ibid., pp. 
210-216.
(70) UNCLOS I,Official Records,Vol.II, p.50. Moreover, 
the Conference adopted a resolution in which the 
U.N. Gen. Ass. was requested "to arrange for the 
study of the juridical regime of historic waters, 
including historic bays and for the communication 
of results of such study to all states members of 
the U.N.". Consequently, the ILC, was charged by 
the resolution of the General Assembly to study the 
question of the juridical regime of historic waters, 
including historic bays, and to make such 
recommendations regarding the matter as the Commis­
sion deems appropriate. U.N. Gen. Ass., Official 
Records, 19th Sess., 1959, Sixth Committee, p.2141. 
For the text of the draft resolution, see U.N.
Doc. A/4333 para 11. See also Resolution 1453 (XIV), 
adopted at the 847th Plenary Meeting, December 7th, 
1959.
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Again, the matter in question has been considered
in the UNCLOS III. In this connection, Article 10(6)
incorporated in the ICNT runs as follows:
"6. The foregoing provisions do not apply to 
so-called 'historic' bays, or in any case 
where the system of straight baselines provided
for in article 7 is applied.
Evaluation
The Geneva Convention specifically provided that its 
other provisions "shall not apply to the so-called 
historic bays". Precisely the same position seems likely 
to emerge from the UNCLOS III. Although the foregoing 
provides some evidence of the international community's 
recognition of the concept of historic bays, this does not 
prevent the suggestion that the concept seems to suffer 
from ambiguity and uncertainty. Neither the Geneva 
Convention, nor the ICNT, however has defined what is 
meant by the term "historic bays". It appears important 
to find a close definition of this term in order to avoid 
any extension of its application. By now it seems 
evident, at least in the writer's view, that unless there 
are some limitations on the coastal States' authority to 
claim zones of water as historic bays, extensive segments 
of the sea could be so considered. Specific requirements 
would seem to be of great import in this area.
(71) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1, 6th Session,
p.23.
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III. Harbours and Ports
It has been recognized that ports integer form
integral parts of the public domain, dominium plenum, of
(72)the state concerned.^  ^ Here it is necessary to go back 
to the Hague Conference for the Codification of 
International Law of 1930. Having considered the 
question of ports, the Hague Conference produced a 
provision according to which "the outermost permanent 
harbour works shall be regarded as forming part of the 
coast" . ^
The problem in question was discussed by the Geneva
Conference of 1958 on the Law of the Sea. For our
purpose, it may be enough to observe that Article 8 of the
Geneva C o n v e n t i o n ^  which is pertinent, runs as follows:
"For the purpose of delimiting the territorial 
sea, the outermost permanent harbour works 
which form an integral part of the harbour 
system shall be regarded as forming part of 
the coast.
Therefore, it is evident that the farthest portions 
of a perpetual harbour works according to the above text, 
are to be treated as if they were part of the land 
territory of the State concerned.
(72) Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref. 5, at 9, p.260. It is 
also distinguished between ports and harbours, as 
the former are man-made while the latter are consid­
ered to be formed by nature. Ibid.
(73) Report of the Second Committee, Conference for the 
Codification of International Law, the Hague, 1930,
LN Doc, C. 230M, 117, 1930, V, p.12.
(74) For further details about the history of this article, 
see Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref. (5 ), at 9, pp.262-263.
(75) Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (31), at 20, p.81,
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Once again, the UNCLOS III considered the question
and produced an almost similar text. Article 11 of the
ICNT provides that:
"For the purpose of delimiting the territorial 
sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which 
form an integral part of the harbour system are 
regarded as forming part of the coast. Off­
shore installations and artificial islands shall 
not be considered as permanent harbour w o r k s " , ^
IV. Mouths of Rivers
Undoubtedly, rivers are interior waters. Thus, it
would be fair to say that a line must be drawn across
their mouths so as to isolate them from territorial sea,
which in turn marks the change in the legal status that
(77)exists between internal and territorial sea. In
seeking to discern present-day law in this respect, it 
must be recognized that entirely different principles have 
been used in closing off rivers. It is thought that 
rules concerning bays are applicable mutatis mutandis in 
the case of river estuaries. According to another 
opinion, a straight line should be drawn across mouths of 
rivers in all cases. Finally, the geographic configur­
ation of the river's mouth and the possible existence of
an estuary, have to be taken into consideration, according
(78 )to a third view. It may be remarked that the last
view involves the difficulty of defining what the estuary
(76) U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/WP, 10/Add.1, p.24.
(77) Hodgson and Smith, op.cit.. Ref.(38),at 22, p.235,
(78) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5), at 9, p.336.
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is. Correct as this may be, it is no reason for denying
that this view was suggested by the Second Committee of
the 1930 Hague Conference for the Progressive Codification
of International Law, However this principle was not
approved by the Hague Conference itself. Having taken a
different view, the Conference instead adopted a provision
according to which the waters of a river could be
considered as constituting inland water up to a line
following the general direction of the coast drawn across
the mouth of the river only when it flows directly into
the sea; that is irrespective of its width. If the
river flows into an estuary, then the rules applicable to
( 79 )bays were to be applied to the estuary.^
Similarly, the final draft of the ILC, namely of 1956,
contained like criteria,^  ^ and Article 13 of the Geneva
Convention which is pertinent, provides that;
"If a river flows directly into the sea, the 
baseline shall be a straight line across the 
mouth of the river between points on the 
low-tide line of its banks."  ^ ^
Before leaving the discussion on mouths of rivers,
attention should be focused on the UNCLOS III which has
considered this question. Article 9 incorporated in the
( 79 ) Report of the Second Committee, LN Doc. C.230.M.117, 
1930, V, p.14.
(80 ) Article 13 of the draft ran as follows:
"1. If a river flows directly into the sea, the 
territorial sea shall be measured from a line drawn 
inter fauces terrarum across the mouth of the river.
"2, If the river flows into an estuary the coasts 
of which belong to a single State, Article 7 'Bays" 
shall apply y Report of the ILC covering the work of 
its 8th Sess., U.N, Gen. Ass. Official Records,nth 
Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/3159), p.18; YBILC, 1956, Vol. 
II, pp.253, 271-272.
(81 ) Brownlie, op.cit., Ref. (31) at 20, p.82. See for
the history of this article, Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref.
( 5 ) at 9, pp.339-342.
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ICNT is almost identical to the language of Article 13
( QQ )
of the Geneva Convention.
V . Roadsteads
Although roadsteads used for the loading and unloading
of ships, are usually situated outside the territorial
sea, they have been considered as forming parts of either
internal waters or territorial seas of coastal 
(8 3 )sovereigns.
Dealing with this question was one of the tasks facing
the preparatory ommittee of the Hague Conference of 1930.
The text prepared by the above committee in this respect
provides that:
"In front of roadsteads which serve for the 
loading and unloading of ships and of which 
the limits have been fixed for this purpose, 
territorial waters are measured from the 
exterior boundary of the roadsteads. It 
rests with the coastal state to indicate 
what roadsteads are in fact so employed 
and what are the boundaries of such road­
steads from which the territorial waters 
are measured.”
Having submitted a proposal to the Second Committee 
of the Conference, the U.K. suggested amending the above 
text. In the light of the U.K. motion the Committee 
adopted the following provision:
(82 ) Apart from the requirement of publicity U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Part II, pp.6-7, very little has 
been said about this article as to where the 
precise mouth of the river may be. See Hodgson and 
Smith, op.cit.. Ref. (38), at 22, p.237,
(83 ) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5), at 9, pp.264-265.
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"Roadsteads used for the loading, unloading and 
anchoring of vessels, the limits of which have 
been fixed for that purpose by the coastal 
State, are included in the territorial sea of 
that State, although they may be situated partly 
outside the general belt of territorial sea. The 
coastal State must indicate the roadsteads 
actually so employed and the limits thereof ^
The Geneva Convention regulates the question of
roadsteads. Article 9 of the Convention on the TSCZ
provides that :
"Roadsteads which are normally used for the 
loading, unloading, and anchoring of ships, 
and which would otherwise be situated wholly 
or partly outside the outer limit of the 
territorial sea are included in the territorial 
sea. The coastal State must clearly demarcate 
such roadsteads and indicate them on charts 
together with their boundaries to which due 
publicity must be g i v e n . ^
Similar rules seem likely to emerge from the UNCLOS 
III. Article 12 of the ICNT is almost identical to the 
corresponding Article of the Geneva Convention.  ^ ^
It appears, therefore, that the waters of the road­
steads have been considered territorial sea although they 
might be situated beyond the limit of the territorial sea 
for the purpose of enabling coastal States to exercise
(84 ) League of Nations Basis of Discussion No. 11, II
Territorial Waters, Conference for the Codification 
of International Law, The Hague, 1930, C.74, M.39, 
1929, V, p.47. Report of the 2nd Committee,
Conference for the Codification of International 
Law, The Hague, 1930, C.230, M.117, 1930, VI, p.13.
(85 ) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.52, UNCLOS I, Official Records 
Vol. II, Plenary Meetings, pp.132,133. For details 
about the history of the article. See Whiteman, op.
cit. Ref. ( 5 ) at 9, pp.268-270.
(86 ) See the text of the Article U.N, Doc. A/CONF,
62/WP.10/Add.1, p.24.
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special rights of control over those roadsteads.
V I . Low-Tide Elevations
Low-tide elevation is a term used to refer to shoals, 
reefs and drying rocks, which are covered at high-tides 
and dry only at low-tide.^  ^ It has been defined as 
"a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by
( 88 )and above water at low-tide but submerged at high-tide. ^
In this connection, it may be observed that low-tide 
elevations create another difficulty as regards drawing 
baselines. Usually, however, they do not affect the 
location of baselines apart from two exceptional cases: 
firstly, according to Article 4(3), namely where light­
houses or similar installations are built on them.^®^  ^
Secondly, low-tide elevations affect the drawing of base­
lines when they are wholly or partially situated within 
the breadth of the territorial sea,^^^^ The low-water 
line in the latter case may be used as a baseline for the 
purpose of measuring the limit of the territorial
( 9x )
sea.^ Therefore, elevations situated at a distance
exceeding the extent of territorial sea from the mainland 
or island, have no territorial sea of their own.^ ^
(87) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref.(5), at 9, p.304.
(88) Knight, op.cit., Ref.(l ), at 8, p.232.
(89 ) See the text of the Article, Brownlie, op.cit..
Ref, (31), at 20, p.80.
( 90 ) According to Article 11 of the Geneva Convention 
on the "TSCZ", ibid., p.82.
(91 ) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref.(5), at 9, p.304.
(92 ) ICJ Reports, 1951, p.128.
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Thus, it appears that the above rules have been well 
established as principles of international law. Accordingly, 
identical Articles to 4 and 11 of the Geneva Convention 
have been produced by the UNCLOS III.^ ^
Section Three 
Islands
Not only are there the problems of straight and 
artificial baselines, but even more complicated difficulties 
arise with regard to i s l a n d s . ^  Both principles of 
international law and practice would appear to suggest that 
they constitute another exception in the establishment of 
baselines permitting deviation from the general rule of 
shoreline. For the moment it is important to note that 
it is recognized that islands in general do affect the 
drawing of baselines as, like mainland areas, they possess 
their own territorial sea.^ ^
However, the question of islands has attracted the 
attention of those concerned with this area of the law of 
the sea. This may be shown in that, from the very 
beginning, this question has been considered by the 
Second Committee, of the Hague Conference for the 
Codification of International Law of 1930. The Committee
(93 ) See Article 12 of the ICNT, A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add.1 
p.24.
(94 ) Seven per cent of the land area of the earth
approximately is encompassed by oceanic islands. 
Almost every coastal State possesses islands and 
many countries are totally insular in geography.
See Knight, op,cit., Ref. ( 1 ), at 8, p.147,
(95 ) Brownlie, op.cit., Ref.(5 ), at 9 , p.202
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evolved in its report the following text :
"Every island has its own territorial sea. An 
island is an area of land, surrounded by water, 
which is permanently above high-water mark."^®® ^
An even better illustration of the serious consider­
ation given to the problem of islands is to be found in 
the fact that the ILC also took upon itself the drafting 
of an appropriate provision pertinent to the subject. It 
incorporated in its final draft Article 10 which provides 
that :
"Every island has its own territorial sea.
An island is an area of land, surrounded by 
water which in normal circumstances is 
permanently above high-water mark."  ^ ^
All this is not the only evidence of the care specific
to the question of islands. It may be added that the
Geneva Conference discussed the question and approved this
text with only one amendment. Article 10 of the Geneva
Convention runs as follows:
"1. An island is a naturally-formed area of 
land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide.
"2. The territorial sea of an island is 
measured in accordance with the provisions 
of these A r t i c l e s ^ ^ ®  ^
A careful reading of the above Article shows that
all islands, irrecpective of their size, population,
(96 ) L.N. Doc. C230. M. 117, 1930, V, p.13.
(97 ) Report of the ILC covering the work of its eighth 
session, 23 April-4 July 1956, U.N. Gen. Ass.
Official Records, 11th Sess. Supp. No. 9 (A/3159) 
pp.16-17; YBILC, 1956, Vol. II, pp.253-270.
(98 ) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L 52; II UNCLS, Plenary
Meetings, pp.132-133; Brownlie, op.cit., Ref. (31), 
at 20, pp.81, 82.
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locational requirement in relation to the mainland, 
namely whether situated in high seas or territorial sea, 
or any other particular geographical or special condition, 
have their own belts of territorial sea,( ^ ^ ^  Only the 
following conditions must be satisfied:
1, The island must be natural and not a r t i f i c i a l .
2. Apart from abnormal circumstances, it must also be 
permanently above sea level.
An observation with regard to the question of newly 
emergent islands may be interposed. Here, two types of 
emergent islands may be distinguished. If an island 
arises within the limit of the territorial sea of a 
certain State it undoubtedly belongs to the State concerned 
and the general principles already outlined are applicable 
to the case. On the other hand, if the island emerges 
on the high sea, it obviously belongs to no one unless 
occupied effectively by any State, which in turn notifies 
other States,
(99 ) Ibid. See also Brown, E.D. "Rockall and the Limits 
of National Jurisdiction of the U.K.", Part 1,
Marine Policy, 1978 p.204; Bishop, op.cit., Ref.
(2 ), at 8, p .301.
(100) This question is disputable. See Knight, op.cit.,
Ref. ( 1 ), at 8, p.156, It is logical to provide 
the naturality of the island for baseline purposes, 
otherwise coastal States would have a wide range of 
liberty to extend their territorial seas by building 
structures upon the adjacent waters of which they 
would be permitted to measure their territorial 
seas from.
(101) This condition is subject to controversy. See Knight, 
op.cit. Ref.(l) at 8, p.156; Whiteman, op.cit.,
Ref.(5 ) at 9, pp.274-303.
(102) Colombos, op.cit. Ref. ( 4) at 9, p.120. In the Anglo- 
Norwegian Fisheries Case the U.K. recognised that
the islands forming part of the "skjaergaard" ought 
to be treated as part of Norway’s coastline. ICJ, 
Reports, 1951, pp.120-123.
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Rules Emerging from UNCLOS III
The UNCLOS III discussed the question of islands and
the ICNT isolated a provision for this purpose. Article
121 (i) of the ICNT follows almost the language of
Article 10 of the 1958 Geneva C o n v e n t i o n . B u t ,  in
one respect at least it can be criticized as it contains
a new text raising a further complication in connection
with this already difficult i s s u e . P a r a g r a p h  3
contains the essence of the problem. It provides that:
”3. Rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no economic zone or continental
shelf.
Clearly, language of this kind leaves much room for 
dispute. One must enquire, firstly, what constitutes a 
"rock"?(^^^) And secondly, what is meant by "cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their
Comment
The above discussion appears to confirm the conclusion 
that islands are all treated under the Geneva Conventions
(103) See the text of the Article U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP 
10/Add. 1, p.68.
(104) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (99), at 44, p.205.
(105) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1, p.69.
(106) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (99), at 44, p.205.
(107) For further details see, Brown, ibid., p.206; 
Hodgson and Smith, op.cit., Ref. (38) at 22, pp. 
230-232,
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of 1958 in the same Whilst the provision
produced by the UNCLOS III is clearly more appropriate in 
excluding certain rocks from generating their own area of 
continental shelf, it does nothing to solve the problem 
as a whole. It is essential for the purpose of avoiding 
any potential confusion and uncertainty, or at least to 
minimize them, that the term rock should be defined and 
some phrase should be added in order to clear up the 
point of habitation.^
It may also be suggested that generalizing the system 
of conferring upon all islands equally the right to possess 
their own continental shelf, is an unequitable principle. 
One might just as well suggest that several factors would 
have to be taken into account before deciding whether it 
is equitable to accord a baseline to any given island.
The configuration of the shore, its resources, the 
propinquity or the remoteness from the shore, the liveli­
hood of the littoral population and so forth are 
inevitable considerations to be taken into account 
before making a decision in this r e s p e c t . S u c h  a 
proposal was suggested during the eighth Session of the
(108) Brown, ibid., p.205; Fahrney II, Richard L. "Status 
of an Island’s Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: A 
Case Study of the Falkland Islands" J. Marit. Law 
Com. Vol. 10, No. 4, 1979, p.552.
(109) Brown, ibid., pp.205, 206.
(no) Decision of the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case. 
Paragraphs 187, 188, 197, 198; see below Ref.(20), 
at 198;UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol. IV, 1975, 
p.15. See also the "Draft Article on Delimitation 
of Areas of Continental Shelf Between Neighbouring 
States"; ibid. Vol. V, 1975, pp.220-221; Brown, 
op.cit.. Ref. (99), at 44, Part II, p.298.
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UNCLOS III. It is proposed to amend Article 121 of the 
ICNT (Regime of Islands) in such a way as to include all 
the relevant circumstances to be considered in attributing 
continental shelves to islands.
Groups of Islands; Archipelagos
Coasts sometimes consist of groups of islands which 
are found either dispersed or so close^^^^^ both to each
(113)
other and to the mainland as to form part of archipelagos. 
Archipelago is defined as "a formation of two or more 
islands, islets or rocks, which geographically may be 
considered as a w h o l e " . I t  is defined also as"a 
group of islands, including parts of islands, inter­
connecting waters, and other natural features which are 
so closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and 
other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, 
economic, and political entity, or which historically have 
been regarded as such".^^^^^
As it is not intended to examine each of the widely 
varying geographical characteristics of archipelagos, it
(111) C.2/Informal Meeting/21, 28 April 1978; See the 
comment of Professor Brown about this proposal.
Brown, ibid.
(112) Knight, op.cit., Ref. ( 1 ) at 8, p.147.
(113) Deciding whether or not a group of islands constit­
utes part of archipelagos depends chiefly on 
geographical factors and exceptionally on historical 
perspective. See Colombos, op.cit., Ref. (4) at 9, 
pp.120, 121.
(114) For further details, see Knight, op.cit., Ref. ( 1 ) 
at 8, pp.183-186,
(115) Stevenson, JohnR. and Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 
1974 Caracas Sessions" AJIL, Vol. 69, 1975, p.21.
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will suffice to observe however, that if a group of 
isolated islands or even one island, creates a difficulty 
as shown above, this fact is even more evident in the 
question of archipelagos. The reason for this would be 
simply that it is generally recognized that each island, 
with certain merits, possesses its own territorial sea 
according to the general rules applicable to islands, 
whilst the archipelagos is still a matter of c o n t r o v e r s y ^  
To demonstrate this, it may be stated that in tracing the 
steps pertinent to the question one might easily conclude 
that archipelagos were treated in the very beginning 
separately, as each one possessed its own territorial sea. 
Then, it came to be recognized that the limit for the 
territorial sea should be measured from the centre of the 
g r o u p . A f t e r w a r d s ,  a new trend arose in favour of 
drawing baselines joining the group of i s l a n d s i f  
they were close enough to each other.
Apart from the outlined trends referred to, the 
Preparatory Committee for the Hague Conference of 1930 
suggested a text according to which "a group of islands
(116) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. ( 5) at 9 , p.286.
(117) Ibid., p.286.
(118) Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald, "The Law and Procedure of 
the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: Points 
of Substantive Law-1", BYBIL, Vol. 31, 1954,
pp.371-417.
(119) The forces lying behind this trend are that since 
such a group of islands sometimes forms a unit, 
thus it becomes important to determine a unified 
belt of territorial sea with all waters around 
the seaward side of the group of islands as a 
whole. See Knight, op.cit.. Ref. (1), at 8, , 
p.156.
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which belongs to a single State and at the circumference 
of the group are not separated from one another by more 
than twice the breadth of territorial waters, the belt 
of territorial waters shall be measured from the outermost 
islands of the group. Waters included within the group 
shall also be territorial waters.
The same rule shall apply as regards islands which 
lie at a distance from the mainland not greater than twice 
the breadth of territorial waters.
However, in spite of this, no rule was produced by 
the Hague Conference, thus subsequent State practice had 
been modified even by drawing any lines between the 
islands of a group.
There is further the fact that the ILC failed to 
produce a draft article regulating the question of 
archipelago. Instead, it only pointed out in a comment 
in Article 10 that the straight baseline system might be 
applicable.
Also the Geneva Convention has not made any particular
( 123 ^provision as to the matter. The problem thus
remained unsolved.
(120) League of Nations, Basis of Discussion No, 13, C.74. 
M39, 1929, V, p.51.
(121) Fitzmaurice, op.cit., Ref. (118), at 48, pp.371-417.
(122) Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (5), at 9, p.203.
(123) Bishop, op.cit., Ref. (2), at 8, p.302,
(124) Although both Indonesia and the Philippines employ 
a straight baseline system, they have declared that 
the baselines for their territorial sea are determined 
by drawing straight lines across the outermost points 
of their outermost islands. See the Philippines 
Claim, YBILC, 1956, Vol. II, pp.69-70; Indonesian 
Claim and the U.K. Protest cited in Lauterpacht, E. 
"The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in 
the Field of International Law - Survey and Comment", 
VI, ICLQ, Vol. 7, 1958, p.538.
50
It may be added that, in spite of the importance of 
the issue, it would seem that no agreement on the subject 
has so far been r e a c h e d . I t  thus becomes of some 
importance to consider the matter at the UNCLOS III. 
Problems of principle emerged throughout the conference as 
to the concept of archipelago States. The debate centred 
on whether or not a coastal State could unilaterally 
declare itself as an archipelago State, or whether it would 
first have to meet certain requirements.^
Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines have 
proposed that archipelago States should be allowed to 
enclose all "archipelago waters" lying within their outer­
most islands on which only innocent passage would be 
permitted.^
On the other hand, the U.K., in an attempt to find a 
solution, proposed to limit the application of the 
principle of archipelago waters. In brief she suggested 
mainly that the baselines connecting the outermost points 
of the outermost islands of the archipelago State must 
not exceed 24 nautical miles and that the ratio of the
(125) Since the Geneva Conference did not accept the 
concept of archipelago, States have been reluctant 
to accept it because of the concern for transit 
through waters in areas where the concept of archi­
pelago might be applied, as well as the fear that 
the principle would be extended by other States 
beyond recognition. See Oxman, Bernard H.,'The 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
The 1977 New York Session', AJIL, Vol. 72, 1978,p.65
(126) Ganz, David,L., "The United Nations and the Law of 
Sea", ICLQ, Vol. 26, 1977, pp.23-24.
(127) Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines:
Draft Articles on Archipelagos, 28 Report, 111,
102 (1973); cited in ILM, Vol. 12, 1973, p.1263.
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zone of the sea to the area of land territory must not 
be more than five to one. Also, according to the U.K.'s 
proposal, the regime applicable to international straits, 
namely free transit, would govern archipelago waters used 
before ratification of the convention for international 
navigation.^^28)
Consequently, agreement was reached during the 4th 
Session of the UNCLOS III on a definition of archipelago 
States, This concept in terms of the ICNT is designed to 
cover a group of islands that "form an intrinsic 
geographical economic and political entity or which 
historically have been regarded as such."^^^^^
Comment
It is worth noting that the UNCLOS III offers a new 
opportunity to resolve the issue. This appears to show 
signs of an important shift in principle to bring about 
universal recognition of the status of certain States as 
archipelago. Although the outcome is still awaiting a 
final decision by the Conference, it is more likely 
however that, if it is desired to include the archipelago 
notion in the treaty, two main points should be taken into 
account. Firstly, the precise limits of the concept must 
be adequately explained in order to avoid any undesirable 
attempt to extend the notion. Among the criteria
(128) U.K. Draft Articles on the Rights and Duties of 
Archipelago States, 28 Report III 99 (1973) cited 
in ILM, Vol. 12, 1973, p.1259.
(129) See the full text of Article 46 of the ICNT, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add.1, p.37.
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suggested are land to water ratios and precise maximum 
lengths for archipelago lines. Secondly, the respective 
rights and duties of archipelago States as well as those 
of the international community have to be specifically 
determined. Anything other than free transit through and 
over what would be parts of archipelago waters is 
contrary not only to the universally recognized concept of 
freedom of the high seas,^^^^^ but also to the principles 
of the current century, namely rapid and easy communication 
between nations.
(130) Stevenson and Oxman, op.cit., Ref. (115), at 47,
pp.21-22.
CHAPTER TWO 
SEAWARD EXTENSION OF MARINE BOUNDARIES
It is necessary at the outset to recall that it is
firmly recognized that coastal States are entitled to
exercise limited rights over parts of the sea and the
seabed adjacent to their coasts as shown e a r l i e r . T o
say the foregoing is not to argue that the seaward
extension of marine boundaries is presently uniform.
Although States claim jurisdiction and recognize that of
others over belts of the sea, they never agree as to the
extent of these offshore areas. More important, claims
of coastal jurisdiction in Latin American States have
changed drastically. A number of States in one form or
another have claimed jurisdiction over large parts of
(2 )the adjacent sea and the seabed.
However, as to the question of delimitation of marine 
boundaries, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
principles of law governing the delimitation of the outer 
limit of the territorial sea and continental shelf. The 
first section of the chapter discusses the breadth of the 
territorial sea. The second section considers the outer 
limit of the continental shelf.
(1) See above, pp. 8 et seq.
(2) See Zacklin, Ralph,"Latin America and the Development 
of the Law of the Sea: An Overview, In Zacklin, Ralph 
ed,, "The Changing Law of the Sea; Western Hemisphere 
Perspectives" 1974, pp.59-73; Hjertonsson, Karin,
"The New Law of the Sea: Influence of the Latin 
American States on Recent Developments of the Law of 
the Sea", 1973, pp.7, 19-38.
Section One
The Breadth of the Territorial Sea
The term "territorial sea" is designed to refer to
that belt of the sea adjacent to the State coastline
which extends from a line running parallel to the shore to
(3 )a specified distance from it. This is usually-
measured from the low-water mark, or under certain
(4)conditions from other locations.
O'Connell defines it as "that area of water adjacent
to the coast over which international law permits the
littoral State to exercise plenary authority, subject only
to a general right of innocent passage on the part of
(5)foreign shipping".
It may also simply be described as "that belt of the 
sea situated between internal waters and high seas".^^^ 
After this very brief clarification, in order to 
understand the doctrine of the territorial sea, we must 
now turn firstly to the question of who is competent to 
decide what is a lawful width for a State's territorial 
sea. Secondly, what, according to the principles of 
international law, is the present lawful width?
(3) The extent of the territorial sea is disputed. It is 
usually measured in marine miles. The marine mile 
is the "admiraity"or "nautical" mile as adopted by 
the British Hydrographic Office. It is equivalent to 
1853 metres. Colombos, op,cit., Ref.(4) at 9, p.88.
(4) Ibid.
(5) O'Connell, D.P. "International Law" 2nd ed., Vol. 1, 
1970, p.455.
(6) Al-Ghoneimy, Dr. M.T., "The International Law of the 
Sea in the New Directions", Cairo, 1975, p.129.
Subsection One
Who is Competent to Determine the 
Lawful Width for a State's Territorial Sea?
Before taking up the question under consideration, it
might be convenient at this point to note very briefly
that there has never been a consensus of opinion as to
the body entitled to determine the width of the territorial
sea. For instance, the extent of the territorial sea,
according to one view, cannot be determined merely
according to the will of the coastal States as expressed
in their municipal law. It follows therefore that it
must be established by international law rules. On the
other hand, an opposing view takes up a position in
support of the opinion that each State is free to determine
unilaterally a lawful width for itself, irrespective of
(1 )the interests of other States,
These two contradicting views are the subject of the 
following discussion.
I . Unilateral Determination by the State Concerned
One possible way around this question is that States 
could determine an authoritative width of territorial sea 
for themselves. In so doing, it is contended that each 
coastal State is exercising its sovereign powers. That
is to say each state is free to fix its limits of 
territorial sea. Consequently, each State is entitled
(7) Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref. (5) at 9, p.137; see also 
The Individual Opinion of Judge Alvarez in the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951, 
p.150.
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exclusively to determine whatever breadth it regards as 
being indispensible to it. Thus, the State takes into
/ g \
account its real needs as it sees them.
f 9 )At this point it must be mentioned briefly that 
this view was advanced vigorously by the Soviet Union and 
the States politically associated with it, as well as being 
commonly supported by several South American States. The 
reason they gave for adopting this view is that coastal 
States ought to be the sole arbiters of their territorial 
seas.(10)
However, due to an extensive expansion of the
territorial sea by Chile, Ecuador and Peru, it became very
urgent for American States generally that this issue be
decided. A special conference of the American States
therefore, was held in Mexico City in 1956 to consider
the "System of Territorial Waters and Related QuestionsV^^^^
After having been adjourned, the conference adopted a 
( 12 )declaration, in accordance with which each State was
entitled to establish its territorial sea within reasonable 
limits, taking into account its real needs. The
(8) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5), at 9, p.75.
(9) U.N. Doc. A/C.N. 4/S.R.166/P.3.
(10) McDougal and Burke, op.cit., Ref. (1) at 11, p.486; 
Pan American Union, "Final Act of the Third Meeting 
of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, 1956,
p p .50-59.
(11) McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke, "The
Community Interest in a Narrow Territorial Sea;
Inclusive Versus Exclusive Competence Over Oceans" 
Cornell Law Quart., 1970, Vol. 45, p.207.
(12) This declaration was adopted with one dissenting 
vote, "the U.S.", and several abstentions. The U.S. 
declared that the adopted declaration was contrary 
to international law. Pan American Union, op.cit., 
Ref. (10) above , pp.50-59; ibid., p.208.
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influencing factors according to the declaration were 
economic needs, security and defence interests as well as 
the related aspects such as geographical, geological and
C13 )
biological considerations.
Turning back to the record of the it would
be pertinent to add that several members of the ILC
proposed, when this matter was discussed, that each State
was qualified to determine the breadth of its territorial
sea at whatever distance was considered vital to secure
f 15 )its economic and strategic needs.  ^  ^ The member from the
Soviet Union, among o t h e r s , a s s e r t e d  this consistently 
throughout the Commission’s deliberation. Another member 
of the Commission, at its fourth Session, also subscribed 
to this view. Professor Scelle stated that the only 
advisable rule was that which took into consideration the 
fact that the territorial sea was the area without which 
at any given time a State felt its existence could not be
( '1 7 ’)
maintained and it could not effectively defend itself.^
It may be added that at the 1958 Geneva Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, the Representative of the Soviet Union 
once again argued strongly that it was a "sovereign right" 
of each coastal State to determine exclusively the width 
of its territorial sea. In an attempt to strengthen his 
argument he maintained that not only "international
(13) Pan American Union, ibid., p.36.
(14) See above p. 55, 56.
(15) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5) at 9, p.75.
(16) See similar views below p.ÇQ
(17) U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 166, 14, 11.
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practice" but also "national legislation" showed a
/18 )
tendency to favour this opinion. The same view was
held by the Czechoslovakian representative at the
Conference. He stated that:
"Each State was competent to fix the breadth of 
its own territorial sea in the exercise of its 
sovereign powers, taking into account its 
genuine needs,
Hungary also took up a similar position.
II. The International Determination
Now it remains to consider the opposing point of view, 
which is that of the majority of States. A completely 
different view, and perhaps more reasonable one, rests its 
case on the contention that the breadth of the territorial 
sea is an important question of international law which 
affects the international community as a whole. It must 
thus be decided by a general community consensus. 
Accordingly, whatever breadth may be ultimately determined, 
it is binding on individual States.
This argument in fact is based on the premise that if 
the right of each coastal State to fix the width of its 
territorial sea unilaterally were recognized, it would in 
this respect render international law ineffective.
Other reasons have been given as a basis for this view.
It has been alleged that unilateral determination is
(18) In effect, all states in the Soviet bloc, apart from 
Poland, took up the same position. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 
4/SR. 166.168, 11.
(19) UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. Ill, p.67.
(20) Ibid., p.63.
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contrary to the basic principles of international law.
Obviously, in authorizing each State to fix its territorial
sea limit, other States are simply required to accept such
a determination. Such exclusive delimitation surely
determines not only the scope and content of domestic
exclusive interests, but also both the inclusive and
C21)exclusive interests of other States. Consequently,
if unilateral determination was generally accepted, it
would lead to a complete loss of community authority. In
addition, a State could easily justify its claimed width
as being legal by reference to its own egoistical
interests, no matter whether they are genuine or not, and
irrespective of how much that width would affect other
States’ interests. However, having outlined the basis
of this view, it may be noted that on the few occasions
this matter was dealt with there has been almost an opinion
to the effect that the width of the territorial sea must
be internationally determined. Replies received from
States by the Preparatory Committee for the 1930 Conference,
for example, made no reference to even a slight desirability
for unlimited authority to fix the breadth of the
f 22 )territorial sea.^ At this conference, apart from
Spain, States generally accepted the concept of an
internationally established limit for the width of the
(23 )territorial sea.
The Inter-American Specialized Conference on "Conser­
vation of National Resources: The Continental Shelf and
(21) See U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 166/p.7.
(22) See McDougal and Burke, op.cit.. Ref.(11) at 56, p.206.
(23) Ibid.
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Marine Waters" was held in March, 1956 at Ciudad Trujillo. 
The issue concerning which body was authorized to determine 
the width of territorial sea was one of the matters put 
before the Conference. The final resolution adopted by 
the conference emphasized that "there exists a diversity 
of positions among the States represented at this
Conference with respect to the breadth of the territorial
no
(25)
sea"(^^) Thus, there was  consensus on this issue
among the American States.
When the problem in question was considered by the 
ILC, it was proposed by Mr. Zourek, of Czechoslovakia that 
each coastal State was free to fix the breadth of its 
territorial sea according to its own needs. That was the 
principle he had formulated in paragraph (1) of his 
proposal, which he hoped would be accepted as a constructive 
solution to the p r o b l e m . M r .  Zourek’s proposal was:
1. Every coastal State, in the exercise of its 
sovereign powers, has the right to fix the 
breadth of its territorial sea.
2. Since the power of the coastal State to fix 
the limits of the territorial sea is limited by 
the principle of the freedom of the high seas, 
in order to conform with international law, the 
breadth of the territorial sea must not infringe 
that principle.
3. In all cases where its delimitation of the 
territorial sea is justified by the real
(24) Inter-American Juridical Year Book, 1955-1957, p.261.
(25) This resolution differed considerably from that which 
had been adopted in Mexico City the month before.
See above pp. 56 et seq.
(26) YBILC, 1956, Vol. 1, p.163.
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needs of the coastal State, the breadth of the 
territorial sea is in conformity with inter­
national law. This applies, in particular, to 
these States which have fixed the breadth of 
their territorial sea at between three and 
twelve miles.
This provision was rejected by eight votes to three 
with three abstentions.
A similar proposal was submitted to the Geneva 
Conference by Peru. However, the Peruvian delegate, 
while intending to realise a general agreement among the 
States upon exclusive coastal competence, remarked that 
several proposals had been put forward for specific limits 
on the territorial sea. The delegation declared, thus, 
that it was "absurd" to require the concurrence of other 
States. Therefore, Peru ultimately withdrew her 
proposal.
Yet another similar proposal was suggested at the 
Geneva Conference by the Soviet Union delegate. It read 
as follows:
"Each State shall determine the breadth of its 
territorial sea in accordance with established 
practice within the limits, as a rule, of three 
to twelve miles, having regard to historical and 
geographical conditions, economic interests, the 
interests of the security of the coastal state 
and the interests of international navigation
It was observed that the crucial phrase in the Soviet’s 
suggested article was "as a rule". The Soviet delegate,
(27) YBILC, 1956, Vol. I, p.162.
(28) Ibid., p.181.
(29) UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol.III, pp.166, 176.
(30) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L.80.
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in an effort to justify the good faith of that phrase, 
declared that it was "inserted ... in order to allow the
(31)
possibility of making exceptions in special circumstances".
Therefore it was clear that the article was designed,
notwithstanding the reference to three and twelve miles,
to sanction each coastal State exclusively to determine the
breadth of its territorial sea. Moreover, the broad scope
and extent of the general criteria such as "historical and
geographical conditions", "economic interests" and so forth
are self-explanatory. In any case, the Soviet proposal 
(32 )was rejected.^
III. Evaluation
To some extent there is understandably a conflict
between wider international community interests and narrow,
national self interests. Nevertheless, this in itself is
unjustified in allowing the coastal State to fix unilater-
(33 )ally the breadth of its territorial sea.^ It may be
observed that granting individual States the right to 
determine the width of their territorial seas might well 
serve in the interests of one State or one group of States, 
but would disregard international community interests.
Moreover, this overestimation of exclusive national 
interests is not fully justified for the following reasons:-
Firstly, it overestimates the interdependence of individual 
States’interests, ignoring the most comprehensive long-term
(31) UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol.Ill,p.108.
(32) UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol.Ill,p.169.
(33) McDougal and Burke, op.cit.. Ref. (11), at 56, 
pp.252-253.
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interests of all States,
Secondly, it does not take into account the possible 
solutions involving harmonization of conflicting interests 
by which all would gain and none would lose.
Thirdly, it disregards the close association between the 
exclusive interests of individual States and the common 
interests of the international community. It is quite 
clear that the utmost gains are produced not from exclusive 
use, however benevolent, but from shared exploitation of 
the seas with reciprocal cooperation between States.
It may be argued that due to the failure of the 
international conferences to agree upon an explicit limit 
for the territorial sea, States are still completely free 
to adopt whatever width they please. This argument may 
be contended, at least in the writer’s view, as it confuses 
between two wholly separate points. The question of who 
has the power to fix the breadth of the territorial sea is 
not related to determining the definite limit of the 
territorial sea. "This is evident because the notion of 
complete freedom is commonly, put forward as a separate 
claim to authority on this problem and, just as commonly, 
rejected even though no prescription as to specific width 
is otherwise adopted".
Also, the more obvious reason for rejecting this 
tendency is that accepting the view that conferring upon 
each State the power to decide the width of its territorial 
sea might lead to international disputes. It seems
reasonable to suppose that a potential dispute between
(34) Ibid., pp.204-205.
(35) Ibid., p.205.
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two adjacent or opposite States making an overlapping 
claim to the same area of the sea as constituting their 
territorial seas, is the only consequence which would be 
produced if one believed in the unrestricted competence of 
the coastal State to determine unilaterally its own 
territorial sea. Accordingly, authorizing coastal 
States to determine their territorial sea exclusively could 
become complete, exclusive monopolization of the common 
resources of the seas by the most powerful States, On 
the other hand, if conflicts are to be solved by means 
other than force, such as military or economic pressures, 
one must find a method of reconciliation. This is 
undoubtedly what is sought by efforts made to achieve 
consensus on the limits of the territorial sea.^^^^
It may be added that the claim that individual States 
are exclusively free to set up whatever limit of territ­
orial sea they desire, would if generally accepted affect 
other States’ interests. Accordingly, such a claim is 
inconsistent with the main principles of international 
law which recognize the sovereignty of each State over its 
land territory and territorial sea. This is because in 
claiming to have the competence to unilaterally determine 
the breadth of their territorial seas. States are*attempting 
to fix not only the tether and content of their rights in
waters adjacent to their coasts, but also the rights of 
(37 )other States. By unilaterally extending their
territorial sea belts. States make a hostile inroad to the
(36) Ibid., pp.204-205.
(37) Ibid., p.204.
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inclusive rights of other States. In turn, those other 
States may claim competence solely to determine the limits 
of their territorial sea zones which, as was mentioned 
earlier, might overlap with others. Certainly, problem­
atic conflicts are the unique and expected results of such 
contradictory interests.
Another observation in this connection must be made.
It is not the unilateral claim, but the recognition by 
the international community, which produces the expectations 
of uniformity in decision which is commonly called inter­
national law.
Finally, it is evident from international practice 
that the notion of exclusive and unreviewable competence 
to determine the width of the territorial sea, is rejected. 
With few exceptions, the members of the ILC either 
contended that some specific limit was established in
international law or that international law did not grant
C 38 )coastal States the right of exclusive determination.
The rejection of Mr.Zourek’s proviso, which ended the
effort to obtain approval for exclusive competence in the
final recommendation on this issue, constituted an
unequivocal determination that coastal competence was
definitely limited by international law.^^^^ This view
might find clear support in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Ca£e^"^0) in which the World Court stated that :
(41 )"... the delimitation of sea areas has
always an international aspect ; it cannot
(38) Ibid., pp.211, 212,
(39) Ibid., p.209.
(40) ICJ Report, 1951, pp.116-132.
(41) The term ’sea areas’ mentioned in the Court’s Judgment 
seems comprehensive enough to be regarded as relevant 
to claims for fixing the breadth of states’ territor­
ial seas.
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be depended merely upon the will of the coastal 
State as expressed in its municipal law.
Although it is true that the act of delimitation 
is necessarily a unilateral act, because only 
the coastal State is competent to undertake it, 
the validity of the delimitation with regard 
to other States depends upon unilateral law."(^^^
Subsection Two 
The Breadth of the Territorial Sea
The next question to be considered is that of the 
breadth of the territorial sea. There can be no doubt 
that this is one of the most complex issues in the law of 
the sea. This complexity arises for the following 
reasons :
1. The lack of a conventional, universal specific limit 
for the territorial sea.
2. The lack of advanced and developed techniques and 
principles, for the delimitation of the territorial or 
any other adjacent maritime zone.^^^^
3. The relative weakness of international custom regulating 
this question
(42) Ibid. However, the Court’s judgment has been 
criticised as it is worded ambiguously. It is argued 
that, having said there is an "international aspect", 
the judgment has left the matter unclarified.
Professor R.Y. Jennings quite rightly requested 
firstly, whether the said term "international aspect" 
means that every third State has a legally opposable 
interest in the delimitation of territorial sea, or 
is it only States whose interests might be affected 
or damaged. Secondly, if the third State has an 
opposable right, how would it be protected in the 
absence of compulsory jurisdiction before the ICJ or 
any other international tribunal? And thirdly, if 
one State objected, while others accepted or approved, 
what would be the position? See Jennings, R.Y.,
op.cit., Ref.(63), at 32, pp.378, 379.
(43) Boggs, op.cit.. Ref. (13),at 14, pp.240-241.
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4. Finally, the inextricable confusion in most books on 
the subject between the problem of the extent of the 
territorial sea, and the controversies over the proper 
method of drawing baselines. It is only in recent 
years that the essential distinction between the 
question of the baseline, and the question of the 
extent of the zone, has come to be generally agreed 
upon, and recognition of this distinction may be 
welcomed as the first step towards a consistent solution 
to the problem as a whole.
However this subsection will be devoted firstly to 
the historical background of the delimitation of the extent 
of the territorial sea,^^^^ secondly to the role of 
international organizations in unifying the extent of the 
territorial sea, and thirdly to the present breadth of 
the territorial sea. Finally, there will be an evaluation 
of the issue.
(44) Smith, op.cit., Ref. (10), at 14, p.22.
(45) It may be argued that it would be pointless to 
engage in an analysis or historical account of 
state practice, discussion and controversies that 
have for centuries revolved around the question.
It is true that such surveys have been carried out 
by numerous writers. However, it is equally 
true that it is worth shedding some light on the 
historical background of this issue. This might 
be justified for the purpose of understanding the 
forces lying behind current claims and trends in 
this respect.
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I . The Historical Perspective of the Extent of the 
Territorial Sea
It is worth remembering that the legal status of the 
sea has been the subject of long and arduous discussion. 
Several theories have been advanced, based upon the two 
opposite principles of the "closed sea" and the "free 
sea".(^^) Meanwhile, the doctrine of mare nostrum, or 
sea belonging to a single nation, was also advocated. 
Various kings and princes began to claim sovereignty over 
waters adjacent to their coasts. Venice, for instance, 
demanded the payment of a levy, beginning in the year 1269, 
from all vessels sailing in the Adriatic.
In 1432, Denmark claimed the exclusive right to fish 
in the Icelandic Sea. In 1609, King James of England 
claimed privileges in the North Sea.^^^^ He prevented 
fishing in the seas of England, Scotland and Ireland 
without his licence.
Consequently, writers also began to argue about the 
question of sovereignty over the territorial sea. Bartolus
(46) See Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref. (5 ) at 12, pp.10
et seq. It had been laid down by Roman Law that the 
sea was communis omnium naturali jure. This is the 
concept ÔT "free sea", common to all mankind. 
Therefore it was not susceptible to possession, and 
its resources were open to all men. This view had 
been incorporated into the Justinian Code promul­
gated in 529. Hence, according to the Roman Law, 
there was no extension of State jurisdiction from 
the coastline seaward. See Fenn, Percy Thomas Jr., 
"Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea", AJIL, 1925, 
Vol. 19, pp.716-727.
(47) Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref. (5 ), at 12, p.11.
(48) Oudendijk, J.K., "Status and Extent of Adjacent 
Waters; A Historical Orientation", 1970, p.15.
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de Sassoferrato (1314-1357) held that the jurisdiction of 
the coastal State extended to a distance one hundred miles 
seaward, which was equivalent to two days journey in 
his time.(^^)
Baldus de Ubaldus (1327-1400), another Italian jurist, 
who was a pupil of Bartolus, proposed a limit of 60 miles, 
a distance which was supposed to equal one day's travel 
Afterwards, jurists continued to advocate the right 
of a coastal State over a belt of the sea around its coast.
( 51 )
Thomas Digges in 1569,^ followed by Robert Gallis in 
( 52 )1622,^ asserted the jurisdiction of a governor over the 
sea around his coast.
In 1635, John Selden produced his work Mare Clausum, 
partly to enhance Charles I's claim for possession over 
wide areas of ocean, and partly to oppose Hugo Grotius* 
Scholary work entitled Mare Liberum which had been written 
in 1609 to support the Dutch view of the infeasibility of 
possession of the sea.
However, towards the end of the seventeenth century 
both the Mare Clausum and Mare Liberum concepts lost their 
identities by being absorbed into the concept of 
possession of a right of national jurisdiction over 
limited belts for restricted purposes of a protective
(49) Knight, op.cit.. Ref. (1), at 8, p.56.
(50) Ibid., p.56.
(51) Gillis, R.J., "Seventeenth Century and Eighteenth 
Century Bases for the Exercise of Protective 
Jurisdiction in the Marginal Sea Area" LL.M. Thesis, 
Edinburgh University, 1975, p.85.
(52) Ibid., p.86.
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nature.
Grotius wrote again on the subject of jurisdiction
over the seas. In 1623 and 1624 he published a great
work on the "Law of War and Peace" in which he advocated
restricted jurisdiction of the coastal State over an area
the extent of which could be controlled from the land.^^^^
Another jurist Samuel Pufendorf put forward the same
view. In the 1688 edition of De Jure Naturae et Gentium,
Pufendorf recognized that a coastal zone of sea was
subject, as regards state practice, to the exclusive
(55 )jurisdiction of littoral sovereigns.^
Other writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centruies such as Cornelius Van Bynkershoek,  ^ Christan 
W o l f f , a n d  V a l i n , u n a n i m o u s l y  recognized the right 
of the littoral State to enjoy a form of jurisdiction or 
sovereignty over a belt of water adjacent to its coast. 
Several treaties, as well as numerous laws and Acts issued, 
acknowledged this.^^^^
By this time however, the principle of the territorial 
sea had evolved, but there was no agreement as to the
(53) Ibid., pp.83, 84.
(54) Swarztrauber, op.cit., Ref.( 5), at 12, p.20.
(55) Pufendorf stipulated four conditions to be met before 
any State could claim jurisdiction over the adjacent 
waters to its coast. For further details see 
Gillis, op.cit., Ref. (51), at 69, pp.99,100.
(56) He stipulated certain conditions for recognizing the 
right of a coastal State over waters adjacent to 
its coast. Ibid., p.101.
(57) He stated that the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
littoral State stretched as far as it could protect. 
Ibid., p .103.
(58) Ibid., pp.104-106.
(59) Ibid., pp.110-121.
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definite limit of coastal sea to be considered within 
exclusive control of the littoral State. Various 
unsuccessful attempts were made to establish a general rule 
which might be applied in all c a s e s . I t  was advocated 
that such a distance depended on the range of a cannon, 
whilst another suggestion was that the limit should be 
determined by the "line of sight". Also, the limit was 
made relative to the Scandinavian League and so forth.
These issues will be our concern in the following 
discussion.
a . The Cannon Shot Rule
The cannon shot principle which evolved during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries simply stated that 
the maritime dominion of a State ended where its power of 
maintaining continuous possession by force of arms endedl®^^
(60) Knight, op.cit., Ref. (1) at 8, p.56.
(61) See Fulton, Thomas Wemyss, "The Sovereignty of the 
Sea: An Historical Account of the Claims of England 
to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of the 
Evolution of the Territorial Waters, with Special 
Reference to the Rights of Fishing and the Naval 
Salute". Edinburgh and London: W, Blackwood and Son, 
1911, p.156; Walker, Wyndham L., "Territorial 
Waters: Cannon Shot Rule" BYBIL, 1945, Vol. 22,
P.222.
(62) The first to advance the cannon shot view were the 
Dutch. On May 6, 1610 a Dutch delegation visited 
England complaining about the British Proclamation 
issued a year earlier. According to that Proclam­
ation "Strangers" were forbidden to fish in a belt 
of water considered as British Seas. The Dutch 
delegation protested against the British claim. The 
protest submitted took the form of a note which 
contained the following: "For that it is by law of 
nations, no Prince can challenge further into the 
sea than he can command with a cannon except gulfs 
within their land from one point to another". See 
Fulton, ibid., p.156; Walker, ibid., p.222; Knight, 
op.cit.. Ref. (1) at 8, p.59.
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This rule was a practical one.(G3) There was never any 
difficulty in determining the extent of the territorial 
sea belonging to a state. One needed only to fire a 
cannon placed on the shore and measure the distance^^^^ 
where the shot fell.^^^^
In a work published in 1703, the Dutch Jurist 
Cornelius Van Bynkershoek, claimed that the sovereignty of 
states ought to be extended to the point at which the 
power of arms placed on the shore ended.
This rule prevailed during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. It was adopted in the treaties 
concluded between Great Britain and Algiers on May 14,
1762 and with France on September 26, 1786, in addition to 
several other agreements.  ^ The rule was also 
promulgated by renowned writers for example Samuel 
Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, Emmerich de Vattel, as well 
as Cornelius Van Bynkershoek. ^
(63) Fulton justified this rule by stating that the sea 
should salute the land and the range of the arms 
determine the limit within which the salute ought to 
be rendered. See Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. (4) at 9, 
p.92; Fulton, ibid.,pp.577 et seq.
(64) The range of guns at the time was approximately one 
marine league. See Colombos, ibid., p.92.
(65) Obviously this rule produced no uniform breadth for 
territorial sea. This is because the range of cannon 
was usually affected by several factors such as 
height, position and calibre of the cannon itself.
See Swarztrauber, op.cit., Ref. (5 ) at 12, p.34.
(66) Colombos, C .J .,"Territorial Waters", Trans. Grotius 
Soc., 1924, Vol. 9, pp.96, 98, Colombos, op.cit.,
Ref. (4), at 9, p.92; Brownlie, op.cit., Ref. (5), 
at 9, p.184. '
(67) Colombos, op.cit., Ref. (4) at 9, p.95.
(68) For further details see Swarztrauber, op.cit., Ref.
(5 ), at 12, pp.27-33; Walker, op.cit., Ref. (61) at 
71, pp.215 et seq.
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One main criticism of the cannon shot rule was its 
variability. The cannon shot range is liable to periodic 
changes as the science of ordnance improves. The 
distance covered by a cannon shot has increased over the 
centuries, and this has rendered the rule untenable. Had 
the cannot shot rule been accepted, some of the territorial 
sea belts would be subject to two or more different 
jurisdictions. The progress of ballistics on the one 
hand, and the necessity for a more effective defence on 
the other, made this concept obsolete and of merely 
historical interest. ^
b . The Line-of-Sight Doctrine
The cannon shot rule, as it has already been outlined, 
was prevalent in the North Central European mainland. 
Meanwhile, another measure was being utilized by the 
peripheral maritime States of Spain, England and 
Scandinavia. This rule depended on the range of vision 
on a fair day. It was incorporated into several laws and 
treaties enacted and convened by a number of States.
The first country to practice the line-of-sight rule 
was Spain. In a proclamation issued in October 1565,
King Philip II of Spain asserted that "No one can come to 
our coasts, harbours, roadsteads or rivers, or within 
sight of our land, , . " .
(69) Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. (66), at 72, p.96; 
Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref. (5), at 12, pp.34, 35.
(70) This principle was adopted by Scotland as well as 
England. See Knight, op.cit., Ref. (1), at 8, p.57.
(71) Crocker, Henry G. ed,, "The Extent of the Marginal 
Sea: A Collection of Official Documents and Views of 
Representative Publicists", U.S. Department of State, 
Washington, 1919, p.622.
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Many treaties and ordinances of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries adopted the limit of ’’the range of
(72')visual horizon” .
In the wars following the French Revolution, the U.S.
defended this rule in order to assert her neutrality.
Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State of the U.S., stated
in 1793 that the breadth of the territorial sea was
subject to differing claims. He said:
’’The greatest distance to which any respectable
assent among nations has been at any time given,
has been the extent of the human sight, estimated
at upwards of twenty miles, and the smallest
distance, I believe, claimed by any nation
whatever, is the utmost range of a cannon ball,
usually stated at one sea league ... This
distance ’of three geographical miles from the
shore’ can admit of no opposition, as it is
recognized by treaties between some of the powers
with whom we are connected in commerce and
navigation, and is as little or less, than is
(73 )claimed by any of them on their own coasts.”
The ’’line of sight” concept had support in legal 
literature as well as state practice. The earliest 
writer to advocate the line of sight limit was Cornelius 
Van Bynkershoek, He later rejected the concept in favour 
of the cannon shot rule. Rayneval, Godey and Grotius, 
also made reference to the ’’line of sight” concept.
Supporters of this concept claimed that the cannon 
shot rule had been inadequate, since it had not provided
(72) Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. (4), at 9, p.92.
(73) Moore, J.B., ”A Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, 
1906, pp.702-703,
(74) Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref. (5), at 12, pp.38-40; 
Knight, op.cit.. Ref. (1), at 8, p.58.
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States with sufficient protection for their fishing and
fiscal interests. They justified this rule on the basis
that it responded to those needs.
The criterion for determining the limit of territorial
sea by the range of vision is open to obvious criticism.
Even though it was supposed to be ascertained on a fair
day, the distance one could see varied. The exact limit
of vision was affected by such factors as the height of
the eye, the position of the observer, the keenness of his
vision, the season, as well as the size and colour of the
(75)object to be seen,^ and perhaps by other circumstances.
c . The Marine League
The extending of the territorial sea to a limit of a
marine league was originally claimed by the Scandinavians.
It appeared for the first time in international practice
in 1743 when the Governor of Finmarken^^^^ gave leave to
Russian fishermen to approach within one league of the
(77 )maritime sphere of his province on payment of dues.
Once again, it was introduced in 1745. A Royal Rescript
of June 18, 1745 was issued for the purpose of preserving
(78 )Danish neutrality. After the separation of Denmark
and Norway the Finmarken Governor’s action, which survived
(75) The criticism was faced by the sponsors of the rule 
was that States could adopt as a limit the mean 
extreme range of human eyesight, translated into 
precise figures. See Swarztrauber, ibid., pp.40-43; 
Crocker, op.cit.. Ref. (71) at 73, pp.394-395.
(76) The northernmost part of Norway.
(77) Kent, H.S.K., "The Historical Origins of the Three- 
Mile Limit", AJIL, 1954, Vol. 48, p.544,
(78) Knight, op.cit.. Ref. (1), at 8, p.67.
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as a part of Norwegian law, was confirmed by a Royal 
Ordinance issued on February 10, 1747.
Sweden also issued in 1756, 1758, 1778 and 1779, Orders 
and Decrees by which she adopted a one league-mile limit 
of territorial sea. The last decree of 1779, which was 
issued by Prince Carl the Younger, asserted for instance 
that the Swedish jurisdiction over a maritime belt was one 
"German Mile" wide within which hostilities would not be 
tolerated.
The one league extent was thus evolved in the
Scandinavian countries from the late sixteenth century to
the early nineteenth century partly for fishing purposes
(81)and partly for reasons of neutrality. Moreover,
other States, such as France, England, Scotland, Spain, 
the U.S. and Germany had, by the nineteenth century, 
incorporated to some extent the terra "marine league" into
the acts marking out their respective maritime
(82 ) boundaries.^
Several unsuccessful attempts were made to persuade 
the Scandinavian States to abandon the rule of one league. 
Most of them adhered to it as it enjoyed legal supremacy 
over any other c l a i m . H e n c e ,  the Scandinavian’s 
Decrees appear to be the beginning of specific limits of
(79) Kent, ibid., p.544.
(80) Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref. (5), at 12, pp.48-49.
(81) Kent, ibid., p.552.
(82) Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref. (5 ) at 12, pp.47-48.
(8 ) Ibid., p.49.
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states’ jurisdiction over belts of sea adjoining their 
coasts.
d . The Three-Mile Limit
In the late eighteenth century, a new measure for the 
breadth of the territorial sea was developed. Statesmen 
and writers started to conceive of a definite hypothetical 
cannon shot range, namely a belt of adjacent water over 
which a cannon shot could range if placed so as to obtain 
a uniform standard of territorial sea zone.
The first writer to conceive of three miles as a 
maximum width for territorial sea was Ferdinando 
Galiani,^^^^ The basis for his convictions is disputed.
It is said that he borrowed the idea from the French. 
Another view sees it as being an effort to achieve a 
compromise between the two predominant limits in use at the 
time, namely that of his own State, "The Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies" criterion, and that of the Scandinavians. 
Galiani’s Government was upholding the cannon shot rule 
which was approximately two miles at the time, while the 
Scandinavians were claiming a league of four miles.
Galiani chose to reach a compromise measure of three miles. 
At any rate, whatever the basis of Galiani’s criterion, he 
has been considered the first advocate of the "three-mile
(84) Knight, op.cit., Ref. (1), at 8, p.68.
(85) Galiani (1728-1787) was originally known as an 
economist. His passion, in international law was 
probably occasioned on account of his diplomatic 
service. He had served in Paris from 1759 to 1769 as 
a secretary of the "Neopolitan Embassy" (Kingdom of 
the Two Sicilies). See Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref,
(5 ), at 12, pp.54-56.
(86) The reason being that, the cannon-shot-three-mile 
equation was formed by them. Swarztrauber, ibid., 
pp.51-54.
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limit" rule. ^
On the other hand, the U.S. has been regarded as the
first state to incorporate the three-mile rule in her
(88 )domestic legislation. Having fixed her territorial
sea according to that rule, the U.S. sent notes on 
November 8, 1793 to both the British and the French 
Governments declaring such action "provisionally".
Seven months later, the rule was incorporated in the law 
of the land enacted by Congress.
Moreover, many treaties concluded, and a series of 
Domestic Acts issued during the nineteenth century adopted, 
the rule of the three-mile limit. The courts, moreover, 
have taken a positive role throughout this century towards 
strengthening the three-mile rule. They have recognized 
in several cases that the territorial sea is three miles 
wide. Academics also approved of the three-mile rule.
To say the above is not to deny that, although the 
"three-mile limit" was born in the nineteenth century, 
contrary claims continued to be made throughout this 
century. It may be referred in this regard to the 
Scandinavian countries, who (apart from Denmark) 
continued to adhere to the four mile rule. Spain, 
supported by Portugal, took many steps to put the six-mile 
limit into effect. Mexico alone claimed a nine-mile belt
(87) Swarztrauber, ibid., pp.54-56.
(88) Ibid., pp.56-60.
(89) Although she was not in a hurry to fix her
territorial sea, the U.S. did so under pressure. For
further details, see Swarztrauber, ibid., pp.56-57.
(90) Denmark had given up the four mile claim by signing
the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention. See 
Swarztrauber, ibid., pp.56-92.
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of territorial sea.^^^^ Furthermore, at the turn of the 
present century, the USSR claimed a broader territorial 
sea, in fact twelve miles. She had claimed a twelve mile 
limit since the time of Imperial Russia, and she embodied 
that limit in a comprehensive statute on territorial 
jurisdiction in 1927.
Thus, in spite of the fact that the three-mile limit 
rule had become a well articulated rule of international 
law,(^^) other claims were steadily being practised in 
competition.
e . Multifarious Standards
It would not be irrelevant, before proceeding further, 
to allude to the fact that other criteria in addition to 
the three-mile standard, were concurrently in operation. 
Some of these measures might seem rather strange. The 
Franco-Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Commerce of May 28, 
1767, for instance, established a 30-mile belt of 
territorial sea around when Moroccan vessels were 
concerned.
Another view accepted the limit of territorial sea as 
being the extent to which those who sail in that part of 
the sea could be constrained from the coast as if they were 
on land.
(91) Ibid., pp.56-92.
(92) Oda, Shigeru,* International Law of the Resources of
the Sea’, Hague Recueil, 1959, II, Vol. 127, p.376.
(93) Daintith and Others, op.cit.. Ref.(4 ) at 9, p. A201.
(94) Crocker, op.cit.. Ref. (71) at 73, p.521.
(95) Walker, op.cit., Ref. (61), at 71, p.210; Kent, op.
cit.. Ref. (77) at 75, p.537.
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Other theories have included the distance which could 
be covered by two days n a v i g a t i o n , ^  the distance of a 
stone’s t h r o w , t h e  length of a race course and the 
maximum range of audibility of the human voice.
II• Role of International Organizations in Unifying the 
Extent of the Territorial Sea
a . Role of the League of Nations
In the last century and early in this one, several 
efforts have been made to end the controversial difficulties 
concerning the territorial sea, and in particular, the 
question of its breadth.
Under the auspices of the League of Nations, a large 
conference met to codify certain aspects of international 
law. The width of the territorial sea was among three 
topics selected for codification by the Conference of 1930.
However, States’ comments, on the questionnaire 
circulated by the preparatory committee, as well as their 
delegations’ attitudes at the Conference itself, showed a 
wide diversity of o p i n i o n . F o u r  types of position 
were shown. Firstly, the great maritime States adhered 
to three or four miles; secondly, other nations supported 
the limit of six miles; thirdly, some States suggested 
that in addition to the three or six mile territorial sea, 
there should be a recognition of the conferring upon 
coastal States of a limited authority beyond that area;
(96) Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. (4) at 9, p.92.
(97) Crocker, op.cit., Ref. (71), at 73, p.394.
(98) Ibid., p.394.
(99) Oda, op.cit., Ref. (92), at 79, p.376.
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and fourthly, the proposal of the Soviet Union for a 
twelve mile territorial sea.^^^^^
States wishing wider territorial sea extensions 
invoked various reasons for them, for example security 
interests and fisheries, while these adhering to a narrower 
limit emphasised the freedom of the sea.
However, despite the minutely worked out preparation 
for codification of the regime of the territorial sea, and 
despite the fact that only a small proportion of the tates 
attending the Conference claimed more than one league of 
territorial sea at the t i m e , t h e  Conference failed to 
unify the extent of the area over which coastal States 
were competent to exercise j u r i s d i c t i o n . A l t h o u g h  
the majority of the delegations did prefer the three mile 
breadth, it would have been difficult to reach an agreement 
on that limit since proponents of this width were not in 
agreement themselves as to the exercise of special 
authority in contiguous zones. While some States 
demonstrated their readiness to recognize the rights of 
coastal States to exercise jurisdiction in a three-mile 
belt plus a contiguous zone, others refused pertinaciously 
to acknowledge the validity of any claims beyond three
(100) McDougal and Burke, op,cit.. Ref. (11) at 56, 
pp.232-233.
(101) No voting took place at the conference. The position 
of the attending States was as follows: nineteen 
States claimed 3 miles; four supported 4 miles; 
twelve advanced six miles and two abstained. See 
League of Nations, Final Act, Conference for the 
Codification of International Law, The Hague, March- 
April, 1930, pp.253-257.
(102) See Daintith and Others, op.cit., Ref. (4), at 9 , 
P.A201; Oda, op,cit., Ref. (92) at 79, p.376.
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miles.(103)
At any rate, the Conference passed a resolution 
recommending a new Conference on this subject and due to 
the adjournment, the problem of the maximum permissible 
breadth of territorial sea remained unsolved.
b . Role of the United Nations 
The ILC
Undoubtedly the sea, while it has always been of 
interest to man, is a source of friction and conflict. In 
the post-war period, many States intended to expand their
(103) See Act of the Conference for the Codification of
International Law, Plenary Meeting, Annex 10, 123- 
124, League of Nations Pub. No. C 351.M.145. 1930,
V; See also, Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref. (5), at 9, p. 
15. It may be observed that the British position,
for example, firmly supported the "territorial sea
belt of three miles without the exercise, as of 
right, of any powers by the coastal State in the 
contiguous zone See for further details,
Swarztrauber, op.cit., Ref. (5 ) at 12, p.137;
League of Nations Final Act, op,cit.. Ref. (101), 
at 81, pp.169-181, 254.
(104) Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92) at 79, p.376, Numerous 
opinions have been advanced to explain the failure 
of the Conference. Professor Jesse S. Reeves 
(1872-1942) ascribed the failure to two factors.
The unwillingness of the participant States to 
compromise was in his view, one of the two reasons.
He added, "this failure may be ascribed in the 
second place to what is believed to have been an 
erroneous view of the work and aim of the Commission. 
Following the instructions of the Conference, the 
Commission did not undertake to agree upon statements 
of existing international law, and so to limit 
itself, but it proceeded into the field of inter­
national law-making". See Reeves, Jesse S., "The 
Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters", AJIL, 
1930, Vol. 24, p.488. Another ground was given to 
explain the conference’s failure. The Chairman of 
the U.S. delegation attributed that failure to the 
extensivity of the program of the conference. He 
added; "The time alloted for its work was one month.. 
It is not desirable that international conferences 
should be conducted under such pressure". See Miller, 
Hunter, "The Hague Codification Conference" AJIL, 
1930, Vol. 24, p.693.
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territorial seas. Some claims simply took the shape of 
municipal legislations to widen the previous limits of 
territorial seas. Other States claimed rights exclusively 
for the purpose of fishing without any alteration in the 
extension of their territorial seas.
However, it had always been recognized that the 
extent of the territorial sea should be agreed upon to 
avoid a source of international conflict. Therefore, the 
U.N. in pursuit of its obligation according to Article 
13(1.a) of its Charter,(^^^^established the ILC by a 
resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 123rd 
Plenary meeting on 21 November, 1947 and entrusted to it 
the undertaking of the progressive development of 
international law and its codification giving the regime 
of the territorial sea priority on its agenda. Fifteen 
members of the Commission were chosen by the General 
Assembly during its third session in 1 9 4 8 . The 
Commission met for its first session in April 1949 and 
continued its work up until 1958. It laid down the 
foundations for the two U.N, Conferences on the Law of 
the Sea that followed. ^
(105) This Article provides that: "1. The General Assembly 
shall initiate and make recommendations for the 
purpose of: (a) promoting international cooperation 
in the political field and encouraging the progres­
sive development of international law and its 
codification". See Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (31) at 
20, p.7.
(106) The members were from Panama, Brazil, U.K., Mexico, 
Netherlands, China, U.S., Syria, U.S.S.R., India, 
Sweden, France, Greece, Colombia and Czechoslovakia. 
The first chairman of the Commission was Manley 0. 
Hudson from the U.S., YBILC, 1949, p.278.
(107) In recognition of the services of the Commission, 
the first Conference paid to it a "tribute of 
gratitude, respect and admiration - for its excellent 
preparatory work". See UNCLOS I, Official Records, 
Vol. II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.48.
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Several proposals were made in the various sessions
with respect to specific limits. These proposals were:
1. Some members of the Commission suggested conferring 
upon each coastal State (deriving from its sovereignty), 
the right to fix the limit of its territorial sea. 
Accordingly, whatever breadth of territorial sea was 
claimed, it was compatible with international law 
provided that it was justified by the real needs of the 
claimant State.
2. Another party in the Commission was of the opinion that 
the Commission should have recognized the fact that, 
although international practice was not uniform in the 
matter of the extent of the territorial sea, it did not 
recognize any extension beyond 12 miles. Each State 
therefore, was legally entitled to establish its 
territorial sea belt up to a limit of twelve miles.
3. A third view which emerged, called upon the Commission 
to admit that every coastal State was exclusively 
entitled to determine its territorial sea up to a limit 
of twelve miles. If, within those limits, the breadth 
was not fixed by long usage, it should not surpass 
what was indispensible for its justifiable interests, 
taking into account other States’ interests in maintain­
ing the freedom of the high sea, as well as, the maximum 
standard of the breadth generally applied in the region. 
In the case of a dispute, the question should be 
referred to the ICJ at the request of either of the 
parties concerned.
4. According to another opinion, each coastal State was
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entitled to determine its territorial sea zone in the 
light of its own economic and strategic needs within 
the limits of three and twelve miles, subject to 
recognition by States maintaining narrower belts.
5. The limit for the territorial sea according to the fifth 
proposal would be three miles. Wider limits, if based 
on customary law, should be recognized. On the other 
hand, any State might fix its territorial sea at a 
distance greater than three miles, but not enforce it 
against States that had not adopted or recognized an 
equal or greater breadth. In no case could the width 
of the territorial sea surpass twelve miles.
However, none of the aforesaid proposals succeeded in 
gaining the acceptance of the Commission. Thus, although 
the Commission was unable to advance any concrete proposal 
concerning the extent for the territorial sea,^^^^^ it 
nevertheless firmly recommended in its final draft that 
claims beyond twelve miles were not permissible.
Finally, the Commission set down its report including 
its final draft on the subject which was used as the basis 
of discussion at the Geneva Conference of 1958 on the Law 
of the Sea. Article 3 of the draft ran as follows:
"1. The Commission recognizes that inter­
national practice is not uniform as regards the 
delimitation of the territorial sea.
(108) Daintith and others, op.cit.. Ref. (4) at 9 ,
pp.A203-A2Q5; Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref, (5) at 9 , 
p.75.
(109) ILC Summary Records, (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN, 4/SR. 
309/10) 1955.
(110) YBIL, 1956, Vol. II, p.256.
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2, The Commission considers that international 
law does not permit an extension of the terri­
torial sea beyond twelve miles.
3, The Commission, without taking any decision 
as to the breadth of the territorial sea within 
that limit, notes on the one hand that many 
states have fixed a breadth greater than three 
miles, and on the other that many States do not 
recognize such a breadth when that of their own 
territorial sea is less,
4, The Commission considers that the breadth 
of the territorial sea should be fixed by an 
international conference.
Moreover, having forwarded the report to the General 
Assembly of the U.N., the Commission suggested that the 
General Assembly "summon an international Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries to examine the law of the sea",^^^^^
The Geneva Conference of 1958 on the Law of the Sea
Having acted upon the report of the ILC, the General 
Assembly suggested an international conference to consider 
the Commission’s draft. A large Conference on the law of 
the sea was convened in Geneva from February 24 to April 
27, 1958. This Conference was called to "examine the law 
of the sea taking into account not only the legal but also 
technical, economic, biological and political aspects of 
the problem, and to embody the results of its work in one 
or more international conventions or such other instruments
(111) YBILC, 1956, Vol. II, p.256.
(112) McDougal and Burke, op.cit.. Ref,(15) at 15, p.543
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as it may deem appropriate. ^
Prior to the Conference, 21 States out of 86 repres­
ented, asserted three miles as the extent for the 
territorial sea. Three of four Scandinavian countries 
claimed four miles and Cambodia claimed five miles. Twelve 
States asserted six miles. Mexico claimed nine miles and 
Albania ten. By that time, nineteen States claimed 
twelve miles or more.^^^^^
However, it was clear from the outset of the confer­
ence that the big maritime powers intended not to 
recognize claims greater than three miles or one league 
of territorial sea. They claimed that the said limit was 
the only fundamental principle of international law, and 
if any other extent was to be accepted it would be done so 
only for the purpose of reaching a general agreement.
On the other hand, most of the Soviet bloc, Arab League,
Asian, African and Latin American States did not admit that
(113) U.N. Gen. Ass., Official Records, 11th Sess. Supp.
No. 17(A/3572) 1956; Res. 1105(XI), February 21,
1957, UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. II, p.11;
See also Johnson, D.H.N., "The Geneva Conference on 
the Law of the Sea", YBWA, 1959, Vol. 13, pp.68-69.
(114) For further details see Bishop, op.cit., Ref. (2), 
at 8, pp.298-299.
(115) The U.K. delegate for example held the following 
view: "One of the matters which would be discussed
by the Conference was whether the limit should remain 
three miles. But for such a discussion to have any 
meaning at all, its starting point could only be 
the three-mile rule which was not only the traditional 
rule observed by a very great number of States over 
a very long period, but was also the only one which 
had commanded any general measure of agreement,
practical application and recognition ..... ".
UNCLOS I, Official Records, I-Committee, p.8. Similar 
views were held by the delegates of the U.S., the 
Netherlands, Japan and Germany. Ibid. pp, 12, 25,
26, 45. Furthermore, the delegations of Greece and 
Spain demonstrated their readiness to retrench their 
territorial seas limit from six to three miles.
Ibid., pp.22, 30.
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there had been any fundamental rule such as the three- 
mile limit either in practice or in theory. In their 
view, claiming twelve miles would never alter any existing 
major rule.^^^^^
As it appeared that there was no opportunity to 
resolve the most inordinately vital and controversial 
question facing the Conference namely that of the 
permissible limit for the territorial sea appertaining to 
a coastal State, various proposals were advanced to 
reconcile the two extremes of 3 and 12 m i l e s . N o n e  
of the compromise proposals put forward before the 
Conference succeeded in securing the necessary majority 
to allow its inclusion in the convention. The Conference 
therefore broke up and the controversial problem of 
reaching agreement upon the limit of territorial sea was 
left unsolved. The tedious debates served only to 
accentuate the many conflicting points of view. The 
Conference adopted a solution recommending the convening 
of another international conference for further consider­
ation of the questions left unresolved. ^
(116) The Soviet point of view regarding this matter was 
stated as follows.
"International law allowed the breadth of the 
territorial sea to be fixed within a limit of 
twelve miles ... History refuted the assertion that 
the three-mile limit was the only universally 
accepted rule in theory and practice...". Ibid., p. 
31. Similar views were repeated by the delegates of 
Saudi Arabia, Mexico and the Philippines. See ibid. 
pp, 135, 165, 170 respectively.
(117) See for instance, the joint Mexican and Indian 
proposal. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L.
(118) See UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. II, p.145.
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The 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea
It was evident that the preservation of peace and 
the maintaining of order on the seas could not be upheld 
unless an agreement on the limit of the territorial sea 
could be carried through. Therefore, the request of the 
1958 Conference to convene a new international conference 
was acted upon by the General Assembly of the U.N. at its 
13th Session in 1958. The Second Conference which was 
held in 1960 in Geneva, was specifically called to reconsider 
the question of the width of the territorial sea.^^^^^
The same views that had been laid before the previous 
Conference were reasserted at this Conference. The big 
maritime powers repeatedly stressed that the only inter­
nationally permissible extent of territorial sea was that 
of three m i l e s . A l s o ,  the Soviet and Arab blocs, 
and almost all of the Asian and African States, denied the
existence of three-mile limit rule.^^^^^ A twelve mile
(122 )extension, was once again suggested at this Conference.^ ^
(119) The Second Conference on the law of the sea met in 
Geneva from March 17 to April 27, 1960. It was atten­
ded by the representatives of 87 States. This 
Conference was called to take up several problems 
which had not been decided at the first Conference in 
1958. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L.56; UNCLOS II, Plenary 
Meetings (A/CONF.13/38) p.145. Res. 1307 (XIII) was 
adopted by the Gen, Ass. December 10, 1958. See U.N. 
Doc. A/Res. 1307 (XIII) 1958; UNYB, 1958, pp.381- 
383; See also Jessup, Philip C ., "The Law of the Sea 
Around Us", AJIL, 1961, Vol. 55, p.104.
(120) See for example the statement of the French delegate, 
UNCLOS II, Official Records, p.117.
(121) See for instance the view expressed by the Saudi 
Arabian delegate. UNCLOS II, Official Records, pp,
38, 119, 145.
(122) See the U.S.S.R. Proposal. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/C. 
1/L.l.
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( 123 )Two other proposals were submitted, one by Mexico alone^ ^
and the other by Mexico in addition to sixteen other 
countries including Iraq and Iran.^^^^^ Both proposals 
were withdrawn and the same sixteen countries, together 
with Venezuela, then submitted a joint proposal according 
to which each coastal State would be entitled to fix the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit of twelve
miles.(125)
However, these proposals failed to get the necessary 
majority vote. Therefore, a number of countries including 
Iraq suggested the adoption of the following resolution:
"The Second United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, considering that there still 
exists wide disagreement on the question of the 
breadth of the territorial sea,
1. Requests the Secretary of the U.N. to 
include in the provisional agenda of the 
twentieth session of the General Assembly an 
item regarding the advisability of convening, 
at an appropriate date, another U.N. conference 
to examine further the question of the breadth 
of the territorial sea;
2. Requests all States participant in this 
Conference which had declared their independence 
prior to 24 October 1945 to abstain from 
extending the present breadth of their territorial 
sea, pending the consideration of this question
by the General Assembly at the aforesaid session;
(123) The Mexican Proposal was substantially the same as
the U.S.S.R. Proposal. See U.N. Doc, A/CONF. 19/C
1/L. 2.
(124) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/C. 1/L,6.
(125) U.N, Doc. A/CONF. 19/C. 1/L, 2/Rev. 1.
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3, Recognizes that, without prejudice to the 
question of the breadth of the territorial and 
pending the consideration of this question 
by the General Assembly, any State is entitled 
to exercise in the sea adjacent to its coast 
up to a limit of twelve nautical miles measured 
from the applicable baseline the same rights in 
respect of fishing and the exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea as it has in its 
territorial sea."^^^^^
As it was expected that the Conference would be
adjourned without making a decision on the subject, the
U.S. and Canada submitted a revised unsuccessful joint
(127 )proposal. Had one of the States which were opposed
to this proposal abstained from the voting, it would have
received the necessary majority. Thus, the States
represented at the Conference did not reach an agreement,
( 128 )
and the question remained undecided.'
(126) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/C. 1/L. 9.
(127) It may be appropriate to produce in part the 
proposal which was defeated because of a single vote
"1. A State is entitled to fix the breadth of its 
territorial sea up to a maximum of six nautical 
miles measured from the applicable baseline.
2. A State is entitled to establish a fishing 
zone contiguous to its territorial sea extending to 
a maximum limit of twelve nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the breadth of its territorial 
sea is measured, in which it shall have the same 
rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation 
of the living resources of the sea as it has in its 
territorial sea.
3. Any State whose vessels have made a practice 
of fishing in the outer six miles of the fishing 
zone established by the coastal State, in accordance 
with paragraph 2 above, for the period of five 
years immediately preceding 1 January 1958, may 
continue to do so for a period of ten years from
31 October I960...".
See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/C. 1/L. 10.
(128) Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92), at 79, p.380.
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Rules Emerging from the Third Conference on the Law of 
the Sea.
Undoubtedly, economic, scientific, security and 
political interests of States are overwhelmingly affected 
by rules of the Law of the Sea, Dissatisfaction with 
the existing rules regulating the legal regime of matters 
concerning the law of the sea, the hiatus in most of the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1958 and the over­
whelming acknowledgement that achieving an explicit 
convention as to the law of the sea would remove a potential 
source of controversy between States, all pressed the U.N. 
to convene a new Conference to codify a new comprehensive 
convention on the subject.
In December 1970, the U.N. therefore adopted a
onven:
(131)
resolution^^^^) calling for the c ening of a third
Conference on the Law of the Sea.
However, it does not seem necessary for present
purposes to examine each and every proposal or provision,
nor to state in detail the legal position which each State
put forward before the Conference as would respond ideally
( 132 )to its own interests.^ Rather, it will be attempted
here to make brief mention to the main attitudes taken 
before the Conference as to the breadth of the territorial 
sea.
(129) Alexander, Lewis M„ and others, "The Costs of 
Failure at the Third Law of the Sea Conference",
J. Marit. Law Com. 1977, Vol. 9, No. 1, p.2.
(130) Resolution 2750 (XXV)C, M December 1970, U.N. Monthly 
Chronicle, January 1971 p.37; ILM, Vol.10, 1971, p.224.
(131) Hereinafter will be referred to as "UNCLOS III".
(132) Having been held in Caracas, the Conference had before 
it the results of the work of the U.N. Sea Bed 
Committee, proposals made by States on one or more
Contd..,
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Accordingly, it may be noted that, at the very early 
sessions of the Conference three major trends surfaced in 
this regard. Amongst views put forward, the first 
favoured formula (A) which would permit each coastal State 
to establish a belt of territorial sea up to 12 miles. 
Formula (B) which would allow coastal States to extend 
their territorial sea up to 200 miles, represented another 
trend put before the Conference. The third tendency was 
to call for recognition of a 12 mile limit coupled with a 
200 mile economic zone over which a coastal State would
( 133 ")
have sovereignty.^
However, it was clear from the outset of the 
Conference that there was widespread agreement on a 12 
mile maximum limit for the territorial sea.^^^^^
Clearly, certain prerequisite conditions had to be 
brought about before a number of States would accept the 
twelve mile limit. That is to say, other issues surely 
had first to be satisfactorily resolved. International 
guarantees for unimpeded transit through and over
international straits used for international navigation^^^^^
(132) contd...
issues and a number of studies prepared by the U.N. 
Secretariat at the Committee's request. See 
Martinez, Arthur D ., "The Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: Prospects, 
Expectations, and Realities", J. Marit. Law, Com.
1975, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp.268-269. Stevenson and Oxman, 
op.cit.. Ref. (115) at 47, p.3.
(133) Ganz, op.cit.. Ref. (126) at 50, pp.18-20.
(134) Apart from few alternatives intended not to approve 
that limit such as, for instance, the proposals 
submitted by Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador, Panama and 
Peru, Even the U.K. as well as Greece, the U.S. and 
others approved the twelve mile limit after a long 
opposition. For further details see Stevenson, John 
R ., and Bernard H. Oxman, "The Preparations for the 
Law of the Sea Conference", AJIL, 1974, Vol. 68,p.9, 
Knight, op.cit., Ref. (1) at 8, pp.332-337.
(135) Stevenson and Oxman, ibid.,pp.9 et seq.
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and an additional zone of 188-mile (e.z.) had to be
g i v e n , T r u e  as this may be, nevertheless, these
facts do not affect the validity of the aforegoing
conclusion. Whatever may have been the reason for
preparing to accept the 12 mile limit, this acceptance
would remain sufficient to reflect the wide support of
delegations in favour of a twelve-mile limit for
territorial sea. A more detailed look at the texts of
the subsequent sessions of the conference would strengthen
(137 )the validity of this observation.^ It may be said
that there was virtually no reference to any other limit
in open d e b a t e . A d d i t i o n a l  support for the
preceding observation may be found in the Informal
( 139 )Composite Negotiating Text, the latest version of the
draft articles based on the negotiations of the UNCLOS
111.(140) According to the provision of the "ICNT"
(136) Stevenson and Oxman, op.cit., Ref. (134) at 93, 
pp.9-12; and op.cit., Ref. (115), at 47, pp.13,14.
(137) Alexander and others, op.cit.. Ref. (129) at 92, 
p.3. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Part 
II bears an Introductory Note that states: "It 
should therefore, be quite clear that the ICNT will 
serve as a procedural device and only provide a 
basis for negotiation. It must not in any case be 
regarded as affecting either the status of proposals 
already made by the delegations to submit amendments 
or new proposals". See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/W.P.8/ 
Part II May 7, 1975, p.l; See also Stevenson, John R 
and Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 197 5 Geneva 
Session", AJIL, 1975, Vol. 69, pp.771-773.
(138) See above, p.93»
(139) Hereinafter will be referred to as "ICNT".
(140) U.N. Doc’ A/CONF. 62/WP. 10, 15 July 1977. This 
composite text replaces the earlier Revised Single 
Negotiating Text (RSNT). See UNCLOS III, Official 
Records, Vol. V, 1976, pp.125-185. It may be noted 
that the articles in the ICNT are numbered in one 
sequence, in contrast to those of the (RSNT) in 
which the articles in each of the four parts were 
separately numbered.
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pertinent to the subject, the permissible breadth of the
territorial sea is fixed at 12 nautical miles. Article
(3) of the ICNT provides that:
"Every State has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit 
not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured 
from baselines determined in accordance with 
the present convention.
III. The Current Extent of the Territorial Sea
To understand the present internationally admitted 
extent of the territorial sea, one must first acknowledge 
that the conflicting views as to the subject, as discussed 
above, are one of the recurring and fundamental problems 
in the law of the sea. The complexity is due chiefly to 
the fact that claims to establish a particular breadth 
for the territorial sea over which jurisdictional claims 
are to be exercised, are today notable for their extreme 
variety and contrasting consequences. It is further 
confusing that of all the conferences held for this 
purpose, none succeeded in fixing a lawful breadth for 
the territorial sea.^^^^^
Indeed, as a matter of state practice, the breadth is 
not presently uniform. Although most States assert 
jurisdiction, and recognize that of others, over a breadth 
of territorial sea of no more than twelve miles, some now
(141) A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add 1, p.21.
(142) Reeves, Jesse S., op.cit., Ref. (104)^ at 82, 
pp.486-499; See also UNCLOS I, Official Records,
Vol. II (Plenary Meetings), Vol. Ill, I Committee 
(TS & CZ); See also, UNCLOS II, Official Records, 
Hudson, Manley 0., "The First Conference for the 
Codification of International Law", AJIL, 1930,
Vol. 24, pp.447-466.
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claim a territorial sea extending out to a 200-mile limit. 
Furthermore, there is great variation even among the claims 
for twelve miles or less. This uncertainty is due to 
the dissimilarity in the interests of the various States 
Undoubtedly, States carrying out a great deal of seaborne 
trade, having great oceanic fleets, and a strong navy, have 
vital interests in the oceans. Their interests, both 
military and economic, are also of vital importance. Thus, 
they seek free movement for their fleets, submarines and 
aircraft, without any sort of interference, since in this 
way they are able to benefit fully from the principle of 
freedom of the seas. Obviously, they advocate a narrow 
territorial sea.^^^^^ Opposing this trend is the view 
of States with a feeble navy, fishing only in adjacent 
waters, and engaging largely in their own coastal trade. 
These States are evidently concerned with keeping other 
countries' vessels as far as possible out of the waters 
adjacent to their shores. Having taken advantage of 
their unique proximity to the sea, they usually tend to 
respect a wider belt of territorial sea.^^^^^
Reasons in support of wider and narrower territorial 
sea are our concern in the following pages.
a . Reasons in Support of a Narrower Territorial Sea
The main argument advanced by the great maritime 
powers is that the seas, unlike land masses, submit to
(143) Daintith and others, op.cit.. Ref.(4), at 9,
P.A201; Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. (4) at 9, p.87.
(144) Bowett, op.cit., Ref. (3), at 1, pp.7-9; Akehurst 
Michael, "A Modern Introduction to International 
Law", 1975, p.213.
(145) Bishop, op.cit.. Ref. (2 ) at 8, p.297.
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common use, for miscellaneous purposes by numerous 
claimants. Accordingly, they should be preserved for 
the fullest, rational and abundant use of all, without 
interference or impediment. The following reasons out­
lined are held to support this view:
1. Freedom of Navigation
The concept of freedom of the sea is repeatedly 
asserted by States who seek to protect claims to the more 
inclusive uses of the sea. Great maritime States with 
much ocean-going shipping and large merchant fleets, 
apparently wish to range as freely as possible over the 
oceans without interference. They understandably 
therefore oppose any extension of coastal States’ 
jurisdiction over belts of waters adjacent to their coasts, 
since freedom of navigation, which is in their interest, 
is only secured on the high seas.^^^^^ This notion was 
advanced by the U.S. and the U.K. delegations at the 1958 
C o n f e r e n c e . I t  was stated by the U.S. delegate in 
justification, that had the permissible limit for 
territorial sea been extended, merchant ships would have 
had to make longer and more costly runs in order to 
skirt the extended territorial seas. Consequently, this
would be a burden on States dependent on seaborne
Th 
(149)
t r a d e . T h i s  line was reiterated in the 1960
Conference.
(146) Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92), at 79, p.384.
(147) See the Proposal submitted by the U.K. U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 13/C 1/L. 134.
(148) See the U.S. delegate’s view, UNCLOS I, Official 
Records I Committee, p.26.
(149) UNCLOS II, Official Records, p.45.
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2. Safety of Shipping
This was held to support the view of narrowing
territorial sea. The U.S. delegation at the 1958
Conference on the Law of the Sea, for instance, stated that:
"Many landmarks still used for visual piloting 
by small craft were not visible at a range of 
twelve miles; only 20% of the world's lighthouses 
had a range exceeding that distance; radar 
navigation was of only marginal utility beyond 
twelve miles; and many vessels 'which frequently 
did not wish to enter the territorial sea' did 
not carry sufficient cable or appropriate equip­
ment to anchor at the depths normally found 
outside the twelve-mile limit.
Once again, at the second Geneva Conference on the 
Law of the Sea in 1960, this approach was adopted by the 
U.S. d e l e g a t e . I t  was emphasized at the second 
conference that any extension of coastal States 
jurisdiction over belts of oceans would endanger seamen, 
as it would isolate them from navigation aids. Many 
shipping routes, according to the U.K. delegate, not only 
facilitate navigation but offer the advantage of protection 
from harm in cases of emergency.
3. Fishery Interests
Perhaps not surprisingly. States' attitudes as to the 
limit for the territorial sea are usually affected largely 
by fisheries interests. It may be added that the
(150) UNCLOS I, Official Records - I Committee, p.26.
(151) See the U.S. delegate's statement, UNCLOS II, Official 
Records, p.45.
(152) UNCLOS II, Official Records, p.56.
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controversies over fisheries divide countries, whether
they are otherwise friendly or not. That is to say, not
only does disagreement rage between the Soviet Bloc and
the western countries, but also between military allies.
Professor Bingham wrote in this respect;
"Indeed, there is no phase of the history of
international affairs which evidences more
strikingly the part which selfish national
interests play in the development of the
doctrines of international law than the
history of fishery claims and their effects
on legal opinions concerning the law of
( 153 )jurisdiction over sea areas.
Therefore, the question of fishery interests was 
repeatedly canvassed at the Geneva Conference, Clearly, 
States with advanced fishing practice were very much 
concerned to secure the enjoyment of fishing in off-shore 
areas of other States. Hence, they feared extending 
territorial sea limits as this would harm their fishing 
interests,  ^ Furthermore, they deny that extending 
territorial sea areas would serve the fishery interests 
of coastal States. In their view, no uniform breadth of 
territorial sea, whatever it might be, could encompass
(153) Bingham, Joseph Walter "Report on the International 
Law of Pacific Coast Fisheries", 1938, p.l; Oda, 
Shigeru, "The Territorial Sea and Natural Resources, 
ICLQ, 1955, vol. 4, pp.415-425.
(154) See for example, the statement of the U.K. delegate 
in the Geneva Conference. UNCLOS I, Official Records- 
I Committee, pp.104-105. The French delegate at the 
same onference stated that the extension of the 
width of the territorial sea to six miles would mean 
a loss of 14% of their annual catch for the 55,000 
Frenchmen engaged in such activities. See UNCLOS I, 
Official Records, I Committee, p.Ill; See, too,the 
Statement of the Italian delegate in the UNCLOS II, 
Official Records, p.64,
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the range within which fish move during their life-span. 
Consequently, no unilateral conservation or exploitation 
would make sense.
4. National Defence and Security Interests
A frequent argument concerned the intrusion of enemy 
craft close to States' shores, endangering their defences. 
Such an argument assumes that a wide territorial sea is in 
the interests of national security.  ^ As to this 
contention. States who support a narrower territorial sea 
refuted this plea on the grounds that it is not fully 
justified. They took the position that in the light of 
current state of ordnance, no extent of territorial sea 
whatever could preserve national security.  ^ The 
U.S. delegation to the 1958 Geneva C o n f e r e n c e , ^  while 
having admitted the importance of national security, 
justified the narrow territorial sea from an entirely 
different angle. It stated that extending territorial 
seas would,if accepted, burden neutral States, which would 
be unable to protect greater areas of territorial sea 
against warships of belligerents. ^
(155) McDougal and Burke, op,cit., Ref. (1), at 11, 
p p .259-260.
(156) See below pp. 102-103.
(157) McDougal and Burke, ibid., pp.482-485; Whiteman, op. 
cit., Ref. ( 5), at 9, p.187.
(158) UNCLOS I, Official Records, I Committee, p.26; See 
Dean, Arthur H; "Freedom of the Seas" For. Aff., 
1958-59, Vol. 37, pp.83-93.
(159) The real concern of the U.S. as to this point, was 
clarified by Mr, Arthur Dean, Chairman of the U.S. 
delegation at both the 1958 and 1960 Conferences.
In an article published after the Geneva Convention 
of 1958, he reflects on the danger of Russian 
submarines as follows; "An extension of the 
territorial sea of neutral nations would dramatically
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5. Responsibility of Coastal States
It is also argued, in support of a narrower 
territorial sea, that coastal States not only acquire 
privileges from the regime of territorial sea, but also 
are bound by an obligation to keep order and peace 
therein.
Therefore, as mentioned above, it was contended that 
a twelve mile territorial sea would impose an additional 
burden on neutral States in times of war.^^^^^ The U.K. 
delegation to the UNCLOS II pointed out in addition, that 
it was not only difficult, but also costly, to control a 
wide territorial sea belt. Moreover, modern warfare 
makes it difficult to fix precisely the position of ships 
at sea. Therefore, the probability of incidents would 
be increased, which in turn would be conducive to 
endangering the safety of coastal States.
(159) contd.
increase the striking power of enemy submarines. If 
the territorial sea were extended to twelve miles, 
an enemy submarine, particularly one with atomic 
power which might operate for long periods without 
surfacing, could operate possibly undetected under 
waters in a neutral State's territorial sea. But our 
surface ships could not operate on the surface of 
these waters within the territorial sea without 
risking charges of violating such State's neutrality. 
An extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles 
might thus make an enemy fleet of submarines, capable 
of discharging missiles from near the coast, practical­
ly inviolable while operating under water in the 
territorial seas of neutral nations. Of course any 
such increase in the effectiveness of underwater 
power is to the benefit of the Soviet Union, which 
today has some 475 submarines, many of them long- 
range types." See Dean, Arthur H., "The Geneva 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was Accompli­
shed .'’A JIL, 1958, Vol. 52, pp.610-611.
(160) Dean, op.cit.. Ref. (1 ), at 8, p.755.
(161) UNCLOS II, Official Records, p.56. See similar views 
of the U.S., UNCLOS I, Official Records - I Committee, 
p.26, of Canada, UNCLOS II, Official Records, p.50;
of Pakistan, ibid., p.86; of Liberia, ibid., p.88, 
and of Iran, ibid., p.104,
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b . Reasons in Support of Wider Territorial Sea
In turning now to the arguments of those States who 
advocate the exclusive interests of coastal States, it 
should be noted that they, on the contrary, concentrate 
on security considerations, and protecting the economic 
interests. They justify their claims chiefly in terms 
of the following:
1. Freedom of Navigation
This claim, in support of a narrower territorial sea, 
is refuted on the grounds that the right of "innocent 
passage" would be conceded to foreign merchant s h i p p i n g ^ ^  
Thus a wider territorial sea would not adversely affect 
the freedom of navigation. ^
2. Safety of Shipping
The difficulty referred to by the U.S. delegation, 
of safety of s h i p p i n g , w a s  answered by other 
delegations. The argument was not unique to the twelve 
mile width, they said, it appeared also to have equal 
validity concerning the six mile limit.
3. National Defence and Security Considerations
This was also referred to in support of the policy 
for a wider extension of the territorial sea. The Soviet
(162) Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92) at 79, p.384.
(163) E.g. the U.S.S.R. UNCLOS II, Official Records, pp.
39 and 146; India, ibid., p.77; Tunisia, ibid. p.111.
(164) See above p. 98.
(165) See the Saudi Arabian Delegate Statement, UNCLOS II, 
Official Records, p.119. The same tenor was 
supported by the Iranian delegate, ibid., p.104,
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Union, or rather the entire Soviet Bloc and other states, 
claimed that the three-mile width was insufficient for 
security. Thus, they argued that a broader belt was 
necessary in order to maintain the security of coastal 
S t a t e s . T h o s e  States, in particular, fear the 
possible approach of enemy warships to their coastlines ^ ^
4. Fishery Interests
It has been argued that fishing in the territorial 
sea is to be exclusively reserved for the coastal State^^^^^ 
Hence, each coastal State which depends economically on 
fisheries, undoubtedly wishes to widen its territorial 
sea as much as possible. This in turn excludes foreign 
fishermen from exploiting its coastal off-shore belt.^^^^^
In other words, the desire to control and profit 
exclusively from fish and other resources of the sea, 
makes it important to widen the territorial sea, in order 
to preserve these resources from foreign exploitation.
After this clarification, however, to one seeking to 
discern present day legitimate extent, it is pertinent to 
ask what the present permissible breadth for territorial 
sea is? Since an agreed international limit does not
(166) Oda, op.cit., Ref. (92) at 79, p.384; Whiteman, op. 
cit., Ref. ( 5) at 9, p.87.
(167) Such views are those of the Indian and the Iranian 
delegates to the 1960 Conference, See UNCLOS II, 
Official Records, pp.77, 104 respectively.
(168) McDougal and Burke, op.cit., Ref. ( 1 ) at 11, p.453.
(169) Such as Iceland, Ecuador and Korea, See Swartztrauber, 
op.cit.. Ref. (5) at 12, pp.180-183.
(170) Jennings, op.cit., Ref. (63), at 32, p.382.
(171) Bishop, op.cit.. Ref, ( 2), at 8, p.300.
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exist, the answer remains in dispute. It was suggested
that there is no law governing this question between the
three-mile and twelve-mile limits. A holder of this view
is Professor Johnston who states that:
"The customary 3-mile rule relating to the
breadth of the territorial sea has certainly
not survived the 1958 and 1960 Geneva
Conferences on the Law of the Sea, if general
consent is the basis of custom, despite the
fact that neither conference could agree on a
suitable substitute. Consensually, the
result of these findings is no-law, not a
( 172 )reversion to the old customary rule."
It must be added that States' attitudes concerning 
this question, are many and varied. It is repeatedly 
asserted by the great maritime powers that the only 
international rule is that of three miles. They also 
state that they consider themselves relieved from the
(173 )obligation to accept any compromise proposal suggested.
The attitude of countries from the Soviet bloc, Afro- 
Asian group, and Latin America, is that the failure of the 
international conferences to agree upon a specific limit, 
is evidence tantamount to a full denial of the three mile
n74)
rule. However, the current position as to the
breadth of the territorial sea is full of uncertainty.
In the absence of a conventional rule, nations claimed 
various widths.
(172) Johnston,D.M., "The International Law of Fisheries", 
1965, p.118.
(173) UNCLOS I, Official Records - I Committee, pp.105,
171, 183, 186; See also UNCLOS II, Official Records, 
pp.32-35.
(174) UNCLOS I, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, p.37.
(175) See the table cited in Knight, op.cit.. Ref. (1 ) 
at 8 , p.329.
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To say this is not to detract from the validity of the 
presently existing rule, which is our concern in the 
following stage.
IV. Conclusion and Evaluation
Clearly, the concepts of the freedom of the sea and 
territorial sea go back about three hundred years, to the 
time when two Dutch jurists Cornelius Bynkershoek and 
Hugo Grotius stated the opinion that a ruler could not 
exercise jurisdiction over a belt of sea, wider than was 
capable of being defended from the land.
During the nineteenth century, the most generally 
accepted limit for territorial sea was measured by the 
"cannon-shot range". Meanwhile, the view was held that 
the zone of sea over which States enjoyed sovereignty, was 
three miles. However, the "cannon-shot" and the "three- 
mile" rule were considered to be equivalent.
Not only jurists disagreed about the extent of the 
territorial sea, but several States also made claims about 
varying limits. By 1900, in addition to claims for the 
traditional three-mile width, there were some claims for 
an extension to six miles, and even more. Some States 
claimed a four-mile territorial sea. In addition to this, 
a small minority of powers advocated that the appropriate 
limit for the territorial sea should not be uniform. 
Accordingly, this limit could be varied in the light of 
each States' interests. Thus in conclusion no firm 
agreement was reached as to the breadth of the territorial
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sea either in theory or practice. ^
In the midst of such uncertainty, the 1930 Hague
Conference was convened. Despite the preparation for
( 177 )the Conference,^ it failed to draft a uniform rule
concerning the breadth of the territorial sea. It may 
be useful to point out that this failure is attributed to 
the widely divergent views held by the States concerned.
The big maritime powers insisted on the adoption of the 
three mile rule whilst other States favoured either 
extensions of this or the three mile breadth plus 
additional contiguous zones.
Both the 1958 and 1960 Conferences on the Law of the 
Sea, held under the auspices of the U.N., met with the 
same lack of success. States proposed numerous limits, 
ranging from the traditional three miles to 200 miles.
The economic, political and security interests, as well as 
the geographical, historical and economic circumstances of 
each State were so vitally important at the time, that 
States were slow to make concessions for the sake of 
reaching a solution. The major maritime powers again 
sought to keep the width of the territorial sea as narrow 
as possible in order that their vessels could enjoy 
maximum freedom of operation at sea. It is important to 
remember that there was another line of thought concerning 
honouring the twelve mile limit since it would be
(176) For further details concerning the varying views, 
see Fawcett, J.E.S., "General Course on Public 
Internation Law", Hague Recueil, 1971, I, Vol. 132, 
pp.447-450; McDougal and Burke, op.cit.. Ref. (11), 
at 56, p.232.
(177) Conference for the Codification of International Law, 
Basis of Discussion, L.N. Pub. No. C.74 M39129 v.
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more appropriate. Additionally, the trend towards a more 
extensive territorial sea belt was greater than it had 
been when the Hague Conference was held. Therefore, no 
agreement on the question was reached.
It is possible to infer from the above that the issue 
of territorial sea breadth is an obstinate problem. 
International law as yet has not reached the necessary 
consensus of opinion to establish a conventional, 
indisputable rule. In these circumstances one has to 
find whether or not any customary rule is in existence.
The vital point in solving this problem, it is 
submitted, consists of striking some equitable balance 
between the valid exclusive interests of individual States 
and the vital inclusive interests of the international 
community at large. That is to say that establishing 
more extensive widths to gain increased protection and 
expansion for the exclusive claims of coastal States, on 
the grounds that the coastal States' interests require a 
broader extent of sovereignty, is not justified. Such a 
view ignores not only the exclusive interests of non­
coastal States, but also the inclusive interests of the 
international community which in turn serves, in the 
long term, the exclusive interests of the individual 
States. It also fails to recognize that these ostensibly 
contradictory interests are not incompatible or that the
long-term interest of the individual States will not be
( 178 ^well served if all States make exorbitant claims.^ ____
(178) Alvarado Garaicoa, Teodoro, "The Continental Shelf
and the Extension of Territorial Waters", Mia Law Q, 
Vol.10, Part 4, 1956, p.490.
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On the other hand, concentration on the interests of 
the international community, by insisting upon a three 
mile zone, on the grounds that this is the only width 
responsive to the overall good, is not fully justified.
Such a narrow belt of territorial sea only serves the 
interests of a number of States, namely, those which have 
large oceanic fishing fleets and strong navies. Obviously 
international law protects not only the inclusive interests 
of the international community but the exclusive interests 
of individual States as well. Thus, such a view weakens, 
if it does not completely ignore, half of the function of 
the law of the sea,^^®^^ Consequently, if expanding the 
limit of the territorial sea ensures the exclusive 
interests of individual States on waters adjacent to their 
coastlines, then concentration on narrowing territorial 
sea limits equally secures the exclusive interests of a 
number of States which are able to benefit fully from the 
principle of the freedom of the seas, not only on waters 
adjacent to their own coasts but also adjacent to the 
shores of other States. This deprives the latter from 
utilizing these waters notwithstanding the fact that their 
right to do so is more easily justified.
The facts which have been adduced make it clear that 
the attainment of an ideal width lies in preserving both 
exclusive and inclusive interests asserted by claimant 
States. Not only should the degree of economic 
development, naval strength and other circumstances unique
(179) Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. ( 4) at 9 , pp.82-83.
(180) McDougal and Burke, op.cit.. Ref. (15 ), at 15, 
p .546 .
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to each State be taken into a c c o u n t , b u t  also the
principles of international law and the interests of the
international community. One might just as well suggest
that neither of the two extreme attitudes, namely, the
traditional three mile limit and the trend towards
extravagant, extensive widths, serve adequately the two
sets of conflicting interests. That is to say, a more
satisfactory solution might be found in achieving a balance
which would protect effectively both the legitimate
exclusive needs of underdeveloped nations in belts of
water adjacent to their shores, thus permitting a State to
take advantage of its unique position and the equally
important inclusive interests of all states in the free
passage through these waters. The fullest possible and
most peaceful use of the sea is in the interest of all
States, both individually and collectively. Opposing
values must be reconciled when conflict arises, in order to
obtain maximum efficiency from the sea for the benefit of 
/182 )
all States. In order to serve these mutual interests,
the maritime powers will have to accept that there must be 
some means of limiting the distance that they can extend 
their territorial sea.
It might be contended that the three mile limit has 
been accepted for centuries, therefore it is the only
(181) This view is held by those States who claim that 
each coastal State should have the right to deter­
mine exclusively the width of its territorial sea 
to whatever extent its needs demand. See the 
statements of the representatives of Bulgaria,
Romania, Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. at the 
UNCLOS II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/8, pp.24,27,65, 105 
and 146 respectively.
(182) McDougal and Burke, op.cit.. Ref. (1) at 11, p.52.
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established customary rule, and remains valid for all
( 133 )States since it has not been replaced by any other rule.
For this argument, it may be stated that this claim 
has indeed become an oft debated topic in the literature 
of the law of the sea. Whilst it is correct to say that 
the three-mile limit had been strongly supported by powers 
very influential in the international law-making process, 
this is no reason for ignoring that it has never been 
universally honoured, as will be discussed later. 
Additionally, an increasing number of claims for a twelve 
mile zone have been made. This has been achieved by 
legislative action in the Socialist States, some of the 
Latin American States and the Asian and African countries 
There appears to be widespread support for accepting twelve 
miles as the maximum breadth of the territorial sea.^^^^^ 
This limit would seem to be the legitimate limit for the 
following reasons :
1. The three-mile limit rule as a standard width to which- 
each State should extend sovereignty over its adjacent 
waters, is not universally accepted as an international 
law ruling today. It may be true that it has been 
observed by States who have had great influence in the 
international law-making process, but one has to admit 
that it has never been generally recognized. Claims for 
wider limits were made and practised, concurrently with
(183) See the statements of the representatives of the 
U.K., France, Japan, the U.S. and the German Federal 
Republic at the UNCLOS I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, 
pp.8, 19, 25 and 26 respectively.
(184) Knight, op.cit.. Ref, ( 1 ) at 8, pp.319-330.
(185) Knight, op.cit., Ref. ( 1) at 8, pp.319-330.
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the three-mile l i m i t . T h e  four-mile rule for
instance, has been adopted in practice by the Scandinavian
( 187 )countries without serious opposition.^ Spain also,
since the eighteenth century, has had the limit of her
( 188 ^territorial sea fixed at six miles,^ and greater widths
have indeed been claimed: twelve miles, for example, by
Russia since 1910.
Along this line Professor Yepes has asserted that:
"... it can be concluded that the three-mile
rule as a maximum territorial sea limit, does
not have today juridical existence as a principle 
of contemporary international law. The rule 
constitutes one of the ido fori which modern 
criticism and world needs have knocked down from 
its pedestal.
Similarly, in the "Principles of Mexico" adopted by 
the Inter-American Council at its Third Meeting in Mexico 
City in January and February of 1956 this was made very 
clear. The first of these principles stated that:
(186) Sweden adopted the four-mile limit in the eight­
eenth century. See above pp.75-77.
(187) The U.K. recognized that the Norwegian claim for 
four-miles was acceptable in view of Norway's 
persistent policy throughout the long period, and 
the increasing disposition to acquiesce to it. ICJ 
Reports, 1951,pp.128 et seq.
(188) Spain fixed her territorial sea at six miles on 
December 17, 1760. She also averred that on May 1, 
1775; May 3, 1830 and June 20, 1852. See Swarz- 
trauber, op.cit., Ref, (5), at 12, pp.90-91.
(189) Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (5) at 9, pp.175-178.
(190) Cited in Szekely Sanchez, Alberto, "A Study of the 
Contribution of the Latin-American States to the 
Development of the International Law of the Sea 
Since 1945" Thesis submitted to the University 
College of London, Ph.D., 1975, p.149; Cheng, Tao, 
"Communist China and the Law of the Sea", AJIL, 
Vol. 63, 1969, pp.53-56.
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"... the three-mile extension to delimit the 
territorial sea is insufficient and does not 
constitute a general rule of international law.
For this reason it is justified to widen the 
maritime zone traditionally called territorial 
sea."(191)
Finally, there can be no better quotation than a
passage from Mr. Swarztrauber's conclusion in this respect:
"Certainly, the three-mile limit existed as a rule 
of international law by the mid-1920's. True, 
it may well be that it had been a law for the many 
dictated by the few. The great maritime powers 
had been in a position to manipulate adherence or
at least compliance, with the three-mile rule.
Doubtlessly there were several, perhaps many.
States that did not necessarily agree with the 
rule which they obeyed, for in 1930, when given a 
gentlemen's chance to be heard, the lesser countries 
spoke out against the rule. Professor Bingham 
was saying that there never had been general 
agreement and in this latter sense he was probably
right."(192)
2. Further evidence of the validity of the breadth of 
12-miles as an accepted limit for the territorial sea may
be found in the record of the ILC. Article 3 of the
Commission's draft indicated clearly that the extent of 
twelve miles for territorial sea was in accordance with 
international law.^^^^^ Often resorted to is the state-
(191) Ibid.
(192) Swarztrauber, op.cit.. Ref. (5), at 12, p.151.
(193) It is worth quoting in part Article 3 which read 
as follows: "1 - The Commission recognizes that 
international practice is not uniform as regards 
the delimitation of the territorial sea. 2 - The 
Commission considers that international law does 
not permit an extension of the territorial sea 
beyond twelve miles See YBILC, 1956, Vol. II,
p .256.
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ment of the Commission's rapporteur at the UNCLOS I in 
which he repudiated that the Commission had meant to admit 
the legality of the twelve mile extent or any other 
specific limit as a standard breadth. This argument 
appears to assume that this remained a non liquet issue 
for the diplomats to deal with.^^^^^ For this contention 
to be answered, it is submitted that it does not lessen 
the fact that the twelve-mile width is an accepted extent. 
The full implications of this statement can only be 
interpreted as showing that a twelve-mile limit is not 
inconsistent with international law. Here then is 
evidence to show that international law does not record 
any existing rule on this point other than to repudiate 
the legitimacy of claims for breadths greater than twelve 
miles. This goes to show that the Commission was unable 
to recognize not only the twelve-mile limit, but also any 
other limit. If such a conclusion is correct, and there 
seems to be nothing to contradict this, why did the 
Commission not settle for a breadth between three miles 
and another limit narrower or greater than twelve miles?
The only plausible inference can be that any distance up 
to twelve miles has been recognized as permissible.
Another clause in the ILC's draft may be invoked as 
an indication to support the view that the commission did 
not mean to allow coastal States to extend their territorial 
seas unilaterally to the maximum of twelve miles. One 
might infer, it may be contended,from Article 66,according 
to which the contiguous zone could not be extended beyond
(194) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39.
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twelve miles, that the territorial sea consequently, 
could not be so a fortiori, otherwise Article 66 would 
become spurious.
The ground given for this view is also not fully
justified, as some States might tend to claim contiguous
zones rather than territorial seas, since the latter allows
not only rights, but imposes duties as well.^^^^^ It is
pointed out by Sir Arnold McNair in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case that :
"a. To every State whose land territory is at 
any place washed by the sea, international law 
attaches a corresponding portion of maritime 
territory consisting of what the law calls 
territorial waters... International law imposes 
upon a maritime State certain obligations, and 
confers upon it certain rights arising out of 
the sovereignty which it exercises over its 
maritime territory.
3. One tendency in recent years has been to claim more
than a twelve mile territorial sea, for example the Latin-
( 197 )American 200-mile claim. Therefore, it would be
advisable to codify the limit of twelve miles to arrest
(195) A State may either adopt a 12-mile extent merely of 
territorial sea and dispense with a contiguous zone, 
or accept 6 miles and have 6 miles contiguous zone. 
Any such course would be consistent with internat­
ional law. See Fitzmaurice, op.cit., Ref. (118),
at 48, pp.374-375; see also the Individual Opinion 
of Judge Alvarez, ICJ Reports, 1951, p.150.
(196) ICJ Reports, ibid.. Dissenting Opinion of Sir Arnold 
McNair, p.160; Individual Opinion of Judge Alvarez, 
p.150.
(197) See Zacklin, op.cit.. Ref. (2), at 53, pp.47-68,
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such tendencies. ^
4. Even clearer proof in support of the twelve-mile
ruling for the territorial sea is to be found in Article
7(4,5) of the CTSCZ. This Article provides that:
"4. If the distance between the low-water marks 
of the natural entrance points of a bay does not
exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be
drawn between these two low-water marks, and the 
waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as 
internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water 
marks of the natural entrance points of a bay 
exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline 
of twenty four miles shall be drawn within the 
bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum 
area of water that is possible with a line of
that l e n g t h . "(199)
As a matter of reasonable inference, the adoption of
the 24-mile rule for bays has strengthened the claim for
twelve miles to be a rule for the width of the territorial
sea; that is to say, twenty four miles being twice the
twelve mile territorial sea. There is no better
quotation in this respect than what has been concluded by
Professor O'Connell,
"Although the Convention contains no rule about 
the extent of the territorial sea, it limits the 
contiguous zone to twelve miles from the coast, 
and provides for a twenty-four mile closing line 
for bays, which figure was arrived at apparently
(198) This is one of the reasons why the U.S. wishes to 
have the 3-mile limit territorial sea replaced by 
the 12-miles in the UNCLOS III. See Martinez, op. 
cit., Ref. (132), at 93, p.256.
(199) U.N. Doc. A/CONE. 13/L.52.
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by doubling the figure of twelve. There may, 
therefore, be an implication in the convention 
favouring a twelve-mile limit.
5. The three-mile rule, according to the view of the 
majority of writers, stemmed from the cannon shot rule.^^^^^ 
If this argument is accepted, and since the cannon shot 
distance has become obsolete because of the development of 
international ballistic missiles, the former rule, namely 
the three mile rule, has in turn become obsolete.
6 , It is often argued that the three mile rule best 
accommodates the true interests of international community, 
as well as the long term interests of individual States.
To this it can be replied that such a limit obviously 
serves the interests of States which have the capital, 
fleets and technological capability to profit from it. 
However, the interests of relatively poor, underdeveloped 
nations are of a totally different nature. The rule thus 
does not serve both equally. In analyzing the function 
of international law, Judge Amraoun, in his separate opinion 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases pointed out that 
states' interests must receive protection on a footing of 
e q u a l i t y . M o r e  important is, if this rule was 
accepted it would lead to the application of the law of the
(200) O'Connell, D.P. "International Law for Students",
1971, p.200.
(201) See Swarztrauber, op.cit., Ref. (5), at 12, pp.51- 
63; Knight, op.cit.. Ref, ( 1 ), at 8, pp.69-70; 
Merrills, J.G. "Images and Models in the World Court: 
The Individual Opinions in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases" Mod. Law Rev., Vol. 41, 1978, p.48.
(202) ICJ Reports, 1969, p.112.
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jungle, by which the most wealthy and developed countries 
would go on thriving, prospering and profiting while the 
rest would still suffer and lose out on progress.
7. It is also contended that any extension of the limit 
of the territorial sea necessarily enforces restrictions 
on the freedom of the sea.^^^^^ Accordingly, had the 
claims to extend territorial seas to twelve miles been 
recognized, seamen would face additional difficulties in 
ascertaining whether or not a vessel was within the 
territorial sea. At the same time, a number of inter­
national straits of vital importance for navigation would 
be converted into internal waters.
It must be admitted that any extension of the 
territorial sea would affect to some degree the freedom of 
navigation. However, it is equally true that any 
contraction, however, slight, would enhance the principle 
of the freedom of the sea. If this conclusion is correct, 
and it is thought definitely to be, then a question arises. 
Why has the doctrine of territorial sea not been totally 
rejected and substituted by conferring certain limited 
rights upon the coastal State? It is easy to answer this 
question on the grounds that the doctrine of the territorial 
sea is fully indispensible regardless of the magnitude of 
its effect on the freedom of the sea. The generally 
recognized principle, not only in municipal legislation, 
but also in international law, is that if two sets of 
interests conflict, the most important one has to be given
(203) McDougal and Burke, op.cit.. Ref. ( 15 ), at 15, 
pp.539-589.
(204) Knight, op.cit., Ref. ( 1), at 8, p.308.
118
precedence. The acceptance of the fact that any State
having a sea-coast has conventionally, as well as
customarily, the right to exercise exclusive powers over
a specific width of the sea,is of enormous international
value. This is irrespective of the effect on the freedom
of the sea.(^^^) These powers were initially developed
in response to the essential needs of a coastal State,
those of self-preservation, security, defence, commerce and
so f o r t h , T h a t  is to say, at the heart of the
doctrine of the territorial sea lies the premise that it
is both reasonable and practical for the coastal State to
have special rights in the territorial sea adjacent to 
(207 )
its coast. It would follow that these vital interests
themselves,justify, if not require, the extension of the 
territorial sea to a specific limit. It may equally be 
suggested that an additional nine miles would not 
constitute a serious impediment.
Having explained the grounds for the legitimacy of 
the twelve mile limit of territorial sea, two important 
points remain which should not be overlooked. Firstly, 
the legitimacy of tending towards zones wider than twelve 
m i l e s , a n d  secondly the compatibility of the twelve
(205) O'Connell, D.P., "Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in Inter­
national Law", BYBIL, Vol. 45, 1971, pp.29-30.
(206) Knight, op.cit., Ref. ( 1) at 8 , p.308.
(207) See ICJ Reports, 1951, p.133, p.150, p. 160.
(208) The Colombian Representative at the Hague Confer­
ence stated that "Any State having a sea-coast has 
rights - natural or acquired - to exercise over a 
specific breadth of sea an exclusive power termed 
sovereignty.... This soveriegnty or local maritime 
jurisdiction is based on grounds which are accepted 
without dispute.... and are connected with the 
existence of the State, its essential needs, its 
self-preservation, security, defence, commerce and 
general development. Usually, the vital interests
Contd....
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mile rule with international law.
It is true that the twelve-mile limit is not the 
most extensive width that has been claimed to date. 
Admittedly, certain Latin American countries have claimed 
greater maritime zones. Yet, this trend is not sufficient 
in itself to be legitimised for the following reasons:'
1. The judgment of the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case is cited to argue for a territorial sea 
wider than twelve miles. It is contended that the court 
made allowance for States to determine the limit of their 
territorial seas,^^^^^ It is true that there was a 
suggestion in the Fisheries Case, that each State should 
be entitled to determine the limit of territorial sea 
which suits its own particular needs by a unilateral 
act.(^^^^ However, such a suggestion does not stand in 
isolation inasmuch as coastal States are entitled to do so 
only in conformity with international law.^^^^^
2, Recognition of territorial sea extending beyond 
twelve miles would be somewhat det rimental to the interests
(208) contd.
of the State are concerned, though what those 
interests are can be determined only by the State 
itself... the natural and acquired rights which 
coastal States possess over the sea are not always 
equal and vary according to the needs and vital 
interests and particular circumstances of each State", 
Cited in Szekely Sanchez, op.cit.. Ref. (190), at 111, 
pp.19-20; See also Garcia-Amador, F.V., "The Latin 
American Contribution to the Development of the Law 
of the Sea", AJIL, Vol. 68, 1974, pp.38-39; Nelson, 
L.D.M. "The Patrimonial Sea", ICLQ, Vol. 22, 1973, 
pp.673-680.
(209) Szekely Sanchez, ibid., pp.149, 151.
(210) ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.130-133.
(211) ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.132-137.
of land-locked states.
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(212)
3. Finally and most significantly, any extension of the
territorial sea beyond twelve miles is not recognized by
international law. The aforecited limit has been, with
(213 )few exceptions, universally accepted.^ Underlying
this view are the practice of States, the opinions of 
j u r i s t s , a n d  proposals presented at the international 
conferences. It offers a "ready made” solution. A 
great number of States have already adopted this limit. 
Even States well known to be accustomed to the three-mile 
width, have abandoned their previous attitudes in favour 
of the twelve-mile e x t e n t . D e c i d i n g  on a twelve 
mile limit would bring an end to claims in excess of that 
width. Also to be taken into account is the growing 
support for a 200-mile limit and so the twelve-mile limit 
seems to be the only advisable solution.
To say this is not to argue against the objection 
that no agreement to establish a specific limit has been 
reached at any of the international conferences.  ^ Of
(212) See the statements made at the U.N. Sea-bed 
Committee by the representatives of U.S.S.R., U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.138/SC. 11/SR 52, p.59, Bulgaria, ibid.
57, p.112, Czechoslovakia, ibid., 56, pp.92-93.
(213) See in this sense Butte, Woodfin L ., "The Law of 
the Sea - Breakers Ahead", Int. Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 
2, 1972, p.256.
(214) See for example Fawcet, op.cit.. Ref. (176), at 106, 
pp.447-450; Martinez, op.cit.. Ref. (132) at 93, 
pp.253-260.
(215) See for instance U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L.
7/Add. 1; U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L. 51; U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L. 52; U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 
11/L, 21; A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L.37.
(216) See above pp. 92-95
(217) Although a consensus on the 12-mile extent has come 
close to being achieved in the UNCLOS III, see 
above pp.92-95.
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course, in the non existence of a conventional rule, one
must search to discover whether or not there is any
customary rule governing the situation. First, it is
worth recalling that it is inaccurate to imply that the
only customary rule has been the three-mile limit. Nor
is it justified to deduce, in the light of the preceding
argument, the incompatibility of the 12-mile rule with
international law. The three-mile limit rule has never
been accepted as an international law ruling as has been
(218 )stated earlier. In addition, although the question
of how custom comes into being and how it can be changed 
or modified are wrapped in mystery and illogicality, the 
predominant view seems to depend on Article 38 Section 
1(b) of the Statute of the International Court of 
J u s t i c e . T h e  aforesaid Article runs as follows:
"International custom, as evidence of a
(220^general practice accepted as law ;"  ^ ^
Despite the fact that the phrasing of the above article 
is criticised on the grounds of a m b i g u i t y , d u a l  
prerequisites for the existence of a customary rule can be 
derived from it. The first element is the so called 
material "practice" and the second is the psychological
(218) See above pp. 110 et seq.
(219) Briggs, Herbert W., "The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum 
Case and Proof of Customary International Law",
AJIL, Vol. 45, 1951, pp.728-730; See also the Asylum 
Case, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp.266-277.
(220) Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (31) at 20, p.276.
(221) See Alexander and others, op.cit., Ref. (129), at 
92 , pp.10, 11.
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"opinio juris".
As far as the first element is concerned, having
decided the essential prerequisites for the formation of
a customary international rule, one must examine whether
the same rule is practised in any given situation.
Obviously, the present practice of States indicates
(223 )a shift towards recognition of the twelve-mile rule.
The U.S., Canada and Australia for example, now advocate
a 12-mile limit where formerly they only claimed three 
(224 )miles. The overwhelming majority of the Eastern
European coastal countries claim a 12-mile territorial 
(225 )
sea. China in 1958 proclaimed a twelve mile
(226 )
territorial sea. The present practice of the
developing countries of Asia and Africa as well as Latin
(227 )
American States is to claim at least twelve miles.
(222) See Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald, "The Law and Procedure 
of the International Court of Justice 1951-1954: 
General Principles, and Sources of Law", BYBIL, Vol. 
30, 1953, pp.1-70; MacGibbon, I.C.,"Customary 
International Law and Acquiescence", BYBIL, Vol. 33, 
1957, pp.115-125; Briggs, ibid., pp.728-730.
(223) See Brown, E.D. "Maritime Zones: A Survey of Claims" 
in New Directions in the Law of the Sea", Vol. Ill, 
1973, p.161.
(224) Since 1966 a 12-mile exclusive fishery zone has been 
claimed by the U.S. See Act of 14 October 1966; 
ST/LEG/SER.B/15, 1970, pp.701, 702. The position of 
the U.S. on the territorial sea is to accept the 12- 
mile limit coupled with free passage through inter­
national straits. See Butte, op.cit.. Ref. (213), at 
120, p.250. See above p. (93). Canada extended her 
territorial sea to 12 miles according to Article 1 
of the Act of 26 June 1970, Reprinted in 9 ILM,
1970, p.553; Australian Act No. 116 of 1967; 17 
November 1967, see ST/LEG/SER.B/15 p.571.
(225) See for instance, the Regulations of 5 August 1960 
of the Soviet Union; ST/LEG/SER.B/15 p.211. Bulgaria 
claims 12 miles of territorial sea, see Decree of
10 October 1951, ibid. B/6 p.80 and Romanian claim 
in ibid, B/6 p.238.
(226) Cheng, op.cit., Ref. (190), at 111, p.53.
(227) Fawcett, op.cit.. Ref. (176), at 106, p.450.
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Japan has shown her readiness to accept a twelve-mile 
(228 )zone. In the interests of general agreement, even
Western European States have shown signs of readiness to
reconsider their positions as regards recognition of the
12-mile territorial sea, France, for instance, extended
her territorial sea from six to twelve miles in December 
( 2 2 Q ')
1971. Therefore, it cannot be doubted that the 12-
mile rule has now been admitted into the corpus of the 
general rules of international law.
The element of opinio juris has created numerous 
difficulties in both theory and practice. This 
concept is generally employed in two different senses. 
Firstly, it is used occasionally to distinguish customary 
international law rules, creating rights and obligations 
from rules of international morality. Secondly, it is 
applied to ascertain whether any particular action executed 
by a certain State or group of States is accepted by 
others as a binding legal rule.
It is certain that the first sense of opinio juris 
is to be seen in the case of the extent of the territorial 
sea. Undoubtedly, claims for a 12-mile limit of
(228) Hjertonsson, op.cit.. Ref. (2), at 53, pp.109,110.
(229) See Article 1 of the Law of December 24, 1971, 
reproduced in ILM, Vol. II, 1972, p.153. Although 
other Western European States claim territorial sea 
between three to six miles they nevertheless have 
shown on occasions their readiness to accept the 
12-mile. See above p.(120).
(230) Cheng, Bin, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer 
Space: 'Instant' International Customary Law",
Indian JIL, Vol. 5, 1965, p.45; Kelsen, Hans,
"General Theory of Law and State", Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1949, pp.114; and 
"Principles of International Law", New York, 1966, 
pp.450 et seq,, MacGibbon, op.cit.. Ref, (222), at 
122, pp.115, 131.
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territorial sea have the purpose of creating legal rights
and obligations over certain parts of the seas.
It now remains to examine the opinio juris in the
second sense, which is a sort of real or presumed assent
(231 )or acquiescence. It is to be observed that the
opinio juris in the second sense does not serve the purpose
of explaining the formation of customary rules. Should a
new rule or action, in order to qualify as a customary
rule, be consistent with existing rules concerning the
same subject, then a new customary rule would of course
(232 )
never be brought into existence.
However, in general, it is submitted, whether or not 
certain action is legally binding depends on the degree of 
acceptance of other States. The twelve-mile rule today, 
as has already been mentioned, is recognized by most 
states. The nature of the readiness to accept the twelve- 
mile limit, in that it is carried out in a spirit of 
compromise, does not detract from its value. It still 
reflects the interests of those States in regulating the 
situation in the light of the compromise. In effect, two 
factors influence the national decision maker either when
(231) Fitzmaurice, op.cit., Ref. (222), at 122, pp.68-69; 
see also the Nationals of the United States of 
America in Morocco Case, ICJ Reports, 1952, p.176; 
The Dissenting Opinion of Judges Hackworth, Badawi, 
Levi, Carneiro and Sir Senegal Rau,pp.215-233.
(232) Numerous unsuccessful attempts have been made to 
solve this contradiction. Limitation of space 
forbids discussing the efforts made in this respect. 
For further details, see Kelsen, op.cit., Ref. (230) 
at 123, "The General Theory", pp.114-149; and 
"Principles of International Law",pp.450 et seq,; 
Ceng, op.cit.. Ref, (230), at 123, p.45.
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he puts forward a unilateral claim or when he has to
decide whether to accept or to reject any other State's
claim. As Mr. Lissitzyn states in his "International
Law Today and Tomorrow":
"The task of deciding whether to apply a norm to 
a new situation is performed not only by inter­
national decision-makers such as the judges of 
international courts, but also, and more 
frequently, by national governments as they 
appraise each other's actions and responses in 
the international arena. In this 'process of 
reciprocal claims and mutual tolerances', they 
are guided not only by their conceptions of the 
general interest of the world community, but 
also, and mainly, by the particular interests 
of their nations. Much of international law, 
thus, rests not on abstract formulations of the 
'general interests' but on the congruence or 
reasonable accommodation of the interests of
many nations producing a consensus which can be
( 233 )translated into legal terms."
The above analysis indicates that the national 
decision-maker is thus influenced firstly by his nation's 
particular needs and secondly, by the desire to put into 
practice a stationary, international legal order which in 
turn serves those interests on the long term. Hence, he 
usually alters those national interests which are not of 
vital importance in achieving accommodation of the more 
vital national interests, by obtaining the recognition of 
other States. Consequently, the desire to achieve a 
compromise never allows the country concerned to forget
(233) Lissitzyn, Oliver J ., "International Law Today and 
Tomorrow", 1965, p.40.
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its essential national interests.
Another outstanding issue to be discussed is the
amount of time necessary for a norm to achieve the status
of an international customary rule. According to the
traditional view, in order for any action to qualify as a
customary rule, one has to ascertain whether or not that
action has been exercised for a considerable period of
time.(^^^) In the Case of the Paquete Habana, the United
States Supreme Court examined several centuries of state
practice to decide whether or not any customary rule had
been established exempting fishing vessels from capture
(235)as prizes of war.
Of course, if the establishment of a customary rule 
is to be appreciated, the element of time must be conside­
red. Correct as that may be, time has become less
(236 )important in these days characterized by rapid change.^
It is to be noted that a number of writers who indicate
(237 )that custom may emerge in a short time,^ cite the
rules of law of sovereignty of airspace which have grown 
up very rapidly. Moreover, state practice subsequent to 
the Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf was so 
extensive that many writers have recognized that the
(234) Waldock, Sir Humphrey,"General Course on Public 
International Law", Hague Recueil, Vol. 106, 1962 
II, p.45; Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald, op.cit., Ref. 
(222), at 122, pp.1-31.
(235) 175 US 677, (1899).
(236) It is said that the importance of the element of 
time is a bare minimum in a field where there does 
not exist, any pre-existing rules, McDougal, Myres 
S. and others, "Law and Public Order in Space",
1963, p.119.
(237) Cheng, op,cit., Ref. (230), at 123, pp.23 et seq.
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concept of the continental shelf has achieved the status
(238)of customary law within five years. Some writers
therefore take the view that reliance upon custom is
casual whilst others point to this as an example of the
(239 )great flexibility in the creation of custom.^ At any
rate, whatever the view, one can easily infer that state 
practice may be converted to customary law today much 
more early than the several hundred years of practices in 
the past, examined in the Paquette Habana Case. This 
conclusion appears more reasonable if one takes into 
account Professor McDougal's point, that the law of the 
sea is growing in response to the unceasing demands 
ensuing from the uses of the sea. According to Professor 
McDougal:
"From the perspective of realistic description, 
the international law of the sea is not a mere 
static body of rules but is rather a whole 
decision-making process, a public order which 
includes a structure of authorized decision­
makers as well as a body of highly flexible, 
inherited prescriptions. It is, in other words, 
a process of continuous interaction, of continuous 
demand and response, in which the decision-makers 
of particular nation states unilaterally put 
forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting 
character to the use of the world's seas, and in 
which other decision-makers, external to the 
demanding State and including both national and 
international officials, weigh and appraise these
(238) Lauterpacht, H . , "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas", 
BYBIL, Vol. 27, 1950, p.376.
(239) Hull, E.W., "The International Law of the Sea: A 
Case for a Customary Approach", Law of the Sea 
Institute, Occasional paper 30, University of Rhode 
Island, R.I., (April 1976).
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competing claims in terms of the interests of 
the world community and of the rival claimants, 
and ultimately accept or reject them. As such 
a process, it is a living, growing law, grounded 
in the practices and sanctioning expectations of 
nation-state officials, and changing as their 
demands and expectations are changed by the 
exigencies of new interests and technology and 
by other continually evolving conditions in the 
world arena.
A further point requiring comment is that although 
the three mile limit had never acquired the authority of 
a general principle of international law, if it is 
presumed that it had, one question fails to be answered.
When does a once generally established rule cease to have 
force? Does it lose its general validity only when 
another recognized rule becomes established, or does its 
binding character vanish at the moment it seems that the 
rule no longer has general support?
The simple answer to this question, it is submitted, 
is that this matter has never been discussed by an inter­
national tribunal, either in general or with respect to 
the laws of the sea. Nevertheless, it has occasionally 
been decided by national courts when considering questions 
of immunity and the jurisdiction of those courts.
For instance, the Austrian Supreme Court, had to
( 242 )
decide in a case before it on May 10, 1950, whether
there was any international, legally valid rule that States
(240) McDougal, Myres S. "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the 
International Law of the Sea", AJIL, Vol. 49, 1955, 
pp.356, 357. This view has been widely supported.
See MacGibbon, op.cit.. Ref. (222), at 122, pp.115- 
125; Fitzmaurice, op.cit., Ref. (222) at 122, pp.67-70
(241) See Hjertonsson, op.cit.. Ref. (2) at 53, p.145.
(242) 1950 ILR, 41, pp.155-166.
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could be sued in the courts of foreign States even in 
matters of private law, or whether they had total immunity.
Having examined the practice of courts of numerous
States, the Austrian Supreme Court reached the conclusion
that some States' courts recognized, in principle the old
rule of immunity from jurisdiction, even where acta
gestionis of private law are c o n c e r n e d . O t h e r
national courts, however adopted the view of restrictive
immunity. The latter made a distinction between the case
in which a government acts in its capacity of ente politica
and the case in which it acts in its capacity of ente
civile. In the former, foreign States were not covered
by this immunity whilst in the latter case they were
c o v e r e d . T h e  Austrian Supreme Court found that
other national courts had again taken up an intermediate
p o s i t i o n . I t  went on therefore to say that:
"This survey shows that today it can no longer 
be said that jurisprudence generally recognises 
the principle of exemption of foreign States in 
so far as concerns claims of a private character, 
because the majority of courts of different 
civilized countries deny the immunity of a 
foreign State and more particularly because 
exceptions are made even in those countries which 
today still adhereto the traditional principle 
that no State is entitled to exercise jurisdiction 
over another State.
(243) Ibid., p.160.
(244) Ibid., pp.158-160.
(245) Ibid., p.160.
(246) Ibid., p.161.
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Accordingly, the court held;
"By international law foreign States are exempt 
from the jurisdiction of the 'Austrian' courts 
only in so far as concerns acts undertaken by 
them in the exercise of their sovereign 
powers . ” )
Although some States still adhered to the rule, it
may be concluded from the foregoing judgment that the
Court held that it had no general validity since other
States had renounced it. This amounts, it is submitted,
to stating that the old customary rule loses its binding
force when it appears that it no longer has general
support.
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Constit-
(248 )utional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany.
In this as in the preceding case, the German Court reached
the conclusion that a rule of international law loses its
binding status when it appears that it has lost its
general support. In the words of the German Court :
"1. Fine Regel des Cblkerrechts, nach der die 
inlèEndische Gerichtsbarkeit für Klagen gegen 
einen ausl&ndischen Staat in bezug auf seine 
nicht-hoheitliche Betatigung ausgeschlossen ist, 
istnicht Bestandteil des Bundesrechts.
2.a) MaBgebend für die Unterscheidung zwischen 
hoheitlicher und nicht-hoheitlicher 
Staatstatigkeit ist die Natur der
(247) Ibid., p.166.
(248) Germany (Federal Republic), Bundesverfassungs- 
gerichts Entscheidungen, Vol. 16, pp.27 et seq., 
(1964) Nr. 5 Beschluss des Zweiten Sénats, Vom 30 
April; See also Hjertonsson, op.cit.. Ref. (2 ), 
at 53, p.147.
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staatlichen Handlung. 
b) Die Qualifikation als hoheitliche oder 
nicht-hoheitliche Staatstatigkeit ist 
grundsatzlich nach nationalem Recht 
vorzunehmen."
Although the preceding two cases are dissimilar to 
the situation we are faced with, nonetheless the same 
result that was reached by these courts can be arrived at 
in relation to the breadth of the territorial sea. That 
is to say, as long as state practice shows that the 
traditional rule of 3-miles is no longer generally recogn­
ized, and since so many States, if not yet a majority, 
renounce the three-mile rule, then it no longer holds 
general validity.
International practice in this tenor not only arises 
in courts' decisions but in official statements as well.
The State Department of the U.S., for example, advised 
the legality of the then pending U.S. legislation delimiting 
her exclusive fishing zone to an extent of twelve miles. 
Although 25 out of the 91 States concerned claimed less 
than a twelve-mile zone, the State Department was of the 
view that the twelve-mile extent was compatible with 
international law, as it was not contrary to the trends in 
the law at that m o m e n t . H e r e ,  it may be of use to 
quote, in part, the State Department's letter to the Senate 
Committee in relation to this matter:
"Since the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference there 
has been a trend toward the establishment of a 
twelve-mile fisheries rule in international
(249) Germany (Federal Republic) ibid., pp.27, 28.
(250) Reproduced in ILM, Vol. 5, 1966, pp.616, 617.
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practice. Many States acting individually or 
in concert with other States have extended or 
are in the process of extending their fisheries 
limits to twelve miles. Such actions have no 
doubt been accelerated by the support for the 
proposal made at the Geneva Law of the Sea 
Conferences in 1958 and 1960, of a fisheries 
zone totalling 12 miles as part of a package 
designed to achieve international agreement on 
the territorial sea.
In view of the recent developments in inter­
national practice, action by the United States 
at this time to establish in exclusive fisheries 
zone extending 9 miles beyond the territorial 
sea would not be contrary to international
law."(251)
From the aforesaid presentation, one can reach the 
conclusion that recent state practice, and changing claims 
of States, provide evidence that the traditional rule of 
a three-mile limit is no longer valid. It lacks the 
support of general recognition, and therefore has been 
replaced by another rule regulating the matter, namely 
the twelve mile limit. Conclusive evidence of this 
proposition can be seen from the present UNCLOS III, at 
which consensus is close to being achieved concerning the 
twelve-mile limit. This would appear to reflect the 
hopes and beliefs of the international community as it 
advances today.
(251) Ibid., p.616.
Section Two 
The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf
It is now generally recognized in international law
that coastal States enjoy not only sovereignty over their
land territories and territorial seas,^^^^^ but also
(253 )certain rights beyond this marginal belt. Underlying
this view is the belief that although the high seas are 
res communis, there is nothing to impede exploration and 
exploitation of particular parts of the submarine areas 
described as continental shelves. This exploration and 
exploitation, it is stipulated, must not affect the legal 
status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of 
the airspace above those waters. This appears to mean 
that the seabed and subsoil of certain parts of the high 
seas have been regarded as being suitable for appropriation 
for the benefit of coastal States as res nullius, provided 
this does not affect the basic principle, namely, the 
freedom of the seas.^^^^^
(252) It may be noted that whilst a State enjoys sovereignty 
to full extent over its land territory, sovereignty 
over its territorial sea is limited by international 
law. For further details see Daintith and others, op. 
cit.. Ref. ( 4), at 9, pp. E.101-E.106; Common 
Market, op.cit.. Ref. ( 4), at 1, p.149; O'Connell, 
D.P., "The Federal Problem Concerning the Maritime 
Domain in Commonwealth Countries", J. Marit. Law 
Com., Vol. 1, No. 3, 1970, p.403; Brown, op.cit..
Ref.(4 ),at 9, p.329; See also Articles 1, 2, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 24 of the Convention of 
1958 on the Continental Shelf.
(253) ICJ Reports, 1969, p.22, para 19; Friedmann, Wolfgang, 
"The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. A Critique", 
AJIL, Vol. 64, 1970, p,232; Brown, ibid., p.329.
(254) Gutteridge, J.A., "The 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf", BYBIL, Vol. 35, 1959, p.102.
134
However, it is worth noting that the term "continental 
shelf" means, in the geological sense, a submerged area 
which begins at the shoreline, slopes seaward and normally 
ends at anything up to a depth of 100 fathoms (200 metres), 
before the seafloor starts descending steeply towards the 
deep ocean basins.
At this point, it must briefly be mentioned that many 
States have recently declared their jurisdiction over 
seabed areas beyond their territorial seas. One might 
also suggest that rarely has an apparent major change in 
the international law plane been more rapidly developed, 
than in the case of littoral States' rights over the sea 
bed areas adjacent to their coasts.
As a result of States' claims and declarations, the 
U.N. found that it was time to regulate this area of the 
law. Therefore, having referred the subject to its 
subordinate body, the ILC, the U.N. recommended examining 
the matter thoroughly and formulating principles relative 
to this field.
In short, the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the 
Continental Shelf certainly marked the first phase of the 
U.N. efforts in this respect. In any event, there 
appear to be a, number of shortcomings in the Convention 
which create arguments and disputes. This in turn 
reveals a need for a new conference to review all aspects 
of the law of the sea.
(255) Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. (4), at 9, p.70.
(256) Lauterpacht, op,cit., Ref. (238), at 127, p.376.
See also Schwarzenberger, Georg and E.D. Brown,
"A Manual of International Law", 6th ed., 1976, pp. 
106-108.
(257) Colombos, ibid., p.76.
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However, the purpose of this part of the work is to 
focus on the law regulating the question of the outer 
limit of the continental shelf. The investigation of 
this subject falls under two main headings:
Subsection 1 - The Historical Perspective of the
Continental Shelf,
Subsection 2 - The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf.
Subsection One
The Historical Perspective of the Continental
Shelf
It may be observed that international law was silent 
on the question of the continental shelf prior to the 
technological advance needed to exploit the sea bed. The 
term "continental shelf" - in the legal sense - therefore, 
has not been used for a long time.^^^^^ Only recently 
has it been developed, through a number of statements 
concerned with coastal States' rights over the submarine 
areas appertaining to their shores. A series of reasons 
advanced by writers who substantiated the coastal States' 
rights, have shared to some extent in the creation of this 
doctrine. In addition, subsequent state practice has put 
into effect the theories developed by these writers.
Before proceeding further, it would be wise to deal 
with statements and opinions, and the practice of states, 
under two separate headings.
(258) The term "continental shelf" appears to have first
been used only in a geological and geographical sense 
in 1887. See Mouton, M.W., "The Continental Shelf", 
Hague Recueil, Vol. 85, 1954, I, pp.350-379.
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1 - Opinions and Statements
Undoubtedly, maritime areas beyond the territorial 
sea have always been part of the high seas,^^^^^
Generally speaking, such parts are not subject to the 
sovereignty of any state, res communis. This basic 
principle Effects the superjacent waters of the high seas 
as well as their subsoil, which includes the continental 
shelf. This view is derived from the theory that the 
high seas are the common property of all people and capable 
of exclusive acquisition by none. On the other hand, it 
is also believed that the high seas are the property of 
no one, thus they are susceptible to any of the means of 
acquisition of territory.
However, not only is the legal status of the high 
seas disputed, but also that of the sea bed and submarine 
areas beneath. As early as 1923-1924, for example, Sir 
Cecil Hurst was of the opinion that the seabed was capable 
of occupation and appropriation. Oppenheim,
(259) Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of the high seas 
1958 provides that: "The term 'high seas' means all 
parts of the sea that are not included in the 
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a 
state". Brownlie, op.cit., Ref. (31), at 20 , p.89.
(260) See Young, R ., "The Legal Status of Submarine Areas 
Beneath the High Seas" AJIL, Vol. 45, 1951, pp. 
225-229.
(261) Hurst, Sir Cecil J.B., "Whose is the Bed of the Sea?" 
BYBIL, Vol. 4, 1923-1924, pp.34-43; Sir Cecil Hurst 
stated that: "where effective occupation has been 
long maintained of portions of the bed of the sea 
outside the three mile limit, these claims are valid 
and subsisting claims, entitled to recognition by 
other States". Ibid., However, it is useful to 
mention at this stage the views worded by Sir Cecil 
Hurst in 1948 when he pointed out that too much 
should not be read into his article published in 
1923-1924 on the grounds that ownership of submarine 
banks or sedentary fisheries to which his earlier
Contd....
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Lauterpacht and O'Connell were also of the view that the
( 262 )
seabed is capable of being occupied.^  ^ This view is
based on the grounds that submarine areas are, like land 
territories res nullius until claimed and occupied by a 
State, That is because the legal status of the seabed 
must be determined by recourse to other principles of 
customary law. These principles, it is contended, 
recognize that portions of the sea floor may legally be 
subjected to the exclusive control of a single State,
( 263 )through an actual and effective exercise of authority;
Other writers make a distinction between the sea bed 
and subsoil, holding that the former is not subject to 
occupation and appropriation, whilst the latter is capable 
of appropriation and use.^^^^^ The late Jude Lauterpacht, 
in his article on the subject of "Sovereignty over 
Submarine Areas" has taken the position that, on the basis 
of acquiescence and effective occupation, and subject to
(261) contd...
article only referred, should be distinguished from 
the continental shelf. See Hurst, Sir Cecil J.B., 
"The Continental Shelf", Vol. 34, 1949, pp.153-169.
(262) Oppenheim, L. "International Law", Vol. 1, 6th ed., 
Ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 1947, pp. 576 et seq.; 
O'Connell, op.cit.. Ref. (5), at 54, pp.516-517.
(263) Young, Richard, "The Legal Regime of the Deep Sea 
Floor", AJIL, Vol. 62, 1968, p.645.
(264) See also Waldock, C.H.M., "The Legal Basis of 
Claims to the Continental Shelf", Trans Grotius 
Soc,, Vol. 36, 1951, p.115; Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. 
(4), at 9, p.,67. Contra.; Smith, H.A., "Great 
Britain and the Law of Nations", Vol. II, 1953, 
edited by Herbert Arthur Smith, 1975, pp.122-123.
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non-interference with the freedom of the high seas, parts 
of the seabed could legitimately be appropriated.
The view that submarine areas are incapable of 
acquisition rests on the contention that it is in the 
interests of commerce to keep them open and free for all. 
This view is criticized as it does not fully justify 
itself. According to Professor Young, there is no logical 
reason for subjecting submarine areas to the same legal 
regime as the water above.
It may be noted that the submerged land was referred 
to without any intention to locate or to claim a "shelf" 
by Vattel in 1758, by Valin in 1760, and in 1803 by 
Rayneval. President Jefferson of the U.S. also mentioned 
this in 1805. Thomas Fulton in 1911 indicated that 
sedentary animals connected with the bottom belong more 
to the soil or bed of the sea, than to the sea itself. In 
1916, it was emphasized by Storni and Suarez that adjacent 
States should have jurisdiction over the shelf, because 
of the importance of commercial fisheries. ^
However, the legal sense of the terra continental 
shelf was utilized for the first time in a Conference at 
the National Fishery Congress, Madrid, 1916. There,
Odon de Buen, later the Director General of Fisheries in
(265) Lauterpacht, op.cit.. Ref. (238), at 127,p.376.
(266) Young, op.cit.. Ref. (260), at 136, p.229. See also 
the contrary view suggested by Sir Cecil Hurst to 
the ILC, that since the high seas are the common 
property of the international community, the develop­
ment of submarine areas beneath them should also be 
entrusted to the international community. For further 
details see U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR, p.28.
(267) Auguste, op.cit.. Ref. (4 ), at 1, pp.39-42.
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Spain, urged the necessity for extending territorial seas 
to include "the whole of the continental shelf, 
because that area was the most suitable place to increase 
the multifarious kinds of fishes.
In 1918 also, the Argentinian scholar, Jose Leon 
Suarez, pointed to the continental shelf in his "El Mar 
TerretorialY Las Industrias Maritima".^^^^)
Attention continued at this early period to be 
directed to the rights on the sea bed and subsoil.
This shows quite clearly that the right to the shelf 
gradually became accepted and acknowledged by most publicists 
In fact, this encouraged States to make greater use of the 
concept especially after scientific research disclosed the 
extent of the huge wealth of the seabed.
II - State Practice
The previous exposition of statements and opinions 
reveals basically that certain parts of the seabed and 
subsoil of the sea adjacent to the States offshore, have 
been recognized as exploitable by the adjacent States, for 
their own benefit. This is an exception to the main 
principle, namely, the freedom of the high seas.
In spite of this, an analysis of state practice will 
reveal that States' attitudes on this matter were still
(268) Auguste, op.cit.. Ref, ( 4 ), at 1 , p.42.
(269) Ibid., Young, Richard, "Recent Development with 
Respect to the Continental Shelf", AJIL, Vol. 42, 
1948, pp.849 et seq.
(270) Auguste, ibid., pp.38-42.
(271) Ibid., pp. 44 et seq.
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ambiguous until the period following the First World War.
However, for the sake of clarifying state practice, 
it will be dealt with in three periods,
1. The period prior to the Truman Proclamation of 1945.
2. The Truman Proclamation of the 28th September 1945.
3. State Practice after the Truman Proclamation.
a . State Practice Prior to the Truman Proclamation
It is reasonable to suppose that the legal concept
of the continental shelf, in so far as the practice of
states was concerned,arose for the first time in 1916. An
instance which may be cited is that of the Russian Empire
Note which was circulated to the powers on the 29th of
( 27 2 )September 1916.^  ^ The Russian Imperial Government
employed the term "continental shelf" officially, when it
(273 )declared that certain deserted islands^  ^ were an integral 
part of its empire.
In addition, the Note was reissued by the Soviet
Union on the fourth of November 1924. According to that
issue, Russia claimed that the said islands were part of
the Northward extension of the continental platform of 
(274 )Siberia.^ This Note, however, neither referred to
the term "continental shelf" as it stands today, nor did
(272) It may be contended that the 1858 "Cornwall Submarine 
Mines Act" could be taken as the earliest State 
instrument dealing with the question of the contin­
ental shelf. To answer such an argument,it may be 
stated that this act had nothing to do with the 
Regime of the continental shelf. For further details, 
see Hurst, op.cit.. Ref. (261), at 136, "Whose is 
the Bed of the Sea", pp. 34 et seq.
(273) The islands were; Bennett, Jeannette, Henrietta
and Herald.See Auguste, op.cit.. Ref,(4), at 1, p.58.
(274) Green, L.C., "The Continental Shelf", CLP, Vol. 4, 
1951, p.58.
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it mention an underwater plateau; neither did it submit
any claim on the basis of the continental shelf doctrine
In 1925 Ceylon issued a Pearl Fisheries Ordinance
which defined the pearl banks. Here again, no actual
( 276 )allusion to the continental shelf was made.^
This appears to indicate that so far, there had been 
no real reference to the doctrine of the continental shelf. 
However, many factors influenced the way in which States 
had to approach this subject. For example;
1. The growing world-wide need for new resources, 
particularly petroleum.
2. The experts' opinion that petroleum lay in great 
quantities beneath the continental shelf.
3. The exploitation of these areas has become possible
(277 )due to the development of technological capabilities;
The combination of these influences forced States to 
approach this subject on a legal basis, in order to justify 
the exercise of their rights over certain parts of the sea 
which constituted the continental shelf. A striking 
example of this approach may be found in the treaty of 
1942 between the U.K. and Venezuela. By this treaty, the 
two powers defined their respective interests in the 
submarine areas adjacent to their coasts in the Gulf of 
P a r i a . The treatment of these submarine areas was
(275) U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/17, p.34.
(276) Green, ibid., pp.58,59.
(277) Buzan, Barry, "Seabed Politics", 1976, pp.34-37; 
Bowett, op.cit., Ref. (3), at 1, p.33,
(278) U.K.T.S., No. 10, 1942.
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based on the grounds that the seabed lying beyond the
limits of territorial sea was res nullius, over which
C 279 )
sovereignty could be acquired by occupation.^ It
was agreed also not to assert any claim over submarine 
areas defined as the seabed and subsoil outside territorial 
waters lying on the other's side of the boundary. Each 
party also undertook to recognize any claim put forward 
by the other on its own side. By Article 6, the parties 
declared that the treaty in no way affected the status of 
the waters of the Gulf of Paria,
The U.K. followed up the treaty with the Submarine 
Areas of the Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order, 1942, under 
which the seabed and subsoil situated beneath waters 
bounded as defined in the order, were annexed to and 
formed part of his Majesty's dominions, and attached to 
the colony of Trinidad and Tobago for administrative 
purposes.
While it is correct to say that the treaty was purely 
bilateral and thus not binding on the non-contracting 
States, one may be entitled to assume that it was the 
earliest State document in which two States took a stand 
concerning the continental shelf. Moreover, it was the 
first instance indicating any installations which may be 
erected.
Two other observations in this connection appear 
necessary. Firstly, this treaty did not only state the
(279) Vallat, F.A., "The Continental Shelf", BYBIL, Vol.
23, 1946, p.334.
(280) Mouton, op.cit.. Ref.(258), at 135, p.368; Green, 
op.cit., Ref. (274), at 140, p.71; Statutory 
Rules and Orders, 1942, Vol. 1, p.919.
143
right of the coastal State to exploit the seabed and 
subsoil, but annexed that area itself to the contracting 
parties' territories. Secondly, it was the first State 
instrument so far, that allowed the division of submarine 
areas between adjacent States, This was combined with 
mutual recognition of rights of sovereignty or control, 
lawfully acquired by each of the two parties in its own 
sphere. Hence, this feature can be considered as 
surpassing the traditional international law rules, which 
had become inadequate or unsatisfactory in the light of 
modern requirements. The traditional rules had not 
accepted the legality of the agreed division of the seabed 
areas.
Only one final point calls for comment. It should 
be stated that the term "continental shelf’ was not used 
in the U.K.-Venezuelan treaty; instead the "submarine 
areas of the Gulf of Paria" were referred to. The treaty 
defined them as the seabed and subsoil outside of the 
territorial sea of the high contracting parties on either 
side of certain lines, drawn as provided for in the 
following articles.
b . The Truman Proclamation
It must be conceded that the starting point of state 
practice is undoubtedly the Truman Proclamation. Admittedly, 
matters took a new turn on the 28th of September 1945 when 
this well-known Proclamation was issued claiming the
(281) Mouton, op.cit., Ref. (258), at 135, p.368.
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(282 )
submarine areas off the U.S. coasts.
An examination of the history of the Truman 
Proclamation shows that it started in 1937, when President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt communicated to the Department of 
State that he was thinking of "an executive proclamation 
by the President". It was to refer to fisheries in the 
Pacific off Alaska, between the 3-mile limit and that 
point of the ocean bed where the water reached a depth of 
100 fathoms. After careful consideration of the 
different aspects of the question by the American author­
ities, the text of the proposed proclamation was ready in 
January 1945. Before finally signing the proclamation, 
the Department of the Interior suggested the addition of
a new sentence at the end of the draft, concerning the
(283 )
issues between the U.S. and other States.
However, the proclamation which specifically 
recognizes the character of the waters above the continental 
shelf as high seas, recites the following as its underlying 
justifications :
1. Because "of the long range world-wide need for new 
sources of petroleum and other minerals .... efforts
(282) See Brown, E.D. "The Continental Shelf and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone: The Problem of Delimitation 
at UNCLOS III", Maritime Policy and Management, Vol.
4, No, 6, 1977, p.377. It was said that the Truman 
Proclamation with regard to the continental shelf 
was described as one of the decisive acts in history, 
ranking with the discoveries of Columbus as a turning 
point in human destiny. See Borchard, op.cit., Ref. 
(7), at 2, p.53; Lauterpacht, op.cit., Ref. (238),
at 127, p.377.
(283) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5), at 9, pp.752-758. For 
the full text of the Proclamation see, Presidential 
Proclamation No. 2667, ST/LEG/SER.B/1, 1951, pp.38 
et seq. For the Executive Order No, 9633, see ibid., 
p. 41.
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to discover and make available new supplies of these 
resources should be encouraged."
2. Such resources are believed to "underlie many parts of 
the continental shelf off the coasts of the United 
States of America, and that with modern technological 
progress their utilization is already practicable, or 
will become so at an early date."
3. ".... recognized jurisdiction over these resources is 
required in the interest of their conservation and 
prudent utilization."
4. ".... the exercise of jurisdiction over the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental
shelf by the contiguous nation, is reasonable and just,
since the effectiveness of measures to utilize or
conserve these resources would be contingent upon
( 284 )cooperation from the shore.
Before considering further state practice, it is 
significant to examine the nature of the proclamation 
since it is, as the ICJ considered it, of particular 
i m p o r t a n c e . T h e  following principles may be ident­
ified in this respect;
1. The continental shelf is regarded as an extension of 
the land mass of the State territory and thus it 
normally appertains to it.
2. Self-protection compels a coastal State to pay heed
to activities off its shore.
(284) See Ref. (283) at 144.
(285) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 86, p.47; see also paras. 
47, 100, pp. 32 and 53 respectively.
(286) See Rao, P. Sreenivasa, "The Public Order of Ocean 
Resources : A Critique of the Contemporary Law of 
the Sea", 1975, p.48.
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3. The proclamation asserts the freedom of the high seas: 
it distinguishes between the waters above the 
continental shelf, and its sea bed and subsoil.
It appears that the Proclamation, by this distinction, 
clearly endeavoured to avoid any strictly territorial 
claim. It only asserted United States’ jurisdiction 
and control of the natural resources of the continental 
shelf.
4. It provides that where the shelf extends to the shores 
of another State or where it is shared with an adjacent 
State, the boundary was to be determined by mutual 
agreement between the affected parties on equitable 
principles. ^
5, It confined the continental shelf to areas beneath the 
high seas, but contiguous to the coasts of the U.S.
6 , The "effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve 
these resources would be contingent upon cooperation 
and protection from the shore".
For all the reasons above,the proclamation, as shown 
earlier, has been understandably considered to be the 
principle document creating the doctrine of the continental 
shelf. It has acquired its great importance also due to 
the fact that no nation has protested the claim. Indeed, 
it has been followed by similar claims by numerous other
States.(288)
However, all that has been said is no reason for 
ignoring the following observations :
(287) See Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5 ), at 9, pp.658-662.
(288) Whiteman, op,cit.. Ref. ( 5), at 9, p.762.
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L. Although the proclamation used the term "jurisdiction 
and control" instead of "sovereignty", it is obvious 
that "jurisdiction and control" in the context of the 
proclamation implies nothing less, it is submitted, 
than sovereignty itself. It has been worded as 
follows: the Government of the U.S. regards the
natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the 
continental shelf beneath the high sea but contiguous 
to the coasts of the U.S. as appertaining to the U.S., 
subject to its jurisdiction and control".
The utilization of the said term in this context
shows that there are no different legal or practical
consequences between asserting that something appertains
to the United States, subject to her jurisdiction and
control, and saying that the same thing is subject to
the sovereignty of the U.S. In the Island of Palmas 
(289)Case,^  to which the U.S. was a party and accepted
the award. Judge Huber stated that "Sovereignty in the 
relations between States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the 
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other State, the functions of a State.... Territorial 
sovereignty, as has already been said, involves the 
exclusive right to display the activities of a State"^^^^^ 
Therefore, as noted above, it is easy to conclude 
confidently that "exclusive rights of control and
(289) 1928, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, U.N., Millwood, New 
York, Vol. II, 1974, pp.838, 839.
(290) Ibid.
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jurisdiction" over subsoil, would seem to be tantamount 
to saying "sovereignty".
2. The jurisdiction and. control rights, which the 
proclamation mentioned, are not only over the shelf and 
its subsoil, but also over its resources. So, 
apparently it did not distinguish the legal status of 
the land territory of the State from that of its 
continental shelf. Moreover, although the proclamation 
limited the U.S. jurisdiction to only the resources of 
the continental shelf itself, the U.S. eventually 
practised its jurisdiction over the shelf as a whole, 
and not only over its resources, and indeed does so to
this d a y . (292)
3. The content and the scope of the term "continental shelf"
(293 )was not defined in the proclamation. It is true
that the accompanying White House Press Release 
indicated that the term referred to submerged lands 
adjacent to the continent, covered by no more than 100 
fathoms of w a t e r . T h i s  is no reason for ignoring 
that the above press release was mentioned in a 
Bulletin, which is obviously not binding and 
easily evaded at any time. It would have been better 
to have had the definition in the proclamation itself.
(291) See Professor Brierly, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 4/SR, 68, 
p.8; see also Hurst, op.cit.. Ref. (261), at 136,
pp. 161-162.
(292) This fact is shown in the United States construction 
of what were called "Texas Towers" for military 
purposes. See Auguste, op.cit., Ref. (4 ), at 1, p. 
95.
(293) Stone, Oliver L ., "United States’ Legislation 
Relating to the Continental Shelf" ICLQ, Vol. 17,
1968, p.107.
(294) Young, op.cit., Ref.(269), at 139, pp.850-851.
(295) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5 ), at 9, p.762.
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c . State Practice After the Truman Proclamation
President Truman's 1945 Proclamation on the continental
shelf was promptly followed by a host of proclamations
issued by other n a t i o n s . S o m e  of these proclamations,
the terms of which were almost restrained in that they
asserted jurisdiction over the subsoil and seabed of the
continental shelf, and some even extended this assertion to
the overlying waters thereof.
A good illustration is that of Mexico. Only one
month after the Truman Proclamation, on 29 October, 1945,
Mexico declared that the continental shelf adjacent to
her coast was to be considered as being incorporated in
the national territory.  ^ Further similar declarations
were issued in 1946, by Argentina on 11 O c t o b e r , a n d
(299 )
Panama in March 1946.  ^ Similar, though more far-
reaching, were the declarations of Chile on June 23, 1947^^^^^ 
Peru on August 1, 1 9 4 7 Costa Rica on July 28, 1948 
Cuba in December 1946^^^^^ and Nicaragua on May 1, 1947^^^^^
(296) Fahrney II, op.cit., Ref. (108), at 46 , p.543.
(297) ST/LEG/SER.B/l, p.13.
(298) Ibid., p.4.
(299) Ibid., p.15; or Political Constitution of the 
Republic of Panama, of March 1946, Article 3. Cited 
in Fitzgibbon, Russell H., "The Constitutions of the 
Americas", 1948, p.605.
(300) The test of the declaration cited in ST/LEG/SER.B/l, 
p.6; or in ILQ, Vol. 2, 1948, pp.135-137.
(301) ST/LEG/SER.B/l, p.16.
(302) Young, op.cit.. Ref, (269), at 139, p.854.
(303) Ibid., p.855.
(304) Ibid., p.853.
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Most of these decrees have differed from the U.S. 
Proclamation on which they purport to be based. They 
expressly proclaimed sovereignty over the continental shelf 
although as was noted earlier, there is rather a difference 
in the language without important difference in the 
consequences. Chile, Peru and Costa Rica proclaimed 
their sovereignty over a belt of sea extending 200 miles 
from their national c o a s t s . N i c a r a g u a  has gone as 
far as to define her national territory in her constitution, 
as lying between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, the 
Republics of Honduras and Costa Rica, and including the 
adjacent islands, the territorial sea, the continental
C307 )
shelf, and the aerial and atmospheric space.^
The U.K. issued a series of proclamations for its 
Carribean Colonies; the Bahamas (Petroleum Act 3 April 
1945), Honduras (Oil Mining Regulations, 2 September 1949), 
and Jamaica (Alteration of Boundaries) 26 November 
1948.(308)
On 21st December 1950, similar claims were made by an 
order issued with regard to the Falkland I s l a n d s . ( 3 0 9 )
The latter used the term "continental shelf" in its title, 
referring to the 100-fathom line.
(305) See above, p.147.
(306) These decrees are summarised in Young, op.cit.,
Ref. (269), at 139, pp.849-855.
(307) Article 5 of the Political Constitution of 1 November 
1950, ST/LEG/SER.B/l, p.15.
(308) ST/LEG/SER.B/l, pp.30-33.
(309) SI, Vol. 1, 1950, No. 2100, p.682.
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In 1950, Pakistan also issued a similar declaration,
on 9 M a r c h . (310)
Similar proclamations were made in 1949 by Saudi 
Arabia on 28 May,(311) Bahrain on 5 June,(31^) Qatar on 
8 June,(318) Abu Dhabi on 10 June,(314) Kuwait on 12 
June,(318) Dubai on 14 June,(31®) Sharjah on 16 June,(31^) 
Ummal Qaiwain on 20 June,(318) Ajman on 20 June,(31^) and 
Ras elkhaima on 17 J u n e . (3^0)
These later proclamations related to the resources of 
the sea bed and subsoil generally. They have one common 
feature in that they all asserted, in varying terms, that 
they did not claim to affect the status of the waters above 
the sea bed and outside territorial sea. These proclam­
ations and declarations are directed to the exploitation 
of oil, and each recognized that the boundary limits should
be determined on equitable principles, by agreement with
(321 )neighbouring States.
(310) The Gazette of 
1950.
Pakistan
(311) ST/LEG/SER.B/l , p.22.
(312) Ibid. , pp.24, 25.
(313) Ibid,, p.27.
(314) Ibid. , p.23.
(315) Ibid. , p.26.
(316) Ibid. , pp.25, 26.
(317) Ibid. , pp.28, 29.
(318) Ibid. , p.29.
(319) Ibid. , pp.23, 24.
(320) Ibid. , pp.27, 28.
(321) Iraq of course, was no
ental shelf than any other State. Therefore, the 
Iraqi Government issued decrees and official releases, 
in which it asserted the Iraqi international rights 
in the areas of the continental shelf before the 
Iraqi coast. See Chapter (5) below, pp.388 et seq.
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Conclusion
An examination of state practice, some facets of 
which have been alluded to, reveals that there are no 
certain basic principles agreed upon unanimously, 
concerning the claims to the continental shelf. The 
following observations can be made on state practice:
1. Many of the declarations and decrees followed the 
Truman Proclamation in pointing out the socio-economic 
considerations, self protection and social needs, to 
justify the State's right to the submarine area 
contiguous to its coast. These factors have in fact 
become part of international law.
2. Although some countries specified the extent of their 
continental shelves, they nevertheless claim different 
limits. To demonstrate this, it may be worth 
mentioning that Honduras, Ecuador, Australia, Portugal 
and the U.S. for example, utilized the test of the 
depth of 200 metres or 100 fathoms. Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico and Peru referred to a distance test of 200 
nautical miles. Saudi Arabia, India and the U.K. 
reiterated the conception of adjacency to reveal the 
extent of their continental shelves. Argentine and 
Guatemala declared their continental shelves to be as 
far as their geological configurations extend beneath 
the high seas. Nicaragua, Panama and the Philippines 
did not claim any fixed limit.(3^2)
3. In some cases, the declarations or proclamations were 
constitutive forms of annexation asserting that the
(322) Rao, op.cit.. Ref. (286), at 145, pp.48, 49.
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continental shelf formed part of their national 
(323 )territory\  ^ In others, they were merely declaratory
of the existing position, for example Australia and 
others have asserted ownership of the resources 
contained in the continental s h e l f , (324)
4, Apart from the South American decrees and declarations, 
the states' asserted that their rights did not affect 
the legal status of the waters above the sea-bed as 
high seas.
5. Also, it seems quite clear that there were three groups 
of declarations and decrees. Firstly, those where 
the term continental shelf is used without further 
delimitation, secondly those where the term continental 
shelf is mentioned, along with certain limitations or 
extensions, and thirdly, those where no continental 
shelf is mentioned.
However, from the above brief illustration of the 
historical perspective of the continental shelf, it appears 
that no other question in international law has received 
such thorough consideration. Moreover, although it has 
developed rapidly and been regulated by international 
convention (The Geneva Convention), it should still be 
remembered that many States are not party to this 
convention, and that the Convention deals inadequately 
with some of the questions involved.
(323) As if the coastal state has complete sovereignty 
over the continental shelf.
(324) Gutteridge, op.cit.. Ref. (254), at 133, pp. 110 
et seq.
Subsection Two 
The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf
The history of the continental shelf, as noted in
the previous subsection, shows quite conclusively that
the continental shelf doctrine has gained acceptance in
(325 )state practice;^  ^ the task now is to consider the
outer limit of the continental shelf. It must be noted
at the outset that geographical and marine sciences reveal
that the shores of States stretch to different extents
beneath the superjacent waters of the seas. That is to
say, shores sometimes descend slowly, and at other times
(326steeply, to the sea.^  ^ The gentle slant of the land
mass of the territory constitutes a shelf, which terminates
in the sea in a submerged state, and then descends
steeply to the ocean bed. It is this "shelf" which
geographers have termed the "continental shelf".
It may be added that the definition of the continental
shelf has been based on different grounds. Some scientists
have founded it on the geographical nature of the shelf,
others have considered the biological facts of the living
resources in the area as solid grounds, and the third
group is of the opinion that the definition must be based
(327 )on the levels of the descents.^
In this connection, it may be of use to cite the 
definition adopted by the Committee on the Nomenclature 
of Ocean Bottom Features in 1953 :
(325) See above pp. 139 et seq.
(326) See Miron, George, "The Outer Continental Shelf - 
Managing'or Mismanaging * its Resources" J. Marit.
Law Com., Vol. 2, No. 2, 1971, p.267.
(327) Lauterpacht, op.cit.. Ref.(238 ), at 127, pp.383-387,
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"Continental shelf, shelf edge and borderland.
The zone around the continent, extending from the 
low-water line to the depth at which there is a 
marked increase of slope to greater depth. Where 
this increase occurs, the term shelf edge is 
appropriate. Conventionally, its edge is taken 
at 100 fathoms, or 2 0 0 metres, but instances are 
known where the increase of slope occurs at more 
than 200 or less than 65 fathoms. When the zone 
below the low-water is highly irregular, and 
includes depths well in excess of those typical 
of continental shelves, the term continental 
borderland is appropriate.
Continental slope. The declivity from the outer 
edge of the continental shelf or continental 
borderland into great depths.
Continental terrace. The zone around the continents, 
extending from the low-water line, to the base of 
the continental slope.
Island shelf. The zone around an island or island 
group, extending from the low-water line to the 
depths at which there is a marked increase of slope 
to greater depths. Conventionally, its edge is 
taken at 1 0 0 fathoms, or 2 0 0 metres.
Island slope. The declivity from the outer edge 
of an island shelf into great d e p t h s . "(328)
As to the legal definition, according to Professor
Brown and other high authorities on the subject, the
definition of the continental shelf is one of the most
debated questions of the law of the sea.(3^9) That is to
say, the definition of the continental shelf is an intri-
(328) Cited in Brown, op.cit., Ref. (99 ), at 44, part 
II, pp. 281-282.
(329) Brown, E.D., "The Outer Limit of the Continental 
Shelf", Jur. Rev., 1968, p.Ill; and op.cit., Ref.
(4 ) at 9 , p.377.
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cate question not only for lawyers but also for physical
scientists who are not wholly in agreement regarding
it (330) rpQ say the foregoing is not to admit that the
problem under consideration is a new one. On the contrary,
it was first considered in the debate of the ILC in the 
(331 )1950s. Accordingly, it is proposed to deal first
of all with the preparatory work of the drafting of 
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
S h e l f . (382) Then time will be devoted to the Geneva 
Conference as well as the text of Article 1 of the 
Convention, the proposals suggested by the organizations 
concerned and the rules emerging from the UNCLOS III.
And finally,, the need for a definite outer limit of the 
continental shelf will be discussed.
I . The Preparatory Work for the Drafting of Article (1) 
of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
The drafting history of Article 1 shows that the ILC 
in the early stages considered that the legal concept of 
the continental shelf need not depend on the geographical 
sense. Therefore, it defined the continental shelf in 
its first draft articles only in terms of exploit- 
a b i l i t y . (388) it provided that
(330) Mouton, M.W. "The Continental Shelf", 1952, pp.6-45.
(331) Brown, ibid. "The Outer Limit of the Continental 
Shelf, p.117.
(332) The attention directed to the ILC's work is justified 
by the significant part which the Commission played 
in preparing the articles on the continental shelf. 
See Oxman, Bernard H., "The Preparation of Article
1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf", J. 
Marit. Law Com., Vol. 3, No. 2, 1972, pp.246-247.
(333) Brown, ibid., p.113; Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92), at 79, 
pp.440 et seq.. See also the Study prepared by the 
Secretariat of the United Nations for the Adhoc
Contd....
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"As here used, the term continental shelf refers 
to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of 
territorial waters, where the depth of the super­
jacent waters admits of the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the seabed and s u b s o i l . "(334)
This appears to mean that the ILC put aside the term 
continental shelf in the geographical sense and employed 
the term exploitability when defining the outer limit of 
the continental shelf. Indeed, this was done for the 
benefit of States which did not possess a continental
shelf in the geographical s e n s e . (385)
In 1953 in the light of governmental comments, the 
Commission abandoned its previous criterion. Operating 
within the belief that "precision must have priority over 
long-term stability and, stressing also the need to avoid 
the adoption of different limits by different States", 
the Commission considered the possibility of adopting a 
fixed limit in terms of the depth of the superjacent 
waters.(^38) Thus, the pertinent Article of the 1953 
draft defined the continental shelf as it referred to 
"the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous
(333) contd....
Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed 
and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limit of National 
Jurisdiction. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/19, 21 June, 
1968, Paragraphs 13-18.
(334) YBILC, 1950, Vol. 1, pp.214-304; YBILC, 1951, Vol. 
II, p.141.
(335) For further details concerning the motives for 
avoiding the geographical sense of the continental 
shelf see. Mouton, op.cit.. Ref. (258), at 135, 
pp.75-76.
(336) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (329), at 155, p.114.
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to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea,
to a depth of 2 0 0 m e t r e s (337)
Three years later, the Commission changed its 
attitude once more and considered in 1956 a combined 
criteria for a fixed depth and exploitability. The 
Commission in its argument for justifying the new criteria, 
raises the point that the Inter-American Specialised 
Conference on "Conservation of Natural Resources : 
Continental Shelf and Oceanic Waters" adopted the view, 
"unanimously held by the American States" that the juris­
diction of the coastal State should be extended beyond the 
limit of 2 0 0 metres to "where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits the exploitation of the natural resources
(338)of the seabed and subsoil." Regardless of the
objection of a number of its members, the Commission 
inserted the criteria on the grounds that the exploit­
ability test would contain the seeds of subsequent 
uncertainties and disputes. The text as considered was, 
however, wholly adopted by the majority of the members of 
the Commission on the basis that it would mitigate the
(337) YBILC, 1953, Vol. I, pp.72-85. It would have been 
better if the Commission had employed the 100 
fathom isobath instead of 2 0 0 metres, because the 
former is not only a convenient line for discussions 
as it is usually drawn on the sea-charts, but also 
the difference between it and the latter is about
17 metres. See Mouton, Ref. (258), at 135, p.418.
(338) Brown, E.D. "The Legal Regime of Hydrospace", 1971, 
pp.4,5. Article 67 of the draft defined the outer 
limit of the continental shelf as it is the "seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea
to a depth of 2 0 0 metres (approximately 1 0 0 fathoms) 
or beyond that limit,to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admit of the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the said areas". YBILC, 1956, 
Vol. II, pp.253-296.
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element of arbitrariness in the 1953 draft by the principle 
of equality.(339)
Eventually, Article 67 of the 1956 draft was approved 
with the addition of a second paragraph concerning the 
islands, by the Fourth Committee of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea.^^^O)
II. The Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf
Although it is true that not all coastal States are
party to the Geneva Convention on the continental shelf, it
is equally true that the problem of the outer limit of the
continental shelf is chiefly that of the interpretation of
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention.(^44) Article 1 which
was adopted by the Geneva Conference defines the outer
limit of the continental shelf:
"For the purpose of these Articles, the term 
'continental shelf' is used as referring (a) to 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
(339) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (329), at 155, p.114; YBILC, 
1956, Vol. II, pp. 296-297. See also Kish, John,
"The Law of the International Space", 1973, pp.
18-19.
(340) The vote was 51 to 9 with 10 abstentions. See 
Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, pp.11-15, and 
op.cit.. Ref. (329), at 155, p.112. However, it may 
be observed that objections were expressed by 
delegates at the conference concerning incorporating 
the criterion of exploitability. Those proposals 
all failed to secure the prerequisite majority.
See for example the Proposal of Argentina U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L.6 UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 
VI, p.127; the French Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
13/C. 4/L.8, ibid., p.129; the Rumanian Proposal,
Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L.4, ibid., p.127. See also 
ibid., pp.4/, 19,21,23,34,46,129 ; see the Canadian 
Proposal Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L.30, ibid., pp.46,
135; the Yugoslav Proposal, Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L.12
(341) See Brown, op.cit., Ref. (329), at 155, pp.112.
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the territorial sea, to a depth of 2 0 0 metres 
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of 
the superjacent waters admits of the exploit­
ation of the natural resources of the said 
areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of 
similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts
of islands."(342)
The clear terms of this provision reveal that the 
adopted definition combining two depth tests for determining 
the adjacent submarine zones over which a coastal State may 
exercise its continental shelf, claims:
I . The 200-metres depth test
II. The criterion of exploitability.
These two criteria will be discussed in the paragraphs 
which follow. However, more than this must be said. Any 
analysis of these two criteria must be prefaced by an 
examination of the word adjacent and whether it implies 
some limitation upon the seaward extension of the 
continental shelf.
a . Submarine Areas Adjacent to the Coast
The word "adjacent" mentioned in Article 1 is very 
often stressed to infer some limitation of the seaward 
extension of the continental s h e l f . (343) it is believed 
that the exploitability test should be interpreted only 
together with the concept of "adjacent areas".
To say this is not to claim that difficulties of 
interpretation have not arisen in connection with this word
(342) Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (31), at 20, p.107.
(343) Butte, op.cit., Ref. (213), at 120, p.239.
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which appears in Article % (344) the contrary, all
the evidence which follows shows clearly that quite 
contradictory views have been expressed in this regard.
In seeking to discern the meaning and the scope of the 
term "adjacent", it is useful to divide the argument into 
two attitudes:
The first, in brief, suggests that the word adjacent 
consists of all the submerged land mass. The grounds 
put forward to justify this view are that it is understood 
from the fact that the shelf area is the natural 
prolongation of continental landmass into and under the 
s e a . (345) in the light of this, it is contended that 
every coastal State "could have all of its geological 
continental s h e l f " . (3^^) %f further evidence was needed
to prove this, it may be found in the following;
a. The term "adjacent" found its own place in the draft 
articles of the ILC and then in the Geneva Convention in 
the light of the results raised by the ’Inter-American 
Specialized Conference on the Conservation of Natural 
Resources: The Continental Shelf and Marine Waters’ held
at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956. For present purposes it is 
enough to observe that the above conference interpreted 
the term"adjacency" in such a way as to include the 
entire geological extension of the continental mass
(344) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (5), at 2, p.166.
(345) See Jennings, R.Y., "The Limits of Continental Shelf 
Jurisdiction, Some Possible Implications of the 
North Sea Judgment", ICLQ, Vol. 18, 1969, p.824; 
Finlay, L ., "The Outer Limit of the Continental 
Shelf", AJIL, Vol. 64, 1970, p.42; ICJ Reports, 1969, 
p.29.
(346) Finlay, ibid., p.42.
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seaward to where the submerged portion of that mass meets
the abyssal ocean floor,(^47)
b . The other point indicates that the same thing may be 
inferred from the Judgment of the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, The Court stressed, it is 
contended, that "Submarine areas do not really appertain 
to the coastal State because - or not only because - they 
are near it’J but because they are to be "deemed to be 
actually part of the territory over which the coastal 
State already has dominion,-in the sense that, although 
covered with water, they are a prolongation or continuation 
of that territory, an extension of it under the sea."(348)
c. An even better piece of evidence, it is alleged, is 
to be found in Article (1) of the Convention itself. It 
is added that the term "continental shelf" implies the 
whole continental shelf and not merely a part of it. The 
absolute implication of the above term should not be over­
looked when it is established, as in the case here, 
without particular restriction.
d. Another reason for what has been said lies in the fact 
that a number of States have granted licences in 
continental slope regions. It is to be noted that these 
acts did not provoke protests from other States, from which 
the recognition and acceptance of the international
(347) Ibid., pp.43-45; for further details concerning the 
Ciudad Trujillo Conference see, Oxman, op.cit.. Ref.
(332), at 156, Part II, J. Marit. Law Com., Vol. 3, 
1972, pp.445-454.
(348) ICJ Reports, 1969, para 43, p.31.
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community can be i n f e r r e d . (349)
However, in contrast to the above view, it is 
contended that the word "adjacent" has here the meaning 
of nearness and not contiguity. Obviously, whilst all 
submarine areas could be considered "contiguous", they 
could not be regarded as "adjacent" or'bear".(3^0) is
true that the ILC took into account the consequences of 
the Cuidad Trujillo Conference. But what may not be 
readily believed is that the Commission approved and then 
adopted the recommendations of the Conference as a whole. 
It only adopted the exploitability test together with 200 
metres depth in response to the explanation of Mr. M. 
Amador that technological advances would be rapid enough 
to make it possible to exploit resources of the seabed at 
a depth over 2 0 0 metres,
It is also of no importance that the basis was
(351 )derived from the Judgment of the ICJ. In that case,
the court was concerned with contemplating the legal 
status of the rights of coastal States over their 
continental shelves, not in determining the outer limit of
(349) Andrassy, Juraj, "International and the Resources of 
the Sea", 1970, p.173; Brown, op.cit., Ref. (5 ), at 
2, pp.179-181; Finlay, op.cit.. Ref. (345), at 161, 
pp.42-61; Jennings, op.cit.. Ref. 345, at 161, pp. 
825 et seq.; Barry, op.cit.. Ref. (5 ), at 2, p.228 
Miron, op.cit.. Ref. (326), at 154, pp.267-268.
(350) The word "contiguous" was used in the ILC’s drafts 
of 1951 and 1953. The word "adjacent" was used for 
the first time in the 1956 draft. This is due 
according to Mr. Goldie, to the ambiguity of the 
former. See Goldie, L.F.E., "A Lexicographical 
Controversy - The Word 'Adjacent' in Article 1 of 
the Continental Shelf Convention", AJIL, Vol. 6 6 , 
1972, p.833.
(351) See above, p. 162.
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the continental shelf. Therefore, that would have no 
real bearing on the point.
The allegation that the term "continental shelf" 
appears in Article (1) in a broad sense and must thus be 
interpreted as consisting of the whole geological extension 
of the shelf, is not, it is contended, fully justified.
It is very difficult to adopt an interpretation of such a 
term without regard firstly to the preparatory work and 
the special circumstances in which it was drafted, and 
secondly to its scientific sense. Indeed, both these 
elements indicate clearly that the term "continental 
shelf", which finds its place in Article (1) of the Geneva 
Convention on the continental shelf, was designed to refer
merely to the continental shelf, not the continental
(352) margin,^
Finally, reference has also been made to the argument 
that a number of States have already granted licences for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting areas of the 
continental margin from which the consent of the 
international community is extracted. With respect to 
this, although States are conducting operations of 
exploitation in the continental margin, the unreasonable­
ness arises from the inference that the acceptance of the 
international community must follow. Such licences for 
exploitation are not granted in the application of Article 
1 but are beyond its limits and contrary to its meaning.
(352) Luard, op.cit., Ref. (4), at 1; pp.38, 39;
Andrassy, op.cit.. Ref. (349) at 163, pp.3-15, 
173-174; Mouton, op,cit.. Ref, (330), at 156, pp. 
12-32; Jennings, op.cit., Ref. (345), at 161, pp. 
825-832.
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Moreover, although States have not protested claims to the
continental margin, this contention could not serve as a
basis in this respect. Quoting and approving Professor
O'Connell's opinion, Andrassy observed that "Normally,
protests are lodged only when the interests of a State
(353 )are directly affected".^ In this respect, there can
be no better quotation than the following two excerpts from
Professor O'Connell's commentary on a similar case.
"Protests have not been directed against the 
less exaggerated claims only because no State 
had sufficient economic interest in the matter 
to challenge what might be described as
intention to commit w r o n g . "(334)
Professor O'Connell goes on further to say
"absence of protest is, therefore, of only 
relative value in determining whether or not
a rule of law has e v o l v e d . "(333)
Conclusion
In the light of the preceding argument, it may now 
be adduced that the word "adjacent", which appears in 
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention, leaves much room for 
argument. However, it is not intended to repeat all of 
what has been said above, it is sufficient to point out 
that provisions should be effective only in their natural 
and ordinary meaning. No doubt the concept of "adjacency"
(353) Andrassy, ibid., p.174,
(354) O'Connell, D.P., "Sedentary Fisheries and the 
Australian Continental Shelf", AJIL, Vol. 49, 1955, 
p.194.
(355) Ibid,
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is a relative m a t t e r . (336) in this connection it may be
quoted from Professor Brown's commentary on the subject
"... it would certainly be illegitimate to 
argue that because point 'x' in mid-Atlantic is 
'not near to' the coast of any State, it cannot 
be within the continental shelf of any State."(33?)
Professor Brown goes on to say:
"Moreover, any argument which seeks to stress the 
element of 'nearness' has to contend with 
realities, such as, for example, the submarine 
areas off the east coast of Argentina, the north 
Russian Coast and the coast of Vietnam which are 
less than 2 0 0 metres in depth out to a distance 
of over 200 miles. Is this 'near' or 'far'? It 
could be answered that these areas fall under the 
first part of the definition 'to a depth of 2 0 0  
metres' but this is unlikely to satisfy those 
states with deeper but still exploitable submarine 
areas at comparable distances from the coast."(3^8)
Accordingly, Professor Brown reaches the conclusion that,
looking at the ordinary meaning of the language used in
Article 1, it would seem that a coastal State may claim
that its continental shelf extends as far as it has the
capacity to exploit the submarine areas, provided that
there is continuity of e x p l o i t a b i l i t y . (33®) Whilst the
records of the ILC furnish a little support for those who
argue that the word adjacent imposes a real limitation
(356) Goldie, op.cit., Ref. (350), at 163, p.833.
(357) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, p.5 and Ref.
(329), at 155, pp.114, 115.
(358) Brown, ibid., p .6 and p.115 respectively.
(359) Brown, ibid., p .8 and p.115 respectively.
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on the seaward extension of the continental s h e l f ,
it does nothing, it is submitted, to solve the problem.
The clear terms of this provision would however outweigh
any inference which might be drawn from the records of
the Commission. In any possible case, practice and the
Convention show undoubtedly that the law today does not
confine national jurisdiction to the continental shelf
in the strict sense. In support of almost all of what
has been stated, we may quote the words of the PCIJ in
the case concerning Polish Postal Service in D a n z i g .
The Court pointed out that:
"It is a cardinal principle of interpretation 
that words must be interpreted in the sense 
which they would normally have in their
context."(362)
b . The Criterion of Depth
It is worth observing that the test of depth in terms 
of 200 metres was originally proposed in the 1953 draft 
of the ILC. Then, it was advocated that it be coupled 
with the exploitability test in the 1956 draft which was 
approved by the Geneva Conference.
It is no doubt correct to say that this criterion 
seems to have considerable apparent advantages. Certainly, 
the 2 0 0 -metre limit is approximately the depth of the outer 
edge where the continental shelf generally comes to an
(360) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (329), at 155, pp.117-143 and 
op.cit.. Ref, (338), at 158, p.8 ; Andrassy, op.cit.. 
Ref. (349), at 163, p.82.
(361) PCIJ, Series B, No. 11, p.39. (1925).
(362) Ibid.
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end and the continental slope starts falling rapidly to
a much greater depth. Thus, it coincides with the
definition of the continental shelf in the geological 
(363 )sense. Another advantage is that this test is not
wholly arbitrary because it is tied up with the practical 
needs at one t i m e ,  (364) as far as they could be
foreseen for a long time to come.
However, there is another aspect to the question.
One must admit that the edge of the shelf in reality 
neither appears as a simple phenomenon as shown on maps, 
nor is it usually to be found around the 1 0 0 fathoms (200 
metres) isobath. Indeed, it may be deeper or shallower 
than 200 metres. Moreover, the edge is not always a 
sharp one, but sometimes very rounded and thus could not
be easily l o c a t e d . (383)
Accordingly, if the criterion for the 100 fathom line 
was applied on its own, it would remove from the definition 
considerable parts of the shelf. That is to say, the 
possibility of exclusive jurisdiction over other submarine 
areas of the continental shelf and insular terraces 
adjacent to a State territory which had a special 
configuration of its coastline, would be excluded. The 
above difficulty exists conspicuously in cases such as 
the North Sea, where the shelf stretches over that sea 
except for that of the Norwegian coast as there are
(363) Colombos, op.cit., Ref. ( 4 ), at 9 , p.76.
(364) At the time when the Geneva Convention was 
concluded.
(365) Mouton, op.cit., Ref. (258), at 135, p.417.
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submerged areas of a depth less than 2 0 0 metres situated
in considerable proximity to the coast and separated by a
narrow channel deeper than 2 0 0 m e t r e s . ^ further
complicated situation may arise where the depth of the
superjacent waters (as in the Arabian Gulf(36?)) wholly
less than the legal d e p t h . (368) this connection,
there is also no logical reason to use the test of depth
(369 )whatever that depth is.^ More important is the
fact that the average depth of the edge is not meant to
be the depth at every point of the edge, but the depth of
a "legal edge" for the purpose of enabling the coastal
State to exercise its rights over certain areas of the
seabed. This legal edge will in many places differ from
(370)the physical edge. In addition, despite the fact
that there is almost a consensus that the test of "200 
metres" is tied to all present estimates of exploitability, 
there can be no doubt that exploitation at depths greater 
than 2 0 0 metres will in the future be economically 
feasible and indeed is already so.(371)
(366) See U.N. Doc, A/CN.4/55 p.4; Jennings, op.cit., Ref, 
(63), at 32, pp.393 et seq.; Ely, Northcutt,
"American Policy in the Development of Undersea 
Mineral Resources; Int. Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1968,
p.218.
(367) See below about the name of the Gulf, pp.^^9-3lO.
(368) Everywhere in the Arabian Gulf the depth is no more 
than 100 metres and the shelf has no edge. See 
YBILC, 1950, Vol. 1, p.214.
(369) Other depths were suggested in the debate of the ILC. 
See YBILC, 1950, Vol. 1, pp.214-239; Mouton, op.cit. 
Ref. (258), at 135, pp.417 et seq.
(370) Mouton, ibid.; YBILC, 1951, Vol. II, p.141.
(371) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5 ), at 9, p.830.
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A further worthwhile question is how this test applies
(372 )if the edge slopes steeply down to the seabed?^  ^ Would
the States concerned be deprived of their continental
shelves, or would the test be neglected and their cases
treated as exceptions?
Certainly, it is a matter of justice that such States
should also be entitled to exploit these areas on an equal
footing with those which possess a continental shelf in
the geological sense.
For the above reasons, the conclusion may be reached
that the test of a fixed depth might lead to unjust
inequality among States by conferring upon States unequal 
(373 )areas. Moreover, this criterion has the disadvantage
of being both variable and unrealistic when technical 
developments make it possible to exploit the seabed and 
subsoil at depths greater than 200 metres. Finally, the 
above are only some of the observations which illustrate 
the ambiguity of the test and the numerous different 
problems concerning the seabed of the continental shelf 
and which the test is not capable of solving.
Logically speaking, the depth test had not sufficiently 
satisfied the members of the ILC for them to consider it 
the sole criterion for the delimitation of the outer limit 
of the continental shelf. Therefore, it was coupled with
another test.(374)
(372) As in the case of the coastal States with adjacent 
submarine areas which do not constitute a contin­
ental shelf such as Chile, Peru and Norway.
(373) Nawaz, M.K., "Alternative Criteria for Delimiting 
the Continental Shelf", Indian J.I.L., Vol. 13, No.
1, 1973, p.31.
(374) Namely the exploitability test.
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c . The Criterion of Exploitability
The second criterion relating to the outer limit of
the continental shelf, as provided for in Article 1 of the
Geneva Convention on the continental shelf, is the
exploitability. The coastal State is permitted to claim
jurisdiction over submarine regions beyond the territorial
sea and beyond the 2 0 0 metre isobath, up until where the
depth of the superjacent waters allows the exploitation of
(375 )the natural resources of the said areas,^
Certainly the adoption of the exploitability test 
together with the fixed depth criterion is designed to 
mitigate the inequalities of the geographical features and 
to achieve justice among States by giving them equal 
rights, whether or not they have a continental shelf. By 
virtue of the exploitability test, all States are entitled 
to exercise sovereign rights over the extent of sea 
adjacent to their coasts as long as its natural resources 
are exploitable. There is another motive behind adopting 
the exploitability test. The criterion is surely of the 
broadest import as it includes the shallow water areas 
which would technically not constitute continental shelf
without special mention.(376)
The records of the ILC and the U.N. Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, show that it was designed to employ the 
exploitability test for a supplementary task to that of 
the 200 metre isobath test. This conferred upon the 
coastal State a right over continental shelf activities
(375) Nawaz, op.cit., Ref. (373), at 170, p.32.
(376) Oxman, op,cit.. Ref. (332), at 156, pp.269-270.
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carried out on the continental slope as continuation of
activities began, or connected with those performed, in
the area between its territorial sea and the 2 0 0 metre
line. The test, looked at from this angle, is intended
to give a particular solution to immeasurable problems
which might have arisen if the 2 0 0 metre clause had been
(377 )accepted as the final test.
Quite apart from the above advantages the definition
given in Article 1 is an inadequate one, since it provides
an outer limit which is neither reasonable, practical, or
clear. Additionally, it obviously lacks the necessary 
(378 )precision,^ and gives rise to disputes as well as
(379 )uncertainty. Furthermore, it leads to numerous
difficulties, as the limited stretch which it provides is 
variable according to the technological advance and the 
States' capacities. Moreover, the extent differs from 
place to place and from time to time. Professor Young 
asked the following question. "Precisely, whose 
technology determines the depth of exploitability? Is it 
the depth which at any given moment with the aid of 
technology any State could reach, or is it limited to the
(377) Goldie, L.F.E. "The Management of Ocean Resources: 
Regimes for Structuring the Maritime Environment", 
Edited in the "Future of International Legal Order”, 
Vol. 6 , 1972, p.183.
(378) One of the delegates to the Geneva Conference 
compared this awkward definition to "a speed limit 
in a town worded as follows: "Maximum speed 50 kilo­
metres per hour, unless your motor is strong enough 
to go faster". See Mouton, M.W., "The Impact of 
Science on International Law", Hague Recueil, Vol. 
119, 1966, III, p.198; Ely, op.cit.. Ref, (366), at 
169, p.219.
(379) Young, op.cit.. Ref. (263), at 137, p.643,
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capacity of the specific State?(380) in other words, 
does the accomplishment of a record depth by any State 
extend automatically the shelf areas of all other States 
regardless of their technological capacities and the 
individual problems which might pertain to their coasts?
This question has been answered by the majority of writers 
affirmatively. However, correct as that may be, the 
question is controversial and d i s p u t e d . ( 3 8 1 )
In fact, the affirmative answer to that inquiry can 
be inferred from the Continental Shelf Convention itself 
in two aspects. The first step in the reasoning is in 
the criterion of exploitability as pointed out in Article
1. It was considered as clearly embodying an objective 
test(382) depending on the highest level of technical 
ability and not on the particular State's capacity. The 
second reasoning can be understood from the full implications 
of Article 2 of the Convention, The affirmative answer 
is indeed implied by the opposite meaning of Article 2 
which states that the rights are exclusive in the sense 
that if the coastal State does not explore the continental 
shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may under­
take these activities, or make a claim to the continental 
shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.
(380) Ibid., pp.643 et seq.; Ratiner, op.cit.. Ref. (14), 
at 4 , p.231.
(381) See Young, Richard, "The Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf; A First Impression", AJIL, Vol.
52, 1958, pp.733, 735; Gutteridge, op.cit., Ref.
(254), at 133, pp.102-110; Oda, op,cit.. Ref. (92), 
at 79, p.442.
(382) The objectiveness is worded in the term "... beyond 
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation" , See the text of 
the Article, Brownlie, op.cit., Ref. (31), at 20, 
p.107.
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The term "without the express consent" is clearly of 
tacit intent. It shows that in the case of inability to 
exploit its continental shelf itself, the State concerned 
is free to concede to any other State or to any other 
nationals the right to explore its continental shelf or 
exploit its natural resources.
Here, another related question may be asked. Professor
Brown posed the question whether exploitation means
"economically feasible exploitation or any exploitation
irrespective of cost?"^^^^^ In reply to this question
Professor Brown suggests that
"... the term 'exploitation' must be linked with 
the notion of economic feasibility. Otherwise, 
there would be no limit whatsoever since even 
the Marianas Trench could be exploited given the 
necessary expenditure. On the other hand, in 
adopting economic feasibility as the test, it 
should be made clear that this does not necessarily 
involve the cost calculations which a company 
operating in a capitalist economy would have to 
make. If, in good faith 'perhaps, to develop 
submarine technology' a 'Socialist' government or 
a firm subsidised by a 'capitalist' government 
were to undertake exploitation of mineral resources 
at a cost which was far in excess of the cost of 
exploiting available land resources, this would, 
it is submitted, fall within the terms of the 
Convention and ground a claim.
For the above reasons, coupled with the fact that the 
clear purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon coastal 
States on the continental shelf is to exploit its natural
(383) Brown, op,cit., Ref. (338), at 158, p.7.
(384) Ibid., p.7.
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resources, one is entitled to assume that only economic 
exploitation is meant by the exploitability test.
A further important question in ascertaining the 
scope of the exploitability test arises. That is to say, 
what is the purpose of the 2 0 0 metre contour clause which 
the Conference retained together with the exploitability 
test if it is immediately followed by a qualification 
which enables the coastal State to exploit an area beyond 
that limit? The exploitability test seems to prevent 
the depth test from being applied. One might just as 
well suggest that it is meaningless to combine these two 
tests, because it was known at the Geneva Conference, if 
not before, that technological developments in the near 
future might make it possible to exploit resources of the
/ ' 3 g 5 ' s
seabed at a depth over two hundred metres.^  ^ In the 
light of these facts, it is thought that the purpose of 
the exploitability test is to protect the rights of those 
States which did not have continental shelves in the 
geological s e n s e . H e n c e ,  it is contended that the 
technological advances in the future would have no effect
('3Q7 )
on the test.^  ^ This means that the exploitability 
test is intended to be applicable only in the case of non­
continental shelf States whose superjacent waters depths 
exceed 2 0 0 metres.
(385) See YBILC, 1956, Vol. II, p.296.
(386) Andrassy, op.cit.. Ref, (349), at 163, pp.83-84.
(387) YBILC, 1956, Vol. II, p.296.
(388) This is because there are two kinds of non­
continental shelf States, The first is that of 
shallow areas and in the second, the superjacent 
waters exceed 200 metres. The only case in which 
the criterion of exploitability works is the 
latter.
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The grounds given to this view not only appear 
strange but also inequitable. The implication which 
cannot be avoided is that it confers on States having no 
continental shelf, rights over areas wider than those 
which the continental shelf States are entitled to have. 
Admittedly, it is a matter of justice to give non 
continental shelf States a claim over certain areas of the 
sea adjacent to their coasts. However, it is equally 
important to bestow the same right on States which have 
continental shelves. From these arguments it appears 
almost certain that the 2 0 0 metre test becomes superfluous 
by reason of gradual advance of technical efficiency.
As to these immeasurable criticisms, some efforts 
have been made to impose some limits on the outer limit of 
the continental shelf in order to bring a halt to the 
continuous extension of claims to the continental 
s h e l f . I t  is often pointed out that the interpre­
tation of the test should be connected with the premise 
that the continental shelf is a natural prolongation of 
the land territory of the S t a t e , a n d  it is on that 
that an outer limit should be p l a c e d . A l s o ,  another 
effort has been made to rely upon the term "continental 
shelf" itself to limit the exploitability test.^^^^^
(389) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5), at 9 , p.830.
(390) Butte, op.cit., Ref. (213), at 120, p.239.
(391) ICJ Reports, 1969, paras. 40, 43, 44, 85, pp. 29,
31 and 47-48 respectively.
(392) Oda, op.cit.. Ref, (92), at 79, p.443; Brown, op. 
cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, pp. 5 et seq.
(393) Jennings, op.cit., Ref. (83), at?2 , p.395; Brown, 
op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, p.8 .
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Moreover, it has been tried to define the outer limit of 
the continental shelf by the supposed intentions of the 
ILC and Geneva Conference by going beyond the literal sense 
of Article 1. The latter view depends on ascertaining the 
intention of the parties and whether or not they intend 
to set limits for continental shelf claims.
However, to say this is not to accept these inter­
pretations as accurate. Firstly, the term "continental 
shelf" is employed in the Convention in a special "legal 
sense" not merely limited to its ordinary meaning.
Secondly, it would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to apply this concept, since the idea of an adjacent area 
as noted a b o v e i s  a relative matter and the concept 
of the continental shelf is in d i s p u t e . T h i r d l y ,  
even as regards the intentions of the ILC and the Geneva 
Conference which were cited as evidence that the 
Commission and the Conference intended some limitations on 
the seaward extension of the shelf, there are reasons to 
oppose such an interpretation.  ^ The only sensible 
conclusion that can be reached concerning Article 1 of the 
Geneva Convention is that the outer limit of the
(394) Brown, ibid., p.8 .
(395) For more details concerning the reasons behind the 
ILC's decision not to adhere strictly to the 
geological concept of the continental shelf see 
Daintith and others, op.cit., Ref. (4 ), at 9 , 
P.A321.
(396) See above pp. 160-167.
(397) The term "submarine areas" was suggested by Prof­
essor Young as a more appropriate term to cover the 
shallow water areas, and areas where the depths are 
over 200 metres. See Young, op.cit., Ref. (260),
at 136, pp.227-228. Also, the term "submarine areas" 
was raised by Mr, Amador in the ILC. See
YBILC, 1956, Vol. 1, pp.130-140.
(398) See below pp. 160 et seq.
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continental shelf according to the said Convention is not 
(399 )limited. This matter is self-evident, as that is
what the conventional text indicates expressly on the one 
hand, and on the other, some States have already exploited 
beyond that limit.
Theoretically, since the rights of the coastal States 
over their continental shelves are ipso jure as long as 
the seabed and subsoil is exploitable, it would appear 
that under the current provision, all the submarine areas 
of the world would be divided among the coastal States. 
Technology is advancing so quickly that the natural 
resources can be exploited or expected to be so in the 
near future by means of drilling from ships at any 
d e p t h , r e g a r d l e s s  of whether the particular State is 
able to exploit the resources itself.
However, to say the foregoing is not to deny that the 
deliberations of the ILC indicate that the Commission had 
not overlooked these considerations. Indeed, the 
history of the drafting of Article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention on the continental shelf demonstrates clearly
(399) Oda, op.cit., Ref. (92), at 79, p.442; Lay, Houston 
S, "Pollution from Offshore Oil Wells" ed. In New 
Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. Ill, 1973,
p .103.
(400) Jennings, op.cit.. Ref, (63), at 32, p.394. See also 
Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158,p.36. Professor 
Brown reaches the conclusion that "Article 1 of the 
Geneva Convention cannot be properly interpreted so 
as to restrict the extension of the shelf by refer­
ence to the geological character of the seabed, and 
thus, the conventional shelf may extend beyond the 
'natural prolongation' of the territory". See Brown, 
ibid., p.36.
(401) Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92), at 79, p.443.
(402) Mouton, op.cit.. Ref. (258), at 135, p.418; Brown, 
op.cit.. Ref. (329), at 155, pp.119-121.
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that the ILC was quite aware of the ambiguity of such a 
text and the difficulties which it would lead to.^^^^^
So, it hesitated between 1950 and 1956 but in the final 
Report of 1956, it combined the two tests of "200 metre 
depth" and "exploitability".
III. Proposals and Recommendations of Non-Governmental 
Organizations and the U.N.
No doubt, man's relationship to the sea has been a 
source of conflict throughout the course of history. 
Interests in the seabed's natural resources are high 
amongst others. In recent years there has been a growing 
awareness of the value of seabed resources. It may 
be added that the rapid progress of technology has made 
the exploitation of resources of the seabed commercially
(403) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (338), at 158, p.4.
(404) The support which the draft articles eventually 
gained is due to four main reasons. For further 
details, see Brown, op.cit., Ref. (338), at 158,p.14.
(405) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (5 ), at 2, pp.174-176; Gamble, 
John King, Jr., "Bloc Thinking About the Oceans: 
Accelerating Pluralism", Edited in "Law of the Sea: 
The Emerging Regime of the Oceans", Proceedings, Law 
of the Sea Institute, Eighth Annual Conference, June 
18-21, 1973, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, 
1974, pp.13-16; Dupuy, Rene-Jean, "The Law of the 
Sea: Current Problems", 1974, pp.26-34; Knight, H. 
Gray, Managing the Sea's Living Resources: Legal and 
Political Aspects of High Seas Fisheries", 1977, pp. 
1-5; Joyner, Christopher C, ed,, "International Law 
of the Sea and the Future of Deep Seabed Mining", 
Proceedings of the John Bassett Moore Society of 
International Law Symposium and the American 
Society of International Law, Regional Meeting, 
November 16, 1974, Virginia, 1975, pp.1-12.
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possible at greater depths than before.
All these factors however had led not only States, 
but also international and non-Governmental Organizations, 
to issue proposals and recommendations on the evolution of 
the international law of the sea in general and the 
question of the continental shelf in particular.
a . Recommendations and Proposals of Non-Governmental 
Organizations
It is unnecessary to discuss all the recommendations, 
proposals and declarations in this connection. It is 
sufficient for present purposes to cite some instances.
One might refer in this regard to the "Draft Declaration 
of Principles which Should Govern the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Exploitation of the Mineral 
Resources of the Sea-Bed and Subsoil Beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction" issued by the International 
Association.  ^ This draft defined the outer limit 
of the continental shelf in terms of adjacency and a depth 
test of 200 metres or distance test of 50 nautical miles. 
Article 2(2) of the draft provides in part: "... submarine 
areas adjacent to its coast to a depth of 200 metres or 50
(406) Auburn, P.M., "The International Seabed Area", ICLQ, 
Vol. 20, 1971, pp.173-176.
(407) Gamble, ibid., pp.13-16.
(408) This draft had been prepared in April 1970 and 
submitted to the 54th Conference of the International 
Association, August, 1970, at the Hague, See Oda, 
Shigeru, "The International Law of the Ocean 
Development" 1972, Vol. 1, p.255.
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nautical miles from the baseline"•
Another criterion was proposed by the American Branch 
of the International Law Association: Deep Sea Mineral 
R e s o u r c e s . T h e  American Branch suggested that the 
limit of national jurisdiction that any State could have 
claimed
would be determined by negotiation at the 
time of creating the regime and would presumably 
take into account the size of each State, its 
population, its stage and economic development 
and perhaps other factorsV^^^^^
The American Branch proposed in its report to the
Committee on Deep-Sea Minerals in 1972 that the outer limit
of the continental shelf should have coincided with "the
outer edge of the continental margin or with a line drawn
2 0 0 miles seaward of the baseline .,. whichever lies
further offshore". ^
Another illustration which may be c i t e d i s  the
(409) Ibid., pp.255-256. It may be noted that the same 
criteria had been recommended by the Association in 
the text prepared by its Deep-Sea Mining Committee 
in February 1972 and introduced at the Session held 
in New York in August 1972. Oda, ibid., Vol. II,
p.2 2 1 .
(410) The Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the 
American Branch of the International Law Association 
Prepared its Report in July, 1968 and a Second 
Report in July 1970. Oda, ibid., Vol. 1, p.259.
(411) Oda, ibid.. Vol. 1. p.263.
(412) Ibid., Vol. II, p.227.
(413) Numerous proposals and recommendations in this 
connection can be found in Oda, ibid. See for example
1. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 
’’Towards A Better Use of the Ocean". 1969, Oda,
op.cit., Ref. (408) at 180, Vol. I, pp.231 et seq.
2. "Istituto Affari Xnternazionali":"International 
Regime of the Sea-bed". Ibid., pp.233 et seq.
3. "World Peace Through Law Centre": "Treaty Govern­
ing the Exploration and Exploitation of the Ocean 
Bed. Ibid., pp.244 et seq.
Contd....
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Recommendations of 1970 put forth by the Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace; The United Nations and
(414 )the Bed of the Sea, The Commission recommended
revising the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
particularly Article 1. It suggested that the rights of 
coastal States should end "at the 200 metre depth line or 
50 nautical miles from shore, which ever occurs further
out".
b . Proposals and Draft Articles Presented at the U.N. 
Seabed Committee and the UNCLOS III
A number of proposals and draft articles were put 
forward at the U.N, Seabed Committee on the International 
Seabed Area and the UNCLOS III. These proposals involved 
the question of seaward extension of the continental 
shelf. While some of these proposals suggested that the 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf that may be 
claimed by a State should have been limited, others did 
not indicate any definite extension.
After asserting that the seabed area should have been 
the "common heritage of all mankind", the draft convention
(413) contd.
4. Mrs. Elisabeth Mann Borgese: "The Ocean Regime - 
Draft Statute". Ibid., pp.280 et seq.
5. Senator Claiborne Pell: Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space". 
Ibid., p.272 et seq.
6 . Mr. Christopher W. Pinto: "Preliminary Draft and 
Outline of a Convention on the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof Beyond 
National Jurisdiction (1972)", Ibid., pp.305
et seq.
(414) Oda, ibid.. Vol. 1, p.237.
(415) Ibid.
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submitted by the U.S. to the U.N. Seabed Committee
adopted a combined criteria of adjacency and a 2 0 0  metre
i s o b a t h . A n o t h e r  draft article on the use of the
seabed for peaceful purposes was submitted by the Soviet
U n i o n . I n  this draft there was no indication at all
as to where the precise outer limit of the continental
shelf from which the international seabed area started.
Many other proposals as to the definition of the
continental shelf were expressed before the U.N, Seabed
Committee and the UNCLOS III.^^^^^ Due to the diversity
and number of views of government delegations and because
of the limitation of space which forbids considering
the various alternative formulae tabled, it would be
sufficient to examine the pertinent provision of the "ICNT".
Article 76 of the ICNT reads as follows:
"The continental shelf of a coastal State 
comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its terri­
torial sea throughout the natural prolongation 
of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin or to a distance of 2 0 0
(416)"Draft United Nations Convention on the International 
Seabed Area" submitted as a working paper for 
discussion purposes at the U.N. Sea-bed Committee
on 3 August 1970 by the U.S. of America. U.N. Doc. 
A/AC. 138/125.
(417) "Provisional Draft Articles of a Treaty on the Use 
of the Sea-bed for Peaceful Purposes", Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Submitted at the U.N. 
Sea-bed Committee on 22 July 1971. U.N. Doc. A/A/C. 
138/43.
(418) See for example the following proposals:
1. The Greek Proposal U.N.Doc.A/CONF.62/C.2/L. 25.
2. The Argentinian Proposal, U.N.Doc.A/CONF.138/SC. 
11/L. 37.
3. The U.S. Proposal U.N.Doc. A/CONF.62/C. 2/L. 42.
4. The Colombian, Venezuelan and Mexican Proposal, 
A/AC.138/SC. 11/L. 21.
5. The Japanese Proposal, A/CONF. 62/L 31/Rev. 1.
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nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured, where the outer edge 
of the continental margin does not extend up to that 
d i s t a n c e ^ ( 4 1 9 )
This formula quite explicitly retains the term
continental s h e l f . T h e  second point is that under
this provision the outer limit of the continental shelf
will be determined by reference to a geographical criterion
considering the continental margin edge as the end of the
extension of the coastal States' rights over the resources
of its continental s h e l f . C e r t a i n l y  the continental
(422 )margin edge is not similar in all cases, which in
turn may lead to inequality among coastal States. Bearing 
in mind this fact, the geographical test is coupled with 
another criterion in terms of fixed distance, namely 200 
miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea of 
the coastal State concerned is measured. The purpose of 
the distance test is to remove the inequality which would 
result if the geographical criterion was applied purely 
and simply.
It is correct to say that the suggested criteria, if 
they were eventually adopted, would place a limitation on 
the seaward extension covered by the convention intended 
to be concluded. This is no reason however for ignoring
(419) U.N, Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 52.
(420) Several considerations favour the retention of this 
term. For further details, see Brown, op.cit.,
Ref.(282), at 144, p.381.
(421) Daintith, Terence and G.D, Willoughby "United 
Kingdom Oil and Gas Law", London, 1977, p.168.
(422) See above pp. 154 et seq.
185
that it would extend the outer limit of the continental 
shelf to embrace parts of the sea which were otherwise 
res communis. It is to be noted that although the word 
'adjacent' mentioned in Article (1) of the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, is surely of the 
broadest import, there seems no reason to abandon it. 
Plainly, the intention behind the inclusion of the word 
'adjacent'in the definition of the continental shelf was 
simply to rule out any question of subsequent extension 
of coastal States' jurisdiction over areas of the seabed, 
although this point is not in reality covered by the 
convention. Therefore, if a limitation more landward than 
the continental margin and 200 miles distance was intended, 
one might suggest the inclusion of the concept of 
"adjacency" in such a context to accurately cover areas 
within considerable proximity to the coast.
It may be added that the definition adopted by the 
ICNT raises problems not only of a technical character,  ^
but also practical difficulties. Taking into account the 
subsequent geological alterations in the seabed and subsoil 
beneath the waters, one might easily conceive of the 
possible difficulties which may arise.
A further word must be said in this regard. As was 
indicated e a r l i e r , w h i l s t  the structure beneath the 
waters sometimes declines steeply, it slopes gently in 
others. Thus, for reasons of inequidistance of the 
continental margin edges from the coasts, the application
(423) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (282), at 144, p.389.
(424) See above pp. 154 et seq.
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of the above criterion would obviously lead to inequity 
with respect to the allocation of seabed areas.
One more question may be asked. Do the national 
exploitation rights over seabed resources extend beyond 
200 miles where the continental margin extends to that 
limit? Quite apart from the fact that the provision is 
clear in permitting the extension of exploitation rights 
to the continental margin edge or 200 miles from shore, 
whichever occurs further out, this matter is disputed.
There are States which assert that States' rights to sea­
bed areas must end at not further than 200 miles. On the 
other hand States with wide margins of course strongly 
oppose this view.^^^^^
Conclusion
The conclusion to be drawn from what has been stated
above is, that the ILC adopted in its draft of 1951 the
exploitability test as the sole criterion for determining
the outer limit of the continental shelf. Due to the
elasticity of the exploitability test, in that it would
permit excessive claims, the Commission later adopted a
test of depth in terms of 200 metres. An obvious reason
for adopting this criterion is that it coincided with the
continental shelf in the geological sense. There is
however an additional reason, in that it was sufficient for
(425) However, the matter is unresolved. A compromise
proposal presented by the U.S. for an accommodation 
that includes coastal State rights over the margin 
linked with revenue-sharing as a solution to the 
problem, is gaining additional support. This proposal 
faced opposition. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF, 62/C 2/L.40. 
See also Brown, op.cit., Ref.(282) at 144, p.383.
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all present and foreseeable practical needs. However, 
such a limit would have the disadvantage of unreasonable­
ness and inequality. Plainly, technical progress 
would make it possible to exploit resources at depths 
greater than 200 metres. On the other hand, it would 
deprive certain States of the right to exploit submarine 
areas, though adjacent to their c o a s t s . F i n a l l y ,  
the Commission linked the isobath limit and the exploit­
ability test so as to put all the concerned States on an 
equal footing. The clumsy combined criterion which was
approved by the Geneva Conference has its own inherent 
(427 )
defects. The main difficulty in this criterion is
that it would permit extensive claims which would result
eventually in dividing all the ocean floor. Whilst it
is difficult to doubt the soundness of Professor Brown's
conclusion that "the scope of the convention ratione loci
was not intended to include the submarine areas of the 
C 428 )
deep oceans", it nevertheless appears possible to
suggest that language of the kind under consideration can 
mean only that no clear limitation is placed on the 
submarine areas covered by the C o n v e n t i o n . I t  must 
be conceded that an expansive interpretation of Article 1 
is undesirable but accurate. One must, it is submitted,
(426) Simply because they are at depths greater than 200 
metres.
(427) Ely, op.cit., Ref. (366), at 169, p.218.
(428) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (329), at 155, p.142.
(429) Professor Oda points out that whatever the 
delegates at the Conference had in mind, the only 
logical interpretation of that provision is that 
it affected the allocation among coastal States of 
all submarine areas of the world. See Oda, op.cit.. 
Ref. (92), at 79, p.442.
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wrestle with the tension between the law that is and the 
law that ought to be. However, if the above conclusion 
is correct, it stands to reason that it would result in 
intense competition between States and might give rise to 
disputes by encouraging "gold rush" and dangerous 
exploitation activities. Even more important consequences 
would be the threat to the freedom of the high seas which 
has long been substantiated and assured to be an undisputed 
basic principle of international law.
The Need for a Definite Outer Limit of the Continental 
Shelf
By now however it seems evident, in view of the 
above mentioned uncertainties, that apart from the 200 
metre isobath test, the criteria for determining the outer 
limits of the continental shelf are open e n d e d , D u e  
to the need for the resources of the seabed together with 
the technological progress which makes oil drilling and 
the exploitation of other minerals possible at great depths, 
expansive claims have been increased. Notwithstanding 
the fact that, as we have seen, the majority of writers 
are dissatisfied with a liberal interpretation of the 
continental shelf definition as laid down in Article 1 of 
the Geneva Convention, as such an interpretation would 
seem to disregard other component elements contained within 
the definition. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that 
the expansionist trend has been notable among coastal
(430) Boggs, op.cit.. Ref. (13), at 14, pp.240, 245, 265- 
266; Butler, W.E., "Soviet Maritime Policy in Legal 
Perspective", Wld. Today, Vol. 28, 1972, p.462.
189
States. The present claims of the Latin American States 
are a good illustration in this respect. Also, in April 
1970, Canada claimed to control and administrate exclus­
ively an area of 100 miles in the North Polar Circle seas 
for the purpose of pollution prevention. If one is to 
believe Mr. Friedmann's logic that this control would turn 
to s o v e r e i g n t y , o n e  could realize how far the 
freedom of the high sea would be threatened. Bearing in 
mind everything that has been said, in addition to the 
fact that a clear continental shelf limit is a sine qua non 
for a new legal regime as deep sea bed resources outside 
national jurisdiction obviously require a specific 
definition of the outer limit of the continental shelf, 
it appears that the redefinition of the continental shelf 
is urgently in demand t o d a y . A s  the exploitability 
test in the present context offers a mean for coastal 
States to augment extensively the submarine areas subject 
to their exclusive rights, a series of ever-increasing 
claims further into the oceans are envisaged and the free 
high seas are seen as finally being enclosed within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal States. This would 
in turn lead, even according to those who believe in the 
restrictive interpretation of Article 1, to the eventual 
recognition by the international community of such 
extensive claims. A good illustration in this regard 
may be found in Mr. Andrassy's conclusion. Mr. Andrassy
(431) Friedmann, op.cit.. Ref. (253), at 133, p.45.
(432) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (338), at 158 , p.3.
(433) Brown, op.cit.. Ref, (329), at 155, p.112; See 
further the same author, op.cit.. Ref. ( 5  ), at 
2 , pp.165-190.
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points out :
"we do not agree with such an interpretation, 
but there is sufficient ground for fear that 
under the influence of various factors it 
could in fact prevail by way of state practice 
and precedents which would not meet a 
sufficiently strong opposition at the right 
moment.
In the light of these factors, one may suggest that 
the solution does not appear to lie in adherence to a 
test so deficient in accuracy, clarity and uncertainty.
On the contrary, if this pressing problem is to be solved, 
work must continue with the express purpose of reconciling 
any provision of international law on the continental 
shelf with the above observations. Several factors must 
be taken into account if a clear, acceptable definition of 
the continental shelf is to be achieved.  ^ These 
factors are not only economic and geographical in relation 
to the coastal States, The interests of humanity as a 
whole must also be considered. It is pointless to repeat 
that in relation to the ocean floor we stand firmly for 
an international regime which retains this area and its 
resources within the domaine public international for the 
benefit of all mankind. Certainly, there will not be 
sufficient seabed area remaining for the benefit of
(434) Andrassy, op.cit., Ref. (349), at 163, p.lll.
(435) See Brown, op.cit., Ref. (282) at 144, pp.384-385; 
Terr, Leonard B., "The 'Distance Plus Joint 
Development Zone' Formula; A Proposal for the 
Speedy and Practical Resolution of the East China 
and Yellow Seas Continental Shelf Oil Controversy", 
Cornell Int. Law J., Vol. 7, No. 1, 1973, pp.58-60.
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m a n k i n d , i f  the currently suggested criterion, 
namely that which is laid down in the ICNT reserving 200 
miles "at least" of the seabed to each coastal state, is 
adopted officially.
(436) An international authority has been proposed for 
this very purpose. See Articles 133-192 of the 
ICNT Relating to the Regime of the Deep Sea-bed 
Area. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add.1, 
pp.73-106.
CHAPTER THREE
THE DELIMITATION OF MARINE BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN OPPOSITE AND ADJACENT STATES
Quite clearly, the determination of marine boundaries 
in general is one of the most important and complex 
problems in the law of the sea. It becomes further 
complicated in the case of two or more adjacent or opposite 
States abutting on a common, adjacent part of the sea.^^^
Stages in the Development of the Rules Relating to the 
Delimitation of Marine Boundaries
I . The ILC
The record of the ILC shows clearly that the Commission 
gave a great deal of consideration to the question of 
delimitation of marine boundaries between neighbouring 
States. The first report to be submitted to the Commission 
in this connection was that of the Rapporteur, Professor 
Francois. In that report only a few remarks were incorpor­
ated and the views of Governments as to the problem of
(o\
apportionment of marine zones were requested.^  ^ During its 
1950 Session, the Commission concentrated on the main points 
related to the subject in seeking for the most appropriate
(1) Namely in areas where the depth of the superjacent 
waters does not exceed 200 metres, or where it does 
exceed that depth but is exploitable. See Oda, Shigeru, 
"Proposals for Revising the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf", Columbij transnat law. Vol. 7,
No. 1, 1968, p.23; Brown, op.cit.. Ref, (282), at 144, 
p.378.
(2) YBILC, 1950, Vol. II, pp.52-65.
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(3 )ways to find a solution to the problem.^  ^ Additionally, 
after having examined the Truman Proclamation of 1945, as 
well as the possibilities of delimitation of marine 
boundaries between neighbouring States, the Commission 
failed to identify any general principle of determination. 
The most that can be inferred from the debate of the 
Commission is its desire for delimitation by agreement 
and failing agreement, an arbitral tribunal should 
decide.
At the 1951 Session, a variety of possible methods
was tested. Here again, as in the latter discussion,
the Commission was unable to find a rule of general
applicability in the case of adjacent States although the
Commission considered the median line as appropriate in
(5 )the case of States lying opposite each other. Thus,
in such a case, it was suggested that the parties were under 
an obligation ex aequo et bono to have their boundaries
(3) YBILC, 1950, Vol. I, pp.214-239.
(4) YBILC, 1950, Vol. I, pp.232-234, 306; Brown, E.D.
"The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases", CLP, Vol.
23, 1970, p.202.
(5) It may useful to cite the commentary to Article 7 of 
the 1951 ILC Report which is in pertinent. It 
provides that :
"It is not feasible to lay down any general rule 
which states should follow, and it is not 
unlikely that difficulties may arise. For example, 
no boundary may have been fixed between the 
respective territorial waters of the interested 
States and no general rule exists for such 
boundaries,"
YBILC, 1951, Vol. II, pp.143, 193 and Vol. I,pp.285 
et seq.; YBILC, 1950, Vol. 1 , pp.232-234 and 306.
See also Brown, op.cit., Ref. (4), at 193, pp.202,
203, and op.cit., Ref. (338), at 158, p.53.
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settled by arbitration. This formulation was not
approved as a result of the comments of governments which
expressed that settlement of disputes ex aequo et bono
(7 )was unacceptable.
The equidistance method was first mentioned in a 
report of a Committee of Experts appointed to find a 
formula for the delimitation of territorial sea,^^^
Having decided to recommend the equidistance method for 
the drawing of boundaries in territorial sea, the 
Committee of Experts added a comment in which it maintained 
that the same method could be used for the delimitation 
of continental shelf boundaries between adjacent States,
In the 1953 Session of the Commission, the Rapporteur, 
Professor Francois, referred to the conclusions of the 
Committee of Experts and advocated the equidistance rule^^^^ 
After a lengthy discussion and a number of objections 
raised by members of the C o m m i s s i o n , t h e  Commission 
held, as did the Committee of E x p e r t s , t h a t  the
(6) ICJ, Pleadings, 1968, Vol. 1, The Counter-Memorial of 
the Netherlands, p.33; Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (4 ), at 
193, p.203.
(7) YBILC, 1953, Vol. II, pp.241-269. In an attempt to 
find a solution to this difficulty, the Rapporteur 
proposed a new draft in which conciliation replaced 
arbitration ex aequo et bono, ibid. p.l; Brown, op. 
cit.. Ref. ("T"), at 193, p.203.
(8) YBILC, 1953, Vol. II, pp. 77 et seq.; Brown, op.cit.,
Ref. (4), at 193, p.203.
(9) See Counter-Memorial of the Netherlands, ICJ Pleadings, 
1968, Vol. 1, pp.333-334.
(10)YBILC, 1953, Vol. 1, pp.107-108, 125-135, 373-375;
Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (4), at 193, p.204.
(11)YBILC, 1953, Vol. 1, pp.126, 130, 132; Brown, op.cit.. 
Ref. (4), at 193, pp.204-207.
(12)It may be recalled that the Committee of Experts had 
admitted that the equidistance method might not always
give an equitable result, and that in such a case a
solution by negotiation might be necessary. YBILC,
1953, Vol. II, p.216; See also Counter-Memorial of the 
Netherlands, ICJ Pleadings, 1968, Vol.I, p.334.
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delimitation of the territorial sea and the continental
shelf should be governed by the same principles. In the
light of the conclusions of the Committee of Experts,
another rule was drafted. For opposite States, the
Commission recommended 'the median line', and there may be
special reasons, such as navigation and fishing rights,
for diverting from the median line. As far as the
adjacent coasts were concerned, the Commission recommended
that the lateral boundary if not already fixed otherwise,
should have been drawn according to the principle of
equidistance from the respective coastlines. As it was
necessary to provide an exception to that principle, in
cases where departure from the general rule was necessary
the Commission recommended the "special circumstances"
( 13 )principle.^ Hence, there are three rules according to
the 1953 draft of the ILC regarding the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between neighbouring States. These 
three rules are; a) agreement if not already fixed 
otherwise; b) equidistance and median-line, and c) unless 
another boundary line justified by special circumstances 
At its 1956 Session, the Commission completed its 
work on the law of the sea, re-examining the text of all 
its articles. After brief discussion the Commission
(13) For instance where a small island near one State's 
coast belongs to another State. See Boggs, op.cit.. 
Ref. (13), at 14, pp.261-263; YBILC, 1953, Vol. I, 
pp.106, 125, 127, 128-134; ibid., Vol. II, p.213.
The commentary of the ILC on this draft article ran 
as follows: "As in the case of the boundaries of 
coastal waters, provision must be made for departures 
necessitated by any exceptional configuration of the 
coast, as well as the presence of islands or 
navigable channels. To that extent the rule adopted 
partakes of some elasticity".YBILC, 1953, Vol. II,
p.216.
(14) YBILC, 1953, Vol. I, pp.106, 213.
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slightly modified the wording of the provisions concerning 
the territorial sea and continental shelf boundaries of 
"opposite" States. Then, an almost similar text to that 
of the 1953 draft was again adopted.
Conclusion
The conclusion to be drawn is that it was not until 
1953 that the method of delimiting marine boundaries by 
application of the equidistance method was investigated by 
the ILC. In addition, the positive assistance which 
might settle maritime boundary problems continued to be 
doubted by members of the Commission. It should be noted 
that the Commission accepted the principle of equidistance 
subject to two conditions. Firstly, priority should be 
given to settlement by agreement, and secondly, modific­
ations would be necessitated by special circumstances.
II. The Geneva Conference and the Relevant Provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions
The debates at the Geneva Conference of 1958 on the 
Law of the Sea were based upon the draft Articles of the 
C o m m i s s i o n . O n  the question relating to the rules 
of delimiting the continental shelf boundaries, only minor 
changes were made. That is to say. Article 6 of the 
Continental Shelf Convention is almost identical to that 
of Article 72 of the draft. The words deleted are in 
brackets and the words added are underlined.
(15) YBILC, 1956, Vol. II, p.300.
(16) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (4) at 193, p.208.
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"... unless another boundary line is justified 
by special circumstances, the boundary (line) 
shall be determined by application of the 
principle of equidistance from the nearest points 
of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each State (of the two
(17 )
countries) is measured."
The relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
on the territorial sea and continental shelf are as 
follows :
Article 12(1) of the TSCS Convention
"1. Where the coasts of two States are opposite 
or adjacent to each other, neither of the two 
States is entitled, failing agreement between 
them to the contrary, to extend its territorial 
sea beyond the median line every point of which 
is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
seas of each of the two States is measured. The 
provisions of this paragraph shall not apply 
however, where it is necessary by reason of 
historic title or other special circumstances to 
delimit the territorial seas of the two States in 
a way which is at variance with this provision.
Article 6(1,2) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf
"1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent 
to the territories of two or more States whose 
coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of 
the continental shelf appertaining to such States 
shall be determined by agreement between them. In
(17) See YBILC, 1956, Vol. II, p.300; UNCLOS I, Official 
Records, Vol. VI, pp.91-98, 130-134, 138, 142, 144; 
Vol. II Plenary Meetings pp. 11-15; See also Brown, 
op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, p.57; and op.cit..
Ref. (4) at 193, p.208.
(18) Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (31), at 20, p.82.
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the absence of agreement, and unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circum­
stances, the boundary is the median line, every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest 
points of the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea of each State is measured,
"2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent 
to the territories of two adjacent States, the 
boundary of the continental shelf shall be 
determined by agreement between them. In the 
absence of agreement, and unless another boundary 
line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary shall be determined by application of 
the principle of equidistance from the nearest 
points of the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea of each State is measured.
A careful reading of Article 6 of the Continental
Shelf Convention will reveal that it makes separate
provisions for the delimitation of the continental shelf
between States whose coasts are opposite each other and
between adjacent States. This distinction between a
median line and equidistance line appears to be in the
wording rather than in substance. They are both identical
in that they establish the boundary line at every point
from every co-ordinate point on the baseline from which
the territorial sea of the States concerned is measured.
(19) Brownlie, ibid., p.109.
(20) See Colson, David A,, "The United Kingdom - French 
Continental Shelf Arbitration", AJÏL, Vol. 72, 1978, 
p.109; See also Anglo-French Arbitration on the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Decision of 
Court of Arbitration of 30 June 1977. Cmnd. 7438,
March 1979. (Hereafter referred to as 'Decision').
The Court of Arbitration held that: "The rules of 
delimitation laid down in the two paragraphs of
Article 6 are essentially the same....... both the
legal rule and the method of delimitation prescribed 
in the two paragraphs are precisely the same..." 
Decision, para. 238, p.112.
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Perhaps this distinction is logical from a geometrical
point of view. That is to say, the term "median line"
refers to the line between mid-points on the shortest
lines drawn between two opposite coasts. In geometric
terms, the "median" line runs roughly in the middle of
maritime areas which it divides, while the equidistance
line "the lateral", appears rather like a line perpendicular 
f 21 ^to the coast.
Accordingly, the Geneva Conventions require delimit­
ation between opposite and adjacent States to be made in 
accordance with:
I. The agreement,
II. The special circumstances.
III. The median-equidistance line.
However, the special circumstances and the equidistance
rules will be discussed in two separate sections. This
will be prefaced by a consideration of the value of the
principle of agreement as set out in the context of
Article 12 of the Convention on the TSCZ and Article (6)
of the Convention on the continental shelf. For the
non-parties to the Geneva Conventions, the position is
governed by the rules of customary international law which
is revealed by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
(2 21)Cases. This will require consideration of the
decision of the Court in a fourth section. The remainder 
of this section will be devoted to examining the concept of
(21) Shalowitz, A.L. "Shore and Sea Boundaries, Vol. 1,
1962, p.231.
(22) ICJ Reports, 1969, p.4.
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"equitable principles" since it occupies a prominent part 
in the current rules concerning the delimitation of marine 
boundaries.  ^ Of special importance in this respect is 
the Decision of the Arbitral Court in the Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf Cases.
Section One 
The Agreement
The Value of Agreement as a Rule to Determine Marine 
Boundaries as Laid Down in the Geneva Conventions
Under Article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the TSCZ 
as well as Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention, 
delimitation of the boundary line between the territorial 
seas and continental shelves of two adjacent and opposite 
States, is to be determined by agreement. The 
Conventions placed agreement ahead of other methods in 
accordance with the way in which marine boundaries should 
be affected.
Correct as it may be that the ILC did not find any
satisfactory method to apply in all cases in this context,
the problem was thus left to be settled by the States
concerned themselves. However correct this is, it is
strange as those States had previously been able to arrange
C25 ^their mutual international relations by agreement.
(23) Blecher, M.D, "Equitable Delimitation of Continental 
Shelf" AJIL, Vol. 73, 1979, p.86.
(24) Decision, op.cit., Ref. (20) at 198; Also, Anglo- 
French Arbitration on Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf, (Interpretation of the Decision of 30 June
1977), Decision of 14 March 1978, Cmnd, 7438, March 
1979, (hereafter referred to as Decision of 14 March
1978).
(25) Andrassy, op.cit., Ref.(349), at 163, pp.91, 92.
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Admittedly, the agreement is the best peaceful means of
solving international disputes, but this is no reason
for ignoring that the convention apparently does not
suggest any criterion for drawing boundaries by agreement.
It is most likely that without objective criterion, any
solution by agreement will be conditioned by such political
factors as the relative power of the States concerned.
This appears to mean that it is necessary to indicate a
guideline to determine the boundaries by agreement.
It is interesting to note that the rule that the boundary
line shall be determined by agreement between neighbouring
States, becomes superfluous since even in the absence of
such a text, the parties are able to have recourse to this
method and divide up their parts of the seabed as they 
(27 )conceive best. This is due to the fact that the
means provided in Article 6 is of jus dispositivm and not 
jus cogens. The contracting parties are always able to
( 28 )regulate their relations irrespective of jus dispositivm.
In fact, the practice of agreement governs the whole of 
international relations. It is well recognized that it 
is provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the U.N, as 
one of the principles for the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes. ^
(26) Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92), at 79, p.444.
(27) Andrassy, op.cit., Ref, (349), at 163, p.24,
(28) Ibid.
(29) Daintith and others, op.cit.. Ref. (4) at 9, p.A328. 
The authors are surely right in concluding that the 
only purpose of insisting upon "the fundamental 
character of this method of settlement ... to point 
out that it is emphasized by the observable fact that 
judicial or arbitral settlement is not universally 
accepted". Ibid., p.A328.
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Further argument in relation to the agreement as 
laid down in the Geneva Conventions, requires brief 
mention. It is to be noted that even in cases when the 
equidistance or the median line rule should be applied, 
agreement would be necessary in order to reach an exact 
boundary line. Most of the agreements concerning the 
delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea are
concluded to that effect, as for instance were the British-
men'
(31)
Norwegian agreement of March 10, 1 9 6 5 , and the agree t
between the Netherlands and the U.K. on October 6, 1965.
Admittedly, agreement as a peaceful legal principle
for settlement of international disputes has several
advantages, but it nevertheless has inherent defects which
might result in its eclipse on the international law 
(32 )plane. ^ The advantages and the defects of the principle
of agreement in the context of Articles 12 and 6 of the 
Geneva Conventions on the territorial sea and continental 
shelf will be dealt with in the following subsections.
Subsection One 
The Advantages of Agreement
Generally speaking, contractual procedure is not only 
the prevailing superior principle in arranging international 
relations, but also where it acquires the conditions of 
international custom, it constitutes a source of customary 
international law rules. It would be fair to say that
(30) U.K. T.S., No. 71, 1965 Cmnd. 2757.
(31) U.K. T.S., No. 23, 1967 Cmnd. 3253.
(32) Andrassy, op.cit.. Ref. (349), at 163, p.24.
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agreements have a number of advantages. To demonstrate 
this, it may be sufficient to refer to the following:
1. Undoubtedly, international law requires no particular 
formalities in the conclusion of an agreement. Agreements 
now take a variety of forms such as an agreed minute,
a memorandum of agreement etc. Moreover, writing is not 
necessary in the creation of an agreement. That is to 
say, it is not necessary to be produced in a written 
document, it may be oral.^^^^
2. It is an easy and rather rapid means of settling
international disputes since it does not take a long time
to be reached. Also, the consent of States can be given
(35 )even by mere silence.^
3. It seems, prima facia, that the agreement ensures 
the consent of the contracting parties, as they usually 
accept the rights and obligations that come from the 
agreement which they accept. While it is correct to say 
the foregoing, it is submitted that the agreement sometimes 
ensures only an ostensible consent. However, an agreement 
at least ensures, when looked at objectively and regardless
(33) McNair, Lord, "The Law of Treaties", 1961, pp. 6-30; 
Waldock, op.cit.. Ref. (234), at 126, pp.70-87.
(34) As in the case of Eastern Greenland. The PCIJ found 
that the Ihlen dec, the statement by the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister that Norway would not object to 
certain Danish acceptance was an international 
agreement. See PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, p.71. (1933)
(35) Bishop, William W ., Jr., "Reservations to Treaties", 
Hague Recueil, Vol. 103, 1961 II, pp.266-302; Henkin, 
Louis, "International Law and the Behavior of 
Nations" Hague Recueil, Vol. 114, 1965 I, pp.200-201; 
Jennings, op.cit.. Ref. (63), at 32, pp.528-532.
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of the pressure which might be e x e r c i s e d , ^  the consent 
of the contracting parties which leads to settlement of 
disputes.
4. In reaching agreements on marine boundaries by coastal 
States, it is doubtful that disputes will arise. In this 
context, agreements frequently clarify rights and 
obligations of the parties. Consequently, such a 
solution implies lasting resolution by avoiding and 
cutting off protracted boundary disputes.
5. Seen from the point of view of international law,
these agreements afford a means of affirming these rules,
or of adopting, varying, suspending or supplementing them
(37 ')in the relations of the parties inter se.
6 . In the case of disagreement, the parties should have 
recourse to one of the means of settlement for international 
disputes, such as arbitration or international courts. 
Obviously, such means not only require a long time to 
achieve solution, but they also result frequently in 
undesirable consequences which might prejudice the parties 
concerned.
For the above, it is clear that agreement is a speedy 
means to arrest international disputes and to maintain the 
rights of the contracting parties. To say the foregoing, 
however, is not to argue that inherent in it is a dangerous 
defect which may override all its merits if it is made
(36) As will be seen later, the agreement does not set
up more than a false consent when it is accompanied
by surrenders and relinquishments. See below pp.205 
et seq.
(37) Wilson, R.R. "The International Law Standard in 
Treaties of the United States", 1953, p.l.
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among unequal states, as will be discussed in the following 
subsection.
Subsection Two
The Defects of Agreement
It is worth observing that international community
relations are not governed by the principle of "equality"
which is more apparent in private law. Here, the
question is whether or not the coastal State has absolute
(38 )freedom in determining its marine boundaries. ^  The
answer to such a question according to Judge Koretski and 
Judge Lachs, could not be other than the negative.
However, while agreement represents consensus between 
the parties on the municipal plane, it is mostly dependent 
on political considerations on the international law 
plane. One might just as well suggest that this leads 
to chaos and to artificial consent, by which the less 
powerful party has to acquiesce in face of the wishes of 
the powerful side.^^^^ The weaker nation, so to speak, 
abandons some of the rights to avoid losing all its 
natural resources, or at least, impeding their exploitation 
In such a case, agreement might appear as if it is really 
made on the pure consent of the parties concerned. To
(38) Moreover, another point calls for comment. It may 
be asked, what principles, if any, apply ipso facto 
if the States concerned failed to reach an agreed 
solution. This matter becomes more acute, according 
to Judge Lach's view, in that the coastal State is 
not bound to negotiate and conclude agreement. See 
ICJ Reports, 1969, p.219,
(39) ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 155 and 219 respectively,
(40) Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92) at 79, pp.444, 445; Detter, 
Ingrid, "The Problem of Unequal Treaties", ICLQ,
Vol. 15, 1966, pp.1069-1089.
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demonstrate this, one may refer to the 1968 Agreement
between Iran and SSLudi A r a b i a , u n d e r  which a maritime
boundary line between the two States is to be drawn so as
to divide the exploitable oil resources in the disputed
area.(^^^ The division of that area however was too
complicated as there are a number of islands, especially 
(43 )Kharg. The need to resolve this problem of offshore
jurisdiction was recognized by both S t a t e s . T h i s  
need to divide up the submarine boundaries became more 
urgent for two reasons. Firstly, offshore oil exploration 
indicated the predicted presence of large reserves of oil
(41) This agreement was signed at Tehran on October 24, 
1968 and entered into force on January 29, 1969. The 
official English translation together with a map 
cited in ILM, Vol. 8, 1969, pp.493-496.
(42) The marine distance between the mainlands of the 
two States ranges from 95-135 miles approximately.
The depth of the waters is never more than 75 metres 
and the average is less. So the whole of the area 
is clearly continental shelf in the legal sense
and appertains to both States. Young, R. "Equitable 
Solutions For Offshire Boundaries: The 1968 Saudi 
Arabia-Iran Agreement", AJIL, Vol. 64, 1970, pp.152- 
157.
(43) This island lies about 16 miles from the Iranian 
mainland and relatively closer to the Arabian side. 
Kharg is waterless and normally uninhabited. The 
sovereignty over this islet was disputed between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia for a long time prior to the 
negotiations and at various times an Iranian Army 
force was stationed on Al-Farisiyah Island and a 
Saudi Arabian co-ordinate force on Al-Arabiyah 
Island, Ibid.
(44) The Royal Pronouncement of Saudi Arabia of May 28, 
1949 affirmed the government’s desire to settle 
submarine boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia 
and her neighbours consistent with equitable 
principles. See Young, R., "Saudi Arabian Off­
shore Legislation", AJIL, Vol. 43, 1949, pp.530-532; 
Also, a similar declaration was announced by the 
Iranian Law of June 19, 1955. See ST/LEG/SER.
B/16 (1974) p.151.
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lying in the centre of the gulf. Secondly, the over­
lapping between the offshore concessions granted by both 
countries consequently impeded by one means or another 
oil operations on both sides. Thereupon, negotiations 
between the two parties commenced using the basis of the 
median line. This was described in an agreement prepared 
by representatives of both governments in Tehran on 
December 13, 1965. According to this agreement the 
Iranian baseline was the median line between the Iranian 
offshore and Kharg Island, The agreement further 
considered that the Al-Farisiyah Island was subject to 
Iranian Sovereignty and the Al-Arabiyah Island to the 
sovereignty of Saudi A r a b i a . H o w e v e r ,  this draft 
was never formally signed or ratified because of Iranian 
reluctance to do so.^^^^
In 1968, strained relations between the two countries 
was marked inter alia by the use of Iranian Array forces 
to protect Iranian oil operations and prevent others from 
so operating. It was clear that the 1965 legislation 
ended in deadlock. So, further negotiations between the 
two States were renewed. In the light of those 
negotiations, a new boundary line was ultimately worked 
out. This line was actually drawn closer to the Saudi 
Arabian coast in favour of Iran. It would not have been 
drawn if such military pressure had not been used.
(45) Al-Arabiyah and Al-Farisiyah are two small islands 
situated in the middle of the Arabian Gulf between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran.
(46) This was due to the subsequent discovery by the 
Iranian concessionaire of important deposits which 
lay mostly on the Arabian side of the proposed line
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It might be contended that the above agreement is 
based on the consent of the two contracting powers. To 
answer such an argument, it is submitted that it does not 
represent the real consent of Saudi Arabia, who 
undoubtedly accepted this agreement in an atmosphere of 
constraint. The boundary line produced by this agreement 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran is seen as a result of the 
pressure used on Saudi Arabia. It should be remembered 
that if such military pressure had not been used, this 
line would perhaps not have been drawn. Therefore, the 
concept of agreement in the present context, if the 
parties were not on an equal footing and no guideline was 
prescribed, leads to subversion of the will of the less 
powerful State which might concede more than the other 
party under certain c o n d i t i o n s . W h i l s t  this risk 
may always exist in the conclusion of international 
agreements, it is particularly dangerous with respect to 
the determination of disputed boundaries.
Hence, one may suggest the amendment of the text of 
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the continental 
shelf, so as to include an objective criterion. This 
appears to mean that it is essential to furnish the text 
with some guidelines in the light of which the parties 
concerned may negotiate.
(47) Equal and unequal agreements have been known on the 
international law plane for centuries. For more 
details see Alexandrowicz, Charles H ., "Treaty and 
Diplomatic Relations Between European and South 
Asian Powers in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries", Hague Recueil, Vol. 100, 1960, II, 
pp.278-287.
Section Two 
Special Circumstances
The Special Circumstances as Laid Down in the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf
As mentioned above, Article 6 of the Continental Shelf 
Convention permits deviation from the application of the 
equidistance or median line rule in situations where 
special circumstances justify another boundary line.^^^^
This appears to mean that various problems concerning the 
delimitation of the continental shelf were expected to 
arise by reason of the extreme variety of legal and material 
factors which may be relevant. The Geneva Conference was 
quite aware of the fact that no principle would ever 
satisfy all cases and some provision had therefore to be 
made for situations requiring special treatment.
However, the concept of special circumstances is an 
equitable principle by which the contracting parties have 
an opportunity to reach a solution involving exceptional 
considerations. That is to say, the task of the special 
circumstances principle is to mitigate the rigidity of the 
equidistance line, which if applied in an unqualified
(48) The debate in the Geneva Conference tends to reflect 
the conclusion that the special circumstances term 
was met with general approval although a number of 
States proposed its deletion. See Grisel, Etienne,
"The Lateral Boundaries of the Continental Shelf and 
the Judgment of the International Court of Justice 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases", AJIL,
Vol. 64, 1970, pp.570-584.
(49) Ibid., pp.579-580.
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manner, results occasionally in absurdity as well as 
inequity.
Correct as that may be, an important question is to 
be decided here. If the presence of the special 
circumstances is dependent on the unilateral estimation 
of the concerned parties themselves, would there be any 
necessity to refer to them independently? The answer is 
obviously in the negative, since the agreement itself is 
considered as an independent method for delimitation of 
the boundaries and accordingly, any unusual conditions 
would be considered during the negotiation in the pre­
stages of the agreement. In other words, the concept of
agreement itself assimilates the effects of the special
(51 )circumstances or any other factors.
After this brief clarification it is to be noted 
that the special circumstances as adduced in Article 6 of 
the Continental Convention has its own virtues and 
disadvantages which are the object of what follows.
I . The Virtues of the Special Circumstances
Considering special circumstances in the delimitation 
of marine boundaries is of great value. As noted above, 
recourse to agreement might not assist the less powerful 
party in substantiating its claims in the absence of 
absolute good faith or in circumstances where the powerful
(50) In analogy it may be observed that the principle of 
the thalweg constitutes an exception to the medium 
filum aqual in the case of navigable river boundaries. 
See Kenworthy, William E,, "Joint Development of 
International Waters" AJIL, Vol. 54, 1960, pp.592- 
602.
(51) See Padwa, David J ., "Submarine Boundaries", ICLQ,
Vol. 9, 1960, p.651.
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side wishes to dictate and impose its will and conditions 
ignoring whatever special circumstances might be in favour
( KO )
of the less powerful party. One might suggest that
the text of the special circumstances is an instrument in 
the hands of the less powerful party to persuade the 
powerful one to recognize these circumstances and to take 
them into account in the course of reaching an agreement.
II. The Defects of the Special Circumstances
The special circumstances term appears in Article 6 
of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in an 
apparently general context. In fact, no criterion is 
suggested for identifying these special circumstances nor 
for their effects. Additionally, while the text indicates 
that "another boundary line" may be justified by the 
presence of such special circumstances, it nevertheless 
implies neither what other boundary line is justified
/ 53 ■)
thereby, nor how such a boundary should be constructed.^
It is more sound to assume that the phrase "another 
boundary line" is a descriptive term contemplating any 
boundary other than one based on the equidistance rule. 
Correct as this may be, it is submitted that the general­
ization in the text might create serious disputes. 
Apparently, it gives the less powerful party an opportunity 
to claim many factors as special circumstances as well as 
the powerful party the ability to deny all such claims if 
it does not believe in absolute good faith that these 
circumstances are included in the Article. Such vagueness
(52) See above pp. 205 et seq.
(53) Jennings, op.cit., Ref. (63), at 32, p.400.
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perhaps even impedes the international tribunal in its 
performance in the course of determining a boundary line 
between neighbouring States and thus prolongs the dispute.
Three further questions call for comment. Firstly, 
how and when such circumstances would be enumerated? 
Secondly, who could be charged with interpreting their
( 55 \
application?^  ^ Finally, is a State pleading special 
circumstances under an obligation to formulate them or 
can it plead at the outset in general terms?
It must be admitted that there are no satisfactory 
answers to these questions. Nor is there any indication 
as to the question of the onus of proof. It is undecided 
where the onus of proof lies or whether the matter should
( 57 >
be referred to arbitration,^ It is also to be
observed that the special circumstances clause in Article 
6 of the Continental Shelf Convention neither identifies 
factors falling within its category, nor eliminates other 
considerations to set up guidelines for the evaluation of 
c l a i m s . P r o f e s s o r  Brown is surely correct when he
(54) This is by reason of the special circumstance 
principle not being a delimitation criterion. Its 
presence only reveals that the equidistance and the 
median lines cannot be constructed without the express 
consent of the coastal States concerned.
(55) See the Statement of the Yugoslav delegate at Geneva 
Conference, UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. VI,
p.91.
(56) Jennings, op.cit., Ref. (63), at 32, p.401.
(57) It has been suggested that the onus pro bandi would 
lie on the State wishing to rely on that criterion. 
Judge Lach suggested that it was not only necessary 
to prove that special circumstances exist, but also 
that the coastal State concerned would suffer from 
special hardship if the equidistance line method 
were applied. See ICJ Reports, 1969, pp.239-240.
(58) Andrassy, op.cit.. Ref. (349), at 163, p.94.
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suggests that "while it would clearly be wrong to attempt 
to draw up a closed list of cases of special circumstances", 
this is no reason for ignoring the necessity of a reasonable 
and "restrictive interpretation of this difficult 
concept Otherwise, this clause opens up a liberty
to claim the existence of special circumstances wherever 
a State finds that such a claim gives a result which 
satisfies its ambitions. It may be stated that there 
was some mention of islands situated in the area to be 
d e t e r m i n e d . E s p e c i a l l y  islands which are far from 
the coast of the State to which they belong, or nearer to 
the coast of the other p a r t y . A l s o ,  mention of the 
case of the existence of mining or fishing rights and of 
navigational routes was made.^^^^ Therefore, as the
(59) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, p.70.
(60) See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge SjeSrensen in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in which he states 
that "The clearer the rule, and the more automatic 
its application, the less the seed of discord is 
sown", ICJ Reports, 1969, p.256.
(61) Although there was nearly unanimity that islands 
might constitute special circumstances, there was no 
agreement as to how account should be taken of their 
presence.
(62) For instance, the Channel Islands off the French 
coast belonging to the U.K.
(63) As regards the mineral deposits. See below pp.
With respect to the historical special circumstances, 
Professor Brown rightly suggests they will "very 
seldom be relevant to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf as distinct from delimitation of 
the territorial sea. Thus, for example, where 
certain waters are recognized as possessing the 
status of a historic bay or other historic waters, 
the baseline of the territorial sea will be extended 
to encompass these waters. The continental shelf 
delimitation, however, will be made not by reference 
to historic special circumstances but rather to the 
baseline of the territorial sea determined by those 
historical circumstances". See Brown, op.cit..
Ref. (338), at 158, p.69.
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preparatory work gives little information if any on the 
content of the special circumstances principle, there are 
two attitudes with respect to the interpretation of this 
term.(^^) The first depends on the application of the 
rule and whether or not it may he appropriately applied.
The second depends upon the formulation of Article 6 
itself, namely, the circumstances must be "special” and 
"justify" a departure from the general rule.^^^^ Obviously, 
these interpretations are not substantiated.
Section Three 
The Equidistance Line Rule
The equidistance line as a rule for drawing marine 
boundaries between States whose coasts are opposite or 
adjacent to each other, simply means that the boundary line 
is to be drawn in such a way that every point on the line 
is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each 
State is measured. This rule was adopted during the 
discussion in the ILC on the delimitation of the territorial 
sea and of the continental shelf as an appropriate boundary 
under certain conditions. It was then incorporated in the 
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
To demonstrate the role of the equidistance method in
(64) It may be noted that the recent decision of the 
Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental 
Shelf Case has examined the question under consider- 
ation. It is intended to deal with this decision 
later, see below pp.256-265.
(65) Grisel, op.cit., Ref. (48), at 209, p.581.
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determining the marine boundaries between neighbouring 
S t a t e s , a n  examination of the method will be dealt 
with under the following headings
I, Practice of States.
II, The Application of the Rule.
III, The Evaluation of the Rule.
The Equidistance Line Rule in State Practice
I. Unilateral State Practice
It must be admitted that a number of States have 
employed the equidistance rule in their national legislation 
Among these, the Democratic Republic of Germany made a 
provision as to the exploration and exploitation of its 
continental shelf adopting the equidistance method as laid 
down in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
Article 3 of this law provides that the delimitation of 
the continental shelf is determined by the median line,
(66) It may be noted at the outset that the equidistance 
line rule is in fact pertinent to the establishment 
of territorial sea boundaries between neighbouring 
States unless there exist islands. Obviously, the 
purpose of conferring upon States limited sover­
eignty over the territorial sea is to exercise 
control therein. Therefore, it appears sound to 
take into consideration the distance from the nearest 
points on the coast as a criterion for the apportion­
ment of territorial sea. In the case of delimitation 
of the continental shelf, the different purposes 
justify the delimitation to be based on their 
principles. This view might find clear support in 
the fact that although Article 12 of the CTSCZ and 
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention deal 
with the delimitation of marine boundaries, their 
wording is not similar. Therefore, it seems that 
the Commission deliberately wanted different treat­
ment of the problem. See ICJ Pleadings, 1968, Vol. 
1, pp.62-63.
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namely, a line every point of which is equidistant from
the nearest points of the baselines. ^
Other examples of State practice may be found in the
collection of National Legislation concerning the seabed
and the ocean floor published by the U.N. in June 1968
which reflects the trend in national legislation
promulgated since 1 9 6 0 . The conclusion arrived at in
the collection reveals that the Netherlands and Sweden made
specific reference in general terms to the Geneva
Convention. Denmark, Finland, Malaysia and the Soviet
Union went even further by adopting Article 6 of the
C o n v e n t i o n . I t a l y  based the delimitation on the
(71)median line pending a g r e e m e n t ^  Norway referred to 
the median line.^^^^
A further example of State practice in establishing 
the boundary line, where it may be regarded as a lateral 
boundary between adjacent States, on the basis of the 
equidistance rule as set out in Article 6 of the Geneva
(67) Article 3, Law of 20 February, 1967 on the Explor­
ation, Exploitation and Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf as modified by the Law of 11 June 
1968, ST/LEG/SER, B/18 Add.2 (Preliminary Issue),
April 1975, p.111.
(68) U.N. Secretariat, Survey of National Legislation 
Concerning the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the 
Subsoil thereof Underlying the High Seas Beyond the 
Limits of Present National Jurisdiction. U.N. Doc. 
A/AC. 135/11. June 4, 1968 p.39; Brown, op.cit. Ref. 
(338 ) at 158, p.60.
(69) U.N. Secretariat, ibid., pp.44, 49; Brown, ibid. p.61,
(70) U.N. Secretariat, ibid., pp.28, 31, 41, 58; Brown,
ibid.
(71) U.N. Secretariat, ibid., p.38; Brown, ibid.
(72) U.N. Secretariat, ibid., p.46; Brown, ibid.
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Convention, may be found in a Decree dated May 16, 1969
(73 )promulgated by Uruguay. In this context it is useful
to quote in full Article 5 of this Decree which provides 
that :
"The lateral delimitation of the continental 
shelf shall be effected, following appropriate 
international negotiation, by application of 
the principle of equidistance, provided for 
under Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf.
There is one more precedent in which the rule of
equidistance has been applied. The Canadian "Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act" of August 2, 1972
confirmed that the line which divides the islands of the
(7 5)Canadian Arctic and Greenland is the equidistance line.
II. Bilateral Agreements
Apart from the unilateral state practice discussed, 
the rule of equidistance arose in bilateral agreements.  ^
Even more important is the fact, that some of these 
agreements were concluded by States not party to the Geneva 
Convention of 1958 on the continental s h e l f . T h e r e
are clear examples of non-party States which concluded
agreements on the basis of the equidistance rule found in
(73) Brown, ibid., p.61.
(74) Cited in ILM, Vol. 8, 1969, pp.1071-1072.
(75) Cited in Lay, S, Houston, Churchill Robin and 
Nordquist, M., "New Directions in the Law of the Sea, 
Documents, Vol. 1, Oceana Publications, New York,
1973, p.200.
(76) Bouchez, Leo J., "The North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases", J. Marit. Law Com., Vol. 1, No, 1, 1969, pp. 
113-114.
(77) See Brown, op.cit., Ref, (338), at 158, p.59.
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Norwegian practice, Norway for instance employed the
equidistance method in agreement with the United 
( 78 )Kingdom. It may be useful to quote in full Article
1 of the aforementioned Convention which provides that:
"The dividing line between the part of the 
continental shelf which appertains to the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and that part which appertains to the 
Kingdom of Norway shall be based, with certain 
minor divergencies for administrative convenience, 
on a line, every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points of the baselines from 
which the territorial sea of each country is 
measured."
The equidistance principle is also enunciated in the
British-Netherland Agreement of 1965. The Preamble of
this agreement reads as follows:
"Desiring to establish the boundary between the 
respective parts of the continental shelf under 
the North Sea on the basis of a line every point 
of which is equidistant from the nearest points 
of the baselines from which the territorial sea 
of each country is at present measured.
Along these lines is the Danish-Dutch agreement of 
1966 in which both States referred to the equidistance
(78) The same rule, namely the equidistance, has been 
used in a number of agreements to which Norway is a 
party. See agreements cited in Brown, op.cit..
Ref. (338), at 158, p.59; see also Article 1 of the 
Norwegian-Swedish Agreement concerning the Delimit­
ation of the Continental Shelf of 1968. Cited in 
Oda, op.cit., Ref. (408), at 180, Vol. 1, p.391.
(79) U.K.T.S., No. 71, 1965. This agreement was convened 
on 10 March, 1965, entered into force on June 29, 
1965. Cmnd. 2757.
(80) Signed on October 6, 1965, entered into force on 
December 23, 1966. U.K.T.S. No. 23, 1967, Cmnd. 
3253.
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line as the boundary line between their continental shelf 
(81)areas. The same trend may be observed in the ItaUan-
Yugoslav agreement of 1968 which considered the frontier
between the two countries on the basis of the equidistance 
(82)
line. Further examples are to be found in the
British-Danish Agreement of 1 9 7 1 , the Bahrein-Saudi 
Arabian Agreement of 1958^^^) and finally the Danish- 
Canadian Agreement of 1973.
The instances of bilateral agreements already referred 
to, are only illustrations, inevitably superficial, and 
far from exhaustive. However, while it is correct to say 
the foregoing, this is no reason for ignoring that among 
the bilateral agreements cited and many others, importance 
has been attached to the special circumstances and 
equitable principles.  ^ It may be added that the 
occasional division of areas of the continental shelf by 
equidistance lines is no proof of a general recognition 
of the equidistance line rule. As Professor Brown rightly 
concludes :
"In one sense, it is rather superfluous to cite 
this treaty practice if the intention is to 
illustrate the general acceptance of the three- 
point rule expressed in Article 6. The fact 
that they are treaties is sufficient to bring
(81) Lay and others, op.cit.. Ref. (75) at 217, pp.128-129.
(82) See ILM, Vol. 7, 1968, p.547; Brown, op.cit.. Ref. 
(338) at 158, p.60.
(83) Signed on November 25, 1971, entered into force on 
7 December 1972. U.K.T.S., No. B 1973, Cmnd.5193.
(84) Oda, op.cit., Ref. (408), at 180, p.420; Brown, op. 
cit., Ref. (338), at 158, p.56.
(85) ST/LEG/SER. B/18/Add. 2, 1975, p.309.
(86) See below pp. 272 et seq.
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them within that rule-delimitation based on 
agreement. They do, however, help to emphasise 
that, almost invariably, agreement is reached on 
the basis of the other two elements in Article 
6, namely, equidistance and allowance for 
special circumstances.
It is to be noted that there is no other interpretation 
of this conclusion than that the adoption of the equi­
distance rule in those agreements was not because they 
attained the status of a general principle.
III. Multilateral Treaties
Not only do bilateral agreements adopt provisions 
in establishing marine boundaries on the basis of the 
equidistance rule, but this rule has even found a striking 
application in multilateral treaties. In support of what 
has been just stated, one might turn to the European 
Fishery Convention of 1964. Article 7 which speaks for 
the delimitation of the exclusive fishing rights, runs as 
follows :
"Any straight baseline or bay closing line which 
a contracting party may draw shall be in 
accordance with the rules of general international 
law and in particular with the provisions of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone opened for signature at Geneva 
on 29th April, 1 9 5 8 ."(^8 )
Moreover, one does not need to recall what has been 
noted earlier that by virtue of the Convention on the 
TSCZ and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the
(87) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, p.60.
(88) Cited in ILM, Vol. 3, 1964, p.478; see also Andrassy, 
op. cit.. Ref, (349), at 163, p. 93.
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delimitation of marine boundaries is to be established in 
accordance with the equidistance rule.^^^^
It is worth observing that up to the end of February 
1972, 41 States have taken the formal steps to accede and 
ratify the TSCZ Convention. As to accession and 
ratification of the Continental Shelf Convention, the 
number of States was 49.^^^^
One related point worth brief mention at this stage 
is that the Convention on the Continental Shelf permitted 
reservation to all articles with the exception of Articles 
1 to 3 and four reservations to Article 6 have already 
been made.^^^^ While it is not intended to examine these 
reservations and their legal effect on the equidistance 
rule, it is necessary in order to complete the picture to 
state these reservations briefly. Two States, Iran and 
Venezuela, made their reservations at the time of signing 
the Convention.  ^ The Iranian reservation paid special 
attention to Article 6 in the sense that it accepted it on 
the understanding that the interpretation of "special 
circumstances" meant that the high water line should be 
taken as the baseline for establishing the continental
(89) See above pp. 197-199
(90) See Oda, op.cit., Ref, (408), at 180, Vol. 1, pp. 
25-26; See also the table laid down in Nawaz, op,cit.. 
Ref. (373) at 170, p.40.
(91) Oda, ibid. It may be added that the ICJ pointed out 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that : "The 
Convention received 46 signatures and up-to-date 
there have been 39 ratifications or accessions",
ICJ Reports, 1969, para 26, pp.24, 25.
(92) See Article 12 of the Continental Shelf Convention.
(93) For texts of the reservations, see ICJ Pleadings,
1968, Vol. 1, pp.230-233.
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shelf boundary.
Venezuela at the time of signature declared that in 
certain areas off the Venezuelan coast there are "special 
circumstances" to be taken into account.
France also made a reservation to Article 6 when she 
ratified the Convention. The French Government by this 
reservation refused the application of the equidistance 
rule in determining any boundary of the continental shelf 
in the absence of specific agreement in three conditions:
a. When such a boundary is measured from baselines drawn 
after 29 April, 1958.
b. When such a boundary extended to a distance beyond the 
200-metre isobath.
c. When such a boundary lies in certain areas which in the 
French Government’s view constitute special circumstances 
within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.
Those areas were specified in the French reservation
so as to include "the Bay of Biscay, the Bay of 
Granville and the sea areas of the Straits of Dover and 
of the North Sea off the French C o a s t " . T h e  
force behind this reservation was, as mentioned by a 
French commentator, the desire of the French Government 
"to avoid inter alia the danger that it might be cut 
off from parts of the continental shelf to which it was 
entitledT^^^)
(94) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (338) at 158, p.59. ICJ 
Pleadings, 1968, Vol. 1, p.230; UNCLOS I, Official 
Records, Vol. VI, 1958, (A/CONF. 13/42), p.142.
(95) ICJ Pleadings, ibid., p.230,
(96) U.N.T.S., Vol. 538, p.336; Brown, op,cit., Ref. (338), 
at 158, p.58. However, these reservations have 
attracted categorical objections declared by other 
States. For details see ICJ Pleadings, 1968, Vol. 1, 
pp.232-233.
(97) Brown, op.cit., Ref. (338), at 158, p.58.
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It appears, according to Professor Brown that "the 
French Government regarded fishery and navigation interests 
as constituting ’special circumstances’ in the Straits of 
Dover and Bay of Biscay".
The other reservation is that of Yugoslavia in which 
she declared that "in delimiting its continental shelf, 
Yugoslavia recognizes no ’special circumstances’ which 
should influence the delimitation’. ' ^
A careful examination of the above reservations will 
certainly reveal that "only the Venezuelan reservation 
appears to amount to a rejection of the rules in Article 
6",(100) Correct as this may be, it appears that 
permitting coastal Btates to make reservations to Article 
6 only means that this Article is not a general rule of 
international law; otherwise members of the Convention 
would not be able to contract out from the rules laid down 
in this Article.
The Application of the Rule
The equidistance or median line rule as set out in 
the Geneva Conventions means drawing the boundary line by 
reference to charts and geographical features as they 
exist on a particular date. Every point on this line 
must be precisely the same distance away from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of 
the countries concerned is measured.
(98) Brown, ibid.
(99) ICJ Pleadings, 1968, Vol. 1, p.344, Brown, ibid., 
p . 59 .
(100) Brown, ibid., p.59.
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It is to be noted that if the coastlines of the 
affected States are regular, the most appropriate boundary 
is a single straight line from the baselines of the land 
boundary terminus to the point of intersection of the 
envelopes of T-mile arcs drawn from the nearest points of 
the baselines of the two S t a t e s . S u c h  a line will 
usually be perpendicular to the shoreline. If the coast 
is exceptionally irregular, so that the two adjacent States 
are in fact opposite to each o t h e r , t h e  most 
reasonable boundary is the line beginning at the land 
terminus and continued by a median line between the lands 
of the two countries. Then, the boundary line beyond 
this first segment is established as mentioned above.
However, to clarify the manner in which the equidist­
ance and median line rules are applied in practice, it is 
useful to give the following examples.
As to the median line, if there are two States a and 
â situated opposite each other, one on the North and the 
other on the South, the median line between them according 
to the Geneva Convention is the line, each point of which 
is equidistant from the baselines from which their 
respective territorial seas are measured. Assuming that 
the points on the baseline of State a are b, c and d, and 
on State a ’s coastline are b, c and d, a certain point 
equidistant from b and b is chosen. This point is the
(101) "T = width of the territorial sea: 3 nautical miles 
4, 6, 12 etc." See Boggs, op.cit., Ref, (13) at 14, 
p.247, For the delimitation of the seaward limit of 
the territorial sea by the envelopes of arcs of 
circles method. See ibid., pp.247 et seq. and 253.
(102) Such is the case in the boundary between Denmark 
and Norway.
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first one on the boundary line between the two States and 
may be called x. Another point, say y, equidistant from 
c and c is chosen. Then a third point, "z" is in the 
same way equidistant from d and 3. A line shall be drawn 
between x, y and z. This is the first part of the median 
line between State a and State â. By fixing other 
co-ordinate points on the baselines of the two States and 
points on the waters equidistant from each two co-ordinate 
points and then drawing a line between these points on 
the water, the median line according to the Geneva 
Conventions is set up between the States.
As regards the equidistance line, a fictitious coastal 
State in the east neighbours another in the west and the 
land frontier line between them ends at a point "m" at 
the coast. The points on the baseline of the eastern 
State are a, b and c from "ra" to the east. Also, the 
points on the baseline of the western State are â, b and 
c from "m" to the west. The boundary line shall be drawn 
between these two States according to the equidistance 
line rule in the following way. A certain point on the 
waters the same distance from a and â is to be chosen.
This point is the first one on the boundary line and may 
be called "x". A line shall be drawn between the points 
"m" and "x". This line will constitute the first part 
of the boundary line on the continental shelf. This 
operation shall be repeated relative to the points b and b 
to obtain a new point, "y" and by drawing a line between 
X, y and z etc., the boundary line shall be fixed between the
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States in accordance with the equidistance rule,^^®^^
The Evaluation of the Equidistance Line Rule
The rule of equidistance line which is to be applied 
according to the Geneva Conventions in the absence of 
agreement, is a well known method. It is applied in 
various situations, for example to determine State 
boundaries on rivers and other w a t e r w a y s . M o r e  
important is that this method is frequently characterised 
as a "general rule".^^^^^ Further, it certainly results 
in an equitable division when a simple geographical 
configuration exists. It follows that such an apportion­
ment would be acceptable to the concerned parties and 
would in turn serve in avoiding long international 
c o n f l i c t s . I t  lAay be added that the equidistance 
line rule has significant practical value which no other 
method of delimitation has. Indeed, as the ICJ revealed, 
it had a combination of "practical convenience and 
certainty of application".
(103) These operations beyond all doubt are technical ones 
and they should be performed by technicians and 
engineers. See Mouton, op.cit.. Ref. (258) at 135, 
p.419.
(104) An alternative boundary in this situation is the 
middle channel line of thalweg,
(105) See YBILC, 1953, Vol. 1, p.107. In the opinion of the 
British delegate at the Geneva Conference, even in 
the case of special circumstances where a departure 
from the median or equidistance line would be just­
ified, the median or equidistance line would provide 
the best starting point for negotiations. See UNCLOS 
I, Official Records, Vol. VI, (A/CON.13/42) p.93.
(106) See ICJ Reports, 1969, paras. 23, 24, p.23. Andrassy, 
op.cit., Ref.(349), at 163, p.93; Colombos, op.cit.. 
Ref. (4 ) at 9 , pp.81-82.
(107) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 23, p.23.
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However, the equidistance line rule, as the ICJ 
clearly pointed out,^^^®^ is neither inherent in the 
doctrine of the continental shelf nor is it a customary 
law rule.(^^^) It was criticized during the 1952 Session 
of the ILC as it "failed to take existing practice into 
account and would not be satisfactory in a number of
cases".(110)
To review the argument for and against the equidistance 
line rule it is worth answering the question whether or not 
the equidistance line rule always propounds the best 
solution in all cases. The answer is clearly in the 
negative, since coastlines are so varied that it is 
difficult to formulate any one rule as an ideal method.
Only when shores of the affected States are almost similar 
does the equidistance line method achieve equitable 
consequences. Indeed, this is rarely to be found. This 
amounts to stating that in order to offer an equitable 
solution, there is a need for numerous exceptions which 
would be applicable more often than the rule itself.
Assuming however that the rule of equidistance is to 
be applied, then an obvious question for one to ask would
(108) Ibid., para. 49, 50, pp. 33, 34; para 101(a), p.53.
(109) Ibid., para 101(a), p.53. There were three factors 
behind adopting the equidistance line rule. These 
factors are; (1) a strong need for a general 
substantive rule which would apply in the absence 
of agreement; (2), it appeared also that in the 
case of failing to reach an agreement, the only 
line which could be drawn automatically in all 
cases was the equidistance line, and (3) the 
Commission felt that it was inevitable that the 
continental shelf be determined by the same method 
which the territorial sea set by.i
(110) YBILC, 1952, Vol. 1, p.180
(111) Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (92 ) a
J JJ • JL O W •
t 79, p.447.
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be how the points from which the equidistance line is to 
be measured would be established. Three probabilities 
may be envisaged in this regard. The line could be 
drawn either from the points along the seaward boundary 
lines of the territorial seas of both States concerned, or 
from the points along their shores, or also from the 
straight baselines determined under Article 4 of the 
territorial sea convention.
Perhaps the first idea, prima facia, seems the most 
reasonable, as long as the continental shelf legally
( 1 1 9 )
begins beyond the territorial sea. Suggested in 1953, 
this rule was rejected on the grounds that there was no 
adopted uniform breadth of the territorial sea. That is 
to say, supposing this argument is accepted, it is to be 
observed that by stating a claim for a wide territorial 
sea, a State would consequently gain a larger area of the 
continental shelf. The second alternative is also 
unacceptable since the shores are too varied. It remains 
to examine the last proposal which the Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf adopts. This view, it must be 
noted, is opposed on the grounds that the baseline itself 
is by no means a line which is in all cases beyond dispute. 
Accordingly, this solution would lead to conflicts in 
situations where no such baselines were predetermined.  ^
In addition, the analogy drawn between delimiting the 
territorial sea and the continental shelf appears to be
(112) YBIL, 1953, Vol. 1, p.125.
(113) See Chapter One concerning the rule relating to 
the demarcation of the points from which the 
baseline of the territorial sea is measured.
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misleading in two aspects. Firstly, whilst the division 
of territorial sea would be rather immaterial, as 
territorial seas are relatively narrow belts, it might 
create injustice and be of great importance if it relates 
to the establishment of the continental shelf boundaries 
which extend further seaward. Secondly, a general 
principle for the delimitation of territorial sea 
boundaries has not been universally accepted and if such 
a principle did exist, it would not necessarily be used 
for the delimitation of the continental shelf.
To the foregoing it may be added that Article 6 of 
the Continental Shelf Convention treats separately two 
types of situation between which it is not always possible 
to distinguish. In governing the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, the distinction is made in the above 
Article between States lying opposite and adjacent to each 
other. However when can it be said that two coasts are 
opposite or adjacent to each o t h e r ? I n  fact there 
are cases, for example the coasts of Italy and Yugoslavia 
on the Adriatic Sea, where the land frontier between two 
States reaches the sea so that they must be considered 
'adjacent', and yet the larger parts of them are opposite 
each other within the usual meaning of the word,^^^^^ It
(114) For these reasons suggestions were made in the early 
stages of the ILC that the continental shelf should 
be divided by agreement between the parties, or by 
arbitration. See YBILC, 1950, Vol. 1, p.234, p. 384.
(115) Shalowitz, op.cit.. Ref. (21), at 199, pp. 231 et 
seq.
(116) Italy and Yugoslavia, Concluded an agreement on 
January 8, 1968 dividing the continental shelf 
between them in the Adriatic Sea. See the separate 
opinion of Judge Amoun. In the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, ^ T l 0 9 .
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may be argued that as long as both situations have to be 
treated in the light of the same principles, the problem 
may appear to be rather moot,
The above proposition, though it seems admissible,
, is not however conclusive in at least two respects. 
Firstly, under the circumstances just described, namely, 
in the Adriatic Sea, the relevant method to determine the 
"lateral" boundary line might not be appropriate to 
delimit the median line. In such a case, where does the 
former end, and the latter start? Article 6 leaves this 
question unanswered, since it does not define "opposite" 
and "adjacent" c o a s t s . T h i s  deficiency perhaps 
leads to a second consequence when two States purport to 
delimit their shelves' boundaries by agreement. The 
parties concerned are entitled under Article 6 to do so 
only if their coasts are "opposite" or "adjacent"; 
otherwise agreement between them would not be binding on 
third States.
To the above it may be added that the equidistance 
line rule does not eliminate the need for agreement in 
order to set an exact boundary line.
A further point deserves particular consideration.
In the delimitation of marine boundaries in the presence 
of islands another obstacle arises. This is because 
islands may not only possess their own territorial sea and
(117) See above, footnote (116),
(118) ICJ Reports, 1969, see the separate opinion of 
Judge Padilla Nervo, p.91; the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Morelli; p.203 and the dissenting opinion 
of Judge 8/rensen, pp. 250 et seq.
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continental s h e l f but they may also affect the 
drawing of baselines from which the territorial sea is 
m e a s u r e d . I s l a n d s  belonging to one State make 
drawing the median line more complicated when they are 
situated somewhere in the sea closer to another opposite
State. Here the problem is whether or not the median line
in this case should be altered so as to accommodate that
island. Of even further complexity is the situation
when an island between two opposite States is subject to 
a third country. Article 6 of the Convention speaks only 
about baselines without indicating whether these are to 
be related to the "mainland" or "island". It is perhaps 
more complicated that the Continental Shelf Convention 
contains no reference to whether or not, the islands 
referred to in Article 1(b), are those of established 
sovereignty. Consequently, it hardly needs explanation 
that, if such islets were given full rights under the 
Convention, the results would be very harmful to the 
interests of many coastal States which might consider such 
an interpretation of the Convention to be contrary to the 
principles of equity. Finally, another observation should 
be made that Articles 2 to 7 refer only to coastal States 
as having rights over the areas of the continental shelf, 
Article 10 indicates to the States entitled to accession 
to the Convention referred to in Article 8. The latter
(119) Article 10 of the CTCZ and Article 1 of the 
Continental Shelf Convention.
(120) Jennings, op,cit., Ref. (63), at 32, p.401. With 
respect to the problem of islands in so far as it 
relates to the delimitation of the territorial sea 
and consequently the delimitation of the continental 
shelf, see above pp. 42 et seq.
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enumerates those States by providing that:
"... all States members of the U.N. or any 
of the specialized agencies and by any other 
State invited.
Section Four 
The Rules of International Customary Law
By now, it seems clear that the equidistance rule, 
strictly speaking, is not the only rule in delimiting 
marine boundaries, irrespective of the nature of the 
apportionment achieved by its application. Nor is there 
a presumption in favour of the equidistance method as it 
represents a general rule of law. In determining marine 
boundaries between neighbouring States, a rule of 
customary international law has apparently been 
d e v e l o p e d . T h e r e  is sufficient proof, as will be 
seen, of a recognition on the international law level, 
that the concept of equity has come into its own in the 
delimitation process. The establishment of the customary 
rule in this context could be constructed from the
judgment of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf
f Arb 
(124)
( 123 )Cases, and the decision of the Court o itration
in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case.
(121) See the text of the Article, Brownlie, op.cit., 
Ref. (31) at 20, p.109.
(122) Daintith and others, op.cit.. Ref. (4), at 9, Vol. 
1, P.A327; Jennings, op,cit., Ref. (345), at 161, 
pp.819 et seq.
(123) ICJ Reports, 1969, p.4.
(124) Decision,op.cit.. Ref. (20), at 198, Decision of 
14 March 1978 op.cit., Ref. (24), at 200.
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I . The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
Importance has been attached to and extensive 
commentaries and analysis have been made on the decision 
of the ICJ in the North Sea Cases. I t  is to be 
noted that there are special reasons why this judgment 
received such attention. One may accept unreservedly 
that the whole problem in which the Court in this case 
dealt with, reflects an aspect of a wider field of the law 
of the sea on which contradictory views are still 
expressed,
However, in order to understand the case certain 
aspects of the dispute must be discussed.
The Dispute
The North Sea waters, apart from the well-known
Norwegian Trough, are shallow and the bottom almost wholly
( 127 )continental shelf.^  ^ Seven coastal States border the
North Sea; the U.K., Norway, Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. All of 
these States apart from Belgium, Germany and Norway have 
ratified or acceded to the Continental Shelf Convention
(125) See for example, Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (4 ), at 193, 
pp. 187-215; and op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, pp. 
41-71; Runnings, N . March and others, "Current Legal 
Developments", ICLQ, Vol. 21, 1972, pp.563-564;
Grisel, op.cit.. Ref. (48 ), at 209, pp.562-593; 
Friedmann, op.cit.. Ref. (253), at 133, pp.229-240; 
Merrilis, op.cit.. Ref. (201), at 116, pp.638-659.
(126) Friedmann, ibid., p.229.
(127) Hopkins, C.A., "Delimitation of the Continental Shelf- 
Conventional and Customary International LawJ' Camb. 
Law, Vol. 28, 1970, pp. 4,5.
(128) Young, Richard, "Offshore Claims and Problems in the 
North Sea", AJIL, Vol. 59, 1965, p.505.
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Several agreements were concluded between the States 
concerned for the delimitation of the continental shelf 
boundaries. The U.K. which is situated along the western 
side concluded agreements with Norway, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. The line xy on figure 1 reflects these 
delimitations which have been based on the median line 
rule. Norway and Denmark have set up by agreement a 
boundary line between them ('op' on figure (130) ^iso,
short, partial boundary lines between the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Germany ('cd' and 'ab' on figure '1') were 
agreed upon in 1964 and 1965 respectively. In 
addition, Denmark and the Netherlands whose coasts are 
not adjacent, agreed in March 1966 upon the division of 
their continental shelves. These agreements were based 
on the equidistance line rule.^^^^^ Germany, whidihas a 
concave coastline, disagreed with extending the partial 
boundary lines on the basis of the same rule, since if it 
were applied it would have resulted in the dotted lines 
('be' and 'de' on figure '1') and consequently the outcome 
would be inequitable. This is because it would prevent 
her from extending her continental shelf to the middle of
(129) The U.K.-Norwegian Agreement, signed on March 10, 
1965, relating to the Delimitation of the Contin­
ental Shelf Between the Two Countries, U.K.T.S. No. 
1, 1965, Cmnd. 2626; The U.K.-Denmark Agreement 
signed on March 3, 1966. U.K.T.S., No. 1, 1966,
Cmnd. 2973; U.K.-Norway two agreements signed Oct.
6, 1965, U.K.T.S., No. 1, 1965. Cmnd. 2830 and 2831.
(130) Agreement Between Denmark and Norway Relating to the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, UNTS, Vol. 
634, p.71.
(131) See Brown, op.cit., Ref. (338)at 158, p.42, See 
also, Hopkins, op,cit., Ref. (127) at 233, p.45.
(132) Oda, op.cit., Ref. (92) at 79, p.449; See also ICJ 
Reports, 1969, pp.7-10.
Figure (1)
Reproduced from the Judgment of 
the ICJ in the North Sea Cases
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the North Sea, and would confer upon her the enjoyment 
of only a narrow portion of the continental shelf.
After further unfruitful negotiations for the
prolongation of the partial boundaries, it was decided by
special agreements between the parties to submit the
( 133 )matter to the ICJ, Also, the parties agreed that
they would delimit the continental shelf area between 
them by agreement in the light of the judgment of the 
Court
The Claims of Germany
It was submitted before the Court on behalf of 
Germany that:
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between the 
parties in a case such as that of the North Sea, was 
governed by the principle that coastal States are 
entitled to "just and equitable" shares of the divisible 
areas on the basis of the length of their coastlines or 
sea frontages.
2. The equidistance rule provided in Article 6(2) of the 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was not 
applicable for determining the boundaries between the 
parties since it was not and had not become a rule of 
customary international law.
(133) Two special agreements together with a tripartite 
protocol were signed at Bonn, on Feb. 2, 1967. See 
ICJ Reports, 1969, pp.7-10; See also Hopkins, op. 
cit., Ref. (127), at 233, pp.4, 5.
(134) Brown, E.D., "Recent Trends in the International 
Law of the Sea with Particular Reference to the 
Legal Regime of Submarine Areas", A thesis submitted 
for Ph.D. degree to the University of London, 1970, 
pp.63-65; and op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, p.42,
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3. Even if that rule found application in the "present 
case", special circumstances, within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the Convention, would allow an exception 
in this case.
4. The equidistance rule was inapplicable between the 
parties for the delimitation of areas of continental 
shelf unless it was set up either by agreement or 
arbitration. Alternatively, if the equidistance line 
method achieved a "just and equitable" apportionment 
of the continental shelf among the States concerned, 
then in this case it would also be applicable. 
Accordingly, as long as the application of this rule 
would not apportion a "just and equitable" share to 
the Federal Republic of Germany, it would be excluded.
5. "Consequently, the delimitation of the continental 
shelf in the North Sea between the parties is a matter 
which has to be settled by agreement. This agreement 
should apportion a just and equitable share to each of 
the parties in the light of all factors relevant in 
this respect".^
The Claims of the Netherlands and Denmark
The submissions of Denmark were identical mutatis 
mutandis to those of the Netherlands. It had been 
contended on behalf of them that;
1. The delimitation of the shelf areas between the parties
was governed by the basic principles of international
law embodied in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of
1958 on the Continental Shelf.____________________________
(135) ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 8,9.
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2. Since the parties failed to agree and as the existence
of special circumstances justifying another boundary
line had not been proven by the Federal Republic of
Germany, the boundary line of the parties’ continental
shelf was to be determined by the equidistance method^^^^^
However, the essential question the Court was asked
was to decide and declare
"What principles and rules of international law
are applicable to the delimitation as between
the parties of the areas of the continental
shelf in the North Sea which appertain to each
of them beyond the partial boundary"determined
by the Conventions of 1964 and 1965 between the
Federal Republic and each of the Netherlands and
(137 )Denmark respectively?"
The Court felt that the cases between Germany on the 
one hand, and Denmark and the Netherlands on the other 
could be treated as one, since the legal argument
/ T 3 Q \
presented on behalf of them both were identical.
The Judgment of the Court
In the light of the geographical and legal realities, 
factors and contentions, the Court held on 20 February 
1969 by eleven votes to six that;
(a) the use of the equidistance method was not obligatory 
between the parties, and
(b) there was no other single method of delimitation, the 
use of which is in all circumstances obligatory;
(136) ICJ Reports, 1969, ibid., pp. 10, 11.
(137) Article (1) of the special agreements. See ICJ,
1969, pp. 7-10.
(138) ICJ, ibid., para. 11, p.19.
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(c) the delimitation of areas of the continental shelf was 
therefore to be effected by agreement "in accordance 
with equitable principles, and taking account of all 
the relevant circumstances".
(d) The factors to be taken into account, in the court’s 
view were:
1. the general configuration of the coasts together 
with the presence of any unusual features,
2. the physical and geological structure and natural 
resources of the continental shelf areas involved.
3. Following all of the above, the delimitation must 
be carried out in such a way as to achieve a 
reasonable degree of proportionality between the 
area of continental shelf to be allocated to each 
State and the length of its coast measured in the 
general direction of the coastline.
The Main Findings and Principles of the Judgment
To draw a conclusion from the full implications of the 
judgment certainly requires an examination of the basis on 
which the Court relied. Turning now to the reasonings 
and findings of the Court, it may be observed that after 
considering the contentions and arguments of both parties, 
the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and the 
Netherlands and Denmark on the other, the Court criticised 
the wording of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 
on the Continental Shelf. The Court also focused on the 
extent of the obligatory character of the above Article.
(139) ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 53, 54.
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Moreover, it analysed the legal concepts of adjacent and 
opposite States and placed emphasis on the natural 
prolongation of the land territory beneath the sea.
The aim of what follows is to examine in brief the 
principles on which the Court based its judgment.
1. The equitability of the equidistance rule is questionable
While admitting that the equidistance rule excelled 
other rules in aspects of "practical convenience and 
certainty of a p p l i c a t i o n " , t h e  ICJ amply verified that 
these reasons were not sufficient in themselves to convert 
what was merely a method into a principle of law.^^^^^
In the view of the Court, two deductions were to be 
drawn from an examination of the perspective of the equi­
distance rule. Firstly, not only was this method 
questionable, but there was no other single satisfactory 
rule of determination in all cases. The Court found that 
determination of marine boundaries should be achieved 
either by agreement or by reference to arbitration.
Secondly, and more central to the delimitation is that it 
should be effected on equitable principles, as could be 
inferred in the view of the Court from the formulation of 
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
itself. The Court’s main argument was based on the 
premise that the Convention gives priority to agreement
(140) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 23, p.23; see also Lambert, 
Michael C ., "Notes on Recent Cases: Delimitations of 
the Continental Shelf to be Made on Equitable 
Principles in Accordance with the Natural Prolong­
ation of the Land in Absence of Bilateral Agreement 
or Application of International Convention. The North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969, ICJ,” J. Marit. Law 
Com., vol. 1, No, 2, 1970, p.329.
(141) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 23, p.23.
241
for determination of marine boundaries, and in the case 
of failing to reach agreement, the Convention introduced 
the special circumstances exception to the equidistance 
rule. In reviewing the record of the ILC, the Court 
demonstrated that even with these mitigations, the equi­
distance method was still doubted, especially as to whether 
or not it would lead to equitable consequences in all 
c a s e s . M o r e  important in the view of the Court is 
that there was no sign in the record of the ILC, which 
discussed and examined the question from 1950 to 1956, to 
indicate that any of the Commission members felt that the 
equidistance rule was an incumbent principle of customary 
international law.^^^^^
In considering the argument that the process of 
delimitation of continental shelf areas between opposite 
and adjacent States is similar, thus the results ought, in 
principle, to be the same or at least comparable, the 
Court observed, that this argument appeared to operate not 
on a rational or conceptual level. Such an argument as 
the Court commented, failed to appreciate the distinction 
between two wholly different situations. The lateral 
"equidistance" line did not divide as did the median line, 
the areas between the concerned States equally, rather it 
frequently left to either party areas that were a natural 
prolongation of the territory of the other.
(142) ICJ Reports, 1969, Para. 49, p.33; Para. 53, p.35; 
Para. 55, pp. 35, 36,
(143) Ibid., para. 49, p.33.
(144) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 58, p.37; para. 57, p.36.
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2. The Equidistance Method is not a Rule of Law
The Court added that the ILC during its early and 
middle stages, not only declined to give the equidistance 
rule any priority, but also ignored claims to the effect 
that its application was a necessity. The Commission on 
the contrary discussed other rules such as delimitation by 
agreement, by recourse to arbitration, by drawing lines 
perpendicular to the coast e^ cetera, and on occasion the 
Commission seriously considered adopting one or other of 
these solutions. In the Court’s view, there was no 
definite rule to be formulated as the superior technique 
concerning the delimitation in all c a s e s . T h e  
Court drew from the discussion of the Commission that the 
adopted rule was founded on the recommendation of the 
Committee of Experts and even so that text gave priority 
to other rules, namely the agreement and special 
circumstances. The Court thought that the experts were 
affected by considerations not of legal theory but of 
practical m a t t e r s . F o r  the Court, neither in the 
Committee of Experts, the ILC nor consequently at the 
Geneva Conference had there been any discussion concerning 
the question of determination of lateral boundaries not 
merely between two adjacent States, but also among three 
or more States on one common shelf "in the same vicinity". 
From this the Court deduced that such situations were not 
really c o n s i d e r e d . I n  rejecting the submission that
(145) Ibid., paras. 50, 51, p.34; see also Colombos, op. 
cit., Ref. (4), at 9, pp.78-86.
(146) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 53, p.35.
(147) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 54, p.35.
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the equidistance rule was a general rule of law, the
Court relied on the grounds contained within the view of
the PCJ in the Lotus Case.^^^^^ It emphasised that there
were clear dicta in that case which could be relied upon
for the present case:
"Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to 
be found ... were sufficient to prove ... the 
circumstances alleged ..., it would merely show 
that States had often, in practice, abstained 
from instituting criminal proceedings, and not 
that they recognized themselves as being obliged 
to do so; for only if such abstention were based 
on their being conscious of having a duty to 
abstain would it be possible to speak of an 
international custom. The alleged fact does not 
allow one to infer that States have been 
conscious of having such a duty; on the other hand, 
there are other circumstances calculated to show 
that the contrary is true."^^^^^
In view of the above dictum, and in applying it to 
the present case, the Court pointed out that in certain 
cases, when the States concerned agreed to draw or did 
draw the boundaries in accordance with the equidistance 
rule, there was no evidence that they did so because they 
felt that they were under an obligation.
3. The equidistance method is not a customary rule of 
international law
One of the main contentions of Denmark and the 
Netherlands was that Germany had been bound by the equi-
(148) Ibid., para. 78, p.44,
(149) Ibid.
(150) Ibid. para. 76, pp. 43, 44.
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distance method, whatever her position may have been in
relation to the Convention, since this rule was erga omnes
because of its prior character.
After having examined the history of determination of
the continental shelf boundaries between adjacent coastal
States, the Court concluded that the method provided in
Article 6(2) was not of the norm-creating character.
Neither the Truman Proclamation nor the deliberations of
the ILC demonstrated that the equidistance method was a
rule of customary international law, and therefore it did
not bind Germany. The Court, to enhance this finding,
resorted to article 12 of the Convention which permitted
(152^reservations to the Articles other than 1 to 3. The
Court concluded that the only customary international law
rules related to the continental shelf were those
mentioned in Articles 1 to 3, The Netherlands and Denmark
claimed that :
"... there are certain other provisions of the 
Convention, also not excluded from the faculty of 
reservation, but which do undoubtedly in principle 
relate to matters that lie within the field of 
received customary law, such as the obligation 
not to impede the laying or maintenance of sub­
marine cables or pipelines on the continental 
shelf sea bed 'Article 4', and the general 
obligation not unjustifiably to interfere with 
freedom of navigation, fishing, and so on 
'Article 5, paragraphs 1 and g ',"(153)
(151) Ibid.para. 37, pp. 28, 29,
(152) Hopkins, op.cit., Ref. (127), at 233, p.6 . See also 
ICJ, Reports, ibid., paras. 48-63, pp.33-39.
(153) Hopkins, op.cit.. Ref. (127), at 233, p.6 . See also 
ICJ, para, 65, p.39.
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Also, they claimed that even if the equidistance rule 
had not been a principle of customary international law, 
it became so since it was included in the Geneva 
Convention.(154)
The Court refuted these pleas as the matters cited, 
namely the obligation not to impede the laying or 
maintenance of submarine cables or pipelines and so on, are 
all related "to or are consequential upon principles or 
rules of general maritime law, very considerably ante­
dating the Convention, and not directly connected with 
but only incidental to continental shelf rights as such. 
They were mentioned in the Convention, not in order to 
declare or confirm their existence, which was not 
necessary, but simply to ensure that they were not 
prejudiced by the exercise of continental shelf rights as 
provided for in the Convention."(^^^^
Then the Court went on to say that Article 6 is so 
framed as to give precedence, firstly to agreement and 
secondly to the exception of special circumstances. So 
the equidistance method did not have a norm-creating 
character. The Court added that even if it had such a 
character, it should have evolved through extensive and 
uniform practice into a rule of customary international 
law.(^^^^ Moreover, the Court was not convinced that 
such a conventional principle became a general rule of
(154) See para. 73, p.42.
(155) ICJ Reports, para. 65, p.39.
(156) Hopkins, op.cit., Ref. (127), at 233, p.7. See 
also paras. 73, 74, pp. 42, 43.
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international law within such a short time. The
(157)convention had been in force for less than five years. 
Furthermore, to decide whether state practice subsequent 
to the Convention amounted to a sufficient degree of 
uniformity and certainty as to satisfy its being a rule 
of customary international law, the Court examined fifteen 
cases in which the continental shelf boundaries have been 
delimited according to the equidistance rule. The Court 
reached the conclusion that over half of these fifteen 
were acting according to the Convention since they were, 
or became, parties to it. As regards States which were 
not parties to the Convention, the Court declared that 
there was not any material evidence that these States 
believed themselves bound to apply the equidistance rule 
because of its obligatory nature or because it was 
mandatory rule. Further, no inference could be 
legitimately drawn from the first group actions to the 
existence of a customary international law rule with 
respect to the equidistance line. In addition, in almost 
all cases cited, the delimitation concerned was of a 
median line between opposite States and not a lateral line 
between adjacent States. The lateral line and the median 
line cases, in the Court's view, differed in various 
respects.(^58)
A commonly voiced criticism of the Court's finding 
in this respect is that the rules mentioned in Article 6 
have been employed in bilateral and unilateral state
(157) The Convention came into force on June 10, 1964.
(158) ICJ Reports, 1969, paras. 75, 76 and 79, pp.43-44 
and 45. See also para. 57, pp. 36-37.
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practice from which it can be deduced easily that this 
method has become a principle of customary international
l a w . < 1 5 9 )
In answer to this criticism it is respectfully 
submitted that the Court did not deny the use of that rule. 
The only fact which the Court stressed was that States 
which employed the rule did not feel they were under an 
obligation to use it.^^^^^ There would seem to be no 
difficulty in agreeing that it is not impossible to say 
that a customary international law rule has come into 
existence where there is practice but no opinio juris. 
Certainly, there is a distinction between "a rule of law" 
and mere "usage". The use of the equidistance rule would 
of course need to be hedged with opinio juris. That is 
to say, there are in fact many occasions on which States 
have followed a certain rule or principle without 
intending it to be a matter of law.^^^^^ As to the 
ordinary requirements in relation to the establishment of 
a customary international law rule, a combination of two 
elements must exist as Article 38(b) of the Statute of 
the ICJ r e p o r t s . F i r s t l y ,  a custom comprising a 
general practice. Secondly, the acceptance of that 
general practice as law.^^^^^
The ICJ, it is submitted, has analysed the interaction
(159) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338) at 158, pp.59-62.
(160) ICJ Reports, 1969, paras. 75, 76 and 79, pp.43-44 
and 45. See also para. 59, p.37.
(161) Waldock, op.cit.. Ref. (234), at 126, pp.40-53.
(162) Article 38(b) provides that:"(b) international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law;" See Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (31) at 20, 
p.276.
(163) Bishop, op.cit.. Ref. (2), at 8 , pp.220-230.
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of the requirements of both the consistent practice and 
of the acceptance and the application of such a practice 
as opinio juris in the well-known "Right of Passage CaseV^^^^^ 
There, the Court considered that a customary right of 
transit for persons and goods existed on the basis of a 
"constant and uniform practice", saying that it was 
satisfied that the practice had been "accepted as law by 
the parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative 
obligation". Portugal also claimed a right of 
passage for armed forces but the Court rejected Portugal's 
claim on the grounds that prior permission which had to be 
obtained for each transit, excluded the existence of a 
right or obligation, even though the permission had always 
been g r a n t e d . T h e  question is then why the Court 
regarded one practice as law binding the two States and 
not the other. In exploring the above case to find the 
answer, one may deduce that there was a matter of law 
present in one case but not in the other.
Further, in the Asylum Case,^^^^^ the Court insisted
that
"Colombia must prove that the usage on which she 
relied was the expression of right appertaining to 
the State granting the asylum and a duty incumbent 
on the territorial State."
(164) Right of Passage Over Indian Territory, Portugal v. 
India, ICJ Reports, IÔ6 0 , p .61
(165) ICJ Reports, 1960, p.40,
(166) See Waldock, op.cit., Ref. (234), at 126, pp.40-53.
(167) ICJ Reports, 1960, pp.40-42; Waldock, ibid., pp.
40-53.
(168) Asylum Case, Colombia v. Peru, ICJ Reports 1950, 
p p. 276'i 25*6, Jennings, op. cit. , Ref. (63), at 32, 
pp. 333-338.
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Again, in the United States Nationals in Morocco 
çg^^(169) impression also emerged that the Court 
reaffirmed its statement in the Asylum Case and rejected 
the U.S. claims on the grounds that the practice was shown 
to have been inspired by considerations other than a 
sense of legal duty.
Obviously, the impression given by the cited cases, 
is that the existence of a customary international law 
rule requires in addition to the uniformity and continuity 
of practice, the vital element of opinio juris which in 
the World Court's view was not present in relation to the 
equidistance rule,
4, The land dominates the sea. The legal regime of the 
continental shelf is that of the seabed and subsoil
The Court emphasized that the notion of the continental 
shelf was a recent legal concept. It was an example of 
encroachment on maritime extensions, which had been 
considered to appertain to no one for centuries. According 
to this recent doctrine, "the land dominates the sea".
It is consequently necessary to examine closely the 
geographical configuration of the coastlines of the 
States concerned.
The Court remarked that partly due to the land being 
the legal source of the rights which coastal States 
exercised over the continental shelf, and also as the 
continental shelf was concerned with submerged land, then
(1G9) The Rights of Nationals of the United States of
America In Morocco Case, France v. United States of 
America, ICJ Reports, 1952, pp.176-233.
250
it must first be clearly established what features do in 
fact constitute such extension.
5. The Principles governing the delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf boundaries
Then the Court turned to the fact that in particular 
situations, the use of the equidistance method produced 
great inequity, such as in the following instances:
a. Where the configuration of the coastlines of the States 
concerned was irregular. The concave or convex 
coastlines, however slight, magnify automatically in 
the delimitation of the continental shelf areas if the 
equidistance line method was applied solely.
b. Where there was no outer boundary to the continental 
shelf as in the North Sea. In such shallow areas the 
claims of the coastal States over their continental 
shelves might converge and intersect. The use of the 
equidistance rule ignoring such irregular geographical 
configurations in the determination of the continental 
shelf areas between adjacent States, led to inequitable 
and unreasonable consequences which were contrary to 
the whole continental shelf notion as a seabed and 
subsoil doctrine.
Having reached these conclusions, the Court declared 
that its function was not to delimit the areas of the 
continental shelf appertaining to each State, but merely 
to point out and demonstrate the principles and rules for
(170) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 96, p.51.
(171) See Daintith and Others, op.cit., Ref. (4 ) at 9, 
p.A329.
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eventually affecting the delimitation of lateral boundaries
( 172 )between adjacent States. The Court went on to
stress that Article 6 was not a part of customary
international law. It did not embody any pre-existing
customary international law rule applicable automatically
in the case of failing to reach agreement between the
States concerned. Nor had its subsequent effect been
sufficient to promote the conventional rule to customary 
(173 )rule. Accordingly, the Court did not see itself
under an obligation to determine whether or not the
configuration of the German coastline constituted "special
(174 )circumstances" within the meaning of Article 6 .^
In attempting to decide the principles governing the
delimitation of continental shelf areas between the
parties, the Court explained that there was an obligation
on the part of opposite or adjacent States to negotiate.
Equitable principles must be followed in such a way as to
leave each party all those parts of the continental shelf
that constitute a natural prolongation of its land
territory beneath the sea, without encroachment on the
natural prolongation of the land territory of the
o t h e r . I n  the words of the judgment,
"the parties are under an obligation to enter 
into negotiations with a view to arriving at 
an agreement, and not merely to go through a
(172) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 84, p.46.
(173) Ibid., paras. 69, 81, pp. 41, 45.
(174) Ibid., para. 82, pp. 45, 46.
(175) Ibid., para. 43 p.31 and p.54; See Daintith and
Willoughby, op.cit., Ref. (421), at 184, p.180.
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formal process of negotiation as a sort of 
prior condition for the automatic application 
of a certain method of delimitation in the 
absence of agreement ; they are under an 
obligation so as to conduct themselves that 
the negotiations are meaningful.
This appears to mean that the parties must approach
the negotiations with an open mind and make a reasonable
( 177 )effort to reach common ground for agreement.^ '
However, the Judgment's treatment of the concept of 
the natural prolongation is criticized in that it has been 
unreasonably stretched. It is argued that the natural 
prolongation belongs to the problem of the seaward 
extensions of the continental shelf. Further it is 
contended that there seems to be no relation between the 
natural prolongation and the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between opposite and adjacent States.
It is of course correct to suggest that the natural 
prolongation concept relates to the seaward boundaries. 
However, it is submitted with the utmost respect that, 
applying the equidistance line in such a case as the North 
Sea, noticeably restricts the extension of the submarine 
territory of either party to something less than what may 
be the real natural prolongation of its land mass. 
Consequently, it confers upon one of the States concerned 
the right to exploit an area which constitutes a natural 
prolongation of the land territory of the other State.
(176) ICJ, Reports, 1969, para. 85(a), p.47.
(177) Daintith and Others, op.cit., Ref. (4 ) at 9, p.A328.
(178) Brown, op.cit., Ref, (338), at 158, p.49; and op.cit., 
Ref. ( 4) at 193, p.197.
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6 . The Concept of Equity
In the course of determining the scope and content 
of the concept of equity, the Court noticed that in the 
North Sea Cases, the shores of three countries were 
comparable in length. This fact, in the Court's view, 
had considerable importance in the sense that they should 
have therefore been given equal treatment. However, the 
configuration of one of the coastlines would, if the equi­
distance line rule were employed, deprive one of the three 
States of the right to gain a part of the continental 
shelf area equal to the parts which the others would 
obtain. The inequity of this situation, the Court 
indicated, was that one of the States would enjoy 
continental shelf rights considerably different from those 
of its neighbours, merely because in the one case the 
coastline is roughly convex in form, whilst in the other 
it is concave.
The Court explained that the delimitation of the 
continental shelf in a sea with a particular configuration 
such as that of the North Sea, might lead to an over­
lapping of the areas appertaining to the States concerned. 
In these circumstances, according to the Court, the 
situation must be dealt with by agreement or failing that 
an equal division, or by agreement for joint exploitation
of the overlapping areas,
Another slant has been given to the Court's judgment 
in suggesting that the delimitation of marine boundaries
(179) ICJ Reports, 1969, Para. 91, pp. 49, 50, para. 98,
p.52.
(180) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 99, p.52,
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must be achieved on equitable principles. There is a
strong case for saying that the judgment adds nothing to
the criteria mentioned in the Convention. Further it is
stated that the concept of "equitable principles" is
superfluous since Article 6 of the Convention provides
special circumstances as one of the rules governing the
delimitation, and equitable principles imply much the same
c o n s e q u e n c e s . M o r e o v e r ,  it is pointed out that
"Equity is a term which lawyers have used to 
convey many different meanings and there is 
therefore considerable scope for argument as 
to the exact content of the term 'equitable
/1 go
principles' used in the Truman Proclamation.^
So far as the relationship between the special 
circumstances and equitable principles is concerned, it is 
submitted that it is quite correct to say that both special 
circumstances and equitable principles rest on similar 
bases. However, they nevertheless differ vastly if they 
were looked at from another side. The special circum­
stances concept in the context of Article 6 , justifies 
another boundary line. This appears to mean that the 
special circumstances principle permits ignoring or 
modifying the equidistance line method but it still does 
not refer to what the boundary line should be. The object 
of equitable principles remains not only to permit the 
exclusion or the modification of the application of the 
equidistance rule, but also to direct the parties concerned
(181) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338) at 158, pp.62, 63 and 
op.cit., Ref. (134) at 236, pp.87-97; Brown, E.O., 
"It's Scotland's Oil? Hypothetical Boundaries in 
the North Sea - A Case Study", Marine Policy, 1978, 
p.1 2 .
(182) Brown, ibid., p.48 and p .86 respectively.
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to the approach in the light of which they must consider 
the problem. Determining whether the delimitation is 
fair or unfair shall depend on whether or not the outcome 
is equitable. The corollary to this argument in the 
Court's view is that the equidistance rule is not to be 
solely applied and no one factor is to determine the issue 
It is permissible to employ a combination of any rules 
seeming to be appropriate in a given situation to achieve 
an equitable result.
In turning now to the argument concerning the import 
of the concept of equity it is submitted that it is true 
that equity is a broad concept, but it is important to 
appreciate that the Court did not consider that it could 
propound an automatic technique to delimit the continental 
boundaries. On the contrary, it emphasized that its task 
was not to delimit the areas of the continental shelf, 
but only to indicate the factors affecting the 
d e l i m i t a t i o n , a n d  that the parties were under an 
obligation to negotiate a solution. The "equitable 
principles" which the Court adopted were only a starting 
point for negotiation. It is merely guidance for the 
States concerned.
One further criticism levelled against the Court’s 
judgment is its considerable reliance on only one factor, 
the length of the coast, and using it as a criterion for 
equitable apportionment.
(183) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 89, p.49.
(184) ICJ Reports, 1969, para, 84, p.46.
(185) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, p.50.
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It is submitted with great respect that the Court 
decided that this factor should be considered in the 
course of delimiting the continental shelf boundaries 
because the land was the source or the basis of the legal 
regime of the continental shelf and the land, as noted 
above, dominated the sea.^^^^^
II,»; The Anglo-French :Contin~entaT Shelf Case
In the most recent Judgment, the full Court of 
Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case,^^^^^ 
has given a further lead to the concept of equity in the 
rules of law concerning the delimitation of marine bound­
aries. The Court in an unanimous judgment reached 
conclusions of considerable interest. It is sufficient 
to say that despite the disimilarity of some of the facts 
of the case with those of the North Sea Cases, great 
emphasis was laid by the Court of Arbitration, that the 
continental shelf boundaries should be delimited in 
accordance with the principle of equity. This will be
/  1  Q  Q  N
discussed in greater detail later.
The Importance of the Decision
The decision in the Anglo-French Case seems to 
represent an important step in the process of the develop­
ment of rules relating to the delimitation of continental 
shelf boundaries. It may be observed that the decision 
gives a clear indication of the Court's attitude in relation
(186) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 96, p.51.
(187) Decision, Ref. (20) at 198, and Decision of 14 March 
1978, Ref. (24) at 200.
(188) See below pp.277-282 and pp. 420 et seq.
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to the principles of equity. More important is the fact 
that the present decision of the Court of Arbitration and 
the Judgment of the ICJ generally recognized an almost 
similar conclusion concerning the rules applicable to the 
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries. One is 
entitled to suggest that this decision as a whole, is a 
very considerable achievement in at least six aspects;
1. It is a decision agreed by all the members of an 
international tribunal body. All five members of the 
Court found this line of thought convincing. It 
is submitted that international judicial decisions are 
seldom taken unanimously. One might assume that this 
"myth" does not so easily occur. Undoubtedly, the 
importance and implications of international decisions 
taken unanimously are self evident.
2. Presumably as the disputant States were parties to the 
continental shelf convention, it was a first opportunity 
to consider the rules for delimiting continental shelf 
boundaries between States party to the Convention.
The decision therefore is helpful in discovering the 
relationship between the rules of customary international 
law and the rules embodied in the Geneva Convention. 
Bearing in mind that the Court of Arbitration although 
it adopted a dissimilar sort of reasoning than that
(189) Decision Para. 255, p.119,
(190) Brown, E.D., "The Anglo-French Continental Shelf
Case", yBWA, Vol. 33, 1979, p.304.
(191) Brown, E.D., "The Anglo-French Continental Shelf
Case", San Diego Law Rev., Vol. 16, Number 3, 1979, 
p.529. For further details about the importance of 
the decision see Brown, ibid., pp.304-305 and pp. 
528-530 respectively.
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relied upon by the ICJ, nevertheless admitted the 
fashion had been set by the ICJ in regarding equitable 
principles as governing the delimitation of the 
continental s h e l f . C e r t a i n l y ,  the effect of the 
Court's decision is therefore to reflect the stability 
and widespread recognition of the principle of equity 
in delimiting marine boundaries between neighbouring 
States,
3, The judges who participated in the case were not only 
high a u t h o r i t i e s ^  but also well known for their 
objective attitudes. Moreover two of the five members, 
Judge Grods and Judge Waldock, were members of the ICJ.
4. More important is the fact that while similar to the 
ICJ, the Court of Arbitration was asked to decide "in 
accordance with the rules of international law applic­
able in the matter as between the p a r t i e s " . T h e  
Court of Arbitration was further requested to determine 
"the course of the boundary 'or boundaries' between the 
portions of the continental shelf appertaining to the 
United Kingdom and the Channel Islands and to the 
French Republic, r e s p e c t i v e l y . M o r e o v e r ,  the 
decision, according to Article 9(1) of the Arbitration 
Agreement, "shall include the drawing of the course of
(192) See also below pp.277-282 and Chapter Five in this 
regard.
(193) The Court consisted of: Sir Humphrey Waldock, Mr.
Paul Reuter, Mr. Herbert Briggs, Mr. Erik Castren,
Mr. Endre Ustor. Mr. Paul Reuter was subsequently 
replaced by Mr. M, Gros. See Article 1 of Arbitration 
Agreement of 1975, U.K.T.S., 1975, No. 137 Cmnd.6280; 
See Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (191), at 257, p.467.
(194) Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, ibid,
(195) Agreement of Arbitration Article 2.
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the boundary or boundaries' on a chart” .
5. It is most noteworthy that the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases related to boundaries between adjacent 
States, in contrast to the present case which is chiefly 
concerned with the situation of States lying opposite 
each other. That is not to say that different 
principles are to be applied in each of the above 
situations. Rather it suggests that difficulties and 
inequities arise in the course of determining lateral 
boundaries more often than in the case of a median line. 
From the above it is intended to prove that although 
the effect and probability of inequity are less than 
they had been in the North Sea Cases, the Court 
emphasized the necessity for the application of the 
equitable principles. The decision may help marginally 
to promote stability of the role of equity in delimiting 
marine boundaries.
6 . Admittedly, the Court of Arbitration prescribed the 
application of "equitable principles" as a general 
principle of international law not because it is
( 197 ')
recognized in national legal systems.^  ^ The 
difference is important in that the Court could resort 
to the latter only with the mutual consent of the 
parties concerned, something which France and the U.K. 
seem to have failed to express or even contemplate.
(196) Article 9(1), ibid.
(197) See Article 38(l-c) of the Statute of the Inter­
national Court of Justice, Brownlie, op.cit., Ref. 
(31) at 20, p.276.
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The Dispute
After unsuccessful negotiation between France and
the U.K. for the apportionment of their respective
continental shelves, the two Governments subsequently
agreed on July 10, 1975^^^^^ to refer the dispute to an
arbitral tribunal^^^^^ to determine
"in accordance with the rules of international 
law applicable in the matter as between the 
parties, the following question:
What is the course of boundary 'or boundaries' 
between the portions of the continental shelf 
appertaining to the United Kingdom and the 
Channel Islands and to the French Republic
The appliable law
The facts of the case in outline were centred on 
whether or not the Geneva Convention was applicable between 
the parties. It is true that both France and the U.K. 
were parties to the Convention, nevertheless they disagreed 
on whether it was in force between them or not.^^^^^
France contended that her acceptance of the Convention 
had been vitiated by the reservations which she had made 
and were rejected by the U.K. Therefore, she totally 
rejected the idea that she was bound by the Geneva 
Convention in the case before the Court. On the other 
hand the U.K. claimed that the Geneva Convention was in 
force between herself and France, thus the delimitation
(198) Arbitration Agreement, The Preamble; See Brown, 
op.cit.. Ref. (190), at 257, p.305.
(199) Decision p.5.
(200) Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement.
(201) See Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (191) at 257, p.463.
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(202)was to be carried out by the application of Article 6 ,
The Court decided that in view of the facts before it,
there was no evidence raising a reasonable supposition that
the U.K. in rejecting the French reservations had
intended an ulterior purpose to prevent the Convention
(203)coming into force between the two States. Therefore,
the decision confirmed that the Geneva Convention was
applicable in the case, in general, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Arbitration A g r e e m e n t . H o w e v e r ,  the
Court after observing the French reservations meanwhile
asserted that Article 6 would not be applicable to the
whole case as the U.K. alleged, nor would it be excluded
as France contended. The Court seems to have taken an
intermediate position in which it considered that Article
6 is inapplicable only within the scope of the French 
(205 )reservations.^ The delimitation of the continental
shelf only in the area meant by the reservations had to 
be carried out, in the view of the Court, in accordance 
with the rules of customary international law.^^^^^
The findings of the Court
Attention must now be turned to the reasonings upon 
which the Court principally relied. At this stage an
(202) Decision, pp.11-21. For the text of the French
reservations and the U.K.'s reject see ibid., paras. 
33, 34, pp.32-34.
(203) Decision, paras.56-61, pp.43-45.
(204) Decision, para. 48, p.40; Paras. 59-110, pp. 44-63.
(205) Decision, para. 61, p. 45.
(206) Decision, para. 62, p.45. See Brown, op.cit..
Ref. (191) at 257, p.468; and op.cit.. Ref. (190) 
at 257, p.306.
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attempt will be made to examine briefly the arguments made 
by the Court, as it is hoped to consider the subject in 
more detail later.
I. The relationship between Article 6 and international 
customary law
It is interesting to note at the outset that the 
Court of Arbitration was inclined to consider both the 
rules of customary international law, as had been expressed 
by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases, and Article 6 of the 
Geneva Convention, The Court made it clear that there 
was no evidence that the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, as the French Government claimed, had 
been obsolete. On the other hand, the Court placed great 
store in the principles of customary international law.
It was the firm belief of the Court that it did not 
regard
"itself as debarred from taking any account in
these proceedings of recent developments in
customary law. On the contrary, the Court has
no doubt that it should take due account of the
evolution of the law of the sea in so far as
this may be relevant in the context of the 
/ 208 )
present case."
The decision is interesting in stressing that whilst 
it considered Article 6 of the Geneva Convention applicable 
in principle, it was unreasonable to infer that it 
regarded the rules of customary international law discussed 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases to be
(207) See below pp. 423 et seq.
(208) Decision, para. 48, p.40.
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inapplicable. In the words of the Court:
"As already pointed out, the provisions of 
Article 6 do not define the condition for the 
application of the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule; moreover, the equidistance- 
special circumstances rule and the rules of 
customary law have the same object - the 
delimitation of the boundary in accordance with 
equitable principles. In the view of this 
Court, therefore, the rules of customary law are 
a relevant and even essential means both for 
interpreting and completing the provisions of 
Article
2 .“ "Special Circumstances" and "Equitable Principles"
The Court of Arbitration went on further to draw
attention to another aspect. It observed that the effect
of applying or not applying the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf, and in particular Article 6 , would make
little if any practical difference to the boundary line in
the case before it.^^^^^ The Court was quite specific
in saying that :
"The double basis on which both parties put 
their case regarding the Channel Islands confirms 
the Court's conclusion that the different ways in 
which the requirements of 'equitable principles' 
or the effects of 'special circumstances' are put 
reflect differences of approach and terminology 
rather than of substance.
(209) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (191), at 257, p.470,
(210) Decision, para. 75, p.50.
(211) Decision, para. 65, p.47; Brown, op.cit., Ref. (191),
at 257, p.497.
(212) Decision, para. 148, p.77.
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3. The status of the equidistance rule
The Court noticed that the fundamental issue at stake
was the role given to the equidistance principle in the
delimitation of the continental shelf. The Court took
the view that no reason could be relied upon for supposing
that there had ever been an equidistance rule on its own.
It remarked that:
"Article 6 , as both the United Kingdom and the 
French Republic stress in the pleadings, does 
not formulate the equidistance principle and 
'special circumstances' as two separate rules.
The rule there stated in each of the two cases 
is a single one, a combined equidistance-special 
circumstances rule. This being so, it may be 
doubted whether, strictly speaking, there is 
any legal burden of proof in regard to the 
existence of special circumstances. The fact 
that the rule is a single rule means that the 
question whether 'another boundary is justified 
by special circumstances' is an integral part of 
the rule providing for application of the equi­
distance principle. As such, although involving 
matters of fact, that question is always one of 
law of which, in case of submission to arbitration,
the tribunal must itself, proprio motu, take
 )
cognisance when applying Article 6 ,"^
However, the Court did not deny that the equidistance 
rule had under Article 6 a more obligatory nature than it 
had under the rules of customary law.^^^^^ Beyond that, 
in the Court's view, the parties to the Convention were 
under an obligation to apply the equidistance method but 
this application ought to be confined only to cases where
(213) Decision, para. 6 8 , p.48.
(214) Decision, para. 70, p.48.
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no special circumstances existed, namely when such 
application leads to an equitable solution. From this 
the Court concluded that the role of the principle of 
"special circumstances" was to secure equitable delimit-
/ p  T C  \
ation. This would seem to be tantamount, it is
submitted, to saying that the "equitable principles", even 
under Article 6 , is the basis according to which it could 
be said that the rule of equidistance is applicable or not. 
This would apparently mean that in deciding whether 
application or non-application of the equidistance rule is 
relevant, one must consider the solution which it would 
lead to, namely its equitability.
Rules Emerging UNCLOS III
From the foregoing two points may be made. Firstly, 
the means of delimitation of marine boundaries between 
neighbouring States in the 1958 Conventions are the equi­
distance or median line-special circumstances. The word 
agreement occurred in Article 6 in a context which 
suggests that the matter has been left to bilateral 
negotiation without any guideline. As shown above there 
is no legal basis whatsoever for the State which is not a 
party to the Convention to accept the application of the 
equidistance line on its own unless it would effect an 
equitable apportionment of marine zones. Therefore, a 
different rule has been evolved on the customary inter­
national law plane. That rule has been enunciated by 
the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, namely 
"delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance
(215) Decision, para. 70, pp.48-49.
266
with equitable principles. ^
Secondly, the question of determination of marine
boundaries is highly divisive. It follows that there
are widely varying views on both the substance and the
(217 )application of international law on this issue.^ ^
Consequently, the contrasting points of view obviously
would lead to international disputes.
Undoubtedly, the reasons described reflect not only
the importance of the question under consideration, but
also that there have been some ambiguities and uncertainties
as to the rules applicable in delimiting marine boundaries.
Therefore, it has been one of the crucial issues discussed
in the course of the debate in the UNCLOS III.
However, it does not seem necessary to recount here
the course of the debate in detail, rather it is sufficient
to state that there is a more fundamental difference
concerning the role of the equidistance line principle.
Two main trends arise. The first maintains that the rule
of equidistance does not constitute a rule of general
international law, but offers only one useful method among
others for drawing marine boundaries between opposite or
adjacent States. This view appears to mean that the
rule of equidistance is not to be deprived of all legal
force, rather to be accepted only when it leads to an
equitable solution. On the other hand the other trend
is that which suggests that the rule of equidistance should
( 218 )be recognized as a general rule.^
(216) ICJ Reports, 1969, Para. 101. pp. 53, 54.
(217) Stevenson and Oxman, op.cit., Ref. (137) at 94, 
pp. 780-781.
(218) See Brown, op.cit., Ref. (99), at 44, p.276.
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In the July 1973 Session of the U.N. Seabed Committee,
the Greek delegate presented its a m e n d m e n t ^  to the
( 220)Turkish draft on the question. According to this
amendment, in the absence of agreement. States were not
entitled to extend their territorial sea beyond the median 
(221 )line. Further proposals submitted to the U.N.
Seabed Committee referred to the rule of equidistance and
(222 )considered it by some means as a general rule.
Admittedly, similar proposals were submitted to the
UNCLOS III and regarded again, the equidistance line rule
as a general principle referring meanwhile to the special
(223 )circumstances and equitable solution.
The Iraqi delegation to the Conference voiced strong 
objections to the approach, namely the one espoused by 
those desiring to invest the equidistance rule with 
primacy. It was its position at the fifth Session of the 
Conference that the general recognized rights of a coastal 
State over marine zones before its coasts did not 
necessarily imply a certain mode of delimitation. The 
rights over the continental shelf imply a certain spatial
(219) U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L. 17.
(220) U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC, 11/L. 16/Rev.1.
(221) U.N. Doc. A/Ac. 138/SC. 11/L. 17; Oda, op.cit.. Ref.
(408), at 180, Vol. II, p.244.
(222) See the Cyprian Proposal of March 28, 1973 (U.N. Doc. 
A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L, 19, Oda, ibid.. Vol. II, p.244; 
The Japanese Proposal of August 15, 1973, (U.N. Doc. 
A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L. 56; Oda, ibid., p.251; The 
Uruguayan Proposal of July 3, 1973, (U.N. Doc, A/AC. 
138/SC. 11/L. 24; Oda, ibid., pp.258-259.
(223) See for example A/CONF. 62/C.2/L.25; A/CONF. 62/C. 
2/L. 31/Rev. 1; A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L.43; A/CONF. 62/WP 
8/Rev.1.
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extension of the areas under control into the high sea, 
but by no means provide any rule for their lateral 
delimitation. Iraq, amongst ten other States, 
submitted a draft in which much weight was given to the 
equitable principles, taking into account all the relevant 
circumstances which would lead to an equitable solution
Setting aside matters concerning the position of Iraq 
at the Conference, other draft articles were submitted to 
the Conference according to which the role of the 
equidistance principle would be weakened in favour of 
equitable principles. ^
However, the pertinent Articles of the ICNT are as 
follows :
Article 15
"Where the coasts of two States are opposite or 
adjacent to each other, neither of the two States 
is entitled, failing agreement between them to 
the contrary to extend its territorial sea beyond 
the median line every point of which is equi­
distant from the nearest points on the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial seas 
of each of the two States is measured. This 
article does not apply, however, where it is 
necessary by reason of historic title or other 
special circumstances to delimit the territorial
(224) The Report of the Iraqi Delegate to the UNCLOS III. 
which was submitted to the Iraqi Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs after the adjournment of the Fifth 
Session of the Conference.
(225) The Report of the Iraqi Delegate ibid.
(226) See for example the Australian and Norwegian 
Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L. 36; The 
Japanese Proposal, U.N. Doc, A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L 56; 
see also U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L, 82; A/CONF. 
62/C. 2/L. 18; A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 23; A/CONF. 62/C. 
2/L 28; A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 74.
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seas of the two States in a way which is at 
variance with this provision.
Article 83
"1. The delimitation of the continental 
shelf between adjacent or opposite States shall 
be effected by agreement in accordance with 
equitable principles, employing, where approp­
riate, median or equidistance line, and taking 
account of all the relevant circumstances.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a 
reasonable period of time, the States concerned 
shall resort to the procedures provided for in 
Part XV.
3. Pending agreement or settlement, the 
States concerned shall make provisional arrange­
ments, taking into account the provisions of 
paragraph 1.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between 
the States concerned, questions relating to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf shall be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of 
that agreement.
In the light of Article 83, one may assume that, for 
the determination of the boundary line between States 
lying opposite or adjacent to each other, the ICNT is
laying great emphasis that the boundaries should be
determined by agreement. Article 83 of the ICNT, in 
contrast to Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the 
continental shelf, makes it mandatory to base the agreement 
on equitable principles. That is to say while similar to
Article 6 in that it regards agreement as the main means
(227) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 63/WP. 10/Add. 1, pp. 24, 25.
(228) Ibid., p.55.
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of delimiting the continental shelf boundaries, the ICNT 
goes further in stipulating that the agreement should be 
made in accordance with the equitable principles. Moreover, 
it imposed restrictions on the applicability of the 
equidistance or median line, the most important being 
that they are applicable only where circumstances are 
appropriate. It may be argued that the concept of 
"equitable principles" is both vague and divisive. What 
the ICNT is suggesting, to counter such criticism, is in 
effect that all the other pertinent factors are to be 
taken into consideration.
However, whilst the above provision offers an excellent 
opportunity for the recognition of equity as the main 
principle in delimiting the continental shelf areas, it 
would, if approved, pose some difficulties. It is right 
to take into account the numerous considerations which 
are likely to occur in diverse circumstances. It should 
also be remembered that the term "relevant circumstances" 
adopted in Article 83, is more, not less, ambiguous than 
the concept of "equitable principle". There must, at 
least, be guidance on these factors. There is also much 
to be said for the case of failure to reach agreement.
Under Article 83 of the ICNT coastal States are permitted 
to recourse to a provisional procedure in the case of 
failure to reach agreement within a reasonable period of 
time. It would seem a matter of reasonable inference 
from the negative sense of Article 83 that prior to 
agreement it permits the concerned parties the enjoyment 
of rights over the continental shelf area up to the
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equidistance or median line. One particular deficiency
is felt to be that if a State prefers the median or
equidistance line rule, it could simply refuse to accept
any other line as long as such a refusal entitled it
easily and automatically to enjoy the rights over the
continental shelf it desires. It may be contended that
the compulsory dispute settlement under Part (XV) might
(229 )mitigate this outcome. For such a contention to be
answered, it is to be noted that this problem still remains 
at least either until agreement is reached or the contro­
versy is settled by the means specified in the draft.
A further criticism lies in asking what weight is to 
be given to islands. In this regard, no reference in 
the draft is made to islands apart from Article 121.
This raises the problem as to whether or not they will all
be entitled to full rights in respect of the continental
shelf. It could be argued that the terms "equitable 
principles" and "all relevant circumstances" adduced in 
Article 83, may embrace this exception. However, for
(229) There was some opposition in the dispute settlement 
group to compulsory dispute settlement of marine 
boundaries between neighbouring States. See 
Stevenson and Oxman, op.cit., Ref. (137), at 94, 
p.781. Moreover, settlement of disputes ex aequo 
et bono had been suggested in the early stages of 
the ILC and had been rejected. See YBILC, 1953,
Vol. II, pp.241-269; See below pp. 192 et seq.
(230) Article 121 provides that "1. An island is a 
naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf of an island 
are determined in accordance with the provisions of 
the present Convention applicable to other land 
territory.
"3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation 
or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf", U.N. Doc, A/CONF, 
62/WP. 10/Add. l,pp.68, 69.
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reasons already put forward, in the sense that these
(531)concepts lack clarity, the question remains in dispute;
IV. The Equitable Principles
1. The Concept of equitable principles in the Truman 
Proclamation
By now it seems clear that under general international 
law there is no obligation on coastal States to accept the 
equidistance method, strictly speaking, for the determin­
ation of continental shelf boundaries, if such a boundary 
does not lead to equitable apportionment. It is to be 
noted that the generally recognized continental shelf 
doctrine conferring the seabed and subsoil of areas under 
the high seas to the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal 
States, implies equitable apportionment. The principle 
of equity has been recognized by State practice.
Moreover, the Truman Proclamation of 1945, which for 
reasons mentioned in paragraph 47 of the Judgment of the 
ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, must be 
considered as having pr pounded the basic rules of law 
in this f i e l d ; m a i n t a i n e d  that the delimitation of
(231) Deliberations at the UNCLOS III have shown support 
for the proposal that islands which cannot sustain 
human life or economic life of their own should 
not be entitled to a continental shelf. See 
Daintith and Willoughby, op.cit.. Ref. (421) at 
184, p.171.
(232) See above pp. 238 et seq.; see also ICJ Pleadings, 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1968, Vol. 1, 
p.31.
(233) ICJ Reports, 1969, para 47 pp.32-33. See also 
Brown, op.cit., Ref. (99), at 44, Part I, p.186.
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the continental shelf, where two States are adjacent to
the same continental shelf, is governed by the concept of
"equitable principles". The aforementioned Proclamation
declared in part that :
"In cases,where the continental shelf extends 
to the shores of another State, or is shared 
with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be 
determined by the United States and the State 
concerned in accordance with equitable 
principles.
However, to appreciate the importance of the Truman
Proclamation in the establishment of the continental shelf
doctrine, one may refer again to the Judgment of the ICJ
in the North Sea Cases. In the course of discovering
the principles applicable as to the delimitation of the
continental shelf boundaries, the Court referred to the
Truman Proclamation and described it as having "a special
status". After a few sentences the Court maitained that:
"The Truman Proclamation however, soon came to 
be regarded as the starting point of the positive 
law on the subject, and the chief doctrine it 
enunciated, namely that of the coastal state as 
having an original, natural, and exclusive ' in 
short a vested' right to the continental shelf off 
its shores, came to prevail over all others
While the World Court particularly focused upon the 
Truman Proclamation, it stressed meanwhile the concept of 
equitable principles which had found wide recognition in 
State practice. A number of subsequent declarations 
followed the same pattern in adopting the equitable
(234) The Truman Proc., op.cit., Ref, (283) at 144,
(235) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 47, pp.32-33, See also 
Blecher, op.cit., Ref. (23), at 200, p.60.
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principles. Although more will be said later, for the 
moment it is sufficient to say that more frequently States 
are referring by some means to equity or equitable
p r i n c i p l e s .
2. The Concept of equitable principles in the Judgment of 
the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
As noted above, the ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases found that the equidistance rule was not an
( 037 )
"inherent necessity of the continental shelf doctrine".
Among the grounds put forward for this view is the fact
that if the equidistance line rule were to be considered
a customary method and consequently applied in all
situations where no agreement could be reached and no
other boundary line was justified by special circumstances,
it should be consonant with certain basic legal principles
which have reflected the opinio juris in all cases in
which the delimitation of the continental shelf boundaries
has been required. According to these basic principles
delimitation must be the object of agreement between the
States concerned and such an agreement should be reached
( 2-38 )in accordance with equitable principles.
The Court then went on to outline certain cardinal 
ideas which must guide the application of equitable 
principles and these ideas are of such fundamental nature 
that it is worth quoting them in full.
(236) Padwa, op.cit., Ref. (51), at 210, pp.628-630.
(237) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 55, p.35.
(238) Ibid., para. 85, p.46.
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"(a) the parties are under an obligation to 
enter into negotiations with a view to arriving 
at an agreement, and not merely to go through a 
formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior 
condition for the automatic application of a 
certain method of delimitation in the absence of 
agreement ; they are under an obligation so to 
conduct themselves that the negotiations are 
meaningful, which will not be the case when 
either of them insists upon its own position 
without contemplating any modification of it ;
"(b) the parties are under an obligation to act 
in such way that, in the particular case, and 
taking all the circumstances into account, 
equitable principles are applied - for this 
purpose the equidistance method can be used, but 
other methods exist and may be employed, alone or 
in combination, according to the areas involved;
"(c) for the reasons given in paragraphs 43 and 
44, the continental shelf of any State must be 
the natural prolongation of its land territory 
and must not encroach upon what is the natural
T239 ')prolongation of the territory of another State."
Turning to the legal basis of this obligation, the 
Court relied not only upon Article 1(2) of the special 
agreement between the parties, but also upon additional 
grounds. Firstly, recourse to negotiation was enunciated 
by the Truman Proclamation. Secondly, this main 
principle obviously underlies all the international 
relations. Finally and most significantly, it is 
recognized in Article 33(5) of the Charter of the U.N.
(239) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 85, p.46.
(240) Ibid., para. 86, p.47.
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It is important to remember that the Court in this 
case considered certain aspects in the process of 
discovering the scope of the concept of "equity". The 
Court was quite specific in deciding that equity did not 
necessarily imply equality. Delimitation had to be 
equitably affected, but it did not necessarily produce 
equal shares in the continental shelf areas of the 
concerned parties. The Court went on to say:
"... equity does not require that a State 
without access to the sea should be allotted 
an area of continental shelf any more than 
there could be a question of rendering the 
situation of a State with an exclusive 
coastline similar to that of a State with a 
restricted coastline.
In indicating to the parties the factors which ought 
to be taken into consideration the Court stated that there 
was no legal limit to the consideration which States may 
take into account for the purpose of making sure that they 
employ equitable m e t h o d s . I t  observed that there 
was no single incumbent satisfactory rule for delimitation 
of marine boundaries in all cases. Yet, the Court 
disclosed some factors, for example the geographical 
features, the geological structure, the natural resources 
of the continental shelf areas involved and the unity of 
deposits. One factor alone, the Court asserted, would 
often be inadequate and the relevant criteria to lead to
(241) ICJ Reports, 1969, Para. 91, pp. 49, 50.
(242) Ibid., para. 93, p.50; para. 94, pp. 50, 51 and 
para. 98, p.52; See also Daintith and others, op. 
cit.. Ref. (4) at 9, p.A330.
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equitable division depended on each set of circumstances ^
3. The concept of equitable principles in the decision of
the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French
continental shelf case.
So far as can be detected, the judgment of the ICJ in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, was not the only
occasion on which judicial approval was given to the notion 
of equitable principles in the delimitation of marine 
boundaries. The Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf Case appears to agree with the World 
Court in this respect, since it asserted that the 
continental shelf boundaries must be determined in 
accordance with equitable principles. It is worth 
observing that in the course of searching for the law in 
force between the parties for example, the Court noticed 
that :
"Article 6 is applicable in principle, to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf as between 
the parties under the Arbitration Agreement. This 
does not, however, mean that the Court considers 
that the rules of customary law discussed in the 
judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
to be inapplicable in the present case. As 
already pointed out, the provisions of Article 6 
do not define the conditions for the application 
of the equidistance-special circumstances rule; 
moreover, the equidistance-special circumstances 
rule and the rules of customary law have the same 
object - the delimitation of the boundary in 
accordance with equitable principles.
(243) ICJ Reports, 1969, paras. 98, 99, p.52; See also 
Daintith and Willoughby, op.cit.. Ref. (421) at 184, 
p .180.
(244) Decision, para. 75, p.50.
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The Court pointed out that the aim of the rule laid 
down in Article 6, like that of the customary law was to 
lead to an equitable apportionment.
In turning to the judgment of the ICJ in the North 
Sea Cases, the Court of Arbitration made it clear that 
it was true that the World Court had taken into account 
the particular circumstances of the case before it. What 
was equally true, the Court stated, was that it would be 
a pity if one ignores that a number of principles which 
had been laid down by the ICJ were of a general nature. 
Quoting the ICJ's passage in which the World Court had 
placed so much reliance on the concept of natural 
prolongation, the Court of Arbitration maintained expressly 
that this concept was "the most fundamental of all the 
rules relating to the continental shelf".
Another question more important in assessing the 
evidential value of the decision of the Court of Arbitration 
in approving the principle of equity in the delimitation 
of the continental shelf, must be considered. Here one 
might test the Court of Arbitration's view towards what 
had been decided by the ICJ in relation to the equidistance 
method. It is worth recalling that the ICJ had held:
"... for this purpose the equidistance method
can be used, but other methods exist and may
(247 )
be employed, along or in combination...",^
Here again, the Court of Arbitration appears to be 
in agreement with the ICJ in not regarding the equidistance
(245) Decision, para, 148, p.77.
(246) Decision, para. 77, p.51.
(247) ICJ, 1969, para. 85(b), p.47.
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rule or any other method as applicable in all situations. 
Whilst affirming the unity and link between the equidistance 
and special circumstances, there is another aspect it is 
submitted in the decision which purports to uphold that 
the more appropriate method in each particular situation 
rested with the relevant circumstances of the case. The 
Court was quite specific in deciding that the fundamental 
condition to be observed in judging the relevance or non­
relevance of the method, is the equitability of the 
consequences to which it would lead.^^^^^ In the words 
of the Court :
"As this Court of Arbitration has already pointed 
out in paragraphs 81-94, the appropriateness of 
the equidistance or any other method for the 
purpose of effecting an equitable delimitation in 
any given case is always a function or reflection 
of the geographical and other relevant circumstances 
of the particular case. In a situation where the 
coasts of the two States are opposite each other, 
the median line will normally effect a broadly 
equal and equitable delimitation. But this is 
simply because of the geometrical effects of 
applying the equidistance principle to an area of 
continental shelf which, in fact, lies between 
coasts that, in fact, face each other across that 
continental shelf. In short, the equitable 
character of the delimitation results not from the 
legal designation of the situation as one of 
'opposite' States but from its actual geographical 
character as such. . Similarly, in the case of 
'adjacent' States, it is the lateral geographical 
relation of the two coasts, when combined with a 
large extension of the continental shelf seawards
(248) Decision, para. 84, p. 54; para. 97, pp. 59, 60.
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from those coasts, which makes individual 
geographical features on either coast more prone 
to render the geometrical effects of applying 
the equidistance principle inequitable than in 
the case of 'opposite* States. The greater risk 
in these cases that the equidistance method may 
produce an equitable delimitation thus also 
results not from the legal designation of the 
situation as one of 'adjacent' States but from 
its actual geographical character as one involving 
laterally related coasts".
Further evidence of the fact that the decision of
the Court of Arbitration has to be taken to have approved
the principle of equity in the delimitation of marine
boundaries, may be found in another passage of the decision.
In considering the rules to be applied the Court paid
particular attention to the actual circumstances of the
region. It concludes for instance that:
"... the specific features of the Channel Islands 
region call for an intermediate solution that 
effects a more appropriate and more equitable 
balance between the respective claims and interests 
of the Parties.
The Court went on to emphasize that in order to 
maintain equitable solution the situation demanded "two 
fold solution". It decided that the first part of the
T2 51 )boundary between the two States "shall be a median line".
The second part of the boundary, in the opinion of the 
Court must not "be so drawn as to allow the continental 
shelf of the French Republic to encroach upon the
(249) Decision, para. 239, p.112.
(250) Decision, para. 98, p.94.
(251) Decision, para. 201, p.95.
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established 12-mile fishery zone of the Channel Islands".
The Court continued:
"this boundary shall be drawn at a distance of 
12 nautical miles from the established baselines 
of the territorial sea of the Channel Islands."
The effect would be in the words of the Court:
"to accord to the French Republic a substantial
band of continental shelf in mid-Channel which
is continuous with its continental shelf to the
(252 )east and west of the Channel Islands region."
Furthermore, in the course of determining the boundary
line between the parties, the Court affirmed the necessity
of observing the particular situation. It went on to say
"The effect of the presence of the Scilly Isles
west-south-west of Cornwall is to deflect the
equidistance line on a considerably more south­
westerly course than would be the case if it were
to be delimited from the baseline of the English
mainland. The difference in the angle is
16°36*14'; and the extent of the additional area
of shelf accruing to the United Kingdom, and 
correspondingly not accruing to the French 
Republic, in the Atlantic region eastwards of the 
1,000 metre isobath is approximately 4,000 square
miles."(253)
All this evidence shows quite conclusively, it is 
submitted, that equity falls to be considered as the well
established and dominant principle of international law
in delimiting marine boundaries.
The decision of the Court of Arbitration has further 
strengthened the validity of this suggestion in regarding
(252) Decision, Para. 202, pp.95, 96.
(253) Decision, Para. 243, p.114.
equity as a principle of general application not only 
under rules of customary law between non-parties to the 
Convention, but, also under Article 6 between the parties.
4. The concept of equitable principles in the UNCLOS III
Without going into this question in any detail, one 
may simply say that the decision of the ICJ in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases has exerted immense influence 
on the debate concerning the question of the delimitation 
of marine boundaries in the UNCLOS III, and has encouraged 
the trend towards delimitation based more closely on the 
concept of equity. Thus a certain group of States not 
wishing to invest the equidistance rule with any primacy, 
lay stress on the fact that the delimitation of maritime 
areas should be effected by agreement in accordance with
e q u i t y . ( 2 5 4 )
Moreover, a review of the provisions made in the
draft articles produced by the Conference shows the
prevalence of the trend to delimit marine boundaries on the
(255 )basis of equitable principles. Those provisions,
cannot, for reasons of space, be dealt with here. One 
matter, however, ought to be mentioned. It is sufficient 
to refer to Article 74 "E.E.Z." and Article 83 "Continental
Shelf" of the ICNT in this r e g a r d . (256)
(254) For example Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, III UNCLOS, off. 
Rec. VI, 145; Romania, ibid. 156; Turkey, ibid. 158; 
Iraq; ibid. 159; Algeria; ibid. 223.
(255) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1: Part II.
(256) U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. I, pp. 50 and 55 
respectively.
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Conclusion
Having examined the rules for delimitation of marine 
boundaries between States lying opposite or adjacent to 
each other, the conclusion to be drawn is that the question 
under consideration is one of the most complicated 
problems of international law. Positive law offers 
little, if any, assistance on this matter. No established 
conventional rule for drawing boundaries between neigh­
bouring States has yet to be unanimously recognized on the 
international law level. The delimitation of the seaward 
areas is mostly regulated by national laws which differ 
from one country to a n o t h e r . (25?)
Turning to the relevant bilateral agreements pertinent 
to the subject, it may be noted that they were concluded 
by reference to local geographical conditions and they do 
not employ any single technique with any "degree of 
uniformity".(258)
Although the determining of a marine boundary by the 
agreement principle as adduced in the Territorial Sea and 
Continental Shelf Conventions is a reasonable matter, 
nevertheless, this provision is pointless since the parties 
are always able thus to arrange not only their differences 
on the seaward limits but also all their disputes. Had 
this provision contained a guiding criterion in the light 
of which negotiations might have been carried out, then 
the reaching of agreement on an equitable basis would 
have been facilitated.
(257) Padwa, op.cit., Ref, (51) at 210, p.629.
(258) Daintith and Others, op.cit., Ref. (4) at 9, p. 
A329.
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A brief word ought at this point to be said about 
the equidistance rule. Clearly, the equidistance rule 
is not the only rule for determining a maritime boundary. 
Moreover, international law does not involve any imperative 
principle for the purpose of the delimitation of seaward 
boundaries.^^59)
In this regard, in the absence of a conventional 
undertaking, States are not obliged to adopt a specific 
mode of conduct with respect to submarine boundaries unless 
that would lead to equitable delimitation. Apparently, 
international law permits resorting to multifarious means,
a s  m a y  be a p p r o p r i a t e .
The difficulties inherent in the application of the
equidistance rule are of three types. The first appears
to relate to baselines from which seaward extensions are
to be measured. It is well known that this line is
disputable. Perhaps the measurement of a baseline of a
non-party to the territorial sea Convention, is further
seaward than those specified in the Convention. According
to the literal interpretation of Article 6 of the
continental shelf Convention, the non-party State to the
territorial convention consequently acquires more shelf
area than those whose baselines are drawn in accordance
( 2 6 1  )with the conventional rule.^ The second category of
( 2 5 9 )  See Daintith and others, op.cit., Ref. (4 ) at 9 ,  
Vol. 1, P . A 3 2 9 .  The authors are surely correct in 
doubting the possibility of a sole, general and 
automatic method to govern the delimitation of the 
seaward boundaries.
( 2 6 0 )  I b i d . ,  P . A 3 2 9 .
(261) This occurs in both cases where the median line or 
the equidistance line are applied.
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problem concerns islands. The continental shelf
Convention as was explained, is silent in this respect
except to affirm in Article 1 that islands are given full
(262 )rights under the regime of the continental shelf.
Article 6 does not indicate whether this text refers to 
the "mainland" or the "island" baselines. If Articles 1 
and 6 were applied literally it would mean that if State 
"Y" has an island two-thirds of the distance across the 
sea toward State "X", State "Y" would get seven-ninths of 
the shelf between itself and State "X". If another 
island belonging to State "X” is situated close to State 
"Y", does that mean that the shelf should be drawn in a 
zig-zag line? If such an island belongs to a third party 
it would cause great difficulties, if islands were given 
full rights to all the benefits of the continental
shelf.(263)
A more difficult problem exists where the configuration 
of the concerned States' coastlines are irregular, namely, 
where one or both is either concave or convex. This 
hiatus might be contested on the premise that the special 
circumstances principle justifies the exclusion of the 
equidistance rule in this situation. However, while such 
an argument is logically correct, it is submitted that 
this clause covers a wide range of situations. This is 
to say, the Convention offers no clear guideline as to the
(262) The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf does 
not define the term island, while the territorial 
sea Convention does define it in Article 10(1). See 
Daintith and Willoughby, op.cit.. Ref. (421) at 184, 
p.171.
(263) Failure in classifying islands into different groups 
has led to disputes. For more details, see Daintith 
and Willoughby, op.cit.. Ref. (42l) at 184, p.171.
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scope and content of the term, as explained earlier, and 
the way therefore remains open for doubt and ambiguity.
The median line dividing the continental shelf area 
when two States face each other is to some extent 
acceptable, since it would very often lead to equitable 
consequences. Correct as that may be, it is to be 
observed that the equidistance line, to produce acceptable 
results, must be drawn perpendicularly to the common 
coastline. Beyond this however, is the clear fact that 
the analogy drawn between the territorial sea and the 
continental shelf boundaries represents a gross error. As 
to this point, reference has been made to the fact that 
the former is a '’narrow region" whilst the latter is a 
wider area. It would be reasonable to suppose that if 
the lateral boundary of the territorial sea is inequitably 
drawn, it would not greatly affect the interests of the 
concerned States in sea resources. Unlike the delimitation 
of the territorial sea, the effects can be drastic when 
the boundary line is inequitably drawn in the delimitation 
of the continental shelf.(264)
However, the ICJ in the North Sea Cases stressed that 
the equidistance rule was not an imperative rule of inter­
national law and Article 6 of the continental shelf 
convention was only a point of departure for negotiation.
The Court pointed out that the "key word" of any meaningful
negotiation was equity.(2^5) Equity is the way to any
(264) Oda, op.cit., Ref. (1), at 192, p.26.
(265) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 85, pp. 46, 47,
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just and lasting boundary settlement.  ^ This concept
has been confirmed most frequently in the unilateral
proclamations and agreements of States claiming rights
(267 )over their continental shelves. In addition, it has
been provided for in the Truman Proclamation. Therefore,
the only reasonable principle for delimitation of seaward
( 268 ^
boundaries is equity.^ This also seems to have been
the conclusion reached by the Court of Arbitration in the 
Anglo-French Case, although with a slight difference in 
reasoning. Similarly clear support in favour of the 
establishment of the "equitable principles" in delimiting 
marine boundaries between opposite as well as adjacent 
States may be found in the ICNT.
Admittedly, equitable principles are unlike any other 
automatic rule in the sense that they do not render a 
ready method for delimitation. This argument, however, 
does not affect the validity that it propounds a starting 
point for negotiation or grounds for decision by a third 
party.
(266) Daintith and others, op.cit.. Ref. (4) at 9, 
p. A329.
(267) Examples are cited in Padwa, op,cit., Ref. (51), 
at 210, p.30.
(268) Daintith and others, ibid., p. A329.
PART TWO
THE DELIMITATION OF THE IRAQI TERRITORIAL SEA AND
CONTINENTAL SHELF
INTRODUCTORY SECTION
THE ARABIAN GULF*
It is imperative in considering the maritime 
boundaries of any State to convey an overall perspective 
of that State and its surrounding area.^^^ A glance at 
the map of Iraq (figure 2) will reveal that she lies at 
the head of the Arabian Gulf between Iran, to the north­
east, and Kuwait, to the west. Thus, some comments on 
the importance of the Arabian Gulf area seem pertinent.
It is firmly believed that the Arabian Gulf area has
always been of considerable strategic, political and
(2 ) \economic importance. This importance has increased
momentously in recent decades by virtue of the ever
increasing significance of oil in the regional and
(3 )international contexts.^
However, prior to the discovery of oil, the Arabian
Gulf States used to depend on the pearl trade, fishing
and s h i p b u i l d i n g . T h e  discovery of oil has been
* See below pp.299-310 concerning the controversy on 
whether the gulf is Arabian or Persian.
(1) See in this sense Young, op.cit.. Ref. (128) at 233, 
p.505; Brown, op.cit.. Ref, (99) at 44, p.182.
(2) Marlowe, John, "Arab-Persian Rivalry in the Persian 
Gulf", J.R.C.A.S., Vol. 51, 1964, p.25; Tahtinen, Dale 
R ., "Arms in the Persian Gulf", 1974, p.l; Glubb, Sir 
John Bagot, "Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty 
Years, 1908 to 1958", 1959, p.19.
(3) Singh, K.R., "The Security of the Persian Gulf",
Ira rev int relat, 1977, p.5.
(4) Hay, Sir Rupert, "The Persian Gulf States and Their 
Boundary Problems", Geoj, Vol. 120, 1954, pp.433-436.
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regarded as the turning point in the history of the
region, giving way to improvements in all aspects of life
there. The oil-fields in the area are now considered to
be the world's richest, and the Arabian Gulf States enjoy
(5 )a revenue from this source.
No doubt, many forces lie behind the claims to 
marine boundaries. Factors both geographical, historical 
and economic have an important bearing on the problems 
which confront the marine boundary-makers, and these 
factors must be considered as a background to our discussion 
of the marine boundaries of Iraq, In this section an 
attempt will be made to review some of the above 
considerations involved in the Arabian Gulf region and 
also discuss these elements in the light of the various 
interests and legal principles concerned.
It is the object of this section to deal with this 
under the following headings:
I, The Geographical Setting of the Arabian Gulf.
XI. The Historical Perspective of the Arabian Gulf.
III. The Economic Position of the Arabian Gulf.
I . The Geographical Setting of the Arabian Gulf
The Arabian Gulf (figure 3) has been defined 
geographically as "That arm of the Indian Ocean lying 
between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran".^^^ It consists
(а) of the Arabian Gulf proper, stretching from the mouth 
of the Shatt al-Arab River in the north-west, to the Strait
(5) Hay, op.cit., Ref. (4), at 288, p.435.
(б) Young, R , , "The Persian Gulf','inNew Directions in the 
Law of the Sea", Vol. Ill, 1973, p.231.
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of Hormuz in the south-east and (b) from the Gulf of Oman
stretching south-east from the Strait of Hormuz to Has
(7)al-Hada at the eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.
These two gulfs in fact, separate the Iranian side from 
the A r a b i a n F r o m  its entrance at the Strait of 
Hormuz to its head at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab River 
the distance is some 430 miles. Then the distance from 
the Strait of Hormuz to the Ocean is some 300 miles. The 
breadth of the gulf varies from 210 miles at its widest 
to 35 miles at the Strait of Hormuz. It covers an area 
of some 92,500 square miles (240,000 square kilometres).
Its total coastline is approximately 615 miles long and 
the volume of its waters, about 2000 cubic miles or 8500 
cubic kms.
On its eastern shore, the Arabian Gulf is bordered 
by the great plateau of Iran, projecting upwards 
precipitously to a mean altitude of 5,000 feet above sea- 
level. Ascending to a lesser height and more gradually, 
from a wide and mostly desert coastal plain, the Arabian 
table-land borders the western side of the Arabian Gulf^^^^ 
It is remarkable that for the most part and particul­
arly along the Arabian side, the waters of the Arabian
(7) The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia,
William Benton Publisher, Vol. 14, 1974, p.106.
(8) See Al-Feel, Dr, M.R., ’’The Strategic Importance of 
the Arabian Gulf”, n.d., p.25.
(9) It is considerably larger than the Gulf of St.
Lawrence, two thirds the size of the Baltic approx.
See Young, op.cit., Ref. (6), at 290, p.231.
(10) The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ibid., p.106.
(11) Marlowe, John, ’’The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth 
Century”, 1962, p.l.
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Gulf proper are extremely shallow and full of coral shoals.
Only in a few places does its depth exceed 100 metres and
( 12 )the average is no more than 40 metres. The line of
greatest depth runs much nearer to the Iranian coast than 
to the Arabian. Only in the Gulf of Oman, beyond the 
Strait of Hormuz, does the seafloor descend swiftly to a
( IQ )
maximum depth of approximately 1,800 fathoms.^
The coasts of the Arabian Gulf are wholly forbidding; 
the Persian Coast is backed by many parallel ranges of 
barren mountains; the Musandam Peninsula and Ras al-Jibal 
promontory are composed of precipitous barren mountains; 
the Arabian Coast from Ras al-Sham to Ras al-Ardh is 
desert, with reefs, shoals and islets; and the head of 
the gulf is formed by deltas, mud flats, and marshes.
The rivers which enter the gulf are the Euphrates, 
Tigris and Karun.^^^^ The Tigris and the Euphrates which 
now converge into the single stream of the Shatt al-Arab, 
some 150 miles from the sea, discharge into the headwaters 
of the Arabian Gulf. Some 1.22 million cubic yards of 
silt annually are carried past Falluja by the Euphrates. 
The volume of silt carried by the Tigris measured at 
Baghdad is 2.2 cubic yards and the Karun brings down about
1.5 million cubic yards.
Isolated reefs, banks and shoals are widespread near 
the shoreline particularly on the Arabian side. A
(12) Young, op.cit., Ref. (6 ), at 290, p.231.
(13) Marlowe, John, op.cit., Ref. (11) at 292, p.2.
(14) Great Britain Admiralty, "Iraq and the Persian Gulf", 
Geo. Hand B. Ser., September 1944, pp.123-133.
(15) Wilson, Sir Arnold, "The Persian Gulf", 1954, p.4.
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notable feature of the western coast of the Arabian Gulf 
is the parallel series of sandy buffer-type formations,
several kilometres in length. These form littoral lakes
t :
(17)
between themselves and the s h o r e s . T h e  north end of
the Arabian Gulf is marked by marshes.
The river ports of Basra, Abadan, Khorramshahar
(Mohammerah) and Bandar Shahpur, at the head of the gulf,
are the major ports. Other ports, which are all quite
inadequate and exposed, are Bushire, Lingen and Bandar
Abbas on the Persian side, and Kuwait, Manama, Dubai and
( 18 )Sharja on the Arabian side.^
The Arabian Gulf has been considered a semi-closed sea
( 19 )and its sole outlet to the sea is the Strait of Hormuz.^
The Iranian coast including the close, inshore Iranian 
islands of Qishm, Henjam, Larak and Hormuz border the 
northern side of the Strait of Hormuz. The southern side 
is formed by the great promontory of Oman, terminating in 
the Musandam Peninsula which is under the sovereignty of 
the Sultanate of Oman. Three small islets known as 
Salamah Wabanatahen or the Quoins lie in the Strait,within 
nine miles of the Musandam Peninsula, which is the most 
constricted part of the Strait of Hormuz. The width
(16) Motwally, Dr. M. "The Arabian Gulf Basin", 1970,
Vol. 1, p.44; Al-Feel, op.cit., Ref. (8), at 292,p.iQ
(17) Motwally, ibid., pp.38-39.
(18) Great Britain Admiralty, op.cit., Ref. (14) at 293 , 
p. 127; Berbuy, J.J, "The Arabian Gulf" translated to 
Arabic by Najdat Hajir and Saaid Al-Kis, 1959, p.53.
(19) New Encyclopaedia Britannica, op.cit.. Ref. (7 ) ,• 
at 292, p.106; Nofel, Dr. Sayyed, "The Arabian Gulf 
or the Eastern Boundaries of the Arabian World",
1969, pp.17-18.
between Larak island to the north and Great Quoin (8,5
miles north of Musandam Peninsula) is 20,7 5 miles. In
this area about 16,5 miles of the Strait’s length is 26
miles or less in width.
It is to be observed that on either side of the
Arabian Gulf, a great number of inlets penetrate the land
mass for several kilometres. These creeks have affected
the history of the Arabian Gulf in that, at their heads,
(21)early civilizations were established.^  ^ Furthermore,
the shoals of the Arabian Gulf contribute to the existence
of civilizations in the area, as they formed natural
(22 )shelters from attacks by Nomads.^
Attention must now be turned to the Arabian Gulf’s
position. It is worth observing that the Arabian Gulf
has an advantage over other inland seas throughout the
world, as it has a central position on one of the main
routes between east and west, lapping the shores of the
(23 )territories of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Iran.^
One might just as well suggest that the Arabian Gulf has 
acted as an important bridge over the centuries, both 
commercially and s t r a t e g i c a l l y . T r a d e  activities in 
the Arabian Gulf are of vital concern. It is important 
to note that history on this matter records continuous
(20) Young, op.cit.. Ref. (6), at 290, p.231.
(21) Al-Feel, op.cit.. Ref. (8), at 292, p.45.
(22) Areas which have been established by reason of this 
natural shelter are Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Aumal-Kayon 
and Ras al-Kayma. The multifarious recent political 
units in the area have grown around these cores. See 
Motwally, op.cit.. Ref, (16), at 294, pp.35-36.
(23) Wilson, op.cit.. Ref. (15), at 293, p.2.
(24) Al-tikrity, S.T., "The Competition Over The Arabian 
Gulf", 1966, p.10.
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competition between the gulf and the rival route of the 
( 25 ^Red Sea,^  ^ the other arm of the Indian Ocean, which was 
almost as important as the Arabian Gulf as a trading route. 
It would be fair to say that the Arabian Gulf has held the 
advantage over the Red Sea, in that it has preserved its 
superiority from the earliest times, proved by the fact 
that its trade volume with India was triple that of the 
Red 8ea.(^^)
Coupled with what has been said, the introduction of 
air travel has further enhanced the importance of the 
Arabian Gulf's position. However, it is now one of the 
great channels of international communication. One 
cannot dispute the fact that almost all airlines from 
western Europe and the U.S. to south east Asia, the far 
east and Australia pass over the Arabian Gulf landing at 
Basrah, Bahrain and Dhahran, As a matter of reasonable 
inference this strategic position makes the gulf a 
significant link between east and west,^^^^
II. Historical Perspective
The Arabian Gulf, like any other marine highway, has 
always been of great importance to international trade. 
Although similar in character to others the Arabian Gulf
(25) Wilson, op.cit., Ref. (15), at 293, pp.18 et seq.
(26) Motwally, op.cit.. Ref. (16), at 294, p.26; "The 
Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal", The 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
Series No. 8, Feb. 1969, p.3.
(27) Wright, Sir Denis, "The Changing Balance of Powers 
in the Persian Gulf, A Paper of an International 
Seminar at the Centre for Mediterranean Studies",
Rome, June 26th to July 1st 1972, p.24.
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differs markedly in at least two respects. Firstly, its
geographical location, as was mentioned earlier makes it
one of the most important strategic transit areas in the
( 28 )world for air, land, and maritime traffic. Secondly,
it possesses the largest proven reserves of oil in the 
world. Clearly, it has thus been the playground for 
numerous rival powers over the centuries.
There is some evidence since Achaemenian times of 
trade through the Arabian Gulf between Mesopotamia and
southern Arabia, the Horn of Africa and India by the
as a
(30)
Assyrians and Babylonians. It w lso used as a
channel for trade by the Phoenicians.
However, the Arabian Gulf was to become the principle
channel of communication between the markets of the east
and west in the eighth century A.D. The rise of Islam,
the Arab conquest of Mesopotamia and Persia, and the
establishment of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad all
contributed to the increasingly important role of the
(31 )Arabian Gulf in trade. The eastern goods which
became increasingly in demand in the markets of Europe 
were spices, precious stones, perfumes and silks. These
eastern goods were exchanged for cloth and metals.
From the twelfth century, western Europe was cut off
from Asia for several hundred years. First of all this
(28) See above pp. 295-296.
(29) Motwally, op.cit., Ref. (16) at 294, pp.1,2.
(30) Wilson, op.cit.. Ref. (15) at 293, pp.8-17.
(31) De Gaury, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald, "Between the 
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf", J.R.C.A.S,,
Vol. 39, 1952, pp.259-268; Marlowe, op.cit.. Ref.
(11), at 292, pp. 2,3.
was caused by the fall of the Roman Empire in the west,
and then later the rise of Islam in the east. During
this period the area was mostly dominated by Arabs.
Once more, by means of the Crusades, western Europe
turned to the shores of the Levant and thereby revived
the previous trading relationships with the east's "Fertile
Crescent" via the Arabian Gulf.
The history of the Arabian Gulf then enters into a
new phase when the Cape route was discovered by Vasco da
Gama in 1498. Among the European peoples, the Portuguese
were the first to use its waters.
It was at the beginning of the sixteenth century,
that the Portuguese, profiting by the recent discovery of
the Cape of Good Hope route, appeared in the Arabian Gulf
and under the famous Albuquerque expedition, and laid the
(33 )foundations for their shortlived but showy empire.
Having maintained political and commercial supremacy for 
about a century the Portuguese were finally driven out of 
the region in 1 6 2 2 . Following the expulsion of the 
Portuguese, a commercial rivalry began between the British 
and Dutch. In 1763 the East India Company had been 
formed. Its residency in the region was at Bushire. 
Although of an entirely commercial nature at first, 
circumstances forced the company to assume a political 
character. The Dutch also, had succeeded in becoming 
for a time, the predominant power influencing the area.
(32) Marlowe, op.cit.. Ref, (11), at 292, p.3.
(33) Wilson, op.cit.. Ref. (15), at 293, p.11.
(34) Ibid.
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However, by the middle of the eighteenth century, 1766,
they gradually fade out of the picture, and the field was
left open to the British to establish political dominance
C3 5 )in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
To a certain extent, it can be seen that the opening 
of the Suez Canal diminished the importance of the 
Arabian Gulf as a marine route by economising the outlays 
of loading and unloading through the Iraqi and Syrian 
territories to the Red Sea, This being so, then it can 
safely be said that during the twentieth century, the 
advent of oil completely restored the importance of the 
Arabian Gulf.^^^^
The Controversy Over the Gulf *s Identity: Arabian or
Persian
Before ending this section, one final point deserves
special attention. It is sometimes argued whether the
(37 ^gulf is Arabian or Persian,^ Although it is not
intended in this work to dwell on the Gulf's Arabian 
character or to examine each aspect pertinent to the 
subject, a brief discussion of this question does seem 
necessary.
It is self-explanatory that any name given to a 
certain area or marine zone is not necessarily sufficient 
in itself to affect its natural and legal status. For
(35) Ibid.
(36) See below pp .310 et seq ,;De Gaury, op. cit.. Ref. (31), 
at 297, pp.259-268.
(37) See for instance, Paul, H.G. Balfour, "Recent 
Developments in the Persian Gulf", J.R.C.A.S. Vol. 
56, 1969, p.12; New Encylcopaedia Britannica, op. 
cit., Ref. (7), at 292, Vol.7, p.890.
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example, although its waters are obviously not red, the 
Red Sea has been called thus for centuries. It appears 
rather that a name must rely for its validity only upon 
factors of actual position and history. Consequently, 
the Tanzanian Republic is now so called in accordance with 
its current, actual position, notwithstanding the fact 
that it is composed of what were formerly two independent 
States, namely Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
Before proceeding further, it may be asked, what is 
the reason for and the origin of the naming of the "Persian 
Gulf". If one goes carefully through what has been 
written on the history of the gulf, it will appear that 
the word Persian was wrongly passed on by the Greeks. The 
story in short is that a marine mission under the command 
of Nearchus, had been sent in 326-325 B.C., by Alexander 
the Great to the Indian Ocean on a geographical expedition. 
Nearchus crossed the Arabian Gulf to Suzah which lies on 
the Iranian side and there Alexander was waiting for his 
expedition. During the voyage, Nearchus followed the 
eastern side of the Arabian Gulf, The western side thus, 
remained unknown to him. After asking Nearchus which way 
he had sailed, accordingly Alexander then named the 
Arabian Gulf "Persian".
Greek geographers and historians are therefore 
considered the first to record this name and to mention it 
in the Ptolemaic Atlas. This Atlas was then translated 
into the Arabic language by the Syriacs. It seems to 
follow that this particular version was then regarded to
(38) Sykes, Sir Percy, "A History of Persia", 1915, Vol.l,
pp,43-52.
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be the principle, geographic reference for both the 
Arabian and Islamic Worlds,
Correct as it may be that any name given would not 
affect either the legal status of the Arabian Gulf, or the 
rights of the adjacent States, or indeed again the legal 
status of its w a t e r s , i t  would seem reasonable to 
suggest, for reasons to be mentioned later to refer to the 
gulf as "Arabian".
A look at the geographical position of the Arabian 
Gulf, shows that seven of the littoral States within the 
gulf are A r a b i c . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  from a historical 
viewpoint it can be seen that it is the interaction 
between Arab and Arab that has not only dominated the use 
of the Arabian Gulf, but has also duly controlled both 
sides of the gulf and navigation on it.^^^^ In contrast, 
the Persians have been cut off from the Gulf's eastern 
shores by the chain of towering mountains parallel to 
these s h o r e s . T h i s  range has undoubtedly had the 
effect of creating geological formations which divide the 
two areas. In addition it is considered that it acts as
(39) Jawad, Dr. M., "It Will Remain Arabian Gulf Whether 
Ignorants Desire or Not", Al-Aklam J., Vol. II, 1970, 
p.78.
(40) See above p. 299.
(41) They are counter-clockwise from the Strait of Hormuz, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, The 
Union of Arab Emirates (the seven former Trucial 
States); and Oman. See Young, op.cit.. Ref. (6), at 
290, p.231.
(42) Al-Mitoori, S.A., "Navigation in Shatt-al-Arab: The 
Treaty of Al-Giers (1975) in Historical Perspective", 
Thesis submitted to USIT for L.L.M. Degree, 1977,
p.30.
(43) Al-Hiti, Dr. S.F., "The Arabian Gulf: A Study in 
Political Geography", Thesis submitted to the Univer­
sity of Baghdad in 1976 for the Degree of Ph.D. in 
Geography, 1976, p.5.
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a border area both in an ethnological and cultural sense 
as well as a geographical and psychological separation.
This situation has been pointed out by numerous historians 
as confirmation of the isolation of the Persians from the 
sea.
The Rev. Charles Forster, for instance, in his book
"The Historical Geography of Arabia", reaches the
conclusion that Arabs
"under various disguises and corruptions of 
their proper name, have, in all ages, composed 
its chief inhabitants.
Exactly the same view was taken by the Danish
explorer, Niebuhr, who visited the Arabian Gulf in 1765.
Mr. Niebuhr reached the same conclusion in his book
"Travels Through Arabia and Other Countries in the East",
edited in 1772. He laid stress on that fact when he
stated that it had been erroneous to name the Arabian Gulf
"Persian" since the Arabs occupied both its shores eastern
and western. He wrote in full:^^^)
"But I cannot pass, in equal silence, over the 
more considerable colonies, which, although they 
are also settled without the limits of Arabia, 
are, however, nearer to it. I mean the Arabs 
upon the southern coast of Persia, who are 
commonly in alliance with, and sometimes subject 
to the neighbouring Schiechs, A variety of 
circumstances concur to indicate, that these 
tribes were settled along the Persian Gulf, before
(44) Forster, Charles, "The Historical Geography of Arabia; 
or, the Patriarchal Evidences of Revealed Religion" 
1844, Vol. 2, pp.208-212.
(45) Niebuhr, Karsten, "Travels Through Arabia and Other 
Countries in the East", Translated into English by 
R. Heron, 1792, Vol. II, p.8.
dUd
the conquests of the Caliphs, and have ever 
preserved their independence. It is ridiculous 
in our geographers, to represent a part of 
Arabia as subject to the Kings of Persia; when, 
so far from this, the Persian Monarchs have never 
been masters of the sea-coast of their own dominions, 
but have patiently suffered it to remain in the 
possession of the Arabians."
Yet another historian, Roderic Owen, an Englishman,
found it strange to call the Arabian Gulf "Persian".
Having visited the Arabian Gulf Region, Mr. Owen wrote:
"No English map shows the Arabian Gulf ; a matter 
of some concern for those who live there. A 
traveller has to proceed as though bound for the 
Persian Gulf - will probably think that is where 
he is, when he reaches Kuwait or Bahrain; only 
to be told that that is where he is is not the 
Persian Gulf? These dry expanses of brown sand, 
those blue expanses of shallow water - and every 
thing above and especially everything below - are, 
have been, will be, integral parts of the Arabian 
Gulf.
This was one of the many things I did not know 
before going there. It was the first Arab state­
ment of opinion I heard and it was repeated at 
intervals over a year of wandering until now it is 
an effort to think of such a place as a Persian 
Gulf, Since this is an account of a journey where 
after the initial effort I regularly took the line 
of least resistance, where I purposely deprived 
myself of a purpose, willed myself to have no will 
and heaped the result on to the lap of Allah, 
shall refer to this burning, humid gulf of the world 
as "Persian" before my arrival and as "Arabian" 
after, for that is only polite.
(46) Owen, R. "The Golden Bubble - Arabian Gulf Documentary", 
1957, p.13.
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The conclusion which we arrive at above as to the 
correct name of the Arabian Gulf is amply confirmed by 
certain other evidence which follows. Striking evidence 
of the Gulf's Arabian character may be found in the fact 
that it has been known in older times as the "Erythrian 
Sea", that is the "Red Sea". It was also called by 
Strabo (64-19 B.C.) the "Red Sea" and sometimes the 
"Arabian Gulf".^^^^ According to proven evidence from 
Acadian engravings, the "Lower Water"(^^^ was the commonly 
used name, by the people who lived near its shores, 
especially those who lived in Iraq.^^^^ Numerous other 
names were attributed to the gulf. It was once called 
the Gulf of Basrah by Ottomanis, who occupied part of the 
region. The Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Bahrain and Gulf of 
Kaateef were all names well known to the A r a b s . N o t  a 
single title among these was Persian, indeed to the 
contrary, they were all Arabic names, which seems to 
provide unequivocal evidence that the Arabs have controlled 
the Gulf since early times. In this regard, European 
historians again have stressed this fact. Sir Arnold 
Wilson, for instance, asserted that the actual authority 
over the Eastern shores since the times of Sabor II (4th 
Century A.D.) had been in the hands of the Arabs. This
(47) Jamil, Dr. Fouad, "The Arabian Gulf in the Records
of Early Historians", Sumar Journal, Vol. 22, Part 1, 
1960, pp.40-42.
(48) Wilson, op.cit., Ref. (15), at 293, p.26.
(49) Similarly the "Mediterranean" was called "Higher Sea" 
because it was situated to their north. See Al- 
Mitoori, op.cit., Ref. (42) at 301, p.30.
(50) Jamil, ibid., pp.40-42; Al-Mitoori, ibid., p.31.
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control continued until the establishment of the Islamic
State, and even then the Persians still had never been the
masters of the Eastern side of the Gulf. Sir Arnold
Wilson mentioned that;-
"Certain it is, however that on the rise of the
Persian Empire, all references to those people
'Babylonians' as participators in the maritime
trade of the gulf disappear and the Arabian
navigators come into prominence. It may even
be that the actual navigation of its waters was
throughout in the hands of the latter, and that
both Phoenicians and Babylonians were no more
than the middle men who received the commodities
C 51)carried by the Arabians."
To the foregoing, it may be added that whilst the
Persians not only knew little of navigation in the Arabian
Gulf but were also cut off from its shores, the Arabs on
the other hand were good sailors and keen traders. Sir
Arnold Wilson confirms the theory of Dr. Theodore Bent in
this respect. It is worth quoting in full the statement
of Sir Arnold Wilson which shows who the skilled
navigators over the Arabian Gulf really were
"We must not omit to inquire who were the skilled
navigators responsible for what must have
constituted, long before our era, a considerable
and increasing volume of trade. The theory
advanced by D r . Theodore Bent was that they were
P h o e n i c i a n s , a n d  that this race was responsible
for the construction, over a very long period of
( 53 )years of the vast number of sepulchral t o m b s . ^
(51) Wilson, op.cit.. Ref. (15), at 293, p.34.
(52) The Phoenicians were Semites; see Wilson, op.cit., 
Ref. (15), at 293, p.29.
(53) Wilson, ibid., p.29.
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The same view has been taken by other historians.
Mr. Miles pointed out that the Arabs
"were the great mediaries and carriers of Indian 
goods to the west, successfully monopolising it 
and excluding all others from the Indian Sea, 
navigating their vessels between India and the 
Euphrates and enjoying a most lucrative trade,
More important is that the Arabian Gulf's identity has
been alluded to in the writings of European historians.
Having described the city of Karak,^^^^ Pliny, the Roman
historian (62-113 A.D.) mentioned:
"Charax is a city situated at the furthest 
extremity of the Arabian Gulf, at which begins 
the more prominent portion of Arabia Felix 
'Eudaemon': it is built on an artificial
elevation having the Tigris on the right, and 
the Eulaeus on the left, and lies on a piece of 
ground three miles in extent, just between the 
confluence of those streams.
The Danish explorer, Karsten Neibuhr, in his
description of the inhabitants of the Arabian Gulf corrected
the error of using the so called "Persian Gulf" term. He
wrote :
"Our geographers are wrong, as I have elsewhere 
remarked, in representing a part of Arabia as 
subject to the Monarchs of Persia. So far is it 
from being so, that, on the contrary, the Arabs 
possess all the sea-coast of the Persian Empire,
(54) Miles, S.B., "The Countries and Tribes of the Persian 
Gulf", 1960, p.3.
(55) Historians take upon themselves that the City of 
Karak is Mohamurah. See Al-Mittory, op.cit., Ref.
(42) at 301, p.31.
(56) Wilson, op.cit., Ref. (15), at 293, p.49; see also 
Al-Mitoori, op.cit.. Ref. (42), at 301, p.31,
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from the mouths of the Euphrates, nearly to those 
of the Indus,
These settlements upon the coast of Persia belong 
not, indeed, to Arabia properly so called. But, 
since they are independent of Persia, and use the 
same language, and exhibit the same manners, as the 
native inhabitants of Arabia, I shall here subjoin 
a brief account of them.
It is impossible to ascertain the period at which 
the Arabians formed their settlements upon this 
coast. Tradition affirms, that they have been 
established here for many centuries. From a 
variety of hints in ancient history, it may be 
presumed, that these Arabian colonies occupied 
their present situation in the time of the first 
Kings of Persia. There is a striking analogy 
between the manners ascribed to the ancient 
Ichthyophagi, and those of these Arabs.
They live all nearly in the same manner, leading a . 
seafaring life, and employing themselves in fishing, 
and in gathering pearls........
Their dwellings are so paltry, that an enemy would 
not take the pains to demolish them. And as, from 
this circumstance, these people have nothing to 
lose upon the continent, they always betake them­
selves to their boats at the approach of an enemy, 
and lie concealed in some isle in the Gulph (Gulf) 
till he has retreated. They are convinced that the 
Persians will never think of settling on a barren 
shore, where they would be infested by all the Arabs 
who frequent the adjacent seas.
..... One cause of the failure of Nadir-Shah's
attempt to subdue these Arabs. In the prosecution 
of this object, the usurper had, at immense expense, 
equipped a fleet of twenty-five large ships, upon 
the Persian Gulf. But as he had no Persian sailors,
he was obliged to take Indians These refusing
to fight against their brethren ....  Towards the
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end of his life, Nadir-Shah was meditating to seize 
these Arabs, to transport them to the shores of the 
Caspian Sea, and to settle a colony of Persians in 
their room. His tragical death prevented the 
execution of this project; and the disturbances in 
Persia have ever since prevented all encroachments
57 )from that quarter upon the liberty of these Arabs."
The historian Mr. Miles appears to agree with this 
conclusion. He confirmed that the first original 
inhabitants of the Arabian Gulf region known to the 
genealogists were the Arabs,
Beyond this is the clear fact that the "Arabian Gulf" 
was agreed upon by another European historian. This name 
had long been used by the Rev. Forster. So much so that 
he explicitly titled Section II part II of his book "The 
Historical Geography of Arabia" 'Coast of the Arabian 
G u l f  .(5^)
Although his book was published under the title 
"Persian Gulf", the French historian Jan Jack Berbuy 
maintained that the Arabian Gulf had been properly named.
He justified using this title for his book on the basis 
of current usage.
Conclusion
The result of the foregoing discussion shows that, 
there are weighty considerations to support the Gulf's 
Arabian character. The Arabs have been the seafarers of
(57) Niebuhr, op.cit.. Ref. (45), at 302, pp.137-140.
(58) Miles, op.cit., Ref. (54), at 306, pp.1-3.
(59) Forster, op.cit., Ref. (44), at 302, p.116.
(60) See Al-Mitoori, op.cit., Ref. (42), at 301, pp.
34, 35.
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almost the entire Arabian Gulf. On both sides the gulf 
was peopled almost exclusively by Arabs. Everywhere 
around the Arabian Gulf, north, west and south has been 
dominated by the Arabs, Even the people living in the 
littoral area to the east of the Arabian Gulf, which now 
belongs politically to Iran, in spite of the recent 
immigration of some thousands of P e r s i a n s , h a v e  been 
and still are all but entirely Arab,^^^^ The Arabs were, 
moreover, skilled navigators and traders, having a know­
ledge of seamanship while navigation on the Arabian Gulf 
was beyond the expertise of Persians who learnt no more 
than a little seafaring. An examination of the history 
of the Arabian Gulf shows that Arabs have repelled all 
invasions into the Arabian Gulf and have controlled the 
area.(^^) As they acquired their livelihood from the 
sea, a spirit of affinity developed between them and the 
area and thus all foreigners seeking a foothold in the 
region, whether Portuguese, Dutch, French, Russian, German, 
Turkish or English were driven away by the Arabs.
In the light of this evidence it seems most surprising
(61) See Al-Katteeb, Dr. M.S. "The Legal Status of the 
Territorial Sea", 1975, p.573.
(62) Ibid.; Arabs have inhabited both sides of the Arabian 
Gulf, Even the people living on the Eastern side of 
the Gulf (Arabistan Province), which was annexed to 
the Persian Territory after the war which Persia waged 
over Kaab State in 1925, belongs to the Arab tribes 
which migrated from the Arabian Peninsula after it 
dried out. The main tribes in Arabistan are: Kaab,
Beni Turuf, Bawia, Benilam, Arafijah, Kethir, Muhaisin, 
Beni Temim, Zargan, and Akrash. See Hakky, Dr. A.M.I,, 
"The Legal Status of the Province of Arabistan", 1974, 
pp. 36-56, 74-79.
(63) See for instance, Miles, op.cit.. Ref. (54), at 306,
p.200.
(64) See Al-Mitoori, op.cit.. Ref. (42), at 301, p.36,
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that some have sought to arrogate the status of "Persian" 
for the Arabian Gulf.
Ill, The Economic Position of the Arabian Gulf Region
The Arabian Gulf Sector, standing at the meeting point 
of the three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe, has 
for many centuries, played an important role in worldwide 
economic trade as well as in the political and military 
relationships of its littoral states. Quite apart from 
the changes introduced into the economy of the region, by 
the advent of oil, the traditional forms of livelihood 
centred around the principle activities of agriculture, 
trading, seafaring, pearling and fishing.
Due to several factors, such as the geological 
formation of the seabed, the temperature of its waters and 
their shallowness, the Arabian Gulf is a favourable 
environment for the growth of the pearl o y s t e r . P e a r l  
fishing was the premier industry until the beginning of 
the present century.
Fishing provides a livelihood for many. In the 
shallow waters are huge V-shaped traps in which the fish 
are stranded and then collected at low tide. Large cage­
like traps which are sunk in deeper water are also used
(65) Long, David E ., "The Persian Gulf: An Introduction
to its Peoples, Politics, and Economics", 1976, p.103.
(66) El-Hakim, Ali Abed El-Muti, "Practice and Policies 
of Certain Middle Eastern States Towards Aspects of 
the Law of the Sea", A Dissertation submitted for the 
Degree of Ph.D., University of Cambridge, 1977, p.62; 
Long, ibid.
(67) El-Hakim, ibid., pp.62-64,
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as umbrella nets,^®^^
However, although all of these pursuits are still 
present, the coming of oil has impaired these means of 
livelihood and seriously crippled them elsewhere in the 
area.(^^) Those who used to dive now mostly prefer 
steady employment with the oil companies to the hardships 
and risks of their old profession and not more than a few 
hundred boats go out every year. Fishing also remains 
mostly a small scale enterprise confined to local 
markets.
To turn now to the subject of oil, notwithstanding
that it had been discovered in Iran and Iraq by the
f 71)beginning of the present century.^ Owing to the
Second World War, exploration, production and export were
delayed and were not resumed until the end of the war.
Once the war was over companies intensified their operations
searching and exploring for oil in the Arabian Gulf region
and now it has become the centre of world oil production
f 72 )replacing the Carribean Sea.^
The whole of the Western World, and more particularly 
its two most dynamic segments Western Europe and Japan, is 
greatly dependent for its essential oil supplies on a number
(68) Hay, Sir Rupert, "The Persian Gulf States", 1959, 
pp. 51-59.
(69) Long, op.cit.. Ref. (65), at 310, p.104.
(70) Lenczowski, George, "Oil and State in the Middle 
East", 1960, pp.37-53.
(71) Marlowe, op.cit.. Ref. (11), at 292, pp.79-97.
(72) Motwally, op.cit., Ref. (16), at 294, Vol. 2, pp. 
461-488; Al-Hiti, op.cit.. Ref, (43), at 301, pp. 
223-238.
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(73 )
of the Middle Eastern States.
In an attempt to ascertain fully the economic picture 
of the region, it is now our concern firstly to deal 
briefly with the proven reserves of oil in the area, 
secondly its percentage of production and finally the 
amount of its exported oil.
a . The Proven Reserves of Oil in the Region
Concerning the matter of proven reserves, the region 
holds a dominating position. The region's reserves have 
risen rapidly, both in absolute terms and as a percentage 
of the world total.
In 1950 the Arabian Gulf reserves were under 42 per 
cent of the world total. By 1975 this figure had risen 
to 49.2 per cent. At the beginning of 1976, world proven 
reserves of petroleum were estimated at 658,686 million 
barrels. Of these, 359,662 million barrels or 54.6 per 
cent were in the Arabian Gulf r e g i o n . T a b l e  1 shows 
the ratio of the reserves of petroleum in the Arabian 
Gulf region compared with that of the world. It reflects 
the fact that the region's reserves of oil are more than 
half of the world total.
Furthermore, experts forecast that the Arabian Gulf
(73) Two important points deserve particular attention; 
firstly, nearly 90 per cent of the Middle Eastern 
regional subtotal are located in the Arabian Gulf 
Area; second; 86 per cent of the Arabian Gulf sub­
total is in Arab lands. See Issawi, Charles, "Oil, 
the Middle East and the World", The Washington 
Papers, 4, pp.1-24.
(74) Source, The Annual Statistical Reports, The Second 
and Third Reports, OPEC, 1973-1974, 197 5. As regards 
Information about Iran's Reserves are obtained from 
the Ministry of Iraqi Oil and Minerals.
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Table No, 1 
Estimated Oil Reserves "million barrels
„C75)
Country 1975 1976
UAE 32,920 32,200
Bahrain 00,336 00,312
Saudi Arabia 141,040 151,800
Iraq 35,000 34,300
Qatar 6,000 5,850
Kuwait 72,800 71,200
Iran 64,000 64,000
Total 352,096 359,662
Total World 715,697 658,686
Percentage of the 
Arabian Gulf to total world 49.2 54.6
oil will continue to flow for a period of 23-43 years 
after 1976 even although production will increase in 
annual output. Table 2 shows the expected year of the 
exhaustion of the Arabian Gulf oil reserves if it is 
exploited at the contemplated production averages. If 
production continued at its present rate the reserves of 
petroleum would last for about 30-65 years in all the 
Arabian Gulf States apart from Bahrain, whose reserves 
are predicted to run out after 18 years. The above 
figures when compared with the average age of wells in
(75) Ibid.
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Table No. 2 (76)
Country Production Averages in 1980 (million Tonnes)
Year of 
exhaustion
Saudi Arabia 1000 1997
Kuwait 200 2019
Iraq 250 1990
U.A.E. 200 1990
Qatar 100 2014
other producing countries, (77) illustrate that the
Arabian Gulf Area is in possession of relatively huge 
reserves of oil.^^^^ All this no doubt reflects the ever 
increasing importance of the area.
b . Production of Oil in the Arabian Gulf Region
Among the world's established oil regi ns, the Arabian 
Gulf sector still shows the highest percentage annual 
increase in production. The total output from the Arabian 
Gulf fields for the years 1974, 1975 and 1976 are shown 
in Table 3.
Moreover, local consumption of petroleum products is 
relatively low. In the Arabian Gulf region not more 
than 5 per cent of the oil produced is consumed locally 
(see table 4).
Apart from the outstanding and attractive features of
(76) Source, Al-Hiti, op.cit.. Ref, (43), at 301, p.247.
(77) The average age of oil fields is some 15-25 years.
See Al-Hiti, ibid., p.247.
(78) Ibid., p.247.
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Table No. 3(80)
Daily Output 
1 unit equals 1000 barrels
Country 1974 1975 1976
U.A.E. 1700 1700 1900
Bahrain 670 670 610
Saudi Arabia 8500 7100 8600
Iraq 2000 2300 2300
Qatar 500 400 500
Kuwait 2500 2100 2200
Iran 6000 5400 5900
Total offtake of
the region 21 870 19 610 22 010
Total offtake of
the world 57 970 54 042 56 032
Percentage of the
region's production % 37,73 % 36.29 % 39.28
Table No, 4^^^^
The Percentage of Consumed Oil In Relation to that Produc<
in the Arabian Gulf Region in 1973
Country Percentage of consumption to 
Produced Petroleum
the
Iraq % 5,7
Kuwait % 5.1
Saudi Arabia % 1.8
Qatar % 5.95
U.A.E. % 2.84
(80) Source. Petroleum Relam Journal, Vol. 9, part 49, July 
16, 1977, p.12; OPEC, The Third Statistical Report,p.8.
(81) International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1973; Arabic Oil 
and Co-operation Journal, Part II, Vol. II, 1976, p.53; 
cited in Al-Hiti, op.cit.. Ref. (43), at 301, p.251.
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the oil industry of the Arabian Gulf and in addition to
its huge reserves are an average production per well which
(82 )is remarkably high and very low costs of production,^
c . Export of the Arabian Gulf Petroleum
Previous discussion has shown that the high percentage 
of annual production is not the only characteristic of 
the Arabian Gulf's petroleum. The total local consumption,
Table No. 5^®^^
The Average Daily Export Figures For Oil From The Arabian 
Gulf During the Years 1974, 1975 and 1976 
One unit equals 1000 barrels
Country 1974 1975 1976
U.A.E. 1700 1400 1800
Saudi Arabia 8500 7100 8300
Iraq 1800 2100 2100
Qatar 500 400 500
Kuwait 2400 2000 2100
Bahrain 423 414 415
Iran 5700 5000 5400
Total Exports 21 023 18 414 20 615
Percentage of exports 
in relation to the 
produced
%96.12 %93.90 %93.66
(82) Estimates of costs of production though obviously 
differing significantly, since they are based on 
widely different assumptions and methods, all agree 
in putting the Middle Eastern figures at only a 
fraction of those in other regions. See Issawi, 
Charles and Mohammed Yeganeh, "The Economics of 
Middle Eastern Oil", 1962, pp.89-102.
(83) Source. OPEC, The Third Statistical Report, pp. 
10-11.
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as has just been referred to, is less than 5 per cent of 
that produced. Hence, this easily gives the region the 
position of being the leading exporter of oil in the 
world market.
A quick glance at Table 5 shows that most of the oil 
produced in the region is exported as raw material to the 
demanding world.
However, suffice it to say that over 90% of the oil 
supplies for Japan are now met by imports from the Arabian 
Gulf.(^^^ Western Europe already satisfies 65 per cent 
of its oil needs from the Arabian Gulf area.^^^^ This 
obviously highlights again the rapidly increasing import­
ance of the Arabian Gulf region in oil production and the 
sharp decline in the western hemisphere's share of 
production. It is also clear that in the coming decade 
the world will have to continue relying heavily on the 
Arabian Gulf region. This in turn has an affect on the 
question of the delimitation of marine boundaries between 
the interested States, as will be discussed in the 
following chapters.
(84) Issawi, op,cit., Ref. (73), at 312, pp,17-18.
(85) Brewer, William, "Comments on the book 'The Persian 
Gulf States’ written by Sir Rupert Hay", M.E.J., 
Vol. 14, 1960, p.103.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DELIMITATION OF THE IRAQI TERRITORIAL SEA
Iraq, as mentioned earlier, is located at the head 
of the Arabian Gulf.^^) Thus, according to both the 
principles of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the TSCZ, 
and international practice, it is entitled to sovereign 
rights over a belt of water adjacent to her coast, that 
is the territorial sea.
It should be made clear at the outset that neither
Iraq, nor Kuwait have acceded to the Geneva Convention on
the TSCZ. Iran, has signed the Convention but has not
(2 )ratified it yet.^ As yet, no bilateral agreement has
been reached between the three political units on the 
delimitation of their respective offshore boundaries.  ^
Such an argument assumes that it is on the basis of the 
general principles of international law that this question 
will be discussed. The chapter will be divided into two 
sections, dealing first of all with the legal boundaries 
of the Iraqi territorial sea, and secondly with the 
difficulties arising in the putting into practice of these 
boundaries. Claims and legislation of Iran and Kuwait 
will not be considered in depth, but will be referred to 
where and when the discussion so requires.
(1) See above p. 288.
(2) El-Hakim, op.cit., Ref. (66), at 310, pp. 3, 64, 124.
(3) Al-Baharna, Husain M., "The Legal Status of the Arabian 
Gulf States", 1968, pp.261-306.
Section One
The Legal Boundaries of the Iraqi Territorial Sea
Iraq has a curved coastline and a very limited water­
front of only 40 miles (64 km.) in width. Sandwiched 
between Iran, which borders the north eastern shore and
the mouth of Shatt-al-Arab, and Kuwait to the west,^^)
Iraqi territorial sea boundaries, it can be assumed, are 
eastern and western in addition to the outer limit which 
constitutes its southern boundary.
However, owing to conflicts between Iraq and her 
neighbours over land frontiers, Iraq's offshore boundaries 
have not been demarcated to date.
This section will be divided into three under the 
following headings :
(1) The outer boundary of the Iraqi territorial sea.
(2) The eastern boundary of the Iraqi territorial sea.
(3) The western boundary of the Iraqi territorial sea.
Subsection One 
The Outer Boundary of the Iraqi Territorial Sea
In general, the location of the outer boundary of the 
territorial sea depends on the baseline from which it is 
measured. It is also affected, as was stated earlier, by 
the width of the territorial sea. It will be attempted, 
therefore, in this section to tackle these two questions 
in addition to the outer boundary of the Iraqi territorial 
sea.
(4) El-Hakim, op.cit.. Ref. ( 66), at 310, pp.156-158.
320
a . The Iraqi baseline
Even although there has been no unanimity with
( 5 )respect to a uniform formula for drawing baselines,
it is valuable to restate that the rules applicable to the
construction of baselines are very well established.^
It is generally recognized according to these rules, that
the normal baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured is the low-water line,^^^
In one of the well known World Court's decisions involving
the question of baselines, the ICJ, in the Anglo-Norwegian
( 8 )Fisheries Case,^   ^ pointed clearly to the proposition
that the principle of low-tide was well established. The
Court explicitly held that;
"For the purpose of measuring the breadth of the 
territorial sea, it is the low-water mark as 
opposed to the high-water mark, or the mean 
between the two tides, which has generally been 
adopted in the practice of States. This criterion 
is the most favourable to the coastal State..."
Having been approved by the Geneva Conference of
1958 on the Law of the Sea, this rule was incorporated in
Article 3 of the Convention on the TSCZ. It can be
(5) The controversy is due partly to different tidal waters 
the degrees of which range between high-high and low- 
low water tides. For further details see Kassim,
Anis F ., "Conflicting Claims in the Persian Gulf",
J. Law E. Dev., Vol. 4, No. 2, 1969, pp.316-317.
(6) See Colombos, op.cit.. Ref. ( 4) at 9, p.113; Smith,
op.cit.. Ref. (10) at 14, pp.9-14.
(7) The wide acceptance of the low-water mark principle is
due to several factors. For further details see
Kassim, ibid., p.317.
(8) ICJ Reports, 1951, p.16.
(9) See above p. 20.
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concluded that the low-water line principle has been 
sanctioned by adjudication adopted by multilateral treaty 
and acted upon even by non-parties to the Geneva Convention. 
Moreover it is likely to be adopted by the unfolding 
UNCLOS III.(IO)
The Iraqi baseline, according to the recognized rules, 
should thus be drawn along the Iraqi coast's low-water mark. 
The general absence of offshore islands beyond the coastal 
fringe eliminates one potential source of controversy.
The region is perhaps, as regards the drawing of baselines, 
a simple situation in terms of technical problems. 
Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest a deviation from 
the general rule of application of either Articles 6, 8,
9 or 10.
The legislation of Iraq, in this regard, it is
submitted wholly conforms to the established rules of
and
(12)
international law. Both the Law No. 71 of 1958^^^^ 
the Republican Ordinance No. 435 dated 15 November, 1958 
refer to the low-water line with respect to the drawing of 
the Iraqi baseline.^
(10) See Stevenson and Oxman, op.cit., Ref, (137), at 94 , 
p.771; see also Article 5 of the ICNT, U.N. Doc,
A/CONF. 62/W.P. 10/Add. 1 p.21.
(11) Article 2. ST/LEG/SER, B/15 (1970) p.90.(Appendix IV).
(12) Article 2. Ibid., p.89-90. Reproduced as Appendix 
No.Ill to this thesis.
(13) The legislation of Kuwait is in conformity with the 
general rule of low-water mark. Article 2 of the 
Kuwaiti Law of 1967 sets up the baseline of the low- 
water mark of mainland, or the outer edge of elevations 
situated at a distance not exceeding 12 miles, and at 
the closing line of the Bay of Kuwait. Article 1, and
2 Appendix N o .(VI11),Iran while adhering to the same 
principle as regards the legislation of her territor­
ial sea, on the contrary adopted the high-water line 
when she signed the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. Iran made two reservations when
Contd....
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One problem could arise regarding the estuary of
the Shaft al-Arab River which partially constitutes the
eastern terminal of the Iraqi baseline. The application
of Article 13 of the Geneva Convention on the TSCZ, which
runs as follows, would provide the solution.
"If a river flows directly into the sea, the 
baseline shall be a straight line across the 
mouth of the river between points on the low- 
tide line of its.banks.
Accordingly, the construction of the Iraqi baseline
across the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab River from the west
eastwards requires fixing a point, opposite the western
bank of the river, on the low-water mark line. A
similar point on the eastern bank is fixed. These two
points should be plotted on large-scale charts officially
recognized by Iraq. A straight line would then be drawn
between the two points. This line forms the Iraqi
baseline across the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab running
along its shore through points fixed with regard,to the
well established principles of international law. It is
thus in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva
Convention of 1958 on the TSCZ, particularly Article (13)
(13) contd...
she signed the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. Iran made two reservations when she acceded 
to the said Convention. The one which is pertinent 
reads as follows "b, Article 6: with respect to the 
phrase 'and unless another boundary line is justified 
by special circumstances' included in paragraphs 1 
and 2 in this article, the Iranian Government accepts 
this phrase on the understanding that one method of 
determining the boundary line in special circumstances 
would be that of measurement from the high-water mark" 
This reservation is cited in Kassim, op.cit., Ref.
(5 ), at 320, p .319.
(14) Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref, (31), at 20, p.82.
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which governs the construction of baselines across 
estuaries of rivers.
b , The Extent of the Iraqi Territorial Sea
Prior to 1958, Iraq had not drawn up her territorial
sea exactly. The general rules recognized by public
international law, according to an official Note sent from
the Foreign Ministry of Iraq to the U.N., were applicable
as to the regime, including the breadth of the Iraqi
( 15 )territorial sea,^ In November of 1958, Iraq issued
The Republican Ordinance No. 435 in which she declared
that her territorial sea was 12 nautical miles in width.
In the same year, Iraq also pronounced, the same claim in
the Law No. (71). Article (2) of the Law provides that:
"The Iraqi territorial sea extends twelve
nautical miles (a nautical mile is equivalent
to 1852 metres) in the direction of the high
sea, measured from the low-water mark following
( 1 7  )the sinuosities of the Iraqi coast".^
Again, the Iraqi enactment regarding her respective 
territorial sea breadth is in accordance with the 
prevailing rule on the subject. It is clearly evident, 
in spite of the failure of the international conferences
(15) Note of February 2, 1956 from the Foreign Ministry 
of Iraq to the U.N. See ST/LEG/SER. B/6 1957 p.26.
(16) See Article 2 of the Republican Ordinance No. (435) 
dated 4 November 1958, Published ST/LEG/SER B/15 
(1970) p.89 and reproduced in Appendix No. Ill to 
this thesis. The same breadth has been adopted by 
Kuwait in accordance with Article 1 of the Decree 
dated 17 December, 1967, Appendix No,VIII Iran also 
fixed her territorial sea at 12 nautical miles. See 
Appendix No. VI.
(17) Published in ST/LEG/SER B/15 (1970) p.90 and 
reproduced in Appendix No. VI to this thesis.
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to establish a conventional rule in this respect, that the 
twelve mile limit has become a steadfast principle of
/  -I o  \
international law.  ^ Moreover, the twelve-mile rule 
has been regionally practised as an accepted limit for the 
territorial sea in this area. Not only have States 
bordering the Arabian Gulf officially delimited their 
respective territorial sea boundaries at twelve miles, but 
also most of the Middle Eastern S t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  
the Arab S t a t e s . T h i s  width has gradually been 
developed in the area to meet local conditions and has won 
recognition from the political units in the region.
c . The Outer Boundary of the Iraqi Territorial Sea
Having outlined the general principles and the Iraqi 
legislation governing the drawing up of baselines and the 
width of territorial sea, it is then easy to delimit the 
Iraqi territorial sea. Although such work falls under 
the function of the admiralty, it is relevant here to 
refer in brief to the mode of construction of the outer 
boundary.
1. Any relevant number of prominent points on the Iraqi 
baseline must first be established on large-scale
(18) See above pp. 110 et seq.
(19) Al-Hakim, op.cit.. Ref. (66), at 310, pp.9-10.
(20) Such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen Arab 
Republic, Sudan and so forth. This is because, the 
Council of the League of Arab States recommended in 
March 1959 that all the Arab States should have 
adopted the 12-mile limit for territorial sea. This 
recommendation was made under resolution 1579 of 
March 26, 1959, adopted during the Leaguers Thirty- 
First Session in Cairo.
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charts officially recognized by Iraq. These points are 
to be on the low-water mark alongside the coast of Iraq 
from the west to the east, that is from where the Iraqi 
low-water mark meets that of Kuwait, to the final point 
on the boundary line in Shatt al-Arab between Iraq and 
Iran.
2. Then, use the width of 12-miles from each of these 
points to form swinging arcs. The line joining the 
points produced from the intersection of those arcs, 
will be the outer boundary of the Iraqi territorial sea.
Drawing the outer boundary of territorial sea, as
mentioned above, conforms with article 6 of the Geneva
Convention which runs as follows:
"The outer limit of the territorial sea is the 
line every point of which is at a distance from 
the nearest point of the baseline equal to the 
breadth of the territorial sea."^^^^
Ultimately, each point on the line constructed will 
be at a 12-mile distance from the Iraqi baseline.
Consequently, Iraqi legislation regarding baselines, the 
breadth of the territorial sea and establishing the outer 
boundary of territorial sea accords the general principles 
of international law as well as the Geneva Convention.
(21) Brownlie, op.cit., Ref. (31), at 20, p.80.
(22) This limit is the respective width of the Iraqi 
Territorial Sea. See Article 2 of the Law No. 71 of 
1958. Appendix No. IV.
Subsection Two 
The Delimitation of the Eastern Boundary of the Iraqi
Territorial Sea
The boundary line on the Shatt al-Arab River, which 
separates Iraq and Iran, constitutes the last section of 
the western Iraqi boundary line. Certainly drawing the 
boundary line of the territorial sea between the two 
countries depends on the precise placing of the last 
point on that line. It is, thus, of a great import to 
set out the boundary line between the two countries.
It will be our concern in this subsection to deal with 
the status of the Iraqi-Iranian boundary. This will be 
examined as follows:-
I. Facts Relating to the Iraqi-Iranian boundary line.
II. Facts Relating to the Boundary Line on the Shatt 
al-Arab.
III. The Crisis of April 1969.
IV. Conclusion. The Facts in the Light of Legal Principles
I. Facts Relating to the Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Line
It is well known that prior to the First World War,
C23 ■)
Iraq was under the control of the Ottoman Empire.
Here, there is evidence to show that the border between
Iran and the Ottoman Empire had been in existence
intermittently for a period of no less than four hundred
years beginning with the first Ottoman Conquest of Iraq
in 1534 A.D. It had frequently been the cause of war,
and almost continuously the subject of strife between the
(23) Khadduri, Majid, "Major Middle Eastern Problems in 
International Law", 1972, pp.3-6.
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two parties. From about half-way through the seventeenth 
century the frontier settled down, however it was never 
defined beyond dispute. This left the frontier between 
Iran and the Ottoman Empire relatively stable, though still 
disputed. To settle the doubtful questions several 
subsequent frontier agreements such as those of 1639, 1746, 
and 1823 were concluded between the two parties. Owing 
to the ambiguity surrounding the texts of these agreements, 
the delimitation itself became the very source of prolonged 
disagreements resulting in the Treaty of Erzerum of 
1 8 4 7 . According to this treaty, the boundary line 
between Iran and the Ottoman Empire was held to run from 
Mount Arrarat to the head of the Arabian Gulf. As to 
the Shatt-al-Arab, the boundary between Turkey and Persia 
on the Shatt a l - A r a b w a s  the low-water line on the 
Persian side. This appears to mean that the navigable 
stream of the shatt was in Turkish h a n d s . U n d e r  
Article 3 of the Treaty of 1847, a Committee to mark the 
borders on land was to be established. In effect, the 
post-war controversies and conflicts in which Turkey became 
involved retarded the process of demarcating the frontiers.
To find a final solution to the controversies between 
the two countries, eventually, a Protocol was signed by 
representatives of Britain, Russia, Persia and the
(24) See Long, op.cit., Ref. (65), at 310, p.52.
(25) The Shatt al-Arab is a river made by the convergence 
of the Tigris and the Euphrates running for 150 
miles or so down to the head of the Arabian Gulf, 
with the contribution of the Karun river. See 
Gressey, George B., "The Shatt al-Arab Basin", MEJ, 
Vol. 12, 1958, pp.448-449.
(26) Marlowe, op.cit.. Ref. (2), at 288, pp.26 et seq.
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Ottoman Empire at Constantinople on the 17th November, 
1913. Under the terms of this protocol a delimitation 
Commission, which consisted of representatives of the 
four powers, was formed to carry out the Protocol of 
Constantinople. Consequently, the "Turco-Persio" 
boundaries were precisely delimited on the map and marked 
on land in 1914.
However, during the war of 1914-1918, the Ottoman 
Empire invaded a succession of States, Iraq being one. 
Obviously, under the doctrine of State Succession "a 
successor State then succeeds not to the treaty as such 
but to the frontiers of its territory . Iraq thus 
inherited, what had been the Turkish territory of 
Mesopotamia.
As a result, the borders between Iraq and Iran were 
assumed to have been stabilised beyond dispute since they 
were well defined by the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 and 
reinforced by the "Persio-Turco" Commission. While such
(27) A1 Katiffi, Dr. A. "Certain Legal Aspects of the 
Iranian Abrogation of the 1937 Agreement", 1969, p.9; 
Marlowe, op.cit., Ref. (2), at 288, p.26.
(28) Lester, A.P., "State Succession to Treaties in the 
Commonwealth", ICLQ, Vol. 12, 1963, p .492.
(29) Al-Katiffi, ibid., p.21; Marlowe, ibid., Lord McNair 
writes: "the general principle is that newly 
established States which do not result from a 
political dismemberment and cannot fairly be said to 
involve political continuity with any predecessor, 
start with a clean slate in the matter of treaty 
obligations, save is so far as obligations may be 
accepted by them in return for the grant of recog­
nition to them or for other reasons, and except as 
regards the purely local or 'real' obligations of the 
State formerly exercising sovereignty over the 
territory of the new State". See McNair, op,cit..
Ref. (33), at 203, p.601.
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an argument is doubtless correct, the fact is that a 
certain number of frontier incidents were recorded. This 
conflict came to a head when the Iraqi Government appealed
to the League of Nations under Article 11 paragraph (2)
of the Covenant. The appeal was made on the 29th
November, 1 9 3 4 . It took the form of a request
submitted in a letter dated 29 November, 1934, from the 
Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Secretary General of the 
League. The request was made as the Iranian Government 
had periodically been committing acts of aggression, while 
at the same time disapproving Iraqi proposals for peaceful
C31 )
and direct contact between the two parties. An
Iraqi overture which was made to the Council indicating 
that the question should have been referred to the PCIJ
for an advisory opinion, was rejected by the Iranian
(32 )Government,^
Finally, some signs of reason were shown in the
relations between the two sides. The case was recalled
at the request of Iraq just before the meeting of the
Council at which it was to have been heard. Ultimately,
(30) Hodson, H.V., "The Middle East: The Admission of 
Iraq to the Membership of the League of Nations and 
the Problem of Non-Arab Minorities", Surv. Int. Aff, 
1934, pp.183-184,
(31) In an Appendix to this letter, the Iraqi Government 
gave an account of some of the more flagrant acts of 
aggression of which the Iranian Government were 
guilty. See the text of the letter and Appendix 
III in L.N.O.J., 1935, pp.196-197 and 208-215 
respectively.
(32) Toynbee, Arnold J., assisted by Boulter, U.M., "The 
Middle East: The Controversies over the Frontier 
Between Iran (Persia)on the one side and Turkey and 
Iraq on the other; and the Four-Power Middle Eastern 
Pact of the 8th July, 1937, surv. int. aff., 1937, 
pp.796-797.
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an agreement settling the boundary dispute was signed by 
the two parties in Tehran on the 4th July, 1937.
It is needless here to analyse the provisions of the 
1937 T r e a t y . I t  should merely be noted that through 
this treaty the parties pledged mainly:
a. To forbear from any sort of interference in one 
another's interior affairs (Article 1).
b . To treat their common frontiers as immutable (Article 2).
c . To consult one another in all international matters 
that might affect their common interests (Article 3).
d . Not to commit any acts of aggression against one 
another (Article 4).
e. To bring any apparent threat or violation of Article
(4) before the League Council, without prejudice to the 
exercising of their rights of self-defence.
The signing of this Treaty at Tehran on the 4th July 
was performed by the respective Foreign Ministers of the 
two States,
It is to be observed that there was a sustained
awareness of the importance of achieving stability and
finality in the settlement of the boundary dispute
between Iraq and Iran in accordance with 1937 Treaty, It
was clearly intended to define perennially the common
(35 )boundary between the two parties.^ This proposition
is supported, as is shown b e l o w , b y  the preamble to
(33) Ibid., p.802.
(34) The full text of the Treaty is reproduced in ILM,
Vol. 8, 1969, pp.478-479.
(35) This conclusion can be drawn from the terms of the 
treaty. See in particular the preamble ibid.
(36) See below pp. 343 et seq.
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the treaty.
However, the committee which had been established in
1938 by mutual negotiation, to mark the boundary line on
land by boundary posts, was suspended because of the
retreat of the Iranian side. Iran, by acting in the same
way as she had prior to the conclusion of the 1937 Treaty,
( 37 )once again threatened Iraqi sovereignty.
II. Facts Relating to the Boundary Line in Shatt al-Arab
The regime in the Shatt al-Arab was governed by the
terms of the Erzerum Treaty of 1847, Article 2(3) of the
aforesaid treaty specifies that :
"The Ottoman Government formally recognises the
unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government
over the city and port of Muhammara, the island 
( 38 )of Khizr, the anchorage, and the land on the
eastern bank - that is to say, the left bank - of 
the Shatt al-Arab, which are in the possession of 
tribes recognised as belonging to Persia. Further, 
Persian vessels shall have the right to navigate 
freely without let or hindrance on the Shatt al- 
Arab from the mouth of the same to the point of 
contact of the frontiers of the two parties.
Not only the above article but also the scholiums of
it given by the U.K. and R u s s i a a s  mediating powers -
show that the whole of the Shatt al-Arab with the exceptions
of Muhammara and Khizr, were under the full jurisdiction
of the Ottoman Empire. In the light of this fact even
(37) Al-Katiffi, op.cit.. Ref. (27) at 328, p.24.
(38) Now known as Abadan.
(39) The full text of the Treaty reproduced in the L.N.O.J., 
1935, p.197-199.
(40) The full text of the above explanation reproduced in 
L.N.O.J., 1935, pp.199-200.
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the left side, or the eastern bank of the river, was
admitted both by Turkey and Persia to be under the
sovereignty of the former.
As noted above, the Turkish-Persian boundary was
again precisely defined by the Protocol of November 4,
1913. In terms of the provisions relevant to the Shatt
a l - A r a b , a p a r t  from the rights of Persia mentioned in
Article 1 paragraphs (a,e), the Shatt al-Arab up to the
normal low-tide line was once more subject to the
sovereignty of Turkey. Moreover, the Boundary Delimitation
(41) The provisions relevant to the Shatt al-Arab are 
paragraphs(a) and (e)of Article 1 which provides in 
part ;
"From this point the line ... shall follow the 
medium filum aquae of the Khaiyin Canal as far as the 
point where the latter joins the Shatt al-Arab, at 
the mount of the Nahr-Nazaileh. From this point the 
frontier shall follow the course of the Shatt al-Arab 
as far as the sea, leaving under Ottoman sovereignty 
the river and all the islands therein, subject to 
the following conditions and exceptions:
(a) The following shall belong to Persia: (1) the 
island of Muhalla and the two islands situate 
between the latter and the left bank of the 
Shatt al-Arab (Persian bank of Abadan); (2) the 
four islands between Shetait and Maawiyeh and 
the two islands opposite Mankuhi which are both 
dependencies of the island of Abadan; (3) any 
small islands now existing or that may be formed 
which are connected at low water with the island 
of Abadan or with Persian terra firma below 
Nahr-Nazaileh.
(e) The Sheikh of Mohammara shall continue to enjoy 
in conformity with the Ottoman laws his rights 
of ownership in Ottoman territory.
The frontier-line established in this declaration 
is shown in red on the map annexed hereto.
The parts of the frontier not detailed in the 
above-mentioned frontier-line shall be established 
on the basis of the principle of the status quo, 
in conformity with the stipulations of Article 3 
of the Treaty of Erzerum". See L.N.O.J., 1935, 
pp.201-205.
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Commission referred to in Article 2 of the 1913 Protocol, 
met many times to achieve its task.^^^^ Here again, the 
description of the frontier in the Shatt al-Arab was 
recorded in the Minutes of the Commission which did not 
materially differ in purport from the previous acts.
Once more, the Shatt al-Arab, with the exceptions of 
Muhammara and Khizr, was entirely under the sovereignty of
Iraq.(43)
However, by the beginning of the 1930s, Iran violated
the sovereignty of Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab. She not
only denied the binding force of those instruments but
also refused to admit the competence of the Basrah Port
(44’)Authorities, as noted above. The question was
referred to the League of Nations and at last, on September 
15, 1937 a lasting settlement was achieved as the 1937 
Treaty was c o n c l u d e d . N o t  only the Protocol of 1913 
and the Minutes of the Delimitation Commission of 1914 
were deemed valid and binding but^^^^ the treaty also 
acknowledged the binding effect of the boundary line 
defined by those instruments with one sole exception. 
Articles 1 and 2 specify that;
Article (1) "The High Contracting Parties are agreed that, 
subject to the amendment for which Article 2 
of the Present Treaty provides, the following 
documents shall be deemed valid and binding,
(42) Article (2). of the Protocol provided that the frontier 
shall be demarcated on land by a delimitation 
Commission. See the text of the Article in L.N.O.J, 
1935, p.205.
(43) The Proceedings of the Commission of 1914 annexed to 
the letter sent from the Iraqi Government to the L.N. 
"Secretary General" see L.N.O.J., 1935, p.207,
(44) See above p. 329
(45) The Preamble of the Treaty. See the full text which is 
produced in ILM, Vol.8, 1969, pp.478, 479.
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that is to say:
la) The Turco-Persian Delimitation Protocol 
signed at Constantinople, November 4th,
1913;
b) The Minutes of the meetings of the 1914 
Frontier Delimitation Commission.
In virtue of the present Article, the frontier 
between the two States shall be as defined and 
traced by the Commission aforesaid, save in so 
far as otherwise provided in Article 2 
hereinafter following."
Article (2) "At the extreme point of the island of Choteit 
'being approximately latitude 30° 17' 25"
North, longitude 48° 19' 28" East', the frontier 
shall run perpendicularly from low water mark 
to the thalweg of the Shatt-el-Arab, and shall 
follow the same as far as a point opposite the 
present Jetty No. 1 at Abadan 'being approx­
imately latitude 30° 20' 8.4" North longitude 
48° 16' 13" East. From this point, it shall 
return to low water mark, and follow the 
frontier line indicated in the 1914 Minutes.
This appears to mean that according to the 1937 Treaty, the 
boundary line on the Shatt al-Arab runs, with only certain 
exceptions along the low-water mark of the eastern coast­
line of the river. The exceptions, from north to south 
are as follows : the port and anchorage of Muhammara above
and below the confluence of the Karun river with the Shatt 
al-Arab, certain islands proximate to the eastern shore 
appertain to Iran. Just north of the No. 1 jetty at 
Abadan the boundary runs outwardly from the low-water line 
to the thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab, following it south-
(46) Article (1), ibid.
(47) Ibid.
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wards for about four miles and then retraces the low-water 
line to a point just north of the island of Choteit.
III. The Crisis of April 1969
On April 19, 1969, the Iranian Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs declared the Unilateral termination of the
Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937, before the Iranian
House of S e n a t e . T h e  Iranian renunciation of the
1937 Treaty was carried out on the basis that:
"The Government of Iran now has no choice but to 
expose the characteristic bad faith of the 
Government of Iraq in evading and refusing for 
more than thirty years to perform its obligations 
under the Treaty."
In the Iranian Government's view, "when the treaty between
Iran and Iraq was concluded in 1937, the position of the
two parties was unequal. Iraq was the protege of the
imperialist power dominant in the region which enabled
Baghdad to press Iran into accepting the iniquitous
(49)boundary provision". Iran thus declared that she no
longer regarded the provisions of the treaty of 1937 as 
binding upon her. The other grounds given for annulment 
were that the established principle of international law, 
that the two parties have equal rights, had not been 
observed in the case of the Shatt al-Arab.
(48) The full text of the statement concerning the 
abrogation of the 1937 Treaty reproduced in ILM,
Vol. 8, 1969, pp. 481-486.
(49) Letter dated 1 May 1969, from the Permanent Repres­
entative of Iran addressed to the President of 
Security Council. Reproduced in ILM, Vol. 8, 1969, 
pp .489-492.
(50) The Iranian letter to the President of the U.N. 
Security Council, ibid., pp. 491, 492; The Statement 
of the Iranian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Ibid., p.484; Tahtinen, op.cit., Ref. (2), at 88,
p. 19.
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Additionally, the Iranian Act of renunciation of the 
1937 Treaty was simultaneous with massing "troops, naval
( 5T )
and air force units all along the Iraqi borders".
The Iranian Government also committed flagrant acts of 
violation against Iraqi sovereignty in the Shatt al-Arab. 
Iranian merchant ships and ships of other nationalities 
protected by Persian vessels and the air force, approached 
the Shatt al-Arab river breaching the rules of navigation
( 52 )
and flouting the orders of the competent authorities.^
Conclusion "The Facts in the Light of Legal Principles"
Needless to say, after examining the situation, the 
boundary line between Iraq and Iran on the Shatt al-Arab 
was found to be precisely delimited in such a way as to 
leave no room for dispute. It was laid down in the 
Erzerum Treaty of 1847, the 1913 Protocol, the 1914 
Minutes of the Delimitation Commission and the 1937 Treaty. 
More important is that the latter admitted the validity 
of all the previous pertinent instruments and events. The 
above facts clearly reveal that the boundary line on the 
Shatt al-Arab had been fixed in binding legal acts, thus 
it remains to examine the incompatibility of the Iranian 
Acts with international law.
Before passing on to this investigation, it is firmly 
recognized in this connection that in principle, any treaty 
remains in force unless terminated in accordance with its
(51) Letter dated 29 April 1969 from the Acting Permanent 
Representative of Iraq addressed to the President of 
the Security Council. Reproduced in ILM, Vol. 8,
1969, pp.487-488.
(52) Abbas, Abbas Abbood, "The Crisis of the Shatt al- 
Arab" 1973, pp.72-73,
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provisions or with the generally recognized rules of
international law.^^^^ Article 42(2) of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that:
"2. The termination of a treaty, its denun­
ciation or the withdrawal of a party, may take 
place only as a result of the application of 
the provisions of the treaty or of the present 
Convention. The same rule applies to suspension 
of the operation of a treaty.
It is pertinent to note that most of the recent
treaties contain an internal means or mode of bringing
them, or their operation to an end. Parties to a treaty
often make a provision therein (a) that the treaty is to
be in operation for a specified period, or (b) that the
treaty will be deemed to be terminated or that the parties
will be deemed to be entitled to denounce or withdraw from
the operation of the treaty with the occurrence of a
certain event or on the fulfilment of certain conditions.
Such treaties are terminated by the application of the
provisions of the treaty itself. This would seem to be
tantamount to saying that the termination or withdrawal is
carried out in the light of mutual consent of the
contracting parties.
However, the termination of or withdrawal from the
operation of a treaty may not be provided for in the
treaty itself. It is a firmly recognized principle of
international law that parties to a treaty may later agree
(53) YBILC, 1966, Vol. II, pp.1-50.
(54) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(55) McNair, op.cit.. Ref. (33), at 203, p.515.
(56) YBILC, 1963, Vol. II, pp.199-200.
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to do either of these things at any time during the 
period of the treaty. In this connection, it may be 
quoted from a passage by Judge Read in the case of the
( 57 'J
International Status of South-West Africa, ^  Judge Read
stated that :
"The second ground is based upon a general 
Principle of Law recognized by civilized nations.
Any legal position, or system of legal relation­
ships, can be brought to an end by the consent 
of all persons having legal rights and interests 
which might be affected by their t e r m i n a t i o n ^
It may be observed that this rule has been acknowledged
as a general principle of international law. The
Declaration of London of 1871, as well as state practice,
support the impossibility of the unilateral termination of
a treaty unless so provided for within the treaty. This
principle becomes more evident in treaties of peace and
treaties fixing a territorial boundary.  ^ The principle
was also reiterated in a resolution of the Council of the
League of Nations of April 17, 1935 which asserted that
"No state can liberate itself from the engage­
ment of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations 
thereof, except as a result of the consent of 
the contracting parties by means of an 
amicable understanding
It appears that this rule has also acquired the
recognition of the international community, to the extent
(57) ICJ Reports, 1950, p.128.
(58) ICJ Reports, 1950, Separate opinion of Judge Read,
p.167.
(59) YBILC, 1963, Vol. II, pp.200-201.
(60) See YBILC, 1963, Vol. II, pp.200-201.
0*3»
that it is incorporated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. Article 54 runs as follows:
"The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal 
of a party may take place:
(a) in conformity with the provisions of the 
treaty; or
(b) at any time by consent of all the parties 
after consultation with the other contracting
States."(Gl)
In practice, this principle has been generally 
observed. Otherwise, it would be easy for States to 
disown their obligations. Surely, this lack of respon­
sibility would in turn affect the confidence of interchange 
between the members of the international community, which 
is the most effectual factor for p e a c e . I t  is to be 
noted that the question of respecting obligations is given
much weight in the Charter of the United Nations which
provides that:
"to establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties.,,"(63)
There is also Article 2(2) of the Charter which
states that :
"2, All members, in order to ensure to all of
them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfil in good faith the 
obligations assumed by them in accordance with 
the present charter."(^^^
(61) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(62) Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5) at 9, Vol. 3, pp.434 et seq
(63) Charter of the United Nations, the Preamble.
(64) Ibid,
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The conclusion to be drawn is as follows: the
termination of a treaty in principle, may take place as 
a result of the happening of an event or under certain 
conditions in accordance with the provisions of the treaty 
itself, or at any time by the mutual consent of the 
parties dehors the treaty.
It remains to examine treaties including no provision 
regarding their termination. In principle, such treaties 
are incapable of being terminated unless they exhibit 
either express or tacit animus or designation of the 
parties to do so.^®^^ More important in connection with 
the question under consideration is that even when tacit 
intent is reached it is not accepted as a means of allowing 
termination of treaty obligations in two cases:
1) when it is categorically provided that a treaty is to 
subsist validly; and
2) treaties of peace and those fixing territorial 
boundaries. This appears to mean that those 
treaties by their very character preclude the possibility 
that the contracting parties contemplated any right of 
unilateral denunciation or withdrawal on the part of
any of them.________________________________________________
(65) Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties. Article 56.
(66) It is disputed where a treaty is silent as to the 
period of its duration or as to whether the parties 
to it may in any circumstances terminate or denounce 
it or withdraw from it. There are two schools of 
thought concerning this question. On the one hand, 
some consider that where the treaty itself is silent 
on the point, it is to be presumed that no such 
right exists, since the parties themselves would not 
have made express provision for it. On the other 
hand there are those who take the view that the mere 
absence of a specific provision of a right of 
termination in the treaty should not be interpreted 
to mean that the right is thereby taken away. See 
Al-Katiffi, op.cit., Ref. (27 ) at 328, pp.25 et seq.
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The preceding discussion, has been dealing with cases 
of termination of a treaty in certain circumstances when 
there is either a provision in the treaty for such a 
possibility or an agreement between the parties outwith 
the treaty. Admittedly, these general principles are 
subject to exceptions where the unilateral denunciation 
or withdrawal of an individual party at will is admitted. 
In short, the right of any individual party to terminate 
the treaty without first obtaining the consent of the 
other party is recognized in two cases:
1, When a material breach of a treaty by one of the
parties to it is committed. One is accordingly entitled
to assume that the violation of an agreement by one party
gives the right to the other party to invoke such a breach
as grounds for the termination of the treaty. This rule
has gained the recognition of the international community
and is codified in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention of
1969 on the Law of Treaties. It runs in part as follows:
"1, A material breach of a bilateral treaty by 
one of the parties entitles the other to invoke 
the breach as a ground for terminating the 
treaty or suspending its operation in whole or 
in part...
2, Quite apart from the previous case, it is accepted 
as a doctrine of customary international law that a party 
to a treaty may claim the right to terminate it or suspend 
its operation unilaterally, on the grounds that there has 
been a fundamental change of circumstances from those
(67) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. This
notion which is often called the doctrine of clausula
rebus sic stantibus, has been codified in the Convention
on the Law of Treaties, Article 62 of this Convention
provides in part that:
"1. A fundamental change of circumstances which 
has occurred with regard to those existing at 
the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and 
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not 
be invoked as a ground for terminating or with­
drawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances 
constituted an essential basis of the 
consent of the parties to be bound by the 
treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to 
transform the extent of obligations still 
to be performed under the treaty.
It cannot be denied that the principles considered 
are not only supported by the majority of writers and 
international tribunals but are now also embodied in the 
Vienna Convention, However, after a study of all the 
principles with regard to the validity of the Iranian 
abrogation of the 1937 Treaty, it is submitted that the 
Iranian denunciation appears to be null and void. There 
seems to be no doubt that the 1937 Treaty cannot be 
considered obsolete for the following reasons:
1. The 1937 Treaty contains no clause for fixing either 
its duration, the date of its termination or any 
precondition or event which could bring about its termin­
ation. It does not provide the right to denounce or
(68) Ibid.
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withdraw from the treaty. On the contrary, the object of 
the agreement of 1937 as can be deduced from its preamble, 
was to achieve eternal stability of the long-standing 
frontier question and to put an end to the tension between 
the two S t a t e s . T h e r e  is evidence to suggest that 
it is always advisable to examine the preamble to boundary 
treaties as a prelude to understanding the tenor of their 
contents. The value of the preamble is illustrated 
very well by the Island of Palmas arbitration. It is 
necessary first to point out that the agreement relating 
to the arbitration of the differences in respect of 
sovereignty over that island was signed by the United 
States of America and the Netherlands on January 23, 1925^^^) 
The preamble to this agreement refers to the parties 
desire,
"to terminate in accordance with the principles
of international law and any applicable treaty
provisions the differences which have arisen
(72 )and now subsist between them..,"^
In his award of April 4, 1 9 2 8 , the Arbitrator,
Max Huber, expressly referred to the terms of this preamble 
which he regarded as:
(69) In the preamble of the treaty the parties cited that 
(... sincerely desirous of strengthening the bonds
of brotherly friendship and good understanding between 
the two States, and of settling definitively the 
question of the frontier between the two States have 
decided to conclude the present Treaty...) op.cit.,
Ref. ( 34 ), at 330.
(70) Fitzmaurice, G.G., "The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation 
and Certain Other Treaty Points" BYBIL, Vol. 28, 1951 
pp. 24-25.
(71) Cited in AJIL, Vol. 2 2, 1928, pp.868 et seq.
(72) Ibid., p.868.
(73) Ibid., pp.867-912.
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"the evident will of the parties that the 
arbitral award shall not conclude by a non 
liquet, but shall in any event decide that the 
island forms a part of the territory of one 
or the other of two litigant powers,
2. Certainly, the main object of all proceedings leading
to the settlement of boundary disputes, including boundary
treaties, is to achieve stability and finality. In
particular, this primary objective, was the intention of
(75 )the parties to the 1937 Treaty. Further evidence in
support of this proposition is afforded by the wording of 
a crucial Article of the Treaty. Article 3 provides in 
part that :
"upon the signature of the present Treaty, the 
High Contracting Parties shall appoint forthwith 
a Commission to erect frontier marks at the 
points determined by the Commission to which 
Article 1, paragraph (b) of the present Treaty 
relates and to erect such further marks as it 
shall deem desire.
Plainly, the intention behind this provision was
simply to rule out any subsequent controversy. In the
light of this provision the parties can be presumed to
have fully intended to definitively establish a visible
frontier line and to have taken all the necessary steps to
achieve this end. This ratio, it is submitted, was
(74) Ibid., p.911.
(75) The contracting States declared their, desire to 
settle definitively the question of the frontier 
between them. See the Preamble of the Treaty, 
op.cit.. Ref. (34), at 330.
(76) Ibid.
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amongst the grounds on which the ICJ based its decision
(77 )in the Case of Temple Preah Vihear. It was taken by
the Court as evidence leading to the conclusion that the
parties intended finality. Having asserted that the
cardinal objectives of frontier agreements, in general, are
to encompass "stability and finality", on this question,
the ICJ stated the following:
"In general, when two countries establish a
frontier between them, one of the primary objects
is to achieve stability and finality. This is
impossible if the line so established can, at
(78 )any moment, ... be called in question."
Yet, the Court took special note of the preamble to 
the treaty of 1907 which recited that the parties were 
desirous "of ensuring the final regulation of all questions 
relating to the common frontiers of Indo-China and Siam".^^^^ 
This was construed as expressing an intention to put an 
end to the state of tension in the relations between the 
two parties and to achieve boundary stability "on a basis 
of certainty and f i n a l i t y " . T h e  Court went on to 
say:
"A further token of the same object is to be 
found in the desire, of which the documentation 
contains ample evidence, and which was evinced 
by both parties, for natural and visible 
frontiers. Even if, as the Court stated earlier, 
this is not in itself a reason for holding that
(77) ICJ Reports, 1962, p.6.
(78) ICJ Reports, 1962, p.34.
(79) Ibid., p.35.
(80) Ibid., p.35.
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the frontier must follow a natural and visible 
line, it does support the view that the parties 
wanted certainty and finality by means of 
natural and visible lines.
3. As regards the so-called Iraqi breach of the treaty 
of 1937 upon which it is particularly relied for terminating 
the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part, 
it should be observed that it is inconsistent with the 
general principles of international law for the following 
reasons :
a. Iraq in fact has never violated any of the provisions
of the 1937 Treaty. Having participated in the Mixed
Boundary Commission, Iraq acted upon her own obligation
under the agreement. It is to be noted that the work
of this Commission was suspended by the withdrawal of
the Iranian side in 1940 at the request of its 
(82 ^Government.^  ^ Therefore, if any importance is to 
be attached to the Iranian claim, it would be in Iraq's 
favour not against her.
b. The second reason lies in the fact that the right of
a party to terminate a treaty on account of a breach
cannot affect any right or status resulting from the 
terms of the treaty. It cannot affect a status quo 
ante to which the treaty put an end.
c. To merely use the breach as a ground for terminating the
agreement is not sufficient in itself to regard the 
entire agreement as annuled. Such action if objected 
to by the other party is subject to adjudication
(81) Ibid., p.35.
(82) Al-Katiffi, op.cit., Ref. (27 ) at 328, pp.33 et seq.
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according to peaceful means provided for in Article 33
of the Charter of the United Nations.
d. The exercising of the right to terminate or withdraw
from a treaty requires compliance with procedural 
aspects. Among the extent of and the conditions for 
the exercising of this right is the instrument 
declaring the termination, which must be signed by a 
body who has authority to take the action of termination 
or is entitled to do so. The Iranian abrogation of 
the 1937 treaty is lacking in this requirement.
4. Finally using a change in conditions as a basis for 
the termination of a treaty, once again, is not sufficient 
in itself. Obviously, if viewed so broadly, it may be 
considered that the doctrine is likely to be invoked 
whenever a party finds itself in a position where the 
fulfilment of the'obligation under the treaty is either 
inconvenient or onerous.
The Iranian abrogation of the 1937 Treaty it is 
submitted, appears to be ineffectual. Although, the 
existence in international law of the principle of rebus 
sic stantibus is recognized, the need to confine its scope 
within narrow limits by regulating the conditions under
(83) Charter of the U.N. Article 33.
(84) See Brierly, James Leslie, "The Law of Nations: An 
Introduction to the International Law of Peace" 6 
ed; 1963, pp.332-336; Kelsen, op.cit., Ref. (230), 
at 123, (Principles of International Law) pp.497,
498, and”Law of Treaties, Introductory Comment, AJIL, 
Supp. 1935(2), pp.1096-1126; Lissitzyn, Olivier J,, 
"Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus sic 
stantibus) AJIL, Vol. 61, 1967, pp.895-^22 ; Garner, 
J.W., "The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus and the 
Termination of Treaties", AJIL, Vol. 21, 1927, pp. 
509-516.
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Which it may be invoked is nevertheless emphasized. The
possible termination of treaties by reason of changed
circumstances is recognized only within narrow and well
defined confines.
In the Judgment of 7 June, 1932, in the Case of the
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, t h e
PCIJ, notwithstanding admitting the rebus sic stantibus
principle, asserted that only a radical change of
circumstances could be considered. Further, while
upholding that certain changes had taken place during the
period of more than a century, the Court considered that
those changes had no bearing on the whole body of
circumstances. ^
Similarly, although in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case^^^^ the ICJ recognized explicitly that
"changes in the law may under certain conditions 
constitute valid grounds for invoking a change
of circumstances affecting the duration of a
treaty," ^
it did confirm certain conditions which may be regarded
as a delimitation of its scope. In the words of the
Court :
"International law admits that a fundamental 
change in the circumstances which determined 
the parties to accept a treaty, if it has
(85) PCIJ Series A/B No. 46 pp. 96-238 (1932).
(86) Ibid.
(87) Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, U.K. v. Iceland, ICJ 
Reports, 1973, p.2; See also Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 
Federal Republic of Germany, v. Iceland, ICJ Reports, 
1973, p.4a.
(88) Ibid., para. 32, p.17; para. 32, p.61 respectively
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resulted in a radical transformation of the 
extent of the obligations imposed by it, may, 
under certain conditions, afford the party 
affected a ground for invoking a termination 
or suspension of the treaty ,,,"(89)
The Court went on to stipulate:
"the change must have increased the burden of 
the obligations to be executed to the extent of 
rendering the performance something essentially 
different from that originally undertaken.
Furthermore,'the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
never operates by the mere claim of the State concerned.
Such a claim if disputed, is subject to examination by
some competent body in order to ascertain the merits
required for its application. In the case of the
Fisheries jurisdiction, just referred to, the Court
confirmed this view stating that:
" ... the doctrine never operates so as to
extinguish a treaty automatically or to allow
an unchallengeable unilateral denunciation by
one party; it only operates to confer a right
to call for termination and, if that call is
disputed, to submit the dispute to some organ
or body with power to determine whether the
conditions for the operation of the doctrine 
(91 )are present."
Before drawing the discussion of the question under
consideration to a close, it would be pertinent to mention
that although international law allows the termination of 
a treaty in the event of some fundamental changes in
(89) Ibid., para 36, p.18; para 36, p.63 respectively.
(90) Ibid., para, 43, p.21; para. 43, p.65.
(91) Ibid., para. 44, p.21.
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conditions, it equally recognizes that in cases of treaties
fixing frontiers, there can be no question of release from
obligations. The Central American Court of Justice, for
example, has taken this stand in the dispute referred to
it between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The Court held that
the treaty in question
"has wholly preserved its binding force up to 
the present....owing to the very nature of its 
stipulations, which are permanent in 
character. " ^
This appears to mean that this Court refused to apply
the clause of changed circumstances to the boundary treaty.
There is a good reason why this should be so. Otherwise,
the rule instead of being an instrument of peaceful
change, might become a source of dangerous fiction.
The principle that treaties establishing boundaries
are outwith the scope of the concept of rebus sic stantibus
has been firmly recognized by the international community.
It has been embodied in Article 62(2) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides in part
that :
"2. A fundamental change of circumstances may 
not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty
establishes a boundary
5. One final point deserves particular attention.
Namely that even if the termination of a treaty was
(92) Cited in Hackworth, G.H., "Digest of International 
Law", Vol. 5, 1943, p.298.
(93) See YBILC, 1957, Vol. II, pp.56-57, 60-63; YBILC, 1963, 
Vol. II, pp.207-210, 80-84.
(94) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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accepted as it is carried out in accordance with the
principles of international law, this would not affect the
validity or the existence of any rights or legal situations
brought about by the execution of the treaty prior to its
termination or indeed from the past performance of any
of its provisions when it was in f o r c e . T h i s
principle has gained the approval of the international
community. It is embodied in Article 70 of the 1969
Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that:
"1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the 
parties otherwise agree, the termination of a 
treaty under its provisions or in accordance 
with the present Convention:
(a ).........
(b) does not affect any right, obligation or 
legal situation of the parties created through 
the execution of the treaty prior to its 
termination."(86)
To sum up, the legal status created by executed 
clauses, territorial settlements of all kinds and boundary 
agreements subsists even after the valid termination of a 
t r e a t y . ^
6. Beyond this, the clear fact that a prerequisite 
procedural act is required for the validity of termination. 
There is evidence to suggest that the party intending to 
terminate the treaty must notify the o t h e r , T h e  
Special Rapporteur to the ILC in 1957 stated that:
(95) YBILC, 1957, Vol. II, pp. 16, 35, 67-68.
(96) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(97) YBILC, 1957, Vol. II, pp.16, 35, 67-68.
(98) YBILC, 1963, Vol. II, p.214.
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"... a declaration of termination which is 
not officially communicated to the other party 
has no effect .... if relations are bad,
governments ................. to communicate
with each other even through a third party."^^8)
A similar clause was incorporated in the 1963 report
of the Special Rapporteur, Waldock, to the
Eventually, this principle has been codified in Article 69 
of the Convention on the Law of Treaties which stipulates 
that the termination, withdrawing from, or suspending 
of the operation of the treaty could only be done through 
an instrument communicated to the other parties to the 
treaty and issued by the party affecting the termination 
or suspension.
There is yet another stipulation. The right of any 
individual party to terminate the treaty, even when it 
is in conformity with international law, has to be expressed 
before the date of termination. Article 56(2) of the 
Convention on the Law of Treaties states that at least 
one year's notice must be given prior to the date of 
termination.(^^^)
On the basis of our examination of the aspects of the 
validity of termination treaties, and taking into account 
that the language of the preamble of the 1937 Treaty used 
the past tense to refer to agreements already concluded,
(99) See Comments of Special Rapporteur to the ILC in 
1957, Secont Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC, 
1957, Vol. II, pp.45-69.
(100) YBILC, 1963, Vol. II, p.86.
(101) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 65.
(102) Ibid., Article 56(2).
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clearly it would seem to support that the Iranian 
abrogation of the 1937 Treaty is inconsistent with the 
principles, of international law in the area of treaty 
laws. Although it is not our concern to deal with the 
legal consequences of the 1937 Treaty, it does remain to 
conclude that:
1. The agreement of 1937 could not be regarded as obsolete 
and was binding upon the parties. Unilateral 
termination on the part of the Iranian Government would 
have no legal effect, since the agreement could only be 
terminated by mutual consent.
2. As far as the status of the Shatt al-Arab is concerned,
it was wholly under the sovereignty of Iraq.
However, "in view of the sincere willingness of 
the two parties ...to reach!eve an ultimate and permanent 
settlement of all outstanding questions between the two 
countries", the crisis thus brought about was eventually 
settled by convening a "Treaty on International Borders 
and Good Neighbourly Relations" in June 1975.
According to Article 2 of this Treaty, international borders 
on the Shatt al-Arab are those demarcated in accordance 
with
"the principles and pursuant to the provisions
of Protocol for the demarcation of river borders
and supplements thereto, appended with this treaty."
Article (1) of the Protocol on the Demarcation of Iraq-
Iran Water Borders annexed to the 1975 Treaty provides that:
(103) See the Preamble of "IRAN-IRAQ Treaty on International 
Borders and Good Neighbourly Relations" of June 13,
197 5 published in the "Baghdad Observer" paper Nos. 
2240-41 June 23 and 24 1975.
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The two contracting parties confirm and realise 
that the demarcation of international water 
borders between Iraq and Iran has been conducted 
in accordance with Thalweg line."^^^^)
However, it is reported that Iraq on October 1, 1979
CIOS')
has denounced the 1975 Agreement, This appears to
mean that this treaty came to an end. From that time on, 
as a result of this denouncement, the situation is as it 
had been up to 1975, namely the entire Shatt al-Arab 
estuary is under the sovereignty of Iraq.
IV. The Drawing of the Eastern Boundary of the Iraqi 
Territorial Sea
Drawing lateral boundaries, if one applies the Geneva 
C o n v e n t i o n , i s  chiefly technical in nature, and 
should not present great difficulties. Thus, once the 
precise position of the ultimate point on the border line 
between the neighbouring States is well defined, the 
construction of the lateral line should not involve any 
issues of principles. Looking in particular to the 
boundary line between Iraq and Iran, the general absence 
of offshore islands beyond the coastal fringe eliminates 
one potential source of controversy.
According to Article 12 of the TSCZ Convention of 
1958, the marine boundary line between Iraq and Iran is the 
equidistance line. This line can be drawn up on points on
(104) The Protocol is published in "Baghdad Observer", ibid.
(105) See The International Herald Tribune, 30084, October 
2, 1979,
(106) The acceptance of certain rules in delimiting narrow 
zones of the sea between lateral States, such as the 
territorial sea, does not necessarily imply or follow 
the acceptance of the same States to the same rules
3 55
the baselines of the two countries. The process of 
determining marine boundaries between neighbouring States 
has been treated thoroughly by numerous experts.
This method involves selecting points on the baseline of 
Iraq a, b and c from M (the ultimate point on the eastern 
bank of Shatt al-Arab), to the west. Also, the points on 
the baseline of Iran are a', b ', and c ' from M to the 
east. The boundary line is drawn between the two 
countries in the following way. A certain point on the 
water, the same distance from a and a ' is chosen by the 
courbe tengeante method. This point is the first one on 
the boundary line and let it be called X. A line is 
drawn between M and X. This line constitutes the first 
part of the boundary line on the territorial sea. Other 
points on water equidistant from b, c and b ', c ' on the 
low-water marks of both Iraq and Iran are then selected 
by the courbe tengeante method. This operation is 
repeated to obtain new points on water, until a point at 
a distance of 12 m i l e s i s  reached. Then, by drawing 
a line connecting those points chosen on the water with 
M, the equidistance line between Iraq and Iran is 
established.
(106) contd...
as in large submarine areas far off the coast. See 
ICJ, North Sea Cases, Pleadings, 1968, Vol. 1, 
p .407.
(107) See e.g., Boggs, op.cit.. Ref. (13), at 14, pp. 
240-266; Knight, op.cit.. Ref. (1), at 8, pp.257- 
258; Whiteman, op.cit.. Ref. (5 ), at 9, Vol. 4, 
pp.323-343.
(108) This distance is the respective width of the Iraqi 
and Iranian territorial seas according to their 
laws. The Iraqi law No. 71 of 1958 (Article (2) 
and Article (3) of the Iranian Act of April 12, 1959. 
See Appendices No.IV and No.VI respectively.
Subsection Three 
The Delimitation of the Western Boundary of the 
Iraqi Territorial Sea
The western boundary of the Iraqi territorial sea 
represents part of the marine boundary line between Iraq 
and Kuwait in the Arabian Gulf. As noted a b o v e the 
land frontier is essential as the ultimate point on that 
line is vital to the issue in question. Our task in 
this subsection is to ascertain where precisely the last 
point on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary line lies. This in 
turn requires us to touch upon the legal status of this 
boundary. Thereafter, an attempt will be made to fix 
the western boundary of the Iraqi territorial sea.
I . Facts Relating to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border Line
Formerly, Turkey was sovereign over what is now 
Kuwait. In the early 1890s this status was not debated. 
Effective Turkish control and administrative authority was 
exercised over Kuwait. The ruler of Kuwait, who was 
allowed limited, administrative authority, used to be 
appointed by Turkish Central Government and was made 
officially subordinate to the Basra Wilaya.^^^^^
Owing to extensive British interests in the Arabian 
Gulf,(^^^^ it was the British hope to bring this territory
(109) See above p. 326.
(110) The Wilaya is the governor. See Longrigg, Stephen 
Hemsley, "Iraq 1900 to 1950", 1953, pp.265-266.
(111) The primary British aim in the area was to make the 
route to India secure and prevent the establishment 
of a strategic position by another power which could 
threaten the approaches to India,
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under their i n f l u e n c e . V a r i o u s  steps were taken to 
this end. This was particularly apparent when the Sheikh 
of Kuwait asked for British protection. He made an 
overture to Britain indicating that a sort of protectorate 
relationship between himself and the British Government 
might prove expedient.
Britain, however, was inclined to maintain a reserved 
attitude as she had every reason to foster amicable 
relations with the Ottoman Empire, which in turn had a 
wide range of interests in keeping Kuwait under her power.
Thus, the Kuwaiti Ruler's request to Britain was 
refused at first.
In the late 1890s, the situation was to change 
radically. Kuwait became a serious concern for British 
diplomacy, with the intrusion of European diplomatic 
conflicts into the Arabian Gulf.^^^^^ There was an 
, important challenge to continued British existence in the 
area.
Russia wanted to arrest British influence in the 
region and subjugate the whole of Asia. France, also,
(112) Firstly, Kuwait was a fair harbour; secondly, it was 
a possible railway terminus for the Baghdad railroad 
project; thirdly, it was a trade-route crossing point; 
and finally, it would allow the exclusion of Russian 
or any other foreign influence. See Busch, Briton 
Cooper, "Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914", 
1967, p.105.
(113) Monroe, Elizabeth "The Shaikhdom of Kuwait 1890s",
Int. Aff., Vol. 30, 1954, pp.227-272; Busch, Briton 
Cooper, "Britain and the Status of Kuwait 1896-1899", 
M.E.J., Vol. 21, 1967, pp. 187-189; and ibid., pp. 
100-101.
(114) Busch, op.cit., Ref. (113) above, pp.187-198; and 
op.cit.. Ref. (112) above , pp.101-102.
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succeeded in concluding an agreement with the Sultan of 
Muscat. Germany fostered her friendly relationship with 
the Ottoman Empire in order to enter and then sway the 
Arabian Gulf area.^^^^^ Additionally, having been alarmed 
about German and Russian Railway plans to utilise Kuwait 
as a terminal for their Middle Eastern road projects,
Britain took charge of Kuwaiti defence and foreign 
a f f a i r s . H a v i n g  arranged for a protectorate regime 
over the Sheikhdom, she therefore drafted a bond with all 
haste and in secrecy on January 23, 1899.^^^^^ By this
bond, the Sheikh bound himself, his heirs and s u c c e s s o r s ^
not to enter into relations with, or cede, sell, lease, 
mortgage or give for occupation or for any other purpose 
any portion of his territory to the governments or subjects 
of any other power unless the previous consent of her 
Majesty's Government had been o b t a i n e d . ^^^8) Britain, 
by this Bond, had a definite foothold and preserved her 
position in the Arabian Gulf in general and in particular 
Kuwait. It was the first time the so-called Kuwaiti
(115) Kumar, Ravinder, "The Records of the Government of
India on the Berlin-Baghdad Railway Question", His.
J. Vol. 5, 1962, p.76.
(116) Busch, op.cit., Ref. (113), at 357, p.187.
(117) The Turks were rumoured to have had knowledge of the 
secret agreement, Britain denied the conclusion of 
this Bond for when asked by the Ottoman Empire.
Busch, op.cit.. Ref. (112), at 357, pp.111-113.
(118) For a consideration of R s . 15,000 (£1,000). See 
Busch, op.cit., Ref.(113),at 357, p.197.
(119) Busch, ibid., p.197; Liebesny, Herbert Liebesny 
"Administration and Legal Development in Arabia;
The Persian Gulf Principalities", M.E.J., Vol. 10,
1956, p.33.
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territory issue was raised.
By the turn of this century, British interests in 
the region were at risk of being challenged by foreign 
powers. An important threat to Britain's position was 
the increasing involvement of Germany in the area. Kuwait 
was surely to be selected as the terminal point of the 
railway line which Germany planned to establish to 
connect east and west. Britain was aware of the likeli­
hood of this new threat to her influence in the region. 
Having intended to preserve if not to enhance her position, 
Britain therefore sought to arrest this challenge. The 
solution would be a declaration of Kuwaiti independence. 
Meanwhile, she wished to avoid any direct clash with the 
Turkish Government,
Hence, more diplomatic statements were called for.^^^^^ 
Having opposed at the outset the participation in the 
construction of the Baghdad Railway, Britain realised that 
if the line was built by Germany alone, as it indeed would 
be, then her final position with regard to it would be a 
very unenviable one. She was very conscious of the fact 
that effectual power in the area would pass to Germany 
soon after the construction of the line. Thus, she 
abandoned this negative approach as far as the Baghdad 
Railway was concerned and decided to associate herself 
with the project at the earliest opportunity. Otherwise, 
she would have cause to regret her exclusion from a scheme
(120) Busch, op.cit., Ref. (113), at 357, pp.197-198; 
and op.cit., Ref. (112), at 357, pp.112-113.
(121) Busch, op.cit.. Ref. (112), at 357, pp.188-189.
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( 122 )
so significant for the balance of power in the region.
On the other hand Germany was aware that the execution of 
the railroad project without any semblance of political
/123 ^
or financial support from Britain was in fact impossible. 
Therefore, in the years to follow, Anglo-Ottoman and Anglo- 
German negotiations on the Baghdajd Railway were initiated. 
Consequently, the parties concerned drew up a treaty in 
1913 according to which Kuwait was to be an autonomous 
Qada^^^^) under Turkish domination, with the Sheikh as 
Q a i m a q a m . g y  this treaty, the territory of Kuwait 
proper was to be that of a circle drawn with a radius 
running from Kuwait Town to the northern tip of Warba 
Island. An outer circle was also drawn within which the 
tribes were to be considered subordinate to Kuwait and 
the Turks were neither to post garrisons nor to make 
administrative changes. Although never ratified on account 
of the outbreak of the First World War, this treaty is 
historically considered the first instrument purporting to 
determine the so-called Kuwaiti Territory boundaries. ^
It can thus be concluded that the status of the 
Kuwaiti boundaries was a subject of long discussion prior
to the eruption of the First World War and even after it.
(122) The history of the Baghdad railroad in Kumar, op. 
cit.. Ref. (115), at 358, pp.70-79.
(123) Germany, at first, succeeded in gaining the support 
of France to provide a financial guarantee for the 
railway. See Kumar, ibid., pp.70-
(124) A city or province comes in second place as a 
matter of importance,
(125) The Governor of the Qada.
(126) Hay, op.cit.. Ref. (68), at 311, pp.98-99; and op, 
cit.. Ref. ( 4 ), at 288, p.435.
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Shortly after the war, the name Kuwait again arose.
Britain wished to reserve her power in Kuwait. Several 
further steps therefore were taken towards delimiting 
definitely the borders of K u w a i t . I n  April 1923, 
the British Representative in Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox, 
addressed a letter to the British Political Resident in 
Kuwait asking him to inform the Ruler of Kuwait of the 
British Government's recognition of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti 
boundaries, as they were previously claimed by the ruler
himself.(128)
Thus far, it is clear that the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundaries 
had not been validly delimited. It is the view of some 
writers that in 1932 Iraq recognized the boundaries 
mentioned in the 1913 Treaty, when the Iraqi State came 
into b e i n g . (^^8) in a letter dated July 21, 1932 to the 
British Representative in Kuwait, Sir Francis Humphreys, 
the Iraqi Prime Minister admitted the land frontier between
(127) The British Representative in Iraq, Sir Percy Cox 
managed in 1922, in cooperation with H.R.B. Dickson, 
when the latter was one of the political captains
in Iraq, to conclude Al-Uqair Conference which 
ended in the delimitation of the Iraqi-Najid and 
the Saudia-Kuwaiti boundaries. There was no 
indication of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi boundaries in this 
Conference. See, Dickson, H.R.P., "Kuwait and Her 
Neighbours", 1956, pp.262-280.
(128) The British Representative Sir Percy Cox wrote, 
in his letter to the Political Resident that "it 
is, in so far as it goes, identical with the 
frontier indicated by the Green Line of the Anglo- 
Turkish Agreement of July 29th 1913, but there 
seems no necessity to make special allusion to that 
document in your communication to the Sheikh...".
See ibid., p .280.
(129) Hay, op.cit.. Ref. (4 ), at 288, p.435.
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Iraq and Kuwait to be as it had been determined in the 
1913 unratified treaty. This letter was accepted by the 
Ruler of Kuwait in a letter dated August 10, 1932.
This status of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundaries remained until 
the Second World War and thenceforth 1963 when the 
representatives of Iraq and Kuwait declared on October 4, 
the recognition of Iraq, the independence of the State of 
Kuwait and its complete sovereignty within the boundaries 
indicated in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq 
dated July 21, 1932.(^21)
II. Conclusion "The Facts in the Light of Legal Principles"
Apart from the aforementioned instruments, no other
legal act to determine the Iraqi-Kuwaiti land frontiers has
come to pass. These instruments it is submitted may lack
a practical binding force. Undoubtedly, States usually
attach much weight to their frontier declarations and
treaties. Accordingly, such an instrument should be
concluded expressly and explicitly. As regards the 1913
Treaty, irrespective of other factors which are outwith
( 132 )
the scope of this work, it had never been ratified.
As far as the Iraqi Prime Minister's letter to the 
British Representative is concerned, it relied upon the 
1913 non-ratified treaty. On the other hand, it can 
hardly be proper to depend on such an act to design
(130) Hay, op.cit.. Ref. (68), at 311, p.98; Al-Baharna, 
op.cit., Ref. (3), at 318, pp.256 et seq.
(131) Middle East Economic Survey, A weekly review of 
news and views on Middle East Oil, published by the 
Middle East Research and Publishing Centre, Beirut, 
No. 49, 11 October and No. 50, 18 October, 1963.
(132) Hay, op.cit., Ref. (68), at 311, p.98.
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international boundaries, since demands required by 
international law in such acts have not been met.
The Iraqi Prime Minister's letter, owing to the non­
existence of both international and constitutional law 
prerequisites, once again lacks the authority of a legally 
binding rule. Such a private letter, if it were regarded 
to delimit the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundaries, widens at least 
in the writer's view, the effect of the text far beyond 
its own terms. It reflected only the personal outlook of 
the Prime Minister himself, as it did not exhaust the 
constitutional prerequisites, namely non dat qui non habet.
Finally, the fact that States have drawn up a 
declaration or a treaty does not mean per se that they have 
acted upon it. One might as well suggest that States may 
require further time to consider the effects of the 
agreement before finally committing themselves. Clearly, 
many constitutions require subsequent legislative approval 
of certain kinds of agreements by a specified organ of the 
State and boundary agreements surely fall within this 
category.
Accordingly, agreements of this sort do not come into 
effect unless the required procedure for approval and 
ratification is completed. ^
After this clarification, it is to be noted that the 
1963 Declaration has neither been authoritatively issued 
nor ratified by the legislative power. Additionally, it, 
by its terms, did not do any more than recognize the status 
quo as it had been, and did not determine what the status
(133) See below, pp. 366 et seq.
quo was. It recognized the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundaries as 
they had been referred to in the letter of the Iraqi Prime 
Minister which in itself was of no binding effect not 
having been framed in accordance with the respective 
constitutional processes. Moreover, neither the Prime 
Minister's letter nor the 1963 Declaration met the 
international law prerequisites. It is submitted that 
predominant opinion and practice support the view that a 
legal act determining frontiers has to define clearly the 
border line, its markers and physical f e a t u r e s . T h i s  
submission is confirmed by examination of international 
practice for a number of frontier treaties have defined 
definitely and accurately the boundaries between the States 
concerned. In support of this it could be relied upon 
the Belgian-Netherlands Boundary Convention of 1843 which 
delimited accurately in Article 3 the boundaries between
( 135 ^
these two countries. In addition to the Belgian-
Nether lands Convention, other frontier agreements almost 
without exception contain similar clauses. The British- 
Ethiopian Frontier Agreement of December 6, 1907, 
the Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries between
( 137 ")
Ecuador and Peru,^ and the United States-Mexican
(134) Bishop, William W. Jr., "Interpretation of Nether- 
lands-Belgian Boundary Convention - Status quo - 
Proof of mistake - acquisition of sovereignty in 
derogation of treaty," AJIL, Vol. 531 1959, pp. 
937-943.
(135) See Article 3, cited in Whiteman, op.cit., Ref. (5 ) 
at 9 , Vol. 3, p.627.
(136) See Whiteman, ibid., pp.661-668.
(137) Article 8 of the Protocol of 29 June, 1942, cited 
in ibid., p .678.
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Convention of August 29, 1 9 6 3 , have all defined the
boundaries between the States concerned definitely and
distinctly. Article l(a,b) and Article 2 of the Agreement
for the Delimitation of Boundaries between the Hashimite
Kingdom of Jordon and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are
(139 )similar in purport. ^  Also, the provisions of the
Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 were of such a nature that 
there could be no doubt about the frontiers affected by 
i t . ( 1 4 0 )
The preceding agreements include all the relevant
instances. They point with clarity to the proposition
that State practice has applied and honoured the practice
of defining the boundaries accurately in frontier
agreements. Otherwise, certainty, which is the chief
aim of such treaties, would not be achieved. As has
been supported by the ICJ, frontier agreements obviously
seek immutability. In the Case Concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear,(^^^^ the ICJ maintained that:
"In general, when two countries establish a 
frontier between them, one of the primary 
objects is to achieve stability and finality.
Furthermore, as well as being state practice, writers
are also of the opinion that subsequent approval is
(138) Cited in ibid., p.690.
(139) The full text of the Agreement is cited in the M.E.J. 
Vol. 22, 1968, pp.346-347.
(140) See for example Articles 2, 3, 6, 11 cited in 
Fitzmaurice, G.G., "The Juridical Clauses of the 
Peace Treaties", Hague Recueil, Vol. 73, 1948, II, 
p .280.
(141) Cambodia v. Thailand, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 2-146.
(142) Ibid., p.34.
essential to the validity of a treaty. Halleck, for
instance favours this view. He wrote:
"... under the positive law of nations, 
ratification by the State in whose name the 
treaty is made, by its duly authorized minister 
or diplomatic agent, furnished with full power, 
is essential to the validity of the treaty, 
was at one time the subject of much doubt and 
discussion. But it is now the settled usage 
to require such ratification, even where this 
pre-requisite is not reserved by the express 
terms of the treaty itself.
Oppenheim is also of the same opinion. He states
that
"Although a treaty is concluded as soon as the 
mutual consent is manifest from acts of the 
duly authorised representatives, its binding 
force is, as a rule, suspended till ratific­
ation is givenV^^^^^
He goes on :
"It is now a universally recognized customary 
rule of international law that treaties 
regularly require ratification, even if this 
is not expressly stipulated.
Similarly, other leading authorities not only express 
the same view but discuss the question at length, citing a 
number of other authorities in support of the question. 
According to the view of the writers, even if the right of 
ratification is not expressly reserved, it is nevertheless 
to be read into the treaty as it exists as a general
(143) Cited in Fitzmaurice, G.G., "Do Treaties Need 
Ratification?", SYBIL, Vol. 15, 1934, p.122.
(144) Oppenheim, op.cit.. Ref. (262), at 137, p.813.
(145) Ibid., p.815.
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principle of
Not only the weight of authority is in favour of the 
necessity for ratification, but also general practice of 
States invariably requires r a t i f i c a t i o n . F o r  
example, Article 5 of the Agreement for the Delimitation 
of Boundaries between the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, previously mentioned, provides 
that :
"This agreement will be ratified according to 
the constitutional procedures in each of the 
contracting Kingdoms.
Turning to international adjudication, the same
conclusion may also be drawn from judgments of the
international tribunal. Lord Stowell, in his judgement
in the Eliza Ann Case^^^^) stated on March 9th, 1813 that:
"According to the practice now prevailing, 
a subsequent ratification is essentially 
necessary, and a strong confirmation of the 
truth of this position is, that there is 
hardly a modern treaty in which it is not 
expressly so stipulated; and therefore it 
is now to be presumed that the powers of 
plenipotentiaries are limited by the condition 
of subsequent ratification
Here, again there is evidence that, in general,
agreements are subject to ratification. This has been
confirmed by the ICJ in the International Commission of
(146) Fitzmaurice, op.cit.. Ref. (143), at 366, p.124.
(147) YBILC, 1962, Vol. II, p.171.
(148) The Full Text is cited in M.E.J., Vol. 22, 1968, 
pp. 346-348.
(149) (1815) Dod, 244-251.
(150) Ibid., at 248.
the ODER Case. The Court approved the contention of the
Polish Government that the "Barcelona Convention" was not
binding upon her since she had not ratified it. Then,
the Court admitted that :
"The expression to draw up 'établir* a convention 
is perhaps not entirely without ambiguity; but 
it would be hardly justifiable to deduce from a 
somewhat ill-chosen expression an intention to 
derogate from a rule of international law so 
important as that relating to the ratification 
of conventions...."
The Court concluded that
"even having regard to Article 338 of the Treaty 
of Versailles, it cannot be admitted that the 
ratification of the Barcelona Convention is 
superfluous, and that the said Convention should 
produce the effects referred to in that Article 
independently of ratification.
The question therefore rests on whether or not a 
treaty signed by plenipotentiaries needs ratification to 
be effective and valid. In the abstract, actions carried 
through by those who are rightly authorized, are incumbent 
upon the principle. However, it is now well established 
by later usage of States, that a treaty even if signed by 
plenipotentiaries, requires ratification.^ ^
The conclusion is that there has been no formal act 
by which Iraq has given her final acceptance to any of 
the aforementioned instruments or intimated this acceptance 
to Kuwait. Seen from the constitutional point of view,
(151) PCIJ Series A, No. 23, p.20 (1929).
(152) Ibid., p.21.
(153) See U.N. Doc. A/5209, YBILC, 1962, Vol. II, p.171.
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the statements referred to are totally devoid of any 
legally binding effect. Contrary to the principles of 
international law, they have not defined in detail the 
exact frontier line between the two countries.
Adopting provisions in a broad sense leads only to the 
most serious hostilities. Therefore, whilst it is our 
desire to show every consideration for the views put 
forward to conclude that a boundary line between Iraq and 
Kuwait has been established, it would however seem, for 
the reasons explained, that in the absence of precisely 
accepted and well defined principles of delimitation in a 
treaty in force it would be dangerous to jump to such a 
conclusion. It would consequently appear that the 
earlier documents have only a slight and inclusive value, 
if indeed any. Their role is confined only to declaring 
the desire of the parties to find a conclusive solution. 
They are thus of a purely rhetorical character.
The Drawing of the Western Boundary of the Iraqi 
Territorial Sea
Unquestionably, the placing of the ultimate point on 
the land frontier between Iraq and Kuwait has enormous 
relevance in determining the maritime boundaries between 
them. It has just previously been indicated that as yet 
the frontiers between the two countries have not officially 
been fixed.
(154) The chief steps in fixing a boundary line can be
summarized in four stages: (1) a political decision 
on the allocation of the boundary line; (2) the 
definition of a boundary in an agreement; (3) the 
demarcation or an actual laying down of the 
boundary line; (4) the subsequent day-to-day 
administration. See Bishop, op.cit.. Ref. (2 ), 
at 8 , p.284.
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In this position it would be necessary to presume 
the location of such a point. Then the process which 
was explained, for constructing, the equidistance line 
between Iraqi and Iranian territorial seas, is to be 
applied.
Section Two 
The Problems of Delimiting the Iraqi 
Territorial Sea Boundaries
In general, the formation of the Arabian Gulf is such 
that major problems and sometimes formidable obstacles to 
the delimitation of marine boundaries are created. For 
example, we may note near the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab 
river, the existence of much precipitated silt carried 
down by the outwash of sandy soil to form a large body of 
solid ground. The amount of silt carried down the 
Shatt al-Arab is estimated to be about 35 million 
cubic metres per year.^^^^^ This natural phenomenon may 
create a problem in that the territories of Iraq and Iran 
may gradually lose ground by reason of accretion. Also, 
the location of the Iraqi baseline is constantly and 
materially being affected by accretion. These problems 
therefore must be considered.
Subsection One 
The Legal Status of Areas Created or Diminished 
by Accretion
Iraq occupies the land of ancient Mesopotamia, an area 
of some 171,000 sq. miles between two rivers, the Tigris
(155) See above pp. 354, 355.
(156) Al-Mitoori, op.cit., Ref. (42), at 301, p.41;
El-Hakim, op.cit., Ref, (66), at 310, p.10.
and the Euphrates. The Shatt al-Arab, one of the longest 
rivers in the world, is the confluence of these twin rivers 
with tributary of the Karun river in the southern part of 
Iraq near the head of the Arabian Gulf. The point of 
convergence of the Tigris and the Euphrates used to be at
the city of Qurna, but in the last quarter of the 19th
century, there were apparent changes in the course of the 
Euphrates causing it to come together with the Tigris a
( 157 ')
short distance farther on at Karmat Ali. The Shatt
al-Arab, which flows on as a single stream to the Arabian
Gulf,has an overall length of 2,200 miles, placing it
among the sixteen longest rivers in the w o r l d . T h e  
three tributaries of the Shatt al-Arab carry large amounts 
of silt. The mean annual volume of sediment deposited by 
the Shatt al-Arab is estimated at approximately 500 
thousand tons.^^^^) it follows then, that the Shatt al- 
Arab river is building new land at the head of the Arabian
Gulf.(460)
Dealing with this particular point, it may be noted
(157) See Al-Mitoori, op.cit.. Ref. (42), at 301, p.36.
(158) Gressey, George B., "Geographical Review, The Shatt 
al-Arab Basin", M.E.J., Vol. 12, 1958, p.448.
(159) Wilson, Sir Arnold T., "The Delta of the Shatt al- 
Arab and Proposals for Dredging the Bar", Geoj,
Vol. 65, 1925, pp.232, 233.
(160) In the earlier centuries the Shatt al-Arab built 
up the land further inland. See Gressey, op,cit.. 
Ref. (158), at 371, p. 449. However, slowly, but 
nevertheless continuously, great territorial changes 
have occurred. The distance between the two 
rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, has been 
estimated to be between 7 and 25 miles. According 
to Pliny, (23-79 A.B.) the Euphrates had in ancient 
times emptied its waters into the sea through its 
own estuary. See Wilson, ibid., p.225.
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at the outset that rules governing accretion are well 
established. They raise only a few small problems in 
theory. Yet, in practice they have created boundary 
controversies.
In general, it is recognized that when a State owns 
the bank of a river, on which accretion takes place, the 
new land is deemed to be part of the territory of that 
State. Accordingly, if a river builds up the shore with 
sediment, the riparian State has exclusive rights to the 
new land. It follows that such alluvial deposits or 
other additions are subject to the littoral State's 
jurisdiction.
Turning first of all to what has been written on the 
subject, there is an overwhelming consensus of opinion 
amongst writers that where accretion adds ground, the new 
land belongs to the riparian State. According to 
Professor Sultan, this mode of acquiring ownership was 
drawn from private law to be included in international law, 
on the grounds that territory of State was an integral part 
of the absolute and private property of the sovereign.  ^
Accretion and new land formations, whether natural or man- 
made, are assimilated to old ones. Additions are 
considered to be part of the State which possesses the 
coast of the river and are thus subject to its sovereignty 
irrespective of whether or not the State concerned has 
made any declaration or claim. Strictly speaking therefore,
(161) Greig, D.W. "International Law" 2nd ed., 1976, p.157.
(162) Ibid., at 157.
(163) Sultan, Hamed, "International Law in Time of Peace"
1st ed., 1962, pp.716-717.
appendages such as deltas, islands, or even sandbanks 
should be attributed to the littoral State, Similarly, 
this concept covers the artificial extensions of man-made 
constructions. Thus, the general rule of accretion is 
applicable to physical changes to the shore, which take 
place by its protrusion out into the sea.^^^^^
Professor Kanim asserts that the slow deposition of 
soil as a river fills up, is subject to the adjoining 
state's jurisdiction, whether or not it was so declared 
or any action was taken in this regard.
Lands emerging within territorial seas or occurring 
at shorelines or mouths of rivers, appertain to the 
coastal State. In the view of Professor Kanim, who shares 
the belief of Professor Sultan, this rule covers any 
artificial additions that the coastal State may build on 
to its harbours as protection from the waves from its 
territorial sea,
Amongst others, Summers, Oppenheim and O'Connell state 
that according to the principles of the law of Nations, 
additional territory arising in rivers and within the 
limits of national jurisdiction, are attached to the 
adjoining S t a t e s . T h i s  concept. De Vattel argues, 
has its origins in Roman Law. It has been transferred 
from the Roman Law rule of accessio cedit principali. It
(164) Ibid.
(165) Kanim, Dr. M.H., "The Principles of Public 
International Law", 1965, p.313.
(166) Oppenheim, op.cit., Ref. (262), at 137, pp.515 et 
seq.; O'Connell, op.cit.. Ref, (200), at 116, p.192; 
and op.cit., Ref. ( 5 ), at 54, pp.428-429;
Summers, Lionel M., "The International Law of 
Peace", 1972, p.37.
follows that additions accrue to the territory of the 
State next to the river as a matter of legal status.
Additional support for the preceding principle may 
be found in international adjudications. Turning to the 
World Court, we note at the outset that the ICJ has not 
had an opportunity to pronounce upon the question of 
accretion. International tribunals, other than the World 
Court, almost without exception apply the general principle 
on accretion. In the Anna Case,^^^^^ the question arose 
as to what was to be deemed the shore, since there were 
a number of small mud islands. The facts of the case, 
in short, were that an American ship "The Anna" was 
captured by a British Privateer near the mouth of the 
Mississippi River, The site of capture was more than 
three miles from the mainland, but no more than two miles 
from the alluvial islands composed of earth and trees 
brought down by the Mississippi River and located on the 
western shore of its principle mouth.
The U.S. claimed that the vessel be restored due to 
the fact that it was seized within the American territorial 
sea, and thus was within her jurisdiction. Lord Stowell 
held that the islands were 'the natural appendages of the 
coast on which they border and from which indeed they are 
formed" and that "whether they are composed of earth or 
solid rock will not vary the right of dominion, for the 
right of dominion does not depend upon the texture of the
(167) De Vattel, E., "The Law of Nations or the Principles 
of Natural Law", Vol. 3, Translation of the Edition 
of 1758, by Charles G. Fenwick, Washington, 1916, 
pp. 102 et seq.
(168) U ^ .  v. U ^ . ,  (1805) 5C. Rob. 373 - 385.
Dsoil".
He accordingly released the ship to its American
owners, as territorial protection extended to the waters
of the islands which he described as forming "a kind of
portico to the mainland".
The case of The Secretary of State for India in
Council V. Sri Raja Chellikani Rama Rao and others^^^^^ in
1916, acknowledged that land additions are to be deemed
part of the territory of the State bordering the river
or the sea. What happened in this case was that islands
had been formed near the mouth or delta of the River
Godaveri. It was held that
"... do not doubt that the general law, as 
already stated, is supported by the preponder­
ating considerations of practical convenience, 
and that, upon the particular case in hand, the 
ownership of the islands, formed in the sea, in 
the estuary of mouth of the Godaveri River, 
is in the British Crown.
In addition, by virtue of Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the ICJ, a solution might be sought for in municipal
law, namely "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations".
At the municipal level, the rule that additions be
considered part of the territory of the State possessing
the river, prevails. Cases discussed and argued by the
(169) Ibid., 385.
(170) 32 T.L.R., 1915-1916, 652-655.
(171) 32 T.L.R., ibid.
(172) Today it is generally admitted that rules of law
accepted by civilized nations constitute part of
international law. See ICJ Pleadings, 1968, Vol.
1, p.392.
U.S. Supreme Court abound with instances pertinent to the
question.^ ^
For example, a dispute arose betweentthe State of
Nebraska and the State of Iowa in 1891, and the problem
was referred to the U.S. Supreme Court. After putting
forward the case, the Court proceeded to state that if the
banks or the shore of a river are extended or changed by
the gradual process known as accretion, then it can be
firmly settled that the additional ground is held by the
riparian S t a t e . T h e  Court then, went on to say that:
"if a territory which terminates on a river..., 
that is to say, every gradual increase of soil, 
every addition which the current of the river 
may take to its bank on that side, is an 
addition to that territory."
Another Judgment decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
supported the principle that natural land accretions formed
by silt can only be thought of as accretions to the portion
of the State next to the river. In the Case of the State
of Louisiana v. the State of Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that accretions attached to a coastal State
formed part of its territory. ^
From the foregoing, it appears clear that natural
formations built up by a river belong ipso facto to the
State owning the bank of the river regardless of any special
(173) New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662 (1836); 
Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23(1904); Oklahoma 
V. Texas, 260 U.S. 606 (1923).
(174) Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359-370, (1891).
(175) 143 U.S. 365 (1891).
(176) Louisiana v. Mississippi, 282 U.S. 458-467, (1930).
(177 )process which has to be gone through.
It follows that the delta pushed seawards by the
Shatt al-Arab, estimated at the rate of about 2 miles a
c e n t u r y , i s  governed by the preceding rule. Yet,
the entire Shatt al-Arab is under the sovereignty of 
(179 )Iraq. It follows that the new land emerging by
reason of silt deposited by the Shatt al-Arab, forms part 
of Iraqi territory. Additionally, Iraq has erected an 
artificial port within her territorial sea. In response 
to the ever increasing demand for Iraqi oil, a deep harbour 
has been built at Kohral-Amya in order to facilitate the 
anchorage and loading of huge oil tankers. This 
artificial formation, in the light of the above propositions, 
is also an integral part of Iraqi territory.
Subsection Two 
The Seaward Extension of the Iraqi Baseline
As stated earlier, the Shatt al-Arab is a great river 
discharging the constituents of a great mud flat. Its 
annual deposits are some 35 million cubic metres.
The extensive sedimentary deposits of the Shatt al- 
Arab obviously affect the location of the water-mark of 
the Iraqi shore. The Iraqi baseline is moving gradually 
but continuously seawards, due to slow and orderly 
accretion. The alterations to the Iraqi baseline, in the
(177) ABU Hayf, Ali Sadiq, "Public International Law", 
1964-1965, p.389.
(178) Encyclopedia Britannica, William Benton, Publisher, 
1970,, Vol. 12, p.527.
(179) See above, pp. 331-336.
(180) See El-Hakim, op.cit.. Ref. (66), at 310, p.10.
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course of time, by the deposit of alluvium from the Shatt 
al-Arab, presents a problem since the location of the 
baseline is the corner stone in delimiting the limits of 
coastal j u r i s d i c t i o n . T h i s  question is of vital 
concern to Iraq, which is located on the inner part of the 
Arabian Gulf with a sharp frontage of some 40 miles.
The line across the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab constitutes 
part of the Iraqi baseline. Under these circumstances, 
it is necessary to ascertain whether or not the alluvial 
formations will automatically affect the placing of the 
Iraqi baseline.
Although it would indeed be convenient to say that 
the Geneva Convention on the (TSCZ) embodies solutions to 
almost all of the problems relating to drawing baselines, 
this is not quite the case. It provides at the outset 
the generally accepted rule that baselines from which the 
territorial sea is measured are always the line of water­
mark following the curve of the c o a s t l i n e . ^  However, 
the language of the sort contained in Article 3 of the 
Convention on the (TSCZ) gives no evidence that it covers 
the problem in question.
Article 4 permits a coastal State to deviate from the 
general principle provided for in Article 3, and claim in 
certain circumstances the right to delimit its territorial 
sea according to the straight baseline rule, for example, 
when the shore is "deeply indented and cut into, or if
(181) See above p.11.
(182) See above pp.289 et seq.
(183) Article 3 of the Convention on the TSCZ.
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its
immediate v i c i n i t y . T h i s  rule again is inapplicable
in the present situation. It is formulated in the light
of the Judgment of the ICJ in the Fisheries Case which was
referred to earlier.
Another provision, seemingly pertinent to the subject,
offers no assistance in this respect. Article 11 provides
a solution for cases where the low-tide elevation is
located within or outwith the respective limit of the
territorial sea of the State concerned.
However, if it is intended to discover the rule
calling for a solution, it should be sought for elsewhere
within the Convention. Perhaps the only general Article
coming near to the point, it is submitted, is Article 13
inasmuch as it concerns the drawing of baselines across
the mouth of rivers. It runs as follows:
"If a river flows directly into the sea, the 
baseline shall be a straight line across the
mouth of the river between points on the low-
tide line of its banks.
In summarizing, it is desirable to make clear the
following points:
a. The normal baseline is the low-water mark.
b. The exceptional baseline where coasts are deeply 
indented or fringed with islands is the straight base­
line from point to point.
c. The only proviso close to the establishment of the
(184) See Article 4 of the Convention on the TSCZ.
(185) See above pp. 16 et seq.
(186) Brownlie, op.cit.. Ref. (31), at 20, p.82.
baseline across the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab River 
is that of Article 13. Its text does not clearly 
indicate where the baseline is to be drawn in the case 
of continuous accretion. The application of a rule of 
such broad terms is surely to be invoked in all cases 
of drawing baselines across the mouth of rivers. That 
is to say, the text is very broad indeed, and language 
of this kind, in the absence of any convincing evidence 
to the contrary, leaves no doubt that wherever the 
mouth of the river is, then the aforementioned provision 
is applicable. Consequently, the baseline will 
automatically follow the alteration to the mouth of the 
river and coincide with it throughout the passing of 
time.
The Convention's provisions relating to the delimita­
tion of marine boundaries between opposite and adjacent 
States, contain no particular clause to cover this 
situation. The clause inserted in Article 12, namely the 
"special circumstances" principle, does not help either.
In dealing with this clause, one only has to look at the 
numerous interpretations which have been advanced from time
f I 87 ^
to time, to realize the vagueness of this term.^  ^ For 
example, the ambiguities to be considered are the 
conditions to be prescribed and the question of authorit­
ative determination of what conditions apply in a given 
case,
In the absence of a particular proviso therefore, 
Article 13, due to its encyclopedic character, must cover
(187) See above pp. 211 et seq.
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the case of the Shatt al-Arab. It follows that the Iraqi 
baseline, according to Article 13 of the Geneva Convention, 
is being pushed gradually towards the sea by the accretion 
of silt deposited by the Shatt al-Arab river.
As there is no particular pre-existing proviso, other 
than Article 13, situations where a bargaining advantage 
can be gained, are anticipated. The probability that 
this process will be acknowledged by only one side in a 
dispute, may safely be predicted. However, the need to 
observe this point in any subsequent negotiations between 
Iraq and Iran on delimiting maritime boundaries, seems 
indispensable. It would be safer to include a specific 
clause in any future bilateral treaty between the two 
countries in order to provide for adjustment to the baseline
It is submitted that the changing of the baseline 
across the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab should not automat­
ically take place on account of alterations to the shores. 
Automatic changes in the baseline following alterations to 
the shores of the river must be rejected to avoid the 
chaos which might ensue if spontaneous adjustment was 
deemed to occur when any such alteration took place.
(188) This certainly will effect the limits of the Iraqi 
maritime boundaries which in turn creates other 
sorts of problems. Admittedly, there are no general 
principles of international law applicable to 
alterations of rivers and their consequences since 
each change possesses its own particular character 
due to its concrete circumstances. However that may 
be, it is suggested that the same proposition as will 
be considered to be applied as Regards alterations
of baselines, is to be applies in alterations of 
marine boundaries.
(189) Even though the alteration is of a limited character 
since any petty extension of the baseline affects 
substantially the width of areas appertain to the 
States concerned.
It would appear more desirable to bring about an 
adjustment to the baseline at intervals.
In view of these factors, and since Article 13 of 
the TSCZ Convention is devoted to laying down in very 
general terms the principles applicable to such situations, 
one would strongly hope for the incorporation of an 
article providing for a particular solution.
Recommendation
It is submitted that it would seem appropriate to 
include the following provision in any future agreement 
between Iraq and Iran.
1. The baseline across the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab 
acknowledged in accordance with the principle laid down 
in Article ( ), will constitute the respective baseline 
from which the marine boundaries of the contracting 
States will be measured.
2. a. The line fixed in accordance with the stipulations 
of the previous paragraph, shall coincide with 
subsequent gradual and natural changes in the mouth of 
the Shatt al-Arab,
b. Artificial changes which may be made by agreement 
between the competent authorities of the contracting 
States, are subject to the rule referred to in paragraph 
2(a) in so far as these changes are admitted to by the 
said authorities.
3. The position of the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab shall be 
surveyed and determined every (..) years, and the 
location of the baseline across the said river shall, 
if necessary, be adjusted as defined in paragraph (2),
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When the baseline across the mouth of the Shatt al- 
Arab has been surveyed, it will still constitute the 
conventional baseline irrespective of whatever changes 
the shores of the Shatt al-Arab may have undergone in 
intervals between one verification and the next.
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DELIMITATION OF THE IRAQI CONTINENTAL SHELF
As shown in chapter two, the rights over the
continental shelf to which the adjacent State is entitled
arise ipso facto and ab initio. T h a t  is to say, the
rights of the littoral State are exclusive, and the State
concerned is not required either to issue any express
declaration, or to take any formal or unequivocal action
(2 )
in order to acquire these rights.^  ^ Any proclamation
to claim sovereign rights over the continental shelf,
therefore, cannot create rights that already exist, nor
validate what is unlawful; and such a declaration will,
(3 )conspicuously, be only of a declaratory character.
A preliminary remark, however, must be made in respect 
of this point. The numerous natural resources of the 
seabed and subsoil are too well known to require much 
clarification. In such a case, delimiting offshore areas, 
in general, has become of imperative necessity. If 
international conflicts are to be avoided, and the
(1) See chapter two.
(2) The Truman Proclamation, op.cit.. Ref. (283), at 144; 
Article 2(3) of the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf of 1958; The ICJ pointed out in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases "... the rights of 
the coastal State in respect of the area of contin­
ental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation 
of its land territory into and under the sea exist 
ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty 
over the land, and as an extension of it in an 
exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural 
resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. 
In order to exercise it, no special legal process has 
to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts
to be performed". ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 19, p.22.
(3) See above pp. 139-153.
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continental shelf areas to be well explored and exploited,
definite boundaries will have to be drawn between those
(4)areas of adjoining States,
In addition to the aforementioned, the question of
drawing a boundary for the continental shelf between
neighbouring States either opposite or adjacent to each
other, is of further vital concern in the Arabian Gulf.
Here, problems sui generis arise which cannot be solved
satisfactorily by the application of the methods developed
for drawing maritime boundaries in normal geographical 
(5 )situations.^ The Arabian Gulf, first of all, (as has
been indicated earlier) is comparatively s h a l l o w , s o
that it would be fair to say that though it is wholly
continental shelf within the meaning of article (1) of the
(7 )1958 Convention, no shelf formation in the technical 
or geological sense exists there. Another complexity 
arises from islands, elevations and other similar features 
which are not only numerous, crowded and scattered 
throughout the gulf but also are commonly the subject of
(4) Grisel, op.cit.. Ref. (48), at 209, p.562; Liebesny, 
Herbert J., "Legislation on the Seabed and Territorial 
Waters of the Persian Gulf" M.E.J., Vol. 1, 1950,
p p .94-95.
(5) Young, op.cit.. Ref, (260), at 136, pp.236-237. The 
author states that "... submarine areas in shallow 
seas or gulfs - such as the Baltic, the Persian Gulf, 
and the Gulf of Paria - present perhaps the most 
difficult situation of all".
(6) The depth of the waters of the Arabian Gulf, rarely 
exceeds 50 fathoms (100 mile). See El-Hakim, op.cit., 
Ref. (66), at 310, p.122.
(7) Ibid., p.58. The Arabian Gulf, it is believed, has 
no continental shelf in either the geographical or 
geological senses. It has been considered as merely 
a flooded part of the continent, Auguste, op.cit..
Ref. ( 4 ), at 1 , p.31.
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disputed sovereighty. Finally and most significantly,
the large number of proven and probable petroleum deposits 
are one of the effectual reasons for the difficulty in 
the delimitation of maritime boundaries process, As
will be s h o w n , c o n f l i c t i n g  claims over submarine 
boundaries in the Arabian Gulf have in many cases first 
arisen as a result of the overlapping of offshore oil 
concession areas. Briefly, in some instances concession­
aires refused to proceed with drilling operations in 
overlapping areas until some agreement or understanding on 
the delimitation of boundaries was reached. Presumably, 
this was because they were reluctant to invest substantial 
amounts of money in exploration in areas which may 
subsequently be contested. Consequently, it has become 
clear that possession of a few miles of submarine area 
could make the difference between owning or not owning a 
profitable oil field.
For the foregoing, and primarily as a result of the
discovery of oil there, most of the local governments have
shown interest in the issue of submarine boundaries. It
may be added to these arguments, that the problem at hand,
is even more serious for Iraq which has a particular
(12 ^problem caused, as will be discussed later,^ by the
(8) Gutteridge, op.cit., Ref. (254), at 133, pp.103-104;
El-Hakim, op.cit., Ref. (66), at 310, p.123.
(9) El-Hakim, op.cit.. Ref. (66), at 310, p.122.
(10) See below pp. 434 et seq.
(11) El-Hakim, ibid., p.122.
(12) See below, pp. 389 et seq.
special configuration and short extent of her coastline,
while at the same time having overriding interests in her 
( 13 )
adjacent sea.
In any event, it will be on this that the present 
chapter will concentrate primarily. It will be divided 
into two sections. The delimitation of the Iraqi 
continental shelf's boundaries will be the subject of the 
following section. Also, since the determination of 
boundaries between the continental shelves of adjacent 
States gives rise to difficult problems and major disputes, 
the second section will be devoted to certain possible 
difficulties in this respect.
Section One
The Delimitation of the Iraqi Continental Shelf
As has been sufficiently demonstrated, the Geneva
Convention, as well as the rules of customary law, vest
in Iraq exclusive sovereign rights over her continental
shelf for the limited purposes of exploration and
exploitation. Obviously, the attribution of such
exclusive jurisdiction requires the delimitation of
boundaries between the different submarine areas
appertaining to Iraq, Kuwait and Iran. It may be observed
that the importance of such partitioning of the seabed and
subsoil is self-evident, but one point deserves particular
attention. It is necessary to recall that the bed of the
Arabian Gulf is wholly continental shelf in the legal
(14 )sense because of its shallowness. Thus, there is no
(13) Al-Muhana, op.cit.. Ref. (18), at 6, pp.240-242.
(14) See above pp. 292 et seq.; See also Article (1) of the 
Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf.
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outer limit of the continental shelf appertaining to Iraq, 
since it will inevitably meet the boundaries of both Kuwait 
and Iran.
After this general clarification, we shall attempt to 
discuss the subject in the following two subsections, 
which, it is expected, will cover the question:
Subsection One: Claims and Legislation of Iraq to the
Continental Shelf Area,
Subsection Two: What are the Rules of Law Applicable to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
Between Iraq and Her Neighbours?
Subsection One 
The Continental Shelf Legislation and 
Claims of Iraq
It might be useful, at the outset, to point out that 
prior to 1949, no national legislation relating to the 
submarine areas, as far as concerns the practice of the
( '15 ')
Arabian Gulf States is known to exist. Admittedly, an
era of legislation and claims was initiated by the 
discovery of enormous oil deposits lying under the seabed 
and subsoil.
(15) Auguste, op.cit., Ref. (4), at 1, p.57.
(16) The first Arabian Gulf State to enact legislation as
to the seabed resources was Iran. An Act was approved 
by the Iranian Council of Ministers in 1949 and was 
passed as a law on June 18, 1955. See Article 2 of 
this legislation published in ST/LEG/SER.B/16(1974)
p.151 and reproduced as Appendix No. ( V ) to this 
thesis. See also Al-Baharna, op.cit.. Ref. (3 ), at
318, pp. 280-281; Auguste, op.cit.. Ref. (4 ), at 1,
p.79. Some writers consider Saudi Arabia which 
asserted, by a Royal Decree dated May 28, 1949, its 
jurisdiction and control over the seabed and subsoil 
of the area contiguous to its coast, as the first
Contd....
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As for Iraq, the first actual claim made by the
Iraqi Government over the continental shelf was the
"Official Proclamation" issued on November 23, 1957, in
which Iraq declared that "all the natural resources" lying
in the seabed and subsoil outside the territorial sea "are
( 17 )the property of Iraq".
It may be noted that the Proclamation was drawn up
so as to conform with the rules of international law.
Therefore, having referred to the fact that Iraq has
exclusive general jurisdiction over such resources, the
Proclamation confirmed that its sole aim was the exercise
of rights established by international practice. Moreover,
it made clear that nothing contained therein would affect
the rules set up regarding freedom of navigation and
( 18 ')fishing in the aforementioned sea zone.^
Before proceeding further, it might be of significance 
to state that Iraq was motivated to issue the afore­
mentioned declaration by the increased Iranian interest in 
the offshore z o n e , T h i s  appeared clearly when an 
agreement was concluded between the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC) and Agip-Minerarie (SIRIP) on August 24, 
1957, in which the area of concession was defined so as
(16) contd...
State in this respect. See El-Hakim, op.cit., Ref. 
(66), at 310, p.47. For the text of the Saudi 
Arabian Decree, see AJIL, Vol. 43, 1949, Supplement 
Section of Documents (separately paged and indexed) 
p.154. As regards, Kuwait, A Proclamation was issued 
on June 12, 1949 published in ST/LEG/SER.B1 (1951) 
p.26 and reproduced as Appendix No. (VII) to this 
thesis.
(17) Published in ST/LEG/SER. B/15 (1970), pp.368-369 and 
reproduced as Appendix No. (1) to this thesis; see 
also the Official Gazette No. 4069 of 27.11.1957.
(18) Appendix No, (1).
(19) El-Hakim, op.cit., Ref. (66), at 310, p.53.
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to include "a zone of the continental shelf located in the
northern part of the (Arabian) Gulf...".
In the light of the above facts, and influenced by
bids laid at Iran's feet in 1958 by a number of oil
companies, it is not surprising to find the Iraqi
Government being motivated to promulgate a supplementary
Proclamation concerning her continental shelf. Having
asserted the statement which had been set down by the
Iraqi Government in 1957, the new instrument re-stated that
the sovereignty of Iraq extended to the territorial sea
(22 )and the seabed and subsoil. Moreover, it asserted
that works and constructions, as have been or will be 
undertaken in the area defined in the Proclamation, fell 
under the " s o v e r e i g n t y " o f  Iraq and that the taking 
up of such works and constructions is authorisable only 
to the relevant Iraqi authorities or to other parties 
authorized by the Iraqi Government. Having reaffirmed 
the adherence of the Iraqi State to the general principles 
of international law pertinent to the question, the 
Proclamation went on to declare the non-recognition of the 
Iraqi Government of any statement, notification, legis­
lation or plan concerning territorial waters or contiguous 
waters issued by any neighbouring country contravening the
(20) Article 3 of the agreement cited in Petroleum 
Legislation, Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts - 
Middle East, Vol. 1, 1959, Iran D-1.
(21) El-Hakim, op.cit., Ref. (66), at 310, p.53.
(22) The Proclamation published in ST/LEG/SER. B/15 (1970) 
p.369 and reproduced in Appendix No. II to this 
thesis; or the Official Gazette No. 4128 dated 
10.4.1958.
(23) See below p.391; see also Appendix No.(11).
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contents of this proclamation.
Comment
From analysis of the preceding excerpts, the following
may be deduced:
1. The legislation follows international practice in 
establishing the rights of the Iraqi State to the 
submarine areas contiguous to the Iraqi territorial sea.
2. The rights which have been established are that "the 
natural resources existing on the seabed and the subsoil 
are the property of Iraq" and that they are subject to 
her "exclusive general jurisdiction" and power of 
disposition as provided for in this legislation.
3. While the rights asserted in the proclamation of 
November 23, 1957 relate merely to the "natural resources" 
(as did the Truman Proclamation) .the supplementary 
proclamation claims full sovereignty over the seabed and 
subsoil to the same extent that Iraq has over the 
territorial sea and airspace over it.^^^^
4. The wording of the legislation indicates that there was 
an awareness of the particular geological and 
geographical facts. Contrary to the Iranian law, it 
avoids using the term "continental shelf". Instead, 
the term "seabed and subsoil" is used which stands to 
reason since there is no shelf in the geographical 
sense.
(24) It has been stated however, that the difference
between the two versions, appears to be slight since 
any control of the submarine resources will 
necessarily involve control of the subsea area as 
such. See Liebesny, op.cit.. Ref. (4 ), at 385, 
p.94; see above p. 147.
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5, The legislation deals only with the subsoil and seabed. 
It confers exclusive jurisdiction and control on the 
Iraqi Government and carries that jurisdiction and 
control to the farthest extent that the subsoil and 
seabed appertain to Iraq. It makes clear that the 
status as high seas of the overlying waters of that 
area, and the right to navigation and fishing therein, 
are not affected.
6. The outer limit of the legislation's applicability is 
not definitely specified. It appears to reach out to 
whatever extent will meet the Kuwaiti and Iranian 
continental shelves. This, indeed, shows an awareness 
of the particular situation of the Arabian Gulf 
presenting a special case in which, because of its 
shallowness, its submarine areas form a single 
continental shelf which must be divided up among the 
surrounding coastal States.
The Delimitation of the Lateral Boundaries of the Iraqi 
Continental Shelf
The extent to which Iraq, as opposed to other neigh­
bouring States, can validly assert jurisdiction and control 
over natural resources underlying the seabed adjacent to 
her coast, is not precisely apportioned in the afore­
mentioned legislation. It implies a certain spatial 
extension of the areas under control, but by no means 
provides any method for its lateral demarcation. It may 
be argued that the supplementary Proclamation of 10 April, 
1958, implies a certain mode of delimitation by referring
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(25 )to the equidistance method. Thus, it seems reasonable
to accept, as a demarcation line between the continental
shelves of Iraq, Kuwait and Iran (as the case may be), the
prolongation of the line of demarcation of the territorial
sea between the nations concerned. As an argument, such
an interpretation must be strongly opposed (for reasons
which will be discussed l a t e r ) . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  it
may be observed that there is no obligation on the part
of Iraq to accept the equidistance method as a conventional
rule since it has been provided for in the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. It must be admitted
that, despite being so carefully drawn up and clearly
containing large elements of progressive development and
codification in the area of the law of the continental
shelf, the Geneva Convention of 1958 can still present
some ambiguities and offers no recognized definite solution
to some difficulties. Amongst those problems, and perhaps
the most complicated one, is the question of dividing up
the continental shelf among various nations sharing a 
( 27 )common shore. In particular, the equidistance
method may produce, albeit not necessarily, an appropriate 
boundary line of the continental shelf between adjacent 
States under normal geographical circumstances. On the 
other hand, there are enough cases where the application 
of this method would lead to an inequitable result that 
cannot be recognized, as will be discussed later.
(25) See the Proclamation of April 10, 1958 Appendix 
No. (11).
(26) See below pp. 395 et seq.
(27) Grisel, op.cit., Ref. (48), at 209, p.562.
(28) See below pp. 397 et seq.
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It may be added, to the shortcomings of the equidistance
method, which have been previously i l l u s t r a t e d , t h a t
this method, as laid down in the context of the Iraqi
statement,is immediately followed by a demonstrative
provision indicating the adherence of Iraq to the
prescribed principles of international law which deny the
binding character of the equidistance criterion on its
own. T h e r e f o r e ,  it must be mentioned, for reasons
which will later be stated, that what is meant by the
equidistance method in the context of the Iraqi Proclamation
is that the application of the equidistance rule is
accepted in the sense recognized by international law. It
appears sound to suggest that, if this term is interpreted
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
(31 ^terms of acts in their context,^ it can find an 
application only under the conditions recognized by 
international law, namely when it will lead to equitable
apportionment as will soon be discussed.
(29) See above pp. 226-232.
(30) It may not be disputed that the equidistance rule on 
its own has not been established as the only general 
rule in delimiting marine boundaries. Not only had 
the ICJ taken this view but even the Court of 
Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf 
Case seems to have approved it. The fact which was 
repeatedly affirmed by the latter court was that 
Article 6 did not provide two rules, equidistance and 
special circumstances, but only one single rule 
equidistance-special circumstances. The distinction 
between the equidistance and equidistance-special 
circumstances is clear and does not need any further 
clarification. See below pp. 424 et seq,
(31) International Acts must be interpreted as a whole, and 
their meanings are not to be determined merely upon 
particular phrases which if detached from the context 
may be interpreted in a sense contrary to that which 
was intended. See the Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania Cases 
(second phase) ICJ Reports, 1950, pp.220-264 at ; 
the Polish Postal Service in Danzig Case, PCIJ, Series 
B, No. 11, p.39. (1925).
Subsection Two
What Are the Rules of Law Applicable to the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between 
Iraq and Her Neighbours?
Having examined the legislation of Iraq concerning
her jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf adjacent to
her coast, our remaining task is to specify the principles
to be employed to divide up the continental shelf area
( 32 )between Iraq, Kuwait and Iran.^
Before taking up this question, it might be convenient
to recall that the Iraqi coastline due to its concavity
and recession takes almost the form of a rectangle. It
runs from the Kuwaiti boundary to the west and then turns
in an eastern direction towards the point on the coast
(33 )where the Iranian coast begins.
This being the case, an immediate problem would then 
arise: namely, the delimitation of submarine boundaries
between Iraq and her neighbours, strictly on the basis of 
the equidistance line, faces a difficult situation. Clearly, 
the effect of the use of the equidistance line, if it were 
applied strictly, would be to pull the line dividing 
maritime belts inwards in the direction of the land.^^^^
(32) The location of Iraq, Kuwait and Iran coupled with 
the fact that the Arabian Gulf is wholly a single 
continental shelf, suggests as noted earlier that 
there would be no probability of an outer limit of 
the continental shelf. It follows that this is not 
the occasion, nor is there need here for an examin­
ation of the rules on the outer limit of the 
continental shelf. It is sufficient for present 
purposes to consider the rules on delimitation between 
neighbouring States.
(33) See above pp. 326-354.
(34) Young, op.cit., Ref. (381), at 173, p.737.
Therefore, if it were determined in accordance with the 
aforementioned principle, ignoring this particular 
configuration, the lateral boundaries would inevitably 
meet the Kuwaiti and Iranian boundaries at a relatively 
short distance. In plain terms, such delimitation would 
ad summam reduce the Iraqi apportionment of continental 
shelf.(35)
In these circumstances, it would seem that any attempt 
to divide the continental shelf boundaries between Iraq 
and her neighbours, without regard to certain factors, 
would lead to an inequitable solution. Yet, it is 
necessary to make the attempt taking into account this 
particular situation in order to militate in favour of a 
large apportionment to Iraq.
Having described this, if we are to discover the 
principles which have to be applied in dividing up the 
continental shelf between Iraq and her neighbours, it may 
be useful to divide the argument into two principle parts. 
In the first part, the question of whether Iraq is under 
an obligation to accept the equidistance method will be 
examined, and, in the second part, an attempt will be made 
to specify the rules applicable in connection with this.
(35) The application of the equidistance method met this 
difficult situation in the case of the Federal 
Republic of Germany whose coast's configuration 
is almost similar to that of Iraq. For the 
purpose of imagining Iraq's share of the continental 
shelf, if it would be defined according to the 
strict equidistance method, it is worth referring 
to the argument of Professor Jaenicke before the 
ICJ in the North Sea Cases, ICJ Pleadings, p.12.
I . Is Iraq Under An Obligation To Accept The Equidistance 
Method On Its Own?
It should be pointed out before proceeding that as 
Iraq has not signed the Continental Shelf Convention, then 
strictly speaking, the equidistance method mentioned in 
Article (6) of the Geneva Convention may not be invoked 
against her.
It is generally recognized, as a principle of inter­
national law, that treaties, whether multilateral or 
bilateral, can neither impose obligations nor modify legal 
rights for non-party States, in general, without their 
consent. ^
In the Island of Palmas Case,^^^) for instance,
Judge Huber said:
"It appears further to be evident that treaties 
concluded by Spain with third powers recognizing 
her sovereignty over the Philippines could not 
be binding upon the Netherlands,"
Further on. Judge Huber went on to say:
"The inchoate title of Netherlands could not 
have been modified by a treaty concluded between 
third powers."
(37) Despite the fact that the majority of writers on 
international law are in agreement that a right may 
be conferred on a third state without its assent, 
is a concept accepted by the majority of modern 
legal systems, there is still much controversy 
regarding the effect of such stipulations. For 
further details see Arechaga, Eduardo Jiménez De, 
"Treaty Stipulations in Favour of Third States", 
AJIL, Vol. 50, 1956, pp.340-341; see also the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, Part II, 
Section 4, Article 34.
(38) 1928 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 
II, p.831.
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Similarly, in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the 
District of Gex,^^^) -^ -^ e PCIJ held that Article 435 of 
the Treaty of Versailles was not binding upon Switzerland 
who was not a party to the treaty, except to the extent 
to which that country accepted it.^^^^
A similar attitude was taken by the PCIJ in the 
Status of Eastern Carelia Case.
By now it seems clear that the doctrine that a State 
is not bound by anything that it has not consented to, is 
a very well established principle of international law. 
This principle has gained the recognition of the 
international community and is codified in the Vienna 
Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties. It may 
be conceded that an individual State is bound by a rule 
adduced in a treaty although it has not previously 
consented to that treaty. That is to say when a general 
rule of customary international law is built up by the 
common practice of States. This principle has also 
gained the acceptance of the international community and 
is provided for in the Vienna Convention.
The above arguments speak for themselves. It is an 
accepted principle of international law that multilateral 
treaties, or particular provisions in them could have an 
effect upon non-parties only if they accept them or when
(39) PCIJ, Series A No. 22 pp.5-51 (1932)
(40) Ibid., p.17.
(41) PCIJ, Series B, No. 5, pp. 7-29 (1923).
(42) See Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.
(43) Article 38, Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.
the treaty or a provision passed into rules of customary
law.(44)
However, to say that is not to exclude the possibility 
of arguing that Iraq is obliged to accept the equidistance 
m e t h o d , o n  the strength of two reasons. No doubt, it 
could be argued that the equidistance method is binding on 
Iraq as it represents a customary rule of international 
law. On the other hand, it may be contended that Iraq 
has recognized the general applicability of the said method. 
The next discussion will be devoted to these two points.
a . The Alleged Customary International Character of the 
Equidistance Method
At the outset, it should be remembered that the merits 
as well as the inherent weaknesses of the equidistance 
method in ensuring an equitable apportionment of maritime 
areas between neighbouring States have been well demonstr­
ated in chapter three, and therefore need not be repeated 
here.(^^) It may suffice to say that the rule of 
equidistance does not contain the flexibility needed to 
accommodate the infinite variety of geographical situations
(44) Customary international law rules by their very nature 
have equal force for all members of the international 
community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any 
right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by 
any of them in its own favour. See Riesenfeld,
Stefan A. "The Neo-Positivist Concept of International 
Law" AJIL, Vol. 59, 1965, pp.321-335 at 323; Baxter, 
R.R. "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary 
International Law", BYBIL, Vol. 41, 1965-1966, pp. 
288-300.
(45) Wherever the equidistance method is referred to, 
hereinafter, the equidistance boundary line, strictly 
speaking, is meant.
(46) See above, chapter three, pp. 214-232.
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throughout the world.
It is true that no established method for the 
determination of continental shelf boundaries of a State 
vis-a-vis another State has yet to be regarded as 
appropriate in all cases. Nations sharing a common shelf 
have only occasionally attempted to delimit their maritime 
boundaries. In those occasional cases a number of 
methods have been employed, in which particular geograph­
ical features have been taken into account, and they have 
only a little, if any, general applicability.  ^ More­
over, using one method rather than another in each case 
has been by agreement between the interested States. It 
may be noted that no single principle has required 
attainment of the delimitation by using any particular 
method with any degree of uniformity.
However, the argument of Professor Jaenicke before 
the ICJ may be cited against the alleged customary 
international character of the equidistance method.
Having referred to the recommendations of the Committee 
of experts which first proposed the equidistance method 
in 1953, Professor Jaenicke concluded that the application 
of the said method was intended to be on the condition 
that it would yield an equitable result and that otherwise 
that method would lose its raison d'etre.
(47) Padwa, op.cit., Ref. (51), at 210, p.629.
(48) Ibid., p.629. The absence of a general principle of 
delimitation has given a number of writers pause to 
employ this fact as a piece of evidence demonstrating 
that the notion of the continental shelf has not 
become part of international law. See for example, 
Waldock, op.cit., Ref. (264), at 137, p.115.
(49) The Committee had pointed out that wherever the
Contd......
It may be added that in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, the World Court outlined that an examination 
of the history of the drafting of Article (6) of the 
Continental Shelf Convention revealed that at no time was 
the equidistance method an inherent necessity of the 
continental shelf doctrine. The Court was quite specific 
in saying that, in contrast, the history of the Article 
had always been dominated by two main concepts. Firstly, 
that "no one single method of delimitation was likely to 
prove satisfactory in all circumstances, and that 
delimitation should, therefore, be carried out by agreement 
'or by reference to arbitration'; and secondly, that it 
should be affected on equitable p r i n c i p l e s ^ T h e  
equidistance technique, in the Court's words "was proposed 
by the Commission with considerable hesitation, somewhat 
on an experimental basis, at most ^  lege ferenda, and
('51 )
not at all 6^ lege lata."  ^ Then the Court confirmed
that the ILC, having failed to establish any of the 
possibilities it examined, turned to a Commission of 
Experts. Consequently, it adopted the method of 
equidistance
"On basis of recommendations of this group which 
was not made up of lawyers, and its recommend­
ations were thus presumably based on considerations 
of practical convenience and cartography7 ^
(49) contd...
equidistance method would not lead to equitable 
apportionment the division of maritime boundaries 
should then be determined by negotiation. See ICJ, 
Pleadings, Vol. II, pp.13 et seq.
(50) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 55, pp.35-36.
(51) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 62, p.38.
(52) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 53, p.35.
The Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Case
seems to agree with the ICJ in this respect. Although
the former Court adhered to the applicability of Article
6, in a limited sense, between France and the U.K., as
both were parties to the Geneva Convention, nevertheless
it tended to reduce the weight to be given to the
equidistance rule. The Court noted that the rule of
equidistance had never been adopted by the Convention as
a rule on its own. The attitude of the Court is evident
in its consideration of the equidistance-special circum-
(53 )stances as only one rule. This is a tacit admission,
it is submitted, of the fact that it was the firm belief 
of the Court that the equidistance rule on its own was not 
a general rule of customary international law.
In addition, another important fact supports the 
view that it cannot be contended that the equidistance 
method is a rule of customary international law. This 
brings us to examine whether the Continental Shelf 
Convention, or to be more specific* Article 6(2),intended 
to be declaratory of existing customary international 
law, or has become so subsequently.
For this question to be discussed, it is first of 
all significant to consider the structure of the Conventions 
on the law of the sea as a whole. Examining the language 
of the preambles of the five Conventions of the law of the 
sea, one can easily infer that only the Convention on the 
high seas is to any great extent declaratory of existing
(53) See above pp. 264 et seq.
international law.^^^^ The following two clauses have
been incorporated in the latter Convention while not
referred to in the four others :
"Desiring to codify the rules of international 
law relating to the high seas,
Recognizing that the UNCLOS, held at Geneva 
from 24 February to 27 April 1958, adopted the 
following provisions as generally declaratory 
of established principles of international
law."(55)
It may be observed that the eagerness and strong 
desire to adopt almost similar, and in substance even 
identical principles, in drafting the provisions of the 
Conventions rather than the inconsistent and non-uniform 
preambles, leads one to believe that the different 
language of the preambles was designated after careful 
thought.
In looking at the equidistance clause, as it is 
expressed in the context of Article 6 of the Continental 
Shelf Convention to decide whether it can be recognized 
as customary international law, it is necessary to observe 
the origin of the Article as well as State practice since 
the Geneva Conference of 1958, The Court, in the North 
Sea Cases concluded that "the Geneva Convention was not 
in its origins or inception declaratory of a mandatory 
rule of customary international law enjoining the use of 
the equidistance principle for the delimitation of
(54) Baxter, op.cit., Ref. (44), at 399, p.286.
(55) The preamble of the Convention.
(56) Baxter, op.cit., Ref. (44), at 399, p.288.
( 57 )
continental shelf areas between adjacent States...",
In the Court's opinion, there were several reasons why 
the rule mentioned in Article 6 was not of a "norm- 
creating character". One was that the principle of 
equidistance was given secondary place to an obligation 
to affect delimitation by agreement. Secondly, the 
provision was further clouded by permitting the reference 
to another boundary line because of "special circumstances" 
Finally, the Court was also troubled by the fact that the 
provision sheds no light in determining what constitutes 
"special circumstances". Even the Court of Arbitration 
did not oppose this view. The corollary of the argument, 
that the equidistance and special circumstances were not 
two rules but two aspects of one rule, is that the 
equidistance rule solely is only half of one rule.
To the foregoing, it may be added that the most 
convincing argument against the alleged customary law 
character of the rule contained in Article 6(2) of the 
Continental Shelf Convention, is the fact that by article 
12 of the Convention, reservations are allowed to all 
articles of the Convention other than to Articles 1, 2 
and 3. Article 12 provides that:
"1. At the time of signature, ratification 
or accession, any State may make reservations to 
Articles of the Convention other than to Articles 
1 to 3 inclusive.
2. Any contracting State making a reservation 
in accordance with the preceding paragraph may at 
any time withdraw the reservation by a
(57) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 81, p.45.
suo
Communication to that effect addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Clearly, permitting reservations to be made to
articles other than 1, 2 and 3, and in view of the
reservations that actually have been m a d e , i t  seems
impossible to avoid the conclusion that a provision of a
Convention^^^^(whose application may be excluded by a
State ratifying or acceding to the Convention), cannot be
invoked opposing a State which has not signed the
Convention such as Iraq under the title of customary
law.(^^) The ICJ found the Convention divided between
the first three articles and the rest. In the Court's
view, that division corresponded to a manifest intent to
have the first three articles express general principles
of international law in contrast to the rest. The ease
with which reservations can be made to the latter group of
articles suggests that they do not create norms of law
binding upon all States. Consequently, the Court drew
from this fact the conclusion that any rule from which a
State could unilaterally withdraw did not rise to the
level of being a legal rule of general validity.
Having discussed extensively the lack of customary
law status of the equidistance method up to the time of
the Geneva Convention on the continental shelf, there is
(58) Brownlie, op.cit., Ref. (31), at 20 , p.110.
(59) See the reservations referred to in the Argument of 
Professor Jaenicke before the ICJ,Pleadings, 1968, 
Vol. II, p.16.
(60) Ibid. at 17.
(61) Ibid.
still the question of the status of the equidistance method 
following the Convention of 1958. In connection with 
this question it is useful to once more refer to the 
attitude of the ICJ in the North Sea Cases. State 
practice subsequent to the conclusion of the Convention, 
in the Court's view, is insufficient to promote the method 
of equidistance to become accepted as a customary rule.
This contention was based on the premise, in the words of 
the Court :
"these various cases constituted more than a 
very small proportion of those potentially 
calling for delimitation in the world as a 
whole, the Court would not think it necessary 
to enumerate or evaluate them separately, 
since there are, a priori, several grounds 
which deprive them of weight as precedents 
in the present context.
Further evidence regarding this may be found in Judge
Ammoun's separate opinion. The statistics cited by Judge
Ammoun demonstrate that only 39 out of 140 States had
become parties to the Convention. The amount of State
practice by non-parties which had been submitted by
Denmark and the Netherlands was thus very small ^^^^in
relation to the approximately 100 States not bound by the
Convention, The Court found that this amount of practice
far from satisfied the requirements that it laid down:
"... state practice, including that of States 
whose interests are specially affected., should
(62) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 75, p.43.
(63) Denmark and the Netherlands had been able to adduce 
15 instances of the application of the principle of 
equidistance. See Baxter, R.R., "Treaties and 
Custom", Hague Recueil, Vol. 129, 1970, I, p.64.
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have been both extensive and virtually uniform 
in the sense of the provision invoked; and 
should moreover have occurred in such a way as 
to show a general recognition that a rule of 
law or legal obligation is involved.
It remains to refer very briefly to the discussion
of the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental
s ho;
(66)
Shelf C a s e , a s  it i oped to consider the relevant
part in greater detail.
It might be contended that the Court of Arbitration 
held that the rule expressed in Article 6 was a rule of 
general law of no less effect and content than the rule 
of customary law set out in the North Sea Cases.
This, it is submitted, is not a reasonable basis 
upon which the customary character of the equidistance 
rule can be founded. No doubt, the Court of Arbitration
intended to, and actually did, confirm that the rule
provided for in Article 6 is a general rule of inter­
national law. However, the actual language of the 
decision clearly reveals that it was not, strictly speaking, 
the equidistance method which was meant by the Court of 
Arbitration. It must be evident to any one reading 
parts of the decision (as will be discussed later) 
that it is not purely and simply the equidistance method 
which is meant by the Court, rather the equidistance- 
special circumstances as one rule, and this is obviously
(64) ICJ, 1969, Reports, para. 74, p.43.
(65) Decision, Ref. (2o), at 198; Decision of 14 March 
1978, Ref. (24), at 200.
(66) See below pp. 420 et seq.
(67) See below p. 424.
not the same as the f o r m e r . S u r e l y ,  as the Court of 
Arbitration repeatedly affirmed, there is no equidistance 
principle on its own: it is - and always has been -
equidistance coupled with special circumstances. Moreover, 
the Court was quite specific in deciding that the use or 
non-use of the equidistance rule or any other method in 
the particular case was affected by the equatibility of 
the consequences which such a use would lead to.
b . The Alleged Recognition by Iraq of the General 
Applicability of the Equidistance Method
Having reached the conclusion that the equidistance 
method is not a rule of customary law, another important 
point particularly deserves to be discussed here. The 
clause set out in the Iraqi Proclamation of April 10, 1958, 
(Appendix No, II ), namely the "equidistance", may be 
invoked as a basis to induce the consent of Iraq to 
deliberately associate herself with this method. This 
contention might be considered as having shown that Iraq 
herself had found the principle of equidistance acceptable 
and interpreted it as a contribution to the justification 
of the binding power of the equidistance method.
In order to answer this contention, some observations 
are worth special mention:
1. A careful reading of the Iraqi Declaration would reveal 
that when the equidistance method was referred to,
Iraq asserted her adherence meanwhile, to the general 
principles of international law. In effect, the 
"equidistance" clause was deliberately and immediately
(68) See above p . 264.
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followed by the clause "general principles of 
international law". Thus, it may be confidently 
asserted that not even a single piece of evidence in 
the declaration could be regarded as recognition of 
acceptance of the equidistance method being solely and 
strictly applied for the delimitation of the Iraqi 
continental shelf.
2, The equidistance method indeed is in clear contradiction 
to certain basic principles of international law. The
disregarded the equidistance method as a rule 
of law, because "... if it were to be compulsorily 
applied in all situations, this would not be consonant 
with certain basic legal notions which, as has been 
observed .... have from the beginning reflected the 
opinio juris in the matter of delimitation; those 
principles being that delimitation must be the object 
of agreement between the States concerned and that such 
an agreement must be arrived at in accordance with 
equitable principles".
3. Such an interpretation of Iraq's conduct in declaring 
the equidistance method so as to exploit this action
to infer the inconsistencies in her attitude towards the 
said rule, cannot succeed. Neither can it weaken her 
position in this regard, since when Iraq issued her 
declaration, she could not have known that it would be 
gone to the extent of interpreting the declaration in 
such a way as to reduce the importance of the clause
(69) ICJ, 1969, Reports, para. 85, p.46.
(70) Ibid.
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"general principles of international law", to in reality 
nothing. Moreover, at that time the Iraqi Government 
could still expect to come to an amicable agreement 
with her neighbours on the delimitation of the 
continental shelf.
If it was asked why Iraq has not opposed the equi­
distance method, it could be answered that the attitude 
on the part of Iraq regarding the delimitation of the 
continental shelf as expressed by her proclamation has 
not been changed. The declaration although drafted 
with meticulous safeguards did not seem to have 
intended to consider the equidistance rule as the sole 
method for delimitation. There is, in fact, a 
difference between employing the equidistance method 
for the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary 
and the equidistance principle as a rule being 
mentioned in the context of Article 6. It is 
respectfully submitted that Article 6 of the Geneva 
Convention prescribes the application of the equidistance 
method only under the conditions it stipulates, that is 
in the absence of agreement and special circumstances.
To demonstrate this, it may be sufficient at present 
to quote the following passage from the decision of 
the Court of Arbitration and elaborate on this point 
later.
"... if the Channel Islands region is excluded 
as falling under the French reservation, the 
Court considers that Article 6 is applicable, in 
principle ... between the parties... This does 
not, however, mean that the Court considers the
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rules of customary law discussed in the judgment
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases to be
inapplicable in the present case. As already
pointed out, the provisions of Article 6 do not
define the condition for the application of the
(71 )equidistance-special circumstances rule,.."^
4, The fact that Iraq refers to the equidistance method in 
her Proclamation, could not be exploited per se to 
assume her recognition of the equidistance method as
an expression of a customary international law. This 
might be proved by the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases. Although Germany not only expressly declared her 
acceptance of the equidistance method, as Iraq might 
assume to have done, and also positively participated 
in the drafting of the Convention becoming one of the 
signatory states, she was considered under no 
obligation by the Court, It may be contended that; 
if Iraq were considered to be obliged to accept the 
equidistance method, since it was mentioned in her 
declaration then evidently this obligation could not 
be more strict that for States which have signed the 
Convention.
5. The argument that Iraq first regarded Article 6(2) as 
a workable solution for the boundary problem, when she 
declared her rights in the continental shelf, might be 
rejected because of the latter conduct of Iraq, It is 
quite understandable that Iraq later hesitated in 
acceding to the Convention when it became apparent that 
her conduct might be interpreted in such a restrictive
(71) Decision, para. 75, p.50.
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manner. Even more important in this connection is 
the attitude of Iraq in the UNCLOS III.^^^^
II. The Rules Applicable to the Delimitation of the Iraqi 
Continental Shelf Boundaries
In view of the arguments put forward earlier, it is 
widely thought that any norm for the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries must contain the highest possible 
degree of pliability. Only such a norm seems to serve 
the purpose of accommodating the infinite diversity of 
coastlines.
Attention must be drawn to the fact that a series of 
international acts reveal an awareness of the problems 
involved. It may be inferred that, most frequently, the 
proclamations have been issued from the very beginning 
when claims to exclusive rights over the continental shelf 
were beginning to be made, showing that the principle of 
equitable solution based on mutual agreement, has been 
regarded as the paramount principle governing the delimit­
ation of the continental s h e l f . A m o n g  examples, is 
the Truman Proclamation, which in the view of the World's 
Court, "must be considered as having propounded the rules 
of law in this f i e l d " . I n  the terms of the said 
Proclamation, "In cases where the continental shelf extends
(72) See above p. 267.
(73) Hudson was of this opinion. See his views in the 
YBILC 1951, p.287; see also the views of Fitzmaurice 
YBILC, 1956, Vol. 1, p.152.
(74) See Padwa, op.cit., Ref. (51), at 210, p.624. It is 
worth stating that it is generally recognized that 
the principles of law accepted by civilized nations 
constitute part of international law. Article (38) 
of the Statute of the ICJ.
(75) ICJ Reports, 1969, para, 86, p.47.
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to the shores of another, or is shared with an adjacent
State, the boundary shall be determined by the U.S. and
the State concerned in accordance with equitable
p r i n c i p l e s " . A n o t h e r  striking example is to be found
in the Saudi Arabian Decree of 1949. According to its
terms, the boundaries "will be determined in accordance
with equitable principles by our Government in agreements
(77 ^with other States". Following this trend, the
legislation of K u w a i t , w h i c h  refers, with regard to 
the delimitation of the Kuwaiti continental shelf areas in 
the Arabian Gulf,to the principle of equity and justice. 
Iran also proclaimed that "if differences of opinion arise 
over the limits of the Iranian continental shelf, these 
differences shall be solved in conformity with the rules 
of equity".
Provisions similar in meaning, although with slight 
variation in wording have been incorporated in other 
proclamations. Several Latin American Acts refer to the 
term "conditions of reciprocity". The Proclamation of 
Costa Rica declares that "... treaties to be concluded in 
recognition of legitimate rights of other countries".
(76) The Truman Proclamation, op.cit., Ref. (283) at 144.
(77) Royal Pronouncement of 28 May, 1949 referred to in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Pleadings, 
Vol. 1, p.31.
(78) Proclamation of 12 June, 1949, Appendix No. VII
(79) Decree of May 1949 referred to in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Pleadings, Vol. 1, p.31 
and Act of 18 June 1Ô55, Appendix No. V.
(80) Padwa, op.cit., Ref. (51), at 210, p.630. Other 
examples are also; the Proclamation of Sultan of 
Bahrain of 5 June 1949 ; the Sheikh of Qatar of 8 June 
1949; Article 2 of the Declaration of the two Houses 
of Parliament of Nicaragua of 28 May 1949. Cited in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Pleadings, 
1968, Vol. 1, p.31.
y; J.y:
Having briefly referred to some prime examples of
acts drawn up for demarcation purposes, it is very
interesting to note that, in all of the above-mentioned 
examples, the great emphasis in these acts is that the 
boundaries should be delimited in accordance with the 
principle of equitable apportionment. It is also 
relevant to note that those claims were not objected to 
by other States, and that therefore, those claims can be 
said to have been tacitly accepted.
In the light of the foregoing, it can be submitted
that these acts, on the one hand reflect the inconvenience 
of any sole method of delimitation, and reveal the 
weakness of unqualified unilateral action with respect to 
the delimitation of parts of the continental shelf shared 
by other States; on the other hand, it would be fair to 
say that those claims constitute a general principle of 
law authorising recourse to equity praeter legem for a 
better implementation of the principles or rules of law.
Moreover, in the records of the ILC which discussed 
the possible methods for dividing up the continental shelf 
between States sharing a common continental shelf, there 
is no indication that at any time any of the Commission's 
members supposed it was incumbent upon them to adopt a 
rule of e q u i d i s t a n c e . O n  the contrary, their 
preoccupation was to reach a criterion which would ensure 
equity. This might easily be inferred from examining 
the attitudes of a number of the Commission's members from 
the report of the Rapporteur J.P.A. Francois, submitted to
(81) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 49, p.33.
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the Commission in its 1951 Session. On the question of
delimitation of the continental shelf, the Rapporteur
proposed that an agreement be reached between the parties
concerned or failing agreement, that the boundary be drawn
by extending the boundary line of their territorial sea.^^^^
Having sustained the first part of the proposal, the
Commission strongly opposed the second. In this respect,
the Chairman of that Session, J.L. Brierly, argued that;
"the allotment should be made by agreements
between the States concerned or by an amicable
arbitration, not by means of hard and fast 
(83 )rules. ... Any rule which the Commission
laid down was bound to be arbitrary.
Another member of the Commission, Sh. Hsu hoped that
the second part of the proposal would be replaced by the
following :
"... or failing agreement, by arbitration on a 
fair and equitable basis.
Discussion by the Commission during its 1953 Session
also touched upon the question under consideration. Here
again, the equidistance rule was considered inappropriate,
and suggestions were made to the effect that the delimiting
of boundaries between adjacent States should have been left
to be established exclusively by agreement between the
interested States.
(82) YBILC, 1951, Vol. II, pp.75 et seq. and p.102.
(83) In the early stages, it was suggested that where an
agreement could not be reached,the States concerned were 
under an obligation to submit the dispute to compulsory 
arbitration. YBILC, 1951, Vol. II, p.143. This question 
will be dealt within section two below, pp.
(84) YBILC, 1951, Vol. I, p.288.
(85) YBILC, 1951, Vol. I, p.289.
(86) See for example the view of the Soviet Member, YBILC, 
1953, Vol. 1, p.128.
In seeking to find an appropriate solution, direct
mention concerning the equidistance method entered upon
the scene in the course of the deliberation of a committee
(87 )of experts, appointed in 1953. It is worth stating
that the Committee designed a very narrow range of 
application for this rule. This might easily be inferred 
from the Committee's comment that it was "important to 
find a formula for drawing the international boundaries 
in the territorial waters of States, which could also be 
used for the delimitation of the respective continental 
shelves of two States bordering the same continental
shelf."(87)
A careful reading of the comment made by the Committee 
of experts will reveal that the equidistance method was 
conceived primarily for the demarcation of the territorial 
sea of the coastal States. The comment, which speaks for 
itself, can only mean that the use of the equidistance 
method for the apportionment of the continental shelf was 
referred to as no more than a mere possibility, and could 
not even tacitly prescribe a mandate for the use of this
method in all situations.(^^)
It may be added that the concept of equity must have 
been in the minds of those who supported the adoption of 
the "special circumstances" clause, though the Convention 
on the continental Shelf makes no explicit reference either 
to equity or equitable principles. The decision of the
(87) The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Pleadings, 
1968, Vol. i:^  p.52.
(88) YBILC, 1953, Vol. II, p.79.
(89) The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Pleadings, 
ibid., p.57.
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Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf 
Case, may strengthen the validity of this observation as 
will be considered in greater detail later.
From the foregoing, it appears beyond reasonable 
doubt, that the ILC tried to specify a criterion which 
would always lead to an equitable apportionment.
The same trend may have been supported by the Geneva
Conference of 1958 on the Law of the Sea, when the question
was again put before the Fourth Committee of the Conference
It was suggested by a number of delegates that the
apportionment of a common shelf would be made in such a way
(91 )as to lead to equitable results.
To the foregoing, it may be added again, that well
known authorities are against the restrictive application
of the equidistance method or any other geometric rule,
unless it leads to equitable results. Sir Hergh
Lauterpacht, for instance, points out that:
"As adumbrated in the various proclamations, 
the delimitation can properly be effected by 
reference to equitable consideration, and any 
formula based on a system of median and 
lateral lines ought to be no more than the 
starting point in search for an equitable 
solution."
(90) See below pp. 428-429.
(91) The Venezuelan Delegate, for example, stated that 
"... that failure to make due provision for special 
circumstances such as were frequently imposed by 
geography could not result in a solution which would 
be fair to all States" UNCLOS I, Official Records, 
Vol. VI : Fourth Committee (Continental Shelf), p.92, 
similar points were raised by the delegates of the 
U.K. ibid., p.93, the Italian ibid., p.93.
(92) Lauterpacht, op.cit., Ref. (238), at 127, p.410.
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The same logical opinion is supported by others such
as Leo J. Bouchez who states:
"In the exploitation of resources of the subsoil 
the local circumstances must be taken into 
consideration for the establishment of an
equitable a p p o r t i o n m e n t )
Along this line, Professors McDougal and Burke argue
that :
"The major Community policy at stake with respect 
to the boundary problems of adjacent and opposing 
States is that of achieving equitable apportion­
ment, thereby avoiding disputes arising out of 
insistence by one or both States on a method of 
delimitation which does not respect the interest 
of the other,
Shalowitz, another authority sharing the same belief
concerning lateral boundaries, goes on to mention that:
"In delimiting such boundaries, the objective is 
to apportion the sea area in such manner as will 
be equitable to both States'.'
On turning now to international adjudication, 
precedents and analogies are already at hand. As noted 
above, experience of the North Sea Cases has shown that 
the Court has taken the view that Article (6) is not of 
the norm-creating character. Therefore, the Court 
asserted that there was no obligation on Germany to be 
bound by the sole equidistance method. The ICJ repeatedly 
stated that the parties concerned were "free to agree upon
(93) Bouchez, Leo J., "The Regime of Bays in International 
Law", 1964, p.198,
(94) McDougal and Burke, op.cit., Ref, ( 1), at 11, p.428.
(95) Shalowitz, op.cit.. Ref. (21), at 199, Vol. 2, 1964, 
p.384.
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one method rather than another or different methods if 
they so prefer". In the words of the Court, the point 
in the process of apportionment is "to seek not one method 
of delimitation but one goal".^^^)
It would seem, at this point that the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases are good illustrations of the fact 
that, on the whole, the only rule should be one which seeks 
an equitable solution.
It is submitted, that there can be no doubt, that the 
judgment of the ICJ in the North Sea Cases, although in 
strict law it concerns only a special boundary question in 
the North Sea and has the force of res judicata only as 
between parties to the case, nevertheless it can, by its 
authority, exert great influence on the settlement of 
many still unsolved boundary problems all over the world^^^) 
It would thus appear that these recommendations support 
Iraq in determining her share in the continental shelf 
area. Setting aside matters of legal notions which were 
pointed out in the Judgment, there are several other 
sufficient grounds which make the position of Iraq almost 
similar to that of Germany. That is to say:
1. The concavity of the German coastline which would have 
been the main cause of the inequitable division of the 
continental shelf, if it were to be determined in 
accordance with the strict equidistance line, is 
similar to that of Iraq.
(96) ICJ Reports, 1969, para. 92, p.50.
(97) See Brown, op,cit.. Ref, (4 ) at 193, p.189; and op. 
cit.. Ref. (181), at 254, p.9; see also the separate 
opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo, ICJ Reports, 1969,
p .99.
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2. A quick glance at a map of Iraq (figure 2 ) shows that 
the Iraqi coastline, sandwiched between that of Iran and 
Kuwait, is not only at the concave head of the Arabian 
Gulf but rather at the most concave part of it.^^^)
3. The waters of the Arabian Gulf are shallow, like the 
waters of the North Sea, and its bottom may be regarded 
as continental shelf wholly.
4. The proven and the possible natural resources in the 
Arabian Gulf, necessitate an equal division of the 
marine area. It is fairly evident that possession of 
a few miles of submarine area would make the difference 
between owning and not owning a profitable oilfield.
However, further judicial evidence supporting the 
principle of equity concerning the allotment of areas of 
the continental shelf is to be found in the decision of 
the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental 
Shelf Case.
Although there is no space to dwell in detail upon the 
aforementioned case, which is a subject of study in 
i t s e l f , n e v e r t h e l e s s  a brief general examination of 
certain aspects, in so far as it may be relevant to the 
determination of the Iraqi continental shelf, seems 
worthwhile.
(98) See the argument of Sir Humphrey Waldock before the 
ICJ in which he maintained that "Iraq is in an 
infinitely more disadvantageous position than the 
Federal Republic", ICJ Pleadings, 1968, Vol. II,
p.114.
(99) See above pp. 293.
(100) El-Hakim, op.cit.. Ref. (66), at 310, p.122.
(101) For further details see the Comprehensive Articles 
written by Professor E.D, Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (191), 
at 257, pp.463-530, and op.cit., Ref. (190), at 257. 
pp. 304-327; see above pp.256-265.
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Briefly, having been inspired by a genuine desire to 
settle their dispute concerning the course of the 
continental shelf boundary, in the arbitration area, France 
and the U.K. entered into an Arbitration A g r e e m e n t o n  
July 10, 1975.(103)
France contended that the Continental Shelf 
Convention, specifically Article (6),could not be applied 
Ip. the present situation between the parties. She 
invoked certain reservations which she had made to the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. Those reservations 
in the French view negated the operation of the 
Convention since they have not been accepted by the 
U.K.(^^^^ In addition, France argued that the Geneva 
Convention "had been rendered obsolete" by rules of 
customary law developed in the course of time.^^^^) The 
French Government maintained that ;
"the recent development of customary law, which 
was stimulated particularly by the work of the 
United Nations, the reactions on the part of 
Governments to this work, the discussions and 
negotiations at the Third Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, and the endorsement of this 
development in the practice of States with 
respect to economic zones and fishing zones of 
200 miles, have rendered the 1958 Conventions
obsolete."(lOG)
(102) This was in accordance with the general obligation 
of all States to resolve their differences by 
recourse to peaceful meansi Article 2(3) of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
(103) Arbitration Agreement of July 10, 1975, United 
Kingdom-France, (1975), U.K.T.S., No. 137, (Cmnd. 
6280); see ibid., pp.256-265.
(104) Those reservations had never been accepted by the 
U.K. Brown, op.cit., Ref.(191), at 257, p.467.
(105) Decision, pp.10-12, 16-18.
(106) Decision, p.16.
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Accordingly, in such a case, France contended that,
the delimitation was to be settled by resorting to the
principles set forth by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases.
In the French Government's view, the rules to be applied
in the present case were:
"the rules of international law applicable in 
this matter between the parties are the rules 
of customary law, as stated in particular by the 
International Court of Justice in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases and confirmed by the 
subsequent practice of States and the work of 
the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea."^^^^)
On the other hand, the U.K. approved the application
of the provisions of the Shelf Convention on the basis
that there were substantial grounds for regarding them as
principles of general international law. A more specific
reason for this attitude was the U.K.'s view that both
she and France were parties to the Convention.(^^8) it
follows from what has been said, that it was reasonable
to infer that resorting to the principles set down in the
North Sea Cases was not appropriate.
It will be observed that the Court of Arbitration
acknowledged that:
"both the importance of the evolution of the 
Law of the Sea which is now in progress and 
the possibility that a development in customary
(107) Ibid., pp. 11, 16.
(108) Decision, pp. 12-5, 18-21, Colson, op.cit.. Ref.
(20) at 198, pp. 98, 99.
(109) Decision, ibid.; Colson, ibid., p.103.
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law may, under certain conditions, evidence 
the assent of the States concerned to the 
modification or even termination, of previously 
existing treaty rights and obligations.
The fact that this particular excerpt was employed
for substituting the recent development of the Law of
the Sea, is not sufficient ground to lead one to assume that
the Court has recognized that the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf "has been rendered obsolete". On the
contrary, the Court confirmed that:
"neither the records of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea nor the 
practice of States outside the Conference 
provide any such conclusive indication that the 
Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 is today 
considered by its parties to be already obsolete 
and no longer applicable as a treaty in force.
While it is correct to say the foregoing, nevertheless,
the Court meanwhile asserted that this was no reason for
ignoring that it:
"regards itself as debarred from taking any 
account in these proceedings of recent develop­
ments in customary law. On the contrary, the 
Court has no doubt that it should take due 
account of the evolution of the Law of the Sea 
in so far as this may be relevant in the context 
of the present case."^^^^)
(110) Decision, para. 47, p.40.
(111) Id.
(112) Id, para. 48, p.40. Professor Brown rightly remarked 
that taking account of recent developments by the 
Court would surely depend upon the extent to which 
the alleged rules "had emerged from their formative 
stage of development and had come to be accepted as 
new norms of international customary law". Brown,
op.cit., Ref. (191), at 257, p.469, and op.cit.,
Ref. (99 ) at 44 , Part 1, p.198.
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Then the Court went on specifically to hold:
"the provisions of Article 6 do not define the 
condition for the application of the equidistance- 
special circumstances rule, and the rules of 
customary law have the same object - the 
delimitation of the boundary in accordance with 
equitable principles. In the view of this Court, 
therefore, the rules of customary law are a 
relevant and even essential means both for 
interpreting and completing the provisions of 
Article
It is clear from the above that the Court regarded 
the Geneva Convention in substance and within certain 
limits, to be in conformity with the rules of general 
international law regarding the delimitation of the 
continental shelf laid down in the North Sea Cases.
Another passage from the decision of the Court can,
and it does, cause one to believe the above inference. The
Court observed that :
"Article 6, as both the United Kingdom and the 
French Republic stress in the pleadings, does 
not formulate the equidistance principle and 
'special circumstances' as two separate rules.
The rule there stated in each of the two cases 
is a single one, a combined equidistance- 
special circumstances rule'.'
It seems reasonable to draw the conclusion, from the 
passage just cited, that the Court denied that Article 6 
of the Geneva Convention renders two rules - an equidistance 
rule and a special circumstances rule. Instead, one may 
accept without reservation that the present Court is of
(113) Decision, paragraph 75, p.50.
(114) Id, para. 68, p.48.
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the view that Article 6 links equidistance and special
circumstances, in a single combined formula.
Exactly the same point emerged from Professor Briggs'
view. In his declaration which he appended to the
decision of the Court, he referred to:
"The view that Article 6 is expressive of 
customary international law - a view already 
held by some Judges of the International Court 
of Justice in 1969 in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases - has been substantially 
strengthened by the subsequent practice of States, 
which has been elaborately analyzed by Counsel 
in this Arbitration
It may be useful, in order to end the discussion, to
state that the same conclusion in purport, with only
slight differences in wording, had been arrived at seven
years earlier. In a work published in 1971, Professor
Brown, in the course of his analysis of the ICJ's
Judgment, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases stated
that :
"In the writer's view, the record surveyed above 
amply verifies that in the course of a development 
over nearly a quarter of a century, the rules 
expressed in Article 6(2) of the Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf have attained the Status 
of international customary law. Two points must 
be emphasised. First, in view of the fact that 
both the German pleadings and the Court's Judgment 
concentrated on the question whether the evidence 
sufficed to prove the equidistance rule, it is 
necessary to emphasise that Article 6(2) contains 
three elements - agreement, equidistance and 
special circumstances. It is submitted that the
(115) Id, p.125.
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latter two elements have now been accepted in 
State practice as being the rules the 
application of which will ensure that, failing 
agreement between the parties, a delimitation 
will be carried out in accordance with the 
'equitable principles' referred to in the 
Truman Proclamation.
Secondly, the assertion is not that state 
practice since 1958 'or 1964, when the Convention 
entered into force ' has transformed the conventional 
rules of international customary law but rather 
that, as a result of a process of refinement and 
consolidation of which the conclusion of the 
Convention was a part, the fundamental but vague 
notions of agreement and equity expressed in the 
Truman Proclamation were transformed into at least 
relatively more precise rules.
Prima facie, the difference between this 
conclusion and the Court's Judgment may seem 
slight. It is submitted, however, that the 
concept of special circumstances is much more 
limited in scope and less open to arbitrary 
concrétisation than the general principle of 
equity as interpreted by the Court.
It is not proposed to analyse this matter except in 
so far as it relates to the delimitation of the Iraqi 
continental shelf. It is quite correct to agree with 
Professor Brown's view that "Article 6(2) contains three 
elements namely, agreement, equidistance and special 
circumstances.  ^ Even more evident, the difference 
between Professor Brown's conclusion and that of the ICJ's
(116) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (338), at 158, pp.61-62; and 
op.cit.. Ref. (181), at 254, p.12.
(117) Ibid., Ref. (338), at 158, pp.61-62.
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may seem s l i g h t . I t  remains to decide, as the 
Court of Arbitration did, that the latter two elements 
expressed in Article 6(2) are not separate rules but "a 
single one, a combined equidistance-special circumstance 
rule".(119)
There is a further point which needs to be dealt with.
It is correct to say that the concept of special
circumstances "is much more limited in scope and less open 
to arbitrary concrétisation than the principle of equity 
as interpreted by the C o u r t " . Y e t ,  if this 
statement was intended to mean that the concept of special 
circumstances is preferable to that of equity, it is 
submitted with the utmost respect that this argument is 
not so readily accepted. In connection with this question, 
it may be suggested that the concept of what constitutes 
equity, although wide, is not a limitless one.^^^^^ It is 
more important to recall that the Court of Arbitration 
appears to give strong backing to the judgment of the ICJ 
in the recognition of the status of the concept of equity 
in delimiting marine boundaries since it repeatedly
stressed that the delimitation of the continental shelf
would be carried out in accordance with equitable 
principles. The Court of Arbitration, in its decision, 
did not exclude the applicability of customary rules set 
forth in the North Sea Cases as to the delimitation of 
the continental shelf, in favour of the equidistance-
(118) Ibid.
(119) Decision, para. 68, p.48.
(120) Brown, op.cit.. Ref. (191) at 257, p.486, and 
op.cit.. Ref. (190) at 257 , p.308.
(121) See above pp. 264, 265.
428
special circumstance rule. It should be stressed that 
on the contrary, the Court observed that the rules of 
customary law were applicable to the case. The 
applicability of the equidistance-special circumstances 
rule was, in the Court's view drawn from the fact that it 
led to the same results as would be arrived at if the 
former rule were applied. Therefore, it appears that 
any limitation of factors would be inconvenient as it 
would cause other factors to be ignored, which may have 
been worth taking into account when settling the boundaries 
of the continental shelf. It would be reasonable to 
suggest that the concept of equity is much more convenient, 
since each situation has to be met in the light of its 
merits and no limitation imposed on factors should be
taken into consideration. To support the foregoing, some
passages of the Court of Arbitration's decision may be 
cited. If these passages are understood correctly, then 
differences as to the continental shelf boundaries are to 
be settled equitably under the combined equidistance- 
special circumstances criterion in the same manner as 
under the rules of customary law. In the words of the 
Court :
"The equidistance-special circumstances rule and 
the rules of customary law have the same object -
the delimitation of the boundary in accordance
with equitable principles. In the view of this 
Court, therefore, the rules of customary law are 
relevant and even essential means both for 
interpreting and completing the provisions of 
_______ Article G."(122)______________________________________
(122) Decision, para. 75, p.50.
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Further it is pointed out:
"... this Court considers that the appropriateness 
of the equidistance method or any other method for 
the purpose of effecting an equitable delimitation 
is a function or reflection of the geographical 
and other relevant circumstances of each 
particular case. The choice of the method or 
methods of delimitation in any given case, whether 
under the 1958 Convention or customary law, has 
therefore to be determined in the light of those 
circumstances and of the fundamental norm that 
the delimitation must be in accordance with 
equitable principles.
Conclusion
In view of the arguments put forward, the following
conclusions are submitted:
1. The methods of deteim ining. boundaries of the continental 
shelf in such a way that every point of the boundary is 
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines 
^rom which the breadth of the territorial sea of each 
State is measured, (equidistance method), is not by 
itself a rule of customary international law. The 
absence of any reference to the declaratory force of 
the provision and the negative inference to be drawn 
from the history of the Convention as it was being 
drafted, would have been sufficient in themselves to 
deny declaratory force to the provision. Thus, it 
still cannot bind to non-parties, among them Iraq, 
since this does not result in an equitable division of 
the parts of the continental shelf between Iraq and 
her neighbours.
(123) Id, para. 97, pp.59-60.
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2. It would seem reasonable to suggest that the record of 
the ILC, opinions of those concerned, state practice, 
the intention of the parties to both the Geneva 
Conference and the UNCLOS and international 
adjudications, provide strong evidence to the effect 
that the dividing up of the continental shelf between 
Iraq, Kuwait and Iran has to be settled in the light 
of equitable principles. This notion while adopted 
from various s o u r c e s r e s t s  upon one foundation.
3. Agreement is deemed to be regarded the major and most 
appropriate rule by which boundaries of the areas of 
any continental shelf can be settled. It is the key 
to the whole matter because it is strikingly evident, 
as the Court of Arbitration has described, that this 
notion is of "general character and applicable to a . 
delimitation under Article 6 no less than under 
customary law".^^^^^
4. In any event, it would be proper, for reasons previously 
suggested, to uncover evidence which parties ought to 
take into account as a basis in the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between Iraq, Kuwait and Iran as the 
case may be. The area of the countries concerned, 
their population and population density, relevant
(124) It must be noted that the work of the UNCLOS III 
is workable only to the extent that it may be 
considered as an indication of the attitudes of 
States rather than as a law since it has not been 
enacted and is still under consideration.
(125) Namely if one were to regard the delimitation, in 
accordance with the Principles of customary law or 
according to the conventional rule (equidistance- 
special circumstances).
(126) Decision, para. 77, p.51.
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political, geographical, geological and economic factors, 
related considerations of security and topography, and 
even the relations with neighbours may not be over-
looked.(127)
Recommendation
For all of the above reasons therefore, it is
respectfully suggested that:
a. Iraq should declare explicitly her intention that the 
equidistance method is applicable in dividing her 
continental shelf vis-a-vis her neighbours, only in so 
far as it is recognized by international law. Coupled 
with earlier references on which this view is based, 
the fact that only such a solution, as proposed by the 
Proclamation of 10 April, 1958, could be regarded as 
substantial grounds for this conclusion. Such a step 
is recommended to remove any legal uncertainty in the 
interpretation of Iraq's conduct in this respect not as 
a change in her attitude,
b, Iraq, in any future negotiation, will refuse to divide 
up her continental shelf boundaries with Kuwait and 
Iran on the basis of the equidistance method (alone).
She has to regard herself as not bound by the rules 
embodied in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, to 
which she is not a party, and in respect of which is 
res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, except
to the extent to which these rules correspond to the 
principles of customary law.
(127) ICJ Reports, 1969, dissenting opinion of Judge 
Koretsky, p . 155 .
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The solution suggested above, it seems, is supported 
by the fact that Iraq and both her neighbours, Kuwait and 
Iran, have maintained, by some means, their adherence to 
the principle of equity and to the general principles of 
international law,^^^^^ This consensus adopted by the 
parties should clearly provide a sound foundation for the 
practical working out of various particular problems 
concerning delimitation of offshore areas between Iraq, 
Kuwait and Iran.
Section Two
The Problems of the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf Boundaries Between Iraq and Her Neighbours
On the assumption that the establishing of marine 
boundaries is in the abstract, quite easily done, particu­
lar situations may, nevertheless cause practical 
complications. That is to say, even if the rules 
set forth previously on delimitation of the continental 
shelf boundaries were recognized by nations concerned, 
major problems would be likely to arise.
It may be seen that, if the above observation is true 
in general, it is especially so in the Arabian Gulf.
Here, a number of factors may contribute to the existence 
of legal problems of considerable importance.  ^ Clearly,
(128) Appendix No. II, Appendix N o .V and Appendix No, VII
(129) Young, op.cit.. Ref. (128), at 233, p.517.
(130) See the dissenting opinion of Judge Sorenson, ICJ 
Reports, 1969, p.256.
(131) Momtaz, Par Djamchid, "Les Problems de la Delimitation 
du Plateau Continental du Golfe Persique a Travers
les Accords de Delimitation en Vigueur” Asian- 
African Legal Consultative Committee, Commemorative 
Volume, New Delhi, 1976, pp.75 et seq.
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the continental shelves, in general, frequently form,
from the stand-point of the petroleum geologist, a
favourable environment for the sediment, in which oil or
( 132 )any other mineral is found. Therefore, it must be
stressed that the Arabian Gulf, as noted earlier,
appears to fit in with this supposition. Further,
it is convenient to bear in mind that the Arabian Gulf is 
not merely an oil pool covered by water; rather it has 
been for centuries, and still is, one of the world's most 
important routes connecting east and west. Thus,strategic 
position, navigation and exploitation of submarine 
resources, the main uses of the sea, may well give rise to 
offshore boundary questions. However, not all offshore 
boundary disputes originate in this way. The shallowness 
of the Arabian Gulf, and the mutability of the Iraqi 
baseline, as well as her irregular coastline, all raise 
legal problems of considerable interest and complexity. 
Several pertinent difficulties may, however, arise. 
Three may be cited because of their importance. Firstly, a 
difficulty arises if the boundary line on the continental 
shelf cuts across a common deposit of petroleum or similar 
liquid m i n e r a l . S e c o n d l y ,  there is the possibility 
of o v e r l a p p i n g , a n d  thirdly there is the question of
(132) Auguste, op,cit., Ref. (4), at 1, p.37.
(133) Kassim, op.cit., Ref. (5), at 320, p.329; YBILC,
1950, Vol. 1, p.214.
(134) Hereinafter is referred to as a "common oil deposit".
(135) It is worth noting that almost all the writers link 
the problem of overlapping with the question of 
common oil deposit, considering them as one problem. 
It is respectfully submitted that although, the two 
questions may very often concur, the opposite, at 
least in the writer's view, is closer to the truth. 
The existence of a common oil deposit does not
contd....
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whether recognized offshore boundaries are to be regarded 
as immutably fixed or whether they may be subject to 
reasonable relocation in accordance with any alteration to 
the baselines which may occur. As the latter problem is 
closely related to the problem of the mutability of the 
baseline and was considered a b o v e , i t  will be 
excluded here. Therefore, the first two problems are our 
concern in the following two subsections.
Subsection One 
The Problems Raised by the Existence 
of a Common Oil Deposit
I. The Problem
A common oil (or any other mineral) deposit is defined 
as a single structure situated on land or offshore, under­
lying the territory of two or more States, and which is
totally, or partially, exploitable from either side of the 
( 137 )boundary line.^ In dealing with this point, the
ICJ described the problem in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf C a s e s as follows:
(135) contd...
necessarily have any connection with the question of 
overlapping. A common oil deposit might possibly 
exist although there was no overlapping or one may 
even be discovered after the establishment of the 
continental shelf boundaries between the nations 
concerned. On the other hand the problem of over­
lapping might occur although there was no common 
deposit.
(136) See above pp. 377 et seq.
(137) Onorato, William T., "Apportionment of an International 
Common Petroleum Deposit", ICLQ, Vol. 17, 1968, p.85; 
Woodliffe, J.C., "International Unitisation of an 
Offshore Gas Field", ICLQ, Vol. 26, 1977, p.339.
(138) ICJ Reports, 1969, p.3,
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"It frequently occurs that the same deposit 
lies on both sides of the line dividing a 
continental shelf between two States, and 
since it is possible to exploit such a deposit 
from either side, a problem immediately arises 
on account of the risk of prejudicial or waste­
ful exploitation by one or other of the States 
concerned."(139)
Having stated this, an immediate question would then 
have to be discussed briefly. Mention must be made that 
States, undoubtedly have exclusive rights over their land 
territory and territorial sea as well as their soil and 
subsoil to an unlimited depth.(^^^) Additionally, States 
have also exclusive jurisdiction over the sea bed and 
subsoil of the continental shelf for limited purposes of 
exploration and exploitation. It follows that unless the 
consent of the State concerned is obtained, no one has the 
right to explore or exploit the resources there, no matter 
whether the deposit has been discovered, or the interested 
State is able, or intends to exploit it.(^^^) These 
principles are obviously directly inspired by the funda­
mental notions of "territorial sovereignty, sovereign 
rights and territorial i n t e g r i t y " . I t  is of course 
a general principle of international law that sovereignty
(139) Ibid., para. 97, p.51.
(140) See Oppenheim, op.cit., Ref. (262), at 137, 
pp. 417 et seq. This is clearly 
indicated in a number of boundary agreements. See 
for instance, Austria-Czechoslovakia Treaty and 
Annexes of December 12, 1928, Art. 4, CVIII LNTS,
p.9; German Democratic Republic-Poland Agreement of 
July 6, (1950), Article 2, UNTS, Vol. 319, p.93; 
Soviet Union-Czechoslovakia, Agreement of November 
30, 1965, Article 1, UNTS, Vol. 266, p.243.
(141) Lagoni, Rainer, "Oil and Gas Deposits Across 
National Frontiers", AJIL, Vol. 73, 1979, p.216.
(142) Ibid., p.215.
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of a State extends to the frontiers, and sovereign rights 
to the dividing line of the continental shelf. Therefore, 
a common oil deposit must be divided among the superjacent 
States, each of which is entitled to exploit the part 
which lies under its soil and subsoil.
Unlike hard mineral deposits, which can conceivably 
be d i v i d e d ^  into independent units, deposits of a
fluid character, (liquid or g a s e o u s ) , s h a r e d  by two 
or more States cannot be divided between the nations 
concerned. It must be recognized that one cannot tell 
in advance, the precise amount of shared natural gas or 
petroleum which underlies the territory or the continental 
shelf of neighbouring States. It is also suggested that, 
even if mining operations were conducted on one side of 
the boundary line, it would still adversely affect 
production costs or reserves on the other, and perhaps
(143) It is easier to solve the problem if the mineral is 
not liquid, e.g. the treaty of 17 May, 1939, between 
Germany and the Netherlands whereby a border line 
between coal deposits was recognized independently 
of the frontier between the two States concerned.
See Mouton, op.cit.. Ref. (258), at 135, p.421.
(144) Even in cases of common hard mineral deposits, it 
must be conceded that there are certain cases where 
cooperation is also reached between the nations 
concerned. E.g. Articles 2 and 3 of the Belgian- 
Nether lands Treaty of October 23, 1950 fixing a 
mining boundary between the coal mines along the 
Meuse, UNTS, Vol. 136, p.40; Article 3 of the 
Netherlands-Federal German Republic of January 18, 
1952, fixing a mining boundary between coal fields 
to the east of the Netherlands-Germany Frontier,
179 UNTS, Vol. 179, p.156. However, cooperation in 
these cases is limited to matters of common interest. 
Furthermore, it is not required by international law 
but rather is stipulated for practical considerations. 
See Lagoni, op.cit.. Ref. (141) at 435, p.213.
(145) Petroleum is not the only mineral to be found in the
continental shelf. Other minerals have been found 
and there are likely to be still more. See Auguste,
op.cit.. Ref. ( 4 ) at 1 , p.38.
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even cause the entire wastage of the deposit, although 
these operations may otherwise be legal.
In the light of the foregoing, it is likely that 
other States cannot extract the minerals from their part 
of the deposit, even if the first State has extracted only 
that portion initially situated in its territory or 
continental shelf.
It may be argued that, as a principle of international 
law, material damage to other State's territory as regards 
extraterritorial environmental effects, especially air and 
water pollution, gives rise to State responsibility. 
Accordingly, as Mr. Lagoni rightly suggested, this is 
equally applicable to the extraterritorial effects of 
mining operations.
It is true that the principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity would be violated by mining through 
the boundary line into that part of a common deposit on 
the territory or continental shelf of a neighbouring 
S t a t e . B u t  it is equally true that it is difficult, 
if not impossible, for reasons relating to oil and gas to 
establish violations of the principles of territorial 
sovereignty. (^ ^^ 9)
Therefore, serious problems of conflict are undoubtedly
(146) In an attempt to avoid problems of this sort, some 
States have agreed to establish a "security zone" 
parallel to the dividing line on the continental 
shelf. However, this solution did not successfully 
solve the problem. See further Lagoni, op.cit..
Ref. (141), at 435, p.217.
(147) Ibid., p.217.
(148) Ibid., pp. 216-217.
(149) These deposits are characterized by a complicated 
"equilibrium of rock pressure, gas pressure and 
underlying water pressure", ibid., p.217.
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conceivable and these types of problems may consequently
account for international disputes, Obviously, it
would be very difficult, due to the substantial economical
interests of such deposits to solve the problem under
consideration.
One point should perhaps be clarified at this stage.
The problem of apportioning international common oil
deposits may appear, prima facia, to be a little
theoretical, since only very few international common
deposits were discovered in the past. Yet, it would now
seem to have a bearing on practice and is hence not merely
a hypothetical question. International law is abundant
in agreements of this sort which we shall discuss more
fully l a t e r . T h e r e  are also a number of examples
of "international deposits" upon which agreements have not
yet been reached. Amongst these the Murchison oilfield
and the Brae oilfield which are believed to straddle both
sides of the boundary line between the continental shelf
area of Britain and N o r w a y , t h e  Statfjord oilfield
which is thought to cross the boundary line between the
ri53 ^British and Norwegian continental shelves,^  ^ and the 
natural gas field Wustrow which extends across the 
boundary line between the Federal Republic of Germany and
(150) See Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion, ICJ Reports, 
1969, p.172.
(151) For example the agreement between the U.K. and 
Norway relating to the exploitation of the "Frigg 
Field" Reservoir and the transmission of Gas 
therefrom to the U.K. U.K.T.S. No. 1, 1976, Cmnd.
6491.
(152) Onorato, William T., "Apportionment of an International 
Common Petroleum Deposit", ICLQ, Vol. 26, 1977, p.324; 
Lagoni, op.cit., Ref. (141), at 435, p.219.
(153) Onorato, ibid., p.324.
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the German Democratic Republic.
Even if we assume that the existence of such common 
fields are as yet very slight, it is still necessary to 
assert that the results of exploration and drilling under 
the seabed of the Arabian Gulf in general permit the 
conclusion that the Arabian Gulf is considered to possess 
appreciable amounts of p e t r o l e u m . I t  follows that 
the delimitation of the seabed between bordering States 
in the Arabian Gulf, will inevitably have to be cut by 
separate boundary lines. Pools of oil will surely be 
found to cross such boundary lines or to be close to them 
so that they may be exploited by way of directional 
drilling by neighbouring States.
In the light of the preceding argument, it would be 
correct to assert that it is more likely that a field of 
petroleum beneath the seabed may extend across the 
boundary line dividing the continental s h e l v e s w h i c h
(154) Lagoni, op.cit., Ref. (141) at 435, p.219.
(155) Kassim, op.cit., Ref. ( 5 ), at 320, p.329.
(156) Momtaz, op.cit.. Ref. (131), at 432, p.77; Onorato,
op,cit.. Ref. (137), at 434, p.85; Kassim, op.cit., 
Ref. ( 5 ) at 320, p.329.
(157) In relation to owners or producers within one 
national area, the problem of apportioning a common 
oil deposit appears to be more easily solved by 
municipal legislation. The 1964 British regulations 
which authorize the Minister of power to require 
unified development scheme in any locality where 
this appears, may be considered as a very good 
example in this case. See the Petroleum (Production) 
(Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations 
Reproduced in the ILM, Vol. 3, 1964, p.621. Paragraph 
(19) of the Schedule No. 2 annexed to the afore­
mentioned act provides in part:
"(1) ... the Minister shall consider that it is 
in the national interest in order to secure the 
maximum ultimate recovery of petroleum and in order 
to avoid unnecessary competitive drilling that the 
oil field should be worked and developed as a unit
contd....
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appertain to Iraq or any of her neighbours.
However, attention must now be turned to the nature 
and extent of rights which may be asserted by the 
nations concerned. Here, it may be asked, how and 
according to what principles shall a common petroleum 
deposit be a p p o r t i o n e d ? ^
Although the problem of apportioning an international 
common oil deposit is not a new one, the rules for its 
solution remain undetermined, and the principles followed 
in practice are variable. Therefore, it can be stated 
with confidence that no general principle of a mandatory 
nature appears to have been publicly a d o p t e d . I t  
will be to this that the next discussion will be devoted.
II. The Possible Solutions
From the outset, it must be admitted that the matter 
of which law to apply, is a difficult problem to solve
satisfactorily. To say this is not to argue the non-
(157) contd...
in co-operation by all persons including the 
Licensee whose licences extend to or include any 
part thereof the following provisions of this 
clause shall apply.
(2) Upon being so required by notice in writing 
by the Minister the Licensee shall co-operate 
with such other persons, being persons holding 
licences under the Act of 1934 or that Act as 
applied by the Act of 1964 in respect of any part 
or parts of the oil field ... as may be specified 
in the said notice in the preparation of a scheme., 
for the working and development of the oil field 
as a unit by the Licensee and the other Licensees 
in cooperation and shall, jointly with the other 
Licensees, submit such scheme for the approval of 
the Minister".
(158) Woodliffe, op.cit., Ref, (137), at 434, pp.338-339.
(159) Momtaz, op. cit., Ref. (131), at 432, p.77.
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existence of answers to this question. Indeed, three 
types of rules are advanced in the literature of inter­
national law to solve the problem.
The first rule, as put forward by certain authors, 
was the prior appropriation rulel^^^) It may be noted 
in the writings of those who adhere to this rule that they 
regard it as the parallel in international law to the rule 
of capture in municipal law.^^^^^ However,this rule 
simply provides that the first State to set out extracting 
and developing the common oil field gains priority over 
all subsequent exploiting States,
Clearly, this pattern would in practice induce 
unnecessary competitive drilling on either side of the
(160) Morris, op.cit.. Ref* (4 ), at 9 , pp.205-210, 214.
(161) Ibid., p.206. Although the issue does not fall 
within the scope of this work, nevertheless, it is 
worthwhile to concede that the rule of unregulated 
production or unrestricted capture governed the 
exploitation of oil fields at one time. A detailed 
look at municipal petroleum laws and adjudication 
would reveal that the aforementioned rule was widely 
used at first due to a meagre knowledge of the 
nature of oil. See for the early beliefs about the 
nature of oil, Nanda, Ved P. and Kenneth R. Stiles, 
"Offshore Oil Spills; An Evaluation of Recent United 
States Responses", San Diego Law Rev. Vol. 7, 1970, 
p.522; Onorato, op.cit., Ref.(137), at 434, p.90. As 
for cases see Westmoreland & C. Nat. Gas Co. v.
Dewitt (1899) 130 Pa. 235; Hammondsv. Central K y .
Gas Co. (1934)255 Ky. 685; Trinidad Asphalt C o . v, 
Ambard (1899) Ac, 594; Upo Naing v. Burma Oil Co. Ltd. 
(1920) L.R.16 Ind. App. 140, However, as time goes
on fundamental knowledge about the natural state of 
oil has been advanced. Eventually, it appears that 
earlier understanding in this regard were founded 
on a mistaken basis as it was proven that oil was a 
static and exhaustible resource. Thus, the earlier 
rule of unrestricted capture has been replaced, as 
will be discussed later by regulations which provide 
for unqualified unilateral exploitation of common 
petroleum deposit. See also, Jacobs, John C,,"Unit 
Operation of Oil and Gas Field", YLJ, Vol. 57, 1947- 
1948, p.1207-1224.
(162) Morris, op.cit., Ref. ( 4) at 9, pp.207 et seq.
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dividing line and in turn this would certainly cause the 
uneconomic exploitation or even perhaps the wastage of 
the common deposit.
A second solution to the problem of common deposit 
suggested by Juraj Andrassy, although not based on the 
prior appropriation rule, leads to similar effects. From 
Andrassy's point of view, the rule of sovereignty over the 
subsoil to the common deposit, would be applied in the 
absence of any agreement to regulate the development of 
the common deposit.
The aforementioned solution, as Mr. Lagoni correctly 
remarked, can lead to competitive drilling.
Based on the"unity of deposit"concept, it is also 
suggested, according to another view, that it would not be 
advisable to divide up a common offshore field by an 
international boundary line. That is to say, it would 
be dangerous to divide up reserves which straddle inter­
national boundaries on a continental shelf amongst several 
n a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y ,  this approach simply advances 
the diversion or bisection of dividing lines of an offshore 
field from its initially supposed location. If the pool 
of oil is subsequently discovered, after the establishment 
of the continental shelf boundaries, in the light of the 
principles of delimitation agreed upon, those boundary 
lines would be subject to alteration. ^
(163) Lagoni, op.cit.. Ref. (I4l) at 435, p.219.
(164) Ibid., p.220.
(165) For further details see Lagoni, op.cit., Ref. (141) 
at 435, p.220.
(166) Onorato, op. cit.. Ref, (L37), at 434, p.86; Mouton, 
op.cit.. Ref.(258), at 135, p.421.
(167) Onorato, op.cit.. Ref.(152), at 438, p.325.
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In this respect, it must be mentioned that practical 
considerations are invoked to justify this approach, as 
it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to draw up a 
line within which submarine development may be permitted 
and beyond which it may not. Additionally, one important 
fact is that even if the other State is allowed to drill 
just outside that limit, it is more likely that such 
drilling is liable to change the conditions of exploitation 
of substances within that limit.
In addition to the reasons stated above, it is also 
suggested that the legal basis of this approach may be 
noted in the clause inserted in Article (6) of the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, namely, the "special 
circumstances" clause. That is to say, the existence 
of an oil field constitutes special circumstances which 
justify deviation from the boundary line as it should
b e . ( 1 9 9 )
Clearly, this approach appears to raise more problems 
than it solves. Nations, it is submitted, presumably 
attach more importance to boundary questions than to 
problems of common resources. Thus, they possibly 
sacrifice their interests in common resources in order to 
retain their legal positions on the international frontiers. 
It is to be noted that the "unity of deposit" in the 
context previously mentioned has been disputed. Nor has 
it been accepted as prevailing, as will soon be discussed.
(168) See Mouton, op.cit.. Ref. (258), at 135, p.421,
The author states that "two concessionaires should 
not tap the same pool, or, in a descriptive parable: 
never two straws in one glass", id., p.421.
(169) Padwa, op.cit., Ref. (51 ), at 210, p.645.
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Finally, a completely different and, perhaps, more 
reasonable and practical approach now widely prevails. 
Amongst other writers on international law,^^^^^ Onorato 
later explained the inconvenience of unilaterally 
developing and exploiting a common deposit. He further 
propounded a solution requiring the co-operative develop­
ment of an international deposit.
With the above tracing of the steps in regard to some 
of the literature developments involved - others will be 
left for later consideration - it now remains to proceed 
to consider the principles involved in the case of a 
common offshore field. Here, the more general question 
must be posed as to what the current applicable rule is, 
if any, for the apportionment of common deposits of 
liquid minerals?
In reply to this question, it should be made clear 
at the outset that the primary sources of international 
law, as any text book on the subject will report, are 
treaty and custom.
In dealing with such an argument, one has first to 
examine whether or not there is any conventional rule 
pertinent to the subject. It would be fair to say that 
the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the continental shelf 
offers no assistance in this respect. Nor has there been
(170) Examples, Woodliffe, op.cit.. Ref, (137), at 434, 
pp.339 et seq.; Lagoni, op.cit.. Ref.(141), at 435,
p.220.
(171) Onorato, op.cit., Ref.(152), at 438, p.327; and his 
earlier view, op.cit.. Ref.(137) at 434,p.101 in 
which he advanced that there had been no established 
rule in the exclusion of any other. The most that 
can be said, he stressed was no party in interest 
could "proceed unilaterally with exploitation 
procedures',’ ibid., p. 101.
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any international multilateral treaty in force.
III. Is There Any Customary Rule on the Topic?
Having said this, our remaining task is to ascertain 
whether any customary rule on the topic is in existence.
In this connection, the question can almost always 
be answered in the affirmative according to the majority 
of writers. Mr. Onorato, for instance, argues that the 
most pertinent policy securing the best exploitation of 
common oil fields and offering the greatest benefits for 
all nations concerned would appear to consist of co-operative 
and non competitive exploitation of common petroleum 
sources. There are sufficient grounds, he maintains, 
which necessarily constitute a rule of customary law 
requiring such an exploitation for a common oil field.
It is hardly possible, for reasons which will be 
discussed later, to concur with this view. The fact that 
the existence of customary rule depends on certain elements, 
makes it necessary to consider the arguments that have been 
advanced from which the establishment of the cooperative 
rule has been derived. In this connection, it would be 
fair to say that the grounds which have been invoked for 
the purpose of concluding the establishment of the 
customary character of the said rule, seem to rely on one 
or two considerations. To find a legal basis for deriving 
this solution, it has been suggested to refer to 
"institutions of international and private law" relating
(172) Terr, op.cit., Ref, (435), at 190, p.67.
(173) Onorato, op.cit.. Ref. (137), at 434, pp.88 et seq.; 
and op.cit., Ref. (152), at 438, pp.329 et seq.
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either closely or by analogy to the matter.
It is contended that, as there is no multilateral 
(175)convention in force on the topic or any clear
customary rule pertinent to the subject, one must examine 
private law in the same manner as the ICJ does in such a 
situation.  ^ Then, it is pointed out that municipal 
law of almost all producing countries do require "co­
relative and non-competitive" exploitation of their common
(177 )petroleum deposits. Accordingly, it is argued that
it must be evident to any one who reads the text of the 
"Petroleum Code of Columbia Decree 1056 of April 20, 1953" 
that parties sharing a common oil field are obliged to 
"adopt a unitised plan of development" under which
( 178 )competition is not allowed and co-operation is required.^
A further example is cited to furnish a firm ground on
which to consolidate this trend. The law of Hydrocarbons
of Venezuela is also referred to as good evidence to
indicate the prevailing precited tendency on the municipal 
(179)level.^ Having reached the conclusion that the rule
which requires co-operative planning in exploiting a 
common oil field, is dominant in municipal law, Onorato 
selected the same doctrine and applied it to international 
petroleum deposits by analogy,
(174) Onorato, op.cit., Ref,(152), at 438, pp.324-337.
(175) There are remarkably a number of bilateral agree­
ments as will be discussed later. See below pp.452 et seq.
(176) Statute of the ICJ, Article 38, paragraph 1, Clause C.
(177) For further details see Onorato, op.cit.. Ref. (137) 
at 434, pp.91-92.
(178) Ibid., p.92.
(179) Ibid., p.93.
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A more important part of the reason,heavily relied
upon in adopting this view, is the fact that there are a
series of precedents on the international law level for
co-operative development and exploitation of international
resources. Coupled with earlier references to municipal
law, the fact that, in almost all cases where limited
natural resources, like petroleum, which possesses the
same physical character, have to be divided up among the
nations concerned, it could be regarded a legal foundation
on which to rest this t e n d e n c y . A m o n g  the cases
which according to the above mentioned view are along
these lines, is the area of fisheries. Several agreements,
it is argued, have been reached between the States
concerned on specific means for co-operative exploitation
of commercial fish s t o c k . F o r  the purpose of
strengthening this trend, examples in the field of non-
navigational use of rivers are also invoked. Here again,
it is contended, a share control, development and use of
international rivers that cross borders, have not been the
/ 1 8 2 )subject of any controversy.^ '
It may be added that Onorato, amongst others, has 
also drawn attention to materials more directly connected 
to the question under consideration. To demonstrate 
the contention that the pattern of state practice requires 
cooperation in apportioning an international common oil
(180) See the Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
ICJ Pleadings, 1968, Vol. 1, p.34; Onorato, op.cit., 
Ref.(137) at 434, p.101; and Ref.(152) at 438,
pp. 330—331.
(181) See the examples cited in Onorato, op.cit.. Ref.(137) 
at 434, p. 94.
(182) Examples are also referred to in Onorato, op.cit.,
Ref.(137), at 434, pp.95-96; ICJ Pleadings, 1968, 
the Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Vol. 1, p.34.
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deposit between neighbouring States, Onorato refers to a 
number of agreements. These agreements which provide for 
cooperation in exploiting and developing international 
common oil deposits, serve, he feels, as a basis for his 
contention.
Evaluation
It is submitted that it is correct to say, for reasons 
which will be discussed later, that the unilateral 
exploitation of an international offshore field is 
inconvenient and must thus be solved by agreement between 
the nations concerned. However, it is not possible to 
infer that "cooperative exploitation" as a rule of 
customary law implied, understood, or resulted from the 
above contentions. This suggestion is amply confirmed 
by certain justifications related to this matter.
There is no more reasonable inference to support this 
submission than that Mr. Onorato himself recognized. In 
stating his case, however, Mr. Onorato expressly pointed 
out that the instances of State practice he cited are rare. 
These instances, he asserts, are not sufficient to prove 
that the concept of cooperative development, as a rule of 
law, imposes obligations on the nations concerned, but 
rather is only a trend.
However, although this may be correct, it is not 
intended to rest this view merely on one argument of 
logic.
The substantial grounds on which the rejection of the 
trend claiming the construction of the cooperative rule
(183) Onorato, op.cit.. Ref. (137), at 434, p.99.
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are based, on both principles of international law and 
practice of States.
Consequently, it is necessary to examine the 
contentions cited as proof of the customary character of 
the cooperative rule.
It is proposed to begin with the allegations which 
rest on domestic legislation. Without pausing to consider 
the value attributed to the municipal legislation in 
connection with the establishment of a rule of international 
law, it will suffice to reject this consideration as a 
pertinent piece of evidence in this respect. This argu­
ment, it may be noted, is not admissible and that the laws 
cited purely domestic instruments unknown to other 
governments. It may be argued that Article 36(2C) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice permits 
recourse to national legislation. However, while such 
an argument is undoubtedly logically correct, it is 
submitted that what is clear from the language used in 
the aforesaid Article is that the allowance to resort to 
municipal legislation is only in the absence of inter­
national practice. Indeed, there is international prac­
tice and States have shown on a number of occasions that 
they are keenly aware of the problem but treated it, as 
will be discussed later in different approaches.
As for precedents in international law to regulate the 
exploitation of resources other than oil but possessing 
the same character, it is proposed to ask the question 
whether these precedents serve to confirm this opinion?
The answer to such a question could only be, it is 
submittedjin the negative. Striking evidence is to be
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found in the famous Lotus Case for example. While
referring to several conventions cited by the French side, 
and dealing with policing of the seas, the PCIJ confirmed 
that a rule of customary law should not be derived 
therefrom. Among the reasons for which the court 
dismissed those treaties was the fact that they had dealt 
with the policing of the high seas. Thus, it was 
unsuitable to apply them in the case before the court 
which dealt with the common-law offence of manslaughter 
That is to say further examination of the judgment dis­
closes the Court's disapproval of the deduction of a rule 
of customary law from the treaties cited by France. The 
reason was obvious enough: whereas the Lotus Case dealt
with the question of jurisdiction as to a collision which 
occurred on the high seas, the Conventions cited related 
to matters which although connected with high seas,were 
of a particular nature such as slave trade and fisheries.
It follows in the court's view that no deduction could be 
made from them to conclude the existence of a rule of 
international law related to the case before it. In the 
words of the court :
"... it should be observed that these conventions 
relate to matters of a particular kind, closely 
connected with the policing of the seas and not 
to common-law offences."
In another case, it was similarly stated that "the 
large number of extradition treaties" cited in the pleadings 
by the Colombian Agent could "have no bearing" on the
(184) PCIJ Reports, Ser. A, No, 10, (1927).
(185) Ibid., pp. 4, 27.
451
question in the case. In the Asylum Case,^^^^^ one of 
the arguments put forward by the court was that the 
treaties cited concerned extradition while the case was in 
fact related to asylum.
It now remains to examine the agreements closely 
relating to exploitation of international offshore fields 
upon which this view particularly relies. Whilst it is 
true that provisions in treaties, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, may form an international customary law, it 
is equally true that not every variety of treaty can give 
rise to a rule of customary law. The fact that the 
establishment of custom depends on the existence of two 
elements, namely usage (repeated practice) and opinio juris 
(psychological element), makes it necessary to 
consider the existence of these requirements.
To demonstrate this it is necessary to first examine 
briefly the status of existing international agreements 
which have been relied upon. For purposes of convenience 
and clarification, these agreements may be divided into two 
categories: those which deal with common oil fields which
have already been discovered, or with common deposits which 
may be discovered in the future.
(186) ICJ Reports, 1950, p.266.
(187) Ibid., pp. 275, 277.
(188) Briggs, op.cit., Ref. (219), at 121, pp.728-731; 
Bishop, op.cit., Ref. ( 2), at 8 , pp.220-230. 
This means that the usage must amount to the 
exercise of the "subjective" right of those who 
practise it.
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a , Agreements Dealing With Previously Discovered Common 
Deposits
It has been observed that one of the grounds relied 
upon above, to confirm that a customary rule for the 
cooperative development of a common oil field has been 
established is the fact that a number of agreements 
contemplating the problem prescribed cooperative exploit­
ation. It is respectfully submitted that these treaties 
are too inconsistent, as will be observed, to yield any 
clear rule of customary law. It is to be noted that when 
a rule is alleged to have been a rule of custom, anyone 
asserting the rule must adduce a qualitative articulation 
of the rule and also a quantitative element. Quite apart 
from the first element, the ordinary sense of the word 
'custom' is something that has repeated itself. It must 
thus be ascertained whether, prima facie, such an element 
exists, by examining the agreements cited to support the 
view claiming the existence of customary law.
With regard to the agreement of 22 February, 1958 
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of 
B a h r a i n , i t  can hardly be believed that it had been 
ever intended to be a cooperation agreement. This
seems clear from the inference of the second clause of
the agreement which provides in part that:
"... This area cited and defined above shall be 
in the part falling to the Kingdom of Saudi
(189) Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf in the "Persian Gulf" Between 
the Shaykhdom of Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, reproduced in ICLQ, 1958, pp.519-521.
(190) Lagoni, op.cit., Ref.(i4 i), at 4 3 5 , p.222.
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Arabia in accordance with the wish of H,H. the 
Ruler of Bahrain and the agreement of H.M. the 
King of Saudi Arabia. The exploitation of the 
oil resources in this area will be carried out 
in the way chosen by His Majesty on the condition 
that he grants to the Government of Bahrain one 
half of the net revenue accruing to the Govern­
ment of Saudi Arabia and arising from this 
exploitation," )
The above excerpt clearly reveals that the Saudi 
Arabian Government may decide the way by which the 
exploitation of oil resources in the area may be carried 
out. Each party to the present agreement would be 
entitled to equal shares of income and benefits from this 
common structure.
A completely different approach has been selected in 
the agreement of 1960 between Czechoslovakia and Austria 
Here the parties agreed to exploit the common deposit each 
on the part which underlies its land territory. Each 
party would be entitled to produce an amount in proportion 
to the amount of reserves in its territory at the time when 
the agreement was concluded. Furthermore, a number of 
means were provided for to guarantee non-wastage of the 
deposit and to ensure that each party would confine itself 
to the limits of production to which he was e n t i t l e d . ^
(191) See op.cit., Ref. (189), at 453, pp.520-521.
(192) Agreement Between the Government of the Czechoslovak 
Republic and the Austrian Federal Government 
Concerning the Working of Common Deposits of Natural 
Gas and Petroleum 1960, UNTS, Vol. 495, No. 7242,
p.125.
(193) Ibid. at Article 3 and Article 5; see also Onorato, 
op.cit., Ref.(137) at 434, p.97et seq.; Lagoni, op. 
cit., Ref.(141), at 435, p.223.
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Another type of solution can be found in the 
Supplementary Agreement of 1962 to the (Ems-Dollart Treaty 
of 1960) between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic 
of G e r m a n y . F o l l o w i n g  a different approach, the 
parties here agreed on settling their national exploitation 
rights in common oil field or other substances, by sharing 
equally the petroleum and natural gas extracted. In 
accordance with the provisions of this agreement the 
concessionaires on both sides are bound to cooperate with 
each other.
In a fourth kind of agreement the matter is approached 
in a wholly different way. A number of agreements provide 
for unitized exploitation of a common d e p o s i t . T h a t  
is to say a single operator who will manage the common 
deposit on behalf of the other parties. Examples of this 
can be found in the 1974 Treaty between Japan and South
Korea.(196)
An almost similar approach, with a slight difference 
in details, was followed in the agreement of 10 May, 1976
('197 )
between the U.K. and Norway.^ Here again, for the
purpose of exploiting the "Frigg Gas Field" it is
(194) The Ems-Dollard Treaty, Supplementary Agreement 
Concerning Arrangements for the Cooperation in the 
Ems Estuary, U.N.T.S,, No, 7404, p.104.
(195) Horigan, J.E. "Unitization of Petroleum Reservoirs 
Extending Across Sub-Sea Boundary Lines of Bordering 
States in the North Sea", NRL, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1974, 
pp.67, 73.
(196) "Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea 
Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part 
of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the two 
Countries, 5 February 1974, "Cited in New Directions 
in the Law of the Sea", Vol. 4, 1975, p.117.
(197) Cmnd, 6491, op.cit.. Ref. (I5l), at 438.
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considered as a single unit. It is worth quoting in 
part Article 1 ( 1 ) of the above agreement which provides 
that :
"(1) The gas in the Frigg Field Reservoir and the 
hydrocarbons produced with or from the gas 
'excluding oil underlying the gas and gas and oil 
in other horizons', referred to in this agreement 
as "Frigg Gas', shall be exploited as a single 
unit by means of installations specified in Annex 
A to this Agreement
Moreover, the above agreement provides that a Unit
operator shall exploit the Frigg Gas. Article (5) runs
as follows :
"For the purpose of exploitation of Frigg Gas 
in accordance with this Agreement a Unit 
Operator shall be appointed by agreement 
between the licensees, subject to the approval 
of the two Governments.
A fifth scheme of arrangements calls for exercising
joint power over the common deposit. Along these lines
is the agreement of July 7, 1965 between the State of
Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the partition
of the Neutral Zone.^^^^^ Although both these States
annexed their part of the zone as an "integral part" of
their territory*, under the provisions of this treaty the
resources exploited from the Neutral Zone are divided
equally among the parties. Article 8 provides in part
that :
(198) Ibid., Article 1(1).
(199) Ibid., Article 5.
(200) Reproduced in ILM, Vol. 4, 1965, pp.1134-1137.
456
"... the two Contracting Parties shall exercise 
their equal rights in the submerged zone beyond 
the aforesaid six miles limit mentioned in the 
Previous Article by means of shared exploitation 
unless the two parties agree otherwise.
b . Future Discoveries of Common Deposits
As regards possible discoveries of common deposits, 
it can be safely said that in almost all delimitation 
agreements of continental shelf areas, particular clauses 
have often been incorporated. One may unreservedly 
accept that these clauses are almost uniform. To say 
this is not to argue the establishment of a customary rule 
for cooperative development of common oil fields. However, 
in order to appreciate the value of this uniformity for 
the purpose of establishing a general rule of international 
law, it is useful to quote passages from these agreements.
A good illustration of this may be found in the
agreement between Britain and Norway in 1965.
Article 4 of this agreement runs as follows
"If any single geological petroleum structure or 
petroleum field, or any single geological structure 
or field of any other mineral deposit, including 
sand or gravel, extends across the dividing line
(201) Article 8 , ibid., p.1135. Along this line is also 
the Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary 
Lines and Sovereign rights over islands Between 
Qatar and Abu Dhabi, 30 March 1969, see ST/LEG/SER, 
B/16, 1974, p.403, or New Directions in the Law of 
the Sea, Vol. 5, 1977, p.223. Here referred to as 
signed on 20 March 1969.
(202) Agreement Between the Government of the U.K. of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Govern­
ment of the Kingdom of Norway Relating to the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the 
Two Countries" 10 March 1965, UNTS Vol.551, p.214.
(203) See below p. 462.
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and the part of such structure or field which 
is situated on one side of the dividing line 
is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other 
side of the dividing line the Contracting Parties 
shall,in consultation with the licensees, if any, 
seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which 
the proceeds deriving therefrom shall be 
apportioned."
Exactly the same picture emerges in the Rome Agreement 
of January 8 , 1968 on the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf between Italy and Yugoslavia. Article (2) provides 
that :
"In the event that natural resources of the 
seabed or beneath the seabed extend from the 
line of delimitation to both sides of the 
continental shelf, so that the resources on 
the continental shelf of one of the contracting 
parties can, in all or in part, be exploited 
from the continental shelf belonging to the 
other contracting party, the competent 
authorities of the contracting parties will 
meet with the intent of reaching an agreement 
to determine the manner in which said resources 
will be exploited, after having first consulted 
with the holders of any concessions in that
area."(205)
Again, a similar provision is that of Article 7 of 
the agreement of 1974 between India and Sri Lanka on the 
boundary in historic waters between the two countries and 
related matters.
(204) See Ref. (202), at 456, Article 4.
(205) Italy-Yugoslavia; Agreement on Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf, Rome, January 8 , 1968. Reproduced 
in ILM, Vol. 7, 1968, pp.547-553, at 550.
(206) Reproduced in the ILM, Vol. 13, 1974, pp.1442-1443 
at 1443.
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c . Is there any obligation on States to require the use 
of any specific rule of apportioning a common deposit?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary in
the first place to ascertain whether there exists any
principle of international law. In endeavouring to trace
the general lines along which state practice is followed
it may be relevant to examine pertinent treaties of the
classification cited, namely whether they deal with
previously discovered or possible oil fields.
As regards the first category, the foregoing survey
reveals that the agreements on previously discovered
common deposits do not adopt one scheme. The first group,
( 207 )agreements which adopt a revenue sharing rule,^ as Mr.
Lagoni rightly observed, are not "cooperative a g r e e m e n t s " ^  
The second group of agreements, as in the Czechoslovak- 
Austrian agreement of I960, can hardly be relied upon 
or considered as "cooperative". If this agreement was 
so, how can one explain that each State is entitled to 
exploit its share in the production separately?
It may be argued that the other agreements cited, 
from which a customary rule calling for cooperative 
exploitation is derived, could be regarded to recommend a 
kind of cooperation.
In order to answer this contention, it is submitted 
that even if they could be considered so, the real question
(207) The Agreement of 1958 Between Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia, see above. Ref.(189), at 452.
(208) Lagoni, op.cit., Ref.(141) at 435, p.222.
(209) See above pp. 456, 457.
459
which one may pose is on the other side. Do these 
agreements satisfy the prerequisite elements for the 
formation of customary international law rule? In 
exploring these agreements to extract the answer, it is 
worth recalling that these agreements adopted little 
uniformity if any. It may be added that to ascertain a 
rule of international law implies an investigation of the 
way in which custom acquires consistency and thus comes to 
be considered as constituting rules governing a particular 
situation. Undoubtedly, the foundation of a custom must 
be the united will of several States, and even of many, 
constituting a union of wills, or a general consensus of 
opinion among the countries concerned. Moreover, it 
must be proved that this custom is established in such a 
manner that it has become binding on all those concerned. 
This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ 
which defined custom "as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law".^^^^^
It follows from this that the number of agreements 
referred to in which common deposit fields were apportioned, 
has not reflected that the alleged rule of cooperative 
development was, apart from conventional stipulations, 
exercised by States as binding and not merely for reasons 
of practical expediency. Even more evident is the fact 
the different approaches followed in the agreements give 
a general idea that by reason of absence of consistency, 
without which a rule of international law cannot be based 
on custom, no rule of customary law can come into existence,
(210) Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.
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In the Asylum Case^^^^^ after having cited treaties
concerning asylum, the ICJ observed that those treaties
contained provisions which were at variance. The variant
provisions, as the Court correctly decided, yielded no
clear line of practice. In the words of the Court, there
was too much "inconsistency in the rapid succession of
(212 )conventions on asylum."^
Similarly, in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case^^^^^
the World Court had to examine whether there had been a
rule of customary law laying down a ten-mile closing line
for the indention of bodies of water in order that they
could be called "bays". The Court was quite specific
in deciding that
"although the ten-mile rule has been adopted 
by certain States... in their treaties and 
conventions"
other States "have adopted a different limit". 
Consequently, the Court held that the ten-mile rule "has 
not acquired the authority of a general rule of inter­
national law."(^^^)
In short, as it is observed by the Court in the 
foregoing cases, the substantive inconsistency of state 
practice prevented them from giving rise to a general 
principle of law.
For the reasons which have been given, the conclusion
(211) ICJ Reports, 1950, pp.266-389.
(212) Ibid., p.277.
(213) ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.116-206.
(214) Ibid., p.131.
(215) Ibid.
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which must be reached is that state practice, pertinent 
to the subject, is too inconsistent to yield any clear 
rule of customary law prescribing the cooperative 
development and exploitation of common oil fields. It 
would be reasonable to suppose that the techniques adopted 
in such bilateral arrangements are sui generis, their 
success depending on the readiness and willingness of 
the parties in question. That is to say, there is 
apparently no rule of international law which requires 
the use of any specific rule in the exploitation of 
common offshore fields.
To say the foregoing is not to argue for a complete 
denial of the existence of any other relevant rule. Whilst 
it is convenient to suggest the non-existence of a 
cooperative rule, this is no reason for ignoring the fact 
that there undoubtedly exists a practice whereby a State, 
sharing a common oil field, is required not to exploit it 
without some kind of understanding with the others 
concerned. In the course of state practice there has 
been a conclusive testimony which leads one to believe 
that a rule of customary law in this connection has been 
established. This may be supported by the fact that 
special provisions have often been incorporated in 
conventions to determine offshore boundaries. An 
appropriate illustration may be found in the agreement of 
1965 between the United Kingdom and Norway.
Other agreements in which similar provisions have 
been incorporated are:
(216) See Article 4 of this Agreement, op.cit., Ref.
(202), at 456.
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( 217 )
The agreement of 1974 between India and Srilanka.
/ 2 n Q >
The agreement of 1971 between the U.K. and Denmark.^
The agreement of 1971 between the U.K. and the Federal 
Republic of Germany.
The agreement of 1965 between the Netherlands and the
U.K.(220)
(221)The agreement of 1973 between Canada and Denmark.
in th 
(223)
( 222 )Other agreements e Middle East, the Indian Ocean
and the Far East.
This uniformity in stipulating an agreement in the 
case of common deposit may serve as a basis for the 
establishment of a rule prescribing that the exploitation 
of a common deposit by some understanding between the 
parties concerned. It may be noted, as Mr. Onorato 
concluded in his earlier article, that it is now recognized 
in international law thati-^^^^^
1. No State is allowed to develop or exploit a common oil 
field if it is reasonably objected to by another State 
unless an understanding with the objecting State is 
arrived at.
(217) Reproduced in ILM, Vol. 13, 1974, p.1442.
(218) Reproduced in ILM, Vol. 11, 1972, pp.723-725.
(219) Reproduced in ILM, Vol. 11, 1972, pp.731-733.
(220) Reproduced in Oda, op.cit.. Ref. (408) at 180, Vol.
1, pp.385-386.
(221) Reproduced in ILM, Vol. 13, 1974, pp.506-511.
(222) Agreement of 1974 Between Iran and Oman, reproduced 
in ILM, Vol. 14, 1975, pp.1478-1479; Agreement of 
1969 Between Iran and Qatar, U.N.T.S., Vol. 787,
p.165; Agreement of 1968 Between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, U.N.T.S., Vol. 696, p.189.
(223) See Lagoni, op.cit.. Ref. (141), at 435, p.231.
(224) Onorato, op.cit., Ref.(1 5 2 ), at 438, pp.327-329.
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2. The manner in which the question of dividing up an 
international common oil deposit must be settled by 
agreement between the States concerned.
3. The States concerned are under an obligation to enter
into negotiation with a view towards arriving at such
4. (225) an agreement,
4. The apportionment of a common oil field among the
(226 )interested States is to be an equitable one.
Conclusion and Recommendation
It now appears that no precise rule of international
law has been recognized to have been applied in the absence
(225) Onorato, op,cit., Ref,(152), at 438, pp.327-329; 
Woodliffe, op.cit., Ref.(137), at 434, p.339.
(226) However, in order to present a complete picture on 
the subject, it may be noted that the legal basis 
of non-competitive exploitation of a common deposit 
is a matter upon which inconsistent views have been 
expressed. It is dealt with in various ways by 
writers. One of the arguments made is to the effect 
that the principle of territorial sovereignty over 
the subsoil together with the obligation not to 
cause material damage to another State and in 
addition to exchange information and consult on 
matters concerning the common deposit, would suffic­
iently furnish solid grounds for this rule. Lagoni, 
op.cit., Ref.(141) at 435, p.220. According to 
another writer, the protection of property rights 
under international law and considerations of 
sovereignty are the legal grounds on which the rule 
rests. Onorato, op.cit.. Ref.(152) at 438, pp.328, 
329. Each of the aforementioned contentions has its 
own fundamental errors. For further details see 
Lagoni, op.cit.. Ref. (l4l) at 435, pp.220, 221, 228. 
In any event, in a work such as this which is not 
mainly concerned with such a problem, it may however 
be useful to note briefly that the principle of 
limited sovereignty alone could serve as a basis
for the contention of the rule by which no State may 
unilaterally exploit a common deposit. It is 
recognized that the purpose of international law is 
to harmonize and reconcile the different interests 
of States and thus each State is allowed to use that 
which is its own as not to injure another's 
property.
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of an agreement. The fundamental error in the view 
claiming the existence of a rule prescribing the application 
of the cooperative rule, is its endeavour to find sources 
of international law in places where they do not exist.
It is submitted that international law is not created by 
an accumulation of opinions, neither is its source a sum 
total of systems, even if they agree with each other.
Those are only methods of discovering some of its aspects, 
of finding some of its principles. In reality, the only 
source of international law is the consensus omnium.
Whenever it appears that the majority of nations constituting 
the international community are in agreement as regards the 
acceptance or the application in their mutual relations of 
a specific rule of conduct, this rule then becomes part of 
international law. From what has been said, along with 
the fact that various types of attitudes have been adopted 
it would be impossible to infer an undertaking of any kind. 
The most that can be said is that cooperative development 
as a rule governing the apportionment of a common oil 
deposit is now a mere trend. It is to be stressed that 
the only principle, in this regard, not to be overlooked 
is the inconvenient exploitation of a common deposit, with­
out the recognition of the States concerned.
As earlier references pointed out that large amounts 
of petroleum underlie the waters of the Arabian Gulf,(^^^^ 
therefore, it is more likely that a number of oil fields 
are situated in such a way as to be shared by Iraq and 
each of her neighbours Kuwait and Iran. This fact alone
(227) See above pp. 310 et seq.
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suggests that there is good reason to seek a satisfactory
solution to the problem. In the absence of any
international convention and since current State practice
now favours the need for some sort of understanding
between the nations concerned, where several countries are
found to be tapping the same oil deposit, it may be
suggested that an agreement be reached between Iraq, Kuwait
and Iran as the case may be. This agreement should seek
for an undertaking as any common single structure or
field of petroleum shall not be developed or exploited
unless an agreement as to the manner whereby such a
(228 )structure shall be developed. The following provision
is suggested to be included in any future agreement between 
Iraq, Kuwait and Iran.
If any single geological structure or field of 
petroleum, or any other mineral deposit beneath the seabed, 
extends across any of the dividing lines set out in this 
agreement, and if any part of such a structure or field, 
situated on one side of that dividing line, is wholly or 
partially exploitable from the other side of the line, then 
both parties hereto shall endeavour to reach agreement as 
to the manner in which such a structure or field shall be 
most effectively exploited and also as to the manner in 
which the benefits arising from such exploitation shall 
be shared,
(228) See Mouton, op.cit.. Ref.(258) at 135, p.421. This 
procedure is the only means to solve such a 
difficulty. Otherwise, in Professor Mouton's view, 
it would be difficult to lay down any general rule. 
Ibid.
(229) If such an agreement could not be reached, see below 
pp. 466 et seq.
Subsection Two
The Settlement of Overlapping Disputes 
Between Iraq and Her Neighbours
The problem
It should first of all be observed that, had submarine 
boundaries in general been carefully determined according 
to the recognized principles of international law, then, 
overlapping of marine zones, would not exist.
However, this does not imply that the delimitation of 
offshore boundaries may always be established without 
disagreement. Indeed, it is sound to suggest that in 
every social system there are inherent areas of dissent 
and dispute.
In looking at the Arabian Gulf in particular, 
concessions granted by the respective States have revealed 
positively that overlapping inevitably occurs. The 
emergence of the problem is more likely in the dividing 
up of marine boundaries, especially, between Iraq and her 
neighbours. Undoubtedly, the configuration of the Iraqi 
coastline; which stretches for only about ten nautical 
miles, further complicates the question and contributes 
tellingly to the existence of overlapping. That is to 
say, the Iraqi continental shelf becomes narrower towards 
the high sea until it overlaps with the Iranian and 
Kuwaiti continental shelves.
It would be inappropriate to argue to the contrary, 
on the grounds that Iraq, Kuwait and/or Iran might possibly 
not challenge the application of the concept of equity.
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In short, apart from the well known differences concerning
the interpretation, content and application of the concept
of e q u i t y , o v e r l a p p i n g  is still viable due to
controversial claims about the location of the baselines,
or at least the basepoints on these lines, from which
(231 )seaward limits are measured,  ^ It also might be 
ascribed to the differences regarding the interpretation 
of the principles of international law pertinent to the 
subject.
Indeed, whatever the factors that produce this result, 
which naturally vary according to the circumstances of the 
case, it will cause a source of international conflicts.
Presumably, a viable social system must in general, 
have the means by which such disputes can be settled with­
out threatening the entity of the system.
In reality, in most domestic societies the law 
performs an essential function by supplying the procedures 
by which disputes can be settled, or at least contained, 
without destroying the fabric of the society. Domestic 
disagreements are not forbidden by national legislation, but 
are limited in scope and intensity as they are frequently 
subject to a definite settlement by centralization of 
authority.
In contrast to this, is the conclusion which would 
follow in the international community. Undoubtedly, the 
settlement of international disputes is a subject of 
great complexity as there was no central body recognized
by the international society, or at least the majority
(230) Colson, op.cit.. Ref, (20 ), at 198, p.105.
(231) Blecher, op.cit., Ref. (23 ), at 200, p.61.
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of States, as being competent enough to settle disputes 
Here, the use of force, instead played an essential 
role in the relations between S t a t e s . H o w e v e r ,  
around the turn of the present century, the idea that war 
as a means of settling international disputes, was 
seriously questioned, and the thought that war could 
function as the final arbiter in the international bargain­
ing process was r e j e c t e d . I t  may be said that the 
principle of renunciation of threats or use of force as
instruments of national policy, has been adopted in a
(235 )
large number of treaties,^  ^ and has now become a
fundamental principle of international law.^^^®^ Thus, 
it has been formulated with the utmost clarity in the 
Charter of the U.N. Article 2(4) imposes definite 
obligations on members of the World Organization, in their 
conduct of international relations, not to use or threaten
force.(937)
(232) Pechota, Vratislav, "Complementary Structures of 
Third Party Settlement of International Disputes" 
Edited in "Dispute Settlement Through the U.N.", 
ed. by K. Venkata Raman, 1977, pp.149-155.
(233) Luard, Evan, "Frontier Disputes in Modern Internat­
ional Relations" In the International Regulation of 
Frontier Disputes, 1970, p.22.
(234) Blishchenko, I.P., "The Use of Force in International 
Relations and the Role of Prohibition of Certain 
Weapons" Current Problems of International Law, by 
Antonio Cassese (ed.) 1975, p.157.
(235) Some of these treaties have been referred to in Ref. 
(126) in, Menon, P.K., "International Boundaries, A 
Case Study of the Guyana-Surinam Boundary", ICLQ,
Vol. 27, 1973, p.762; Blishchenko, ibid., pp.159- 
160. However the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907 made a significant contribution to the develop­
ment of the principle of prohibiting recourse to 
force by States. See ibid., p.157.
(236) Jennings, R.Y., "The Acquisition of Territory in 
International Law", 1963, pp.52-68. Blishchenko, 
ibid. p.162.
(237) Charter of the U.N.
469
Not only has the Charter of the U.N. imposed 
obligations not to use force but also enumerated procedures 
whereby States may adjust their differences peacefully. By 
virtue of Article 33 of the Charter of the World Organiz­
ation, the parties to any dispute which is likely to 
disturb the maintenance of international peace and good
understanding between nations, shall first of all seek a
( 238 )
solution, inter alia, by negotiation. Failing to
reach a mutual solution by negotiation, disputants would
(239 )
resort to a third party.
The Possible Solutions
Accordingly, if a controversy arose between Iraq and 
any of her neighbours relating to the overlapping of the 
continental shelf, it would be solved on the basis of 
either of the above existing amicable means. These means 
and their applicability to disputes relating to the 
problem under consideration will be briefly explored. For 
convenience, they will be discussed here under two 
headings: diplomatic negotiation and means other than
negotiation.
(238) Charter of the U.N. Article 33.
(239) Ibid. The various kinds of third party intervention 
may be, mediation, conciliation, good offices, and 
arbitration or judicial settlement. See Menon, op. 
cit., Ref.(235), at 468, p.726.
(240) That is because - the use of good offices to bring 
the parties together into direct negotiations, or 
mediation in which the mediating parties take 
part in the discussion, or conciliation, where in 
the conciliator makes finding which the parties 
remain free to accept or reject - are all methods 
to get the parties to the dispute to negotiate and 
agree upon a solution. Thus it, appears 
reasonable not to separate them from negotiation.
See Bishop, op.cit.. Ref. (2 ), at 8 , p. 173.
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I . Diplomatic Negotiation
For the reasons previously suggested it is possible 
to stress that areas of the continental shelf between Iraq, 
Iran and Kuwait will in some manner converge and 
overlap.
On the threshold of an exploration of the rules to be 
applied so as to solve the problem it may be of use to 
ascertain the record of the ILC pertinent to the subject.
It may be noted that the Commission was faced with the 
problem under consideration. It was recorded, along with 
others relating to the continental shelf under the heading 
(question y)^(242) ^t would be fair to say that a number
of alternatives through which this point ought to be
settled, were open to the Commission, One of the 
Commission's members, Mr. Hudson, pointed out that the 
International Law Association's Committee on Rights to the 
Seabed and its Subsoil, had considered the rights vested 
in coastal States on the said area. The Committee, Mr. 
Hudson mentioned, had recommended in its report that there 
must have been criteria to find a solution when continental 
shelves overlapped. It had been the view of the 
International Law Association's Committee that neither 
international custom nor international practice had 
provided any enlightenment on the subject. Not only had 
international custom and practice been so, but also 
writers had not been able to offer a suitable solution. 
Therefore, as a matter of reasonable inference according
(241) See above p. 466.
(242) YBILC, 1950, Vol. 1, p.232.
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to Mr* Hudson, it was suggested to set the question
a s i d e . ( 9 4 3 )
A second possibility was examined to achieve this 
aim. The disputed area was to be equally divided between 
the States concerned under Mr. el-Khourg's view. He 
affirmed that there was good reason for this to be used as 
a basis. From his standpoint, since the general rule 
when two States were separated by waters was that the fron­
tier was fixed in the middle of these waters the same rule 
should be applied in the case of overlapping.
A third type of solution was suggested by Mr. Amado 
who, to enhance his argument, cited that the Barcelona 
Conference had failed to reach an agreement in the case of 
the utilization of the water power of frontier river. He
went on further to state that the attempts which some 
South American States had made in this regard to reach a 
desirable mutual agreement at the Pan-American meetings 
at Havana in 1928 and at Montevideo in 1933 were also not 
successful. Consequently Mr. Amado pointed out that it 
was impossible to adopt a general principle on that point. 
Thus, he recommended that a ruling by an impartial body in 
each particular instance, on the basis of law, would be 
an appropriate means of settling overlapping disputes.
Another proposal was suggested by Mr * Yepes.
Potential areas of overlapping of the continental shelf as 
he put his case, had to be settled by agreement between
(243) YBILC, 1950, Vol. 1, pp.232-233.
(244) Ibid., p.233. This view was opposed by Mr. Hudson
on the grounds that there had been no such principle. 
Ibid., p.233.
(245) Ibid.
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the nations concerned. He remarked that it would be 
inappropriate to set forth any general rule, since each 
situation was unique. He then proposed that a problem of 
the sort under consideration could be satisfactorily 
settled only in the light of its own conditions, as 
considered by the parties concerned. In the absence of 
any agreement, the dispute would be settled by the means 
provided under international law for the settlement of 
disputes between States.
Comment
It is submitted that the history of the consideration 
of the question of overlapping confirms the conclusion that 
there was a strong need for a general substantive rule to 
be applied in the case of overlapping. Nevertheless, the 
ILC was unable to lay down any universal criteria. 
Consequently, as had been advocated by the Truman 
Proclamation of 28 September 1 9 4 5 , the question was 
left to be settled between the p a r t i e s . T h e r e f o r e ,  
as Mr. Yepes correctly stated, no single method to settle 
such a problem would be satisfactory since each
situation is unique by virtue of its own facts. Accordingly, 
it would appear that negotiation, with a view to reaching 
agreement, is the only apposite means by which the goal
(246) Ibid.
(247) See above Ref. (283), at 144.
(248) The agreement may be brought about through direct 
negotiation by the disputant States or through the 
friendly intervention of a third State or States.
See above p. 469.
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is to be a c h i e v e d . (249)
Here, it is necessary to return to the legislation of 
Iraq. It may be observed that the principles set forth 
in that legislation are so devised as to be in clear 
conformity with the principles just outlined. Apparently, 
by virtue of Article 3 of the Law No. 71 of 1 9 5 8 , the 
apportionment of the continental shelf area between Iraq 
and her neighbours when disputed shall be determined by 
agreement between Iraq and the States concerned.
It may be noted that diplomatic negotiation is
obviously the chief method for settling the vast majority
of differences and for forestalling the rise of potential
controversies. To demonstrate this, one may quote
the following sentences from the dissenting opinion of
Judge Moore in the Mavrommatis Case,^^^^^ in which he
pointed out that:
"... Yet, in the international sphere and in the 
sense of international law, negotiation is the 
legal and orderly administrative process by which 
governments, in the exercise of their unquestion­
able powers, conduct their relations one with 
another and discuss, adjust and settle, their 
differences. Many celebrated judical decisions 
might be cited to show the respect paid to this 
principle. . . " . ^
(249) Negotiation is the simplest method of settling 
disputes and very often what happens. See Summers, 
op.cit.. Ref. (166), at 373, p.118.
(250) Appendix No.IV.
(251) Bishop, op.cit., Ref. (2), at 8, pp.172-173.
(252) PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, pp.6-93 (1924).
(253) Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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Thus, one is accordingly entitled to assume that, 
acting in good faith, disagreements on the question in 
hand are susceptible to settlement through negotiation.
To clarify this, it is important to note that disagreements 
on overlapping areas, as has been s h o w n , v a r y  
according to the reasons which give rise to overlapping.
Two main possibilities are feasible in this respect. In 
the first place, it could be ascribed to the controversial 
attitudes to the location of baselines. If such is the 
case, it is proposed to resort to the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention on the TSCZ pertinent to the subject. 
Articles 4, 7, 8 and 9 which define the baseline and lay 
down the principles closely related to the foregoing, may 
offer useful assistance.
It is certain that the provisions referred to cannot 
eliminate all disagreements involving delimitation of 
continental shelf boundaries. Nevertheless, they do 
accommodate the majority of differences which if not 
settled, lead to dangerous and acute conflicts.
On the other hand, if overlapping was due to disagree­
ment on the interpretation or application of the rules of 
international law under which lateral boundaries of the 
continental shelf can be delimited, it is recommended to 
chose, by mutual negotiation, the most appropriate method 
or methods for carrying out this delimitation. This, it 
may be added, must be achieved in the light of the 
established principles of international law pertinent to 
the subject which requires equitable delimitation as
(254) See above, p. 467.
475
shown in the previous chapter.
One final point should perhaps be considered. It
is conceivable to argue that, although an agreement is
certainly the chief method of settling disputes between
States, and negotiation is a necessary preliminary before
having recourse to other procedures, nonetheless it has
obvious disadvantages by reason of its primordial nature.
Firstly, it may be contended that the States concerned
are, as shown earlier, frequently grossly unequal in
bargaining power, and less powerful States negotiating
with strong States find themselves subjected to the will
of the o t h e r s . S e c o n d l y ,  negotiation is not suitable
for fixing disputed facts objectively and impartially, as
this is a task of particular difficulty in international
disputes. Thirdly, in the absence of a moderating third
party influence, the negotiators usually stake claims as
high as possible in the bargaining process, regardless of
legal or other merits, and this may aggravate rather than
ease the dispute.
Confronted with the foregoing objections, it must
however be said that these weaknesses in the principle
should not be exaggerated. Neighbouring States obviously
have a strong interest in arriving at an agreement to 
(257 )the dispute,^  ^ otherwise they would not be able to fully
(255) An equitable delimitation of continental shelf areas 
is required, as was conspicuously decided by the 
Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Case, under 
the Geneva Convention no less than under customary 
international law. See above pp. 263.
(256) See above, pp. 205 et seq.
(257) Grisel, op.cit., Ref. (48), at 209, p.593.
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exploit the seabed and its s u b s o i l . I n  addition, 
the principle that the States concerned must resort to 
negotiation whenever areas were claimed by more than one 
State to be part of their continental shelves might find 
clear support in the Judgment of the ICJ in the North Sea 
Cases. The Court laid down that areas of continental 
shelf claimed by several States "... are to be divided 
between them in agreed proportions".
It is thus appropriate to mention that when an area 
is claimed by Iraq, Kuwait or Iran, as the case may be, 
recourse in the first instance must be made to negotiation.
However, to say the foregoing is not to deny the event 
of difficult dispute, or it may sometimes be impossible to 
arrive at a settlement by negotiation. If a dispute is 
of a serious and complex nature, requiring thorough 
investigation and involving some measure of controversy as 
to legal or other merits, some technique other than that 
of negotiation seems indispensable. Therefore, it would 
be appropriate to resort to arbitral procedure or 
adjudication. This procedure is our concern in the 
following discussion,
II. Means Other Than Negotiation
Once the issue regarding overlapping reaches the 
stage that it cannot be solved by negotiation, a variety 
of methods for dealing further with it are open to the
(258) See Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion in the North 
Sea Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p.172.
(259) ICJ Reports, 1969, p.53,
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parties to the dispute.
It may be noted that the ILC was apparently aware of
the fact that the application of the Geneva Convention on
the continental shelf would not be satisfactory in all
cases. Therefore, having anticipated the potential for
disputes between States with overlapping claims, the ILC
in the early stages was inclined to adopt a solution which
demanded that when an agreement could not be reached, the
States concerned should be obliged to submit the dispute
to arbitration ^  aequo et bono. Article 3 of the
Draft Articles on the continental shelf adopted at the
1951 Session of the ILC ran as follows:
"Two or more States to whose territories the 
same continental shelf is contiguous should 
establish boundaries in the area of the 
continental shelf by agreement. Failing 
agreement, the parties are under the obligation 
to have the boundaries fixed by arbitration
However, the question was reconsidered on other occasions
in the ILC and the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea
(260) Since forms of third parties other than arbitration 
or adjudication are not more than negotiation in 
which the task of third party is only to bring the 
disputants together (see above p.469), they will 
not be discussed as independent means. For further 
details see Sohn, Louis B . , "International 
Arbitration Today", Hague Recueil, Vol. 108, 1963,
I, pp.11-21.
(261) YBILC, 1951, Vol. II, p.143.
(262) Ibid. The commentary of the Commission on this 
Article was "it is not feasible to lay down any 
general rule which States should follow; and it is 
not unlikely that difficulties may arise... it is 
proposed therefore that if agreement cannot be 
reached and a prompt is needed the interested States 
should be under an obligation to submit to 
arbitration ex aequo et bono." Ibid.
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In brief, the compulsory judicial settlement was strongly 
opposed and no provision in this connection was eventually 
adopted. Instead, an Optional Protocol of Signature dated 
April 29, 1958, which was based on a Swiss proposal, was
adopted.(263)
It is now convenient to deal briefly with the factors 
employed to meet the proposals of the compulsory judicial 
settlement as set forth, with caution and even suspicion 
in the Draft Articles. Throughout the debate, the 
opposing attitudes of the delegates questioned the adequacy 
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on matters of the 
continental shelf. The objections put forward were;
a. It was pointed out that the extension of the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction to include differences on the 
continental shelf, served as a permanent restraint on 
the will of States concerned to resort to other 
pacific means. Indeed, any reference to arbitration 
or adjudication must be linked to the situation 
envisaged in Article 33 of the Charter of the U.N.
In other words, the act of resorting to the ICJ is not 
fully independent of other procedures provided for in 
the said Article. Otherwise, it may be observed, the 
extension of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction may 
endanger rather than secure international peace.
(263) For further details, see Al-Havnawi, M., "The Law 
of Sea in Time of Peace", 1963, pp.503, 504.
(264) See the argument of Mr. Ruiz Mereno (Argentian)
UNCLOS I, Summary Records, pp. 100-104; the 
argument of Mr, Kanakaratne (Venezuela), ibid., 
p .105.
479
b. It was argued that it was against the Charter of the 
U.N. to refer disputes on questions of continental 
shelves compulsorily to the ICJ. Continental shelf 
questions, like any other type of international dispute, 
were to be settled in the light of the Charter of the 
U.N. which contained no such obligation. It was also 
important to bear in mind that accession to the ICJ
had been left optional. Moreover,
"the number of States which had accepted 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect 
of certain categories of disputes never a very 
large one, was constantly diminishing."
Even those States which did accept such jurisdiction
limited its scope, as they first of all accepted it only
with respect to certain disputes and, secondly, with
various reservations,
c. There were no significant grounds to justify the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on disputes arising 
over the continental s h e l f . T h i s  observation, 
became even more evident once it was remembered that 
States were not compelled to have resource to the World 
Court in the case of any disputes arising out of the 
articles relating to the interpretation or application 
of other subjects, such as the fisheries or the 
conservation of living resources, which had been much
r268 )more controversial.^
(265) See the argument of Mr. Lee (Republic of Korea), 
ibid., p.99; the argument of Mr. Nae (Romania), ibid.,
p.101.
(266) The Argument of Mr. Nae (Romania), ibid., p.101.
(267) The Argument of Mr. Lee (Republic of Korea), ibid., 
p. 99.
(268) Ibid.
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d. It was obvious, according to another point of view, 
that the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ was not in 
favour of less powerful States, for it would give some 
opportunity to take unnecessary legal action as a means 
to bring pressure to bear on others. Additionally, if 
either disputant simply did not agree to refer a 
question to the Court, or refused to accept a Court's 
judgment, it may have endangered rather than secured 
international peace.
e. It was noted that the jurisdiction of the ICJ had
already extended to "all cases which the parties refer
to it". In the terms of the Statute of the ICJ, the
parties could evidently authorize the Court to decide
their case not only "in accordance with international
/ 270)
law", but also "ex aequo et bono". So, as a
matter of reasonable inference, it was perfectly clear 
that there was no need to assert this procedure in 
Article 73 of the draft Articles on the law of the sea, 
since the action proposed was already in hand,
(271 )Accordingly, Article 73, was rendered obsolete.
In other words, it appears that no convincing reasons 
were given as to why compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
was provided for in Article 73, since such a procedure 
was already included in the Statute of the ICJ.^^^^^
(269) The argument of Mr, Lee (Republic of Korea), ibid., 
p.99.
(270) The argument of Mr. Gomez Robledo (Mexico), ibid., 
p.103; Statute of the ICJ, Article 36(1) and 
Article 38 (1,2).
(271) The argument of Mr, Gomez Robledo (Mexico) ibid., 
p.103.
(272) See the argument of Mr, Nikolic (Yugoslavia), ibid., 
at 104; the argument of Mr, Jhirad (India), ibid., 
at 105,
f . Importance was also attached to the fact that the concept 
of the continental shelf was new in international law 
and the rules relating to it had not been put to the 
test of experience. Therefore, this surely amounted
to stating that it was not only unnecessary but also 
dangerous to compel States to accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the
g . Another important reason for objecting to the compulsory 
jurisdiction, was that placing restrictions on States
to accept one particular method of settling disputes 
before trying to seek a solution by another, was 
unacceptable since disputes were of different natures. 
Moreover, the ICJ was a legal tribunal, whilst the 
subject on which it was proposed that the Court had 
compulsory jurisdiction,was in fact technical.
h . With regard to this, it was contended that the 
compulsory dispute settlement was, by its nature, 
contrary to one of the most basic and honoured traditions 
of international law.^^^^^ The equality of sovereigns, 
it was stressed, served as a permanent restraint on the 
concept of compulsory settlement of disputes.
(273) See the argument of Mr. Molodtsov (Union of Socialist 
Republics), ibid., p.99.
(274) See the argument of Mr. Ruiz Moreno (Argentina), ibid., 
pp. 100, 102; the argument of Mr, Schwarch Anglade 
(Venezuela), ibid., pp.100, 101; the argument of Mr. 
Gomez Robledo (Mexico), ibid., p.103.
(275) The argument of Mr. Ruiz Moreno (Argentina), ibid., 
p .104.
(276) This is well characterized in the writings of 
Lauterpacht:
"... the function of law is to regulate the 
conduct of men by reference to rules whose format­
as distinguished from their historical - source of 
validity lies in the last resort, in a precept 
imposed from outside. Within the community of
Contd,,,.
However, for the reasons mentioned above, Article 73 
of the Draft Articles of the ILC was not approved. Instead, 
an alternative proposal, as shown earlier, was submitted 
as a reasonable compromise to annex an optional protocol 
to the Convention. It only remains to examine the main 
principles of the protocol in order to ascertain their 
applicability over matters relating to overlapping of 
continental shelf areas. The following principles might 
be identified;
1. Instead of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
provided for in Article 73 of the ILC's draft, which
was vigorously opposed in the deliberation of the
the
(278)
(277 )ILC,  accession to the clause was made
optional.
It is also to be noted that any party to a conflict can 
take its dispute to the ICJ, It is clear that once 
the jurisdiction of the Court is accepted by the 
disputants, its decision shall be final and binding on 
both parties.
(276) contd,..
nations, this essential feature of the rule of 
law is constantly put in jeopardy by the 
conception of the sovereignty of States which 
deduces the binding force of international law 
from the will of each individual member of the 
international community. This is the reason 
why any inquiry of a general character in the 
field of international law finds itself at the 
very start confronted with the doctrine of 
sovereignty". See Lauterpacht, H., "The 
function of law in the International Community", 
1933, p.3.
(277) See above pp. 478 et seq.
(278) See the preamble of the Protocol and Article 5. The 
full text of the Protocol reproduced in Knight, op, 
cit.. Ref. ( 1 ), at 8, Vol. 2, Annex E. pp. E1,E2.
(279) Article 1 of the Protocol.
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3. The disputing parties shall refer the conflict to a 
second type of third-party settlement of international 
disputes, namely, to an arbitral tribunal lieu of 
the ICJ. However, such reference is on the condition 
that the parties must agree within a period of two 
months after one party has forwarded its opinion to 
the other that a dispute exists.
4. Again, there is an alternative way to settle the dispute 
It is also possible to bring the dispute, within the 
same period of two months, to a conciliation procedure 
before recourse to the ICJ.^^^^^ The conciliation 
commission shall make its recommendations for the 
settlement of the dispute within five months after its 
appointment.
5. There is no obligation on the part of the disputants 
to adhere to any of the suggestions made by the 
conciliation commission. Either party is entitled 
within two months of making the recommendations not to 
accept them and then to bring the dispute before t e
ICJ.(282)
6. Finally, the protocol is only open to States who become 
parties to any of the Conventions on the Law of the Sea 
approved by the Geneva Conference of 1958.^ ^
(280) Article 3 of the Protocol.
(281) Article 4(1),
(282) Article 4(2)
(283) Article 5.
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The settlement of the problem of overlapping between Iraq 
and her neighbours
Previously, we have been dealing with the procedures 
through which. States in general, may settle their 
differences on the delimitation of the continental shelf, 
in accordance with the general principles of international 
law including the Geneva Convention. It now remains to 
examine the applicability of those procedures in the case 
of Iraq, Before passing on to this investigation, it 
may be convenient first of all to state that all differences 
pertinent to the subject which may arise between Iraq and 
her neighbours, may be settled by either of the following 
procedures :
1. The optional protocol of signature.
2. The ICJ.
3. Bilateral Agreements.
The aim of what follows is to examine the above 
procedures,
I. The Optional Protocol of Signature
It would be possible to argue that the solution may 
be found in the Optional Protocol annexed to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1958.
In reply to this, it may be pointed out that, whether 
the optional protocol operates as a means to settle over­
lapping disputes, depends largely on the conditions 
provided for therein in order to be applied.
In terms of this protocol, the protocol is to be applied 
on claims brought by any party to it.^^^^^ Certainly,
(284) Article (1) .
the protocol is open to be signed only by States who 
become party to any of the conventions on the law of the 
sea.(^^^) As for Iraq, this protocol would appear to be 
inapplicable inasmuch as she has not been a party to any 
of the Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea. This 
would not therefore, qualify her to accede to the 
optional protocol. Consequently, the question under 
consideration is not covered by the optional protocol. ^
(285) Article (5).
(286) No doubt, the Geneva Conventions of 1958 on the Law 
of the Sea lack a watertight and efficient system 
for settling disputes in the area of the law of the 
sea. See Fahrney, op.cit.. Ref. (108), at 46 ,
p.540. On the other hand, the basic aim of the 
UNCLOS III is to adopt a comprehensive Law of the 
Sea Convention. The establishment of an effective 
and comprehensive system for settling Law of the 
Sea disputes which may arise from the interpretation 
and application of the Convention is highly 
desirable.Adede, A.O. "Settlement of Disputes Arising 
Under the International Law of the Sea Convention", 
AJIL, Vol. 69, 1975, p.798.
In short, as a result of discussion during the 
Sessions of the Conference held to date, the approach 
adopted by the ICNT (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP 10/Add. 
1/22 July, 1977, Part XV, p.142) would offer States 
a wide choice of modes of settlement, ranging from 
the most informal non compulsory procedures with 
non binding decisions, to formal compulsory 
procedures entailing binding decisions. Adede, A.O., 
"Notes and Comments: Law of the Sea - The Integration 
of the System of Settlement Disputes Under the Draft 
Convention as a Whole". AJIL, Vol. 72, 1978, p.84; 
and ibid., "Settlement of Disputes" pp. 798-818; and 
"Law of the Sea: The Scope of the Third Party 
Compulsory procedures for Settlement of Disputes", 
AJIL, Vol. 71, 1977, pp.305-311, However, although 
the draft articles contain elaborate provisions in 
the area of the law under consideration, in terms 
of these provisions only a limited group of cases 
will be subject to the compulsory procedure provided 
for in the convention to be concluded. It is to be 
noted that certain exceptions may be made to the 
compulsory settlement procedures (Part XV Article 
287 of the ICNT). Boundary delimitation falls in 
this category. See Article 297 of the ICNT, ibid. 
Thus, if one believes Mr. Adede's reasoning that the 
Convention will require careful interpretation and 
application as it will be in the form of delicately
Contd....
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II. The ICJ
It may also be proposed that the ICJ may be resorted 
to in order to settle any dispute which might arise with 
respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf between 
Iraq and her neighbours. In order to test whether such 
a procedure could be turned to in this connection, it 
must be observed that the chief channel through which 
jurisdiction is conferred on the Court, lies in Article 
36(1,2) of the Statute. This provision runs in part as 
follows ;
Article 36
"1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all 
cases which the parties refer to it and all 
matters specially provided for in the Charter of 
the U.N, or in treaties or conventions in force.
2. The States parties to the present Statute may 
at any time declare that they recognize as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agree­
ment, in relation to any other State accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court..."(287)
It follows that, to bring the question before the 
Court, disputants were simply required either to be 
parties to the Statute, or to agree to do so. It is of 
significance to recall that the Statute of the Court as
yet has never had all States as parties to it, and Iraq
belongs to the States in this category.
(286) contd.
balanced provisions representing painfully worked 
out compromises, then the need for a more efficient 
system for settling disputes is stronger. See 
Brown, op,cit., Ref. ( 99 ), at 44, Part II, p.203.
(287) Statute of the ICJ,
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Of course, this leads one to conclude that the ICJ 
is without jurisdiction in disputes over the law of the 
sea in general which might exist between Iraq and her 
neighbours.
Ill Bilateral Agreements
It remains to ascertain whether any bilateral agree­
ment in force which can be considered as providing for a 
procedure leading to the peaceful settlement of disputes 
in relation to the delimitation between Iraq, Kuwait or 
Iran.
As regards Iraq and Iran, they appear to have entered 
into an agreement for Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 
July 24, 1 9 3 7 . It may be noted at the outset that 
the treaty defines certain methods for the settlement of 
disputes between the two parties. These are judicial 
means, arbitration or conciliation.
Turning firstly to judicial settlement, it would be 
fair to say that Article 2(1) confers compulsory juris­
diction upon the PCIJ (now may be read the ICJ).^^^^^
(288) L.N.T.S., Vol. 190, p.271. The Treaty came into 
force with the exchange of ratifications, June 20, 
1938. This treaty was to be in force for a period
of five years and to remain so for successive periods 
of five years unless denounced by either party with­
in a period of not less than six months earlier than 
the expiry of the five-year period. As far as this 
writer is aware, no denunciation has been traced.
One is accordingly entitled to assume that it still 
to be in force.
(289) Article (1).
(290) Article 37 of the Statute of the ICJ provides that:
"Whenever a treaty or convention in force 
provides for reference of a matter to a 
tribunal to have been instituted by the 
League of Nations, or to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, the matter 
shall, as between the parties to the present 
Statute, be referred to the International
Contd...
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Meanwhile, Article 2(2) enumerates a variety of conditions
in which certain defined classes of differences are
excluded from the World Court's jurisdiction. Amongst
matters excluded are those provided for in paragraph 3,
concerning the territorial status of one or other of the 
(291)
parties. As the delimitation of offshore boundaries, by 
their very nature, are always to be deemed territorial, 
accordingly, disputes of this type would appear to be 
excluded from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
As an alternative to judicial settlement, recourse 
may be made, by agreement between Iraq and Iran, to 
arbitration. Under the treaty it may be noted, the 
party unwilling to resort to arbitration, due to his 
reluctance to accept the expected award, has the opportunity 
to avoid this procedure. Thus, to dispose of the 
consequences which might be produced by arbitration, the 
party concerned can simply refuse to agree to resort to 
arbitration.
It remains to examine the third form of procedure 
provided for in Article 6 of the treaty which runs as 
follows :
"Any dispute a settlement of which cannot be 
reached by means of a judicial or arbitral 
decision under the provisions of the present 
Treaty shall be submitted to conciliation
(290) contd.
Court of Justice."
Brownlie, op.cit., Ref, (3l), at 20, p.276.
(291) L.N.T.S., Vol. 190, p.271.
(292) Articles 3 and 4. L.N.T.S., Vol. 190, p.271.
(293) Article 6. Ibid,
This provision is put into force when disputes cannot 
be settled by means of judicial or arbitral decisions. 
Consequently, disputes over territorial status, including 
differences on the delimitation of offshore boundaries, 
would fall within this category.
But, although conciliation has a role to play in 
international relations, it is submitted that this 
provision would not fully serve to settle disputes of the 
nature under consideration. It is true that conciliation 
performs a useful service, as the intervention of an 
independent body can give new life to negotiation and open 
up a new p e r s p e c t i v e s . I r r e s p e c t i v e  of the above 
advantages of conciliation, the difficulty is that the 
treaty adopts the pattern of the Hague Conventions and 
provision is made for a commission^^^^^ consisting of five 
m e m b e r s . E a c h  party appoints one national commiss­
ioner, while the other three are chosen by agreement. It 
may be predicted with certainty that a party reluctant 
to the formation of the Commission would prevent the
establishment of the Commission by merely refusing to
appoint the members of the Commission. At any rate, the 
appointment of the non-national members, in the event of 
disagreement to mutually appoint them, can be made by the 
President of the Council of the League of Nations. Correct 
as this may be,a similar solution cannot be made with
(294) See Cot Jean-Pierre, "International Conciliation", 
translated by R. Myers, European Publications, 
London, 1972, pp.1-5.
(295) Articles 8 and 9.
(296) The odd number five makes it easier to take
decisions,
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respect to the national commissioners. Also, further 
difficulties may arise even in the event of appointing non­
national members, for as the League of Nations Council no 
longer exists, it would be debatable whether the Security
Council of the United Nations could be regarded as its 
(297)successor.
To this it may be added that, according to Article 17
of the treaty, conciliation would not lead to a binding
settlement unless the conciliation decision was accepted
(298 )by the parties concerned.
As to similar disputes which may arise between Iraq 
and Kuwait, both countries appear to be bound by the impact 
of the League of Arab States. In disputes, in which the 
rights of the parties are at issue, they undertake by 
virtue of Article 5 of the Pact to solve their differences 
in accordance with the language of this provision.
This Article provides in part that:
"Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes 
arising between two or more member States of the 
League is prohibited. If there should arise among 
them a difference which does not concern a 
State's independence, sovereignty, or territorial 
integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have
(297) Johnson, D.H., "The Constitution of an Arbitral 
Tribunal" BYBIL, Vol. 30, 1953, pp.156-157.
(298) Article 17 provides that: "The Purpose of the 
Conciliation Commission shall be to clear up points 
in dispute, to obtain all requisite information to 
that end by enquiry or otherwise, and to endeavour 
to reconcile the parties to the dispute. It shall 
be free to submit to the parties, after consider­
ation of the dispute, the terms of whatever 
agreement it may consider appropriate, and fix a 
time limit for the expression of their respective 
opinions".
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recourse to the Council for the settlement of 
this difference, the decision of the Council 
shall then be enforceable and obligatory
A careful reading of the above text would reveal that 
territorial disputes and questions of territorial integrity 
of member States are out of its scope. Moreover, prior 
to the application of this Article, the consent of the 
disputants is required. Exceptions to the provision are 
hence so many that it does not operate in cases involving 
offshore boundaries.
Comment and Recommendation
The facts advanced above make it clear that the 
methods of settling disputes, which have been discussed, 
have problems in common, or unique difficulties. In the 
light of the preceding arguments, it may now be stated that 
when disputes concerning overlapping arise between Iraq 
and her neighbours, no procedure is available by which 
they may be definitely settled. It is therefore proposed 
to work out arrangements to settle quarrels prior to the 
actual disputes.
It is suggested to enter into either bilateral agree­
ments with Iran and Kuwait separately, or a multilateral 
agreement with them both on a wide and firm basis. In 
either case, disputes on the delimitation of marine bound­
aries which diplomacy will fail to settle must be subject 
to a binding settlement. Two types of arrangement may 
be imagined to achieve the above proposal:
(299) Cited in Peaslee, Amos J., (ed.) "International 
Governmental Organizations: Constitutional 
Documents',’ Vol. II, 1974, p. 1118,
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a. A treaty by which Iraq and her neighbours may agree on 
the delimitation of their offshore boundaries in general, 
and also agree to submit disputes which arise under the 
treaty and cannot be settled by negotiations, to some 
form of third party determination,
b. A general arbitration treaty between Iraq and her 
neighbours including reciprocal acceptance of the ICJ 
jurisdiction.
With any of the above alternatives, it is submitted 
that in the structure of these agreements, the kinds of 
problems which party nations agree to submit to binding 
settlement should be characterized.
Therefore, it appears reasonable to suggest that 
special provision is necessary to be incorporated in any 
possible treaty between Iraq and her neighbours. The 
following text may be suitable in this respect.
The signatory Powers agree that disputes which 
may arise between them as to the interpretation or 
application of the present t r e a t y a n d  which 
have not been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall 
at the request of either party, be submitted to 
settlement by arbitration, unless the parties agree
to seek a solution by some other pacific means.
(300) In dealing with this particular question, namely the 
delimitation of submarine boundaries, it is submitted 
that a variety of reasons may cause unwillingness to 
to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
rather than the arbitration. Firstly, arbiters are 
usually chosen by the disputant States. They, there­
fore enjoy their confidence. Secondly, for the same 
reason, arbiters may be chosen to be particularly 
competent in settling a certain dispute such as the 
one under consideration.
(301) Or by characterizing particular kinds of problems.
CONCLUSION
What has been said demonstrates quite conclusively
that consideration of the subject of marine boundaries is
both timely and complex. It is timely in that the law
of the sea is in a state of exceptional activity and reform
The complexity of the subject is due not only to the
unclear status of the rules of international law on the
subject, but also to the fact that the use and exploitation
of the sea and the seabed increases with the rise in the
world's population on the one hand and the progress of
technology on the other. Certainly, the different
policies and interests of States have made it difficult to
establish precise rules for delimiting marine boundaries.
One component of the limits of coastal jurisdiction
is the baseline along the coast from which marine zones
are measured. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone contains particular provisions to
deal with the determination of baselines. However, the
Convention, as noted earlier, makes no provision for
island groups and archipelagos. It may be added that the
rules adduced in the Convention relating to the
circumstances justifying the drawing of straight baselines
along coasts are loose and invite wide flexibility of
interpretation. Another shortcoming in the Convention
in this regard is the absence of specific provision for
so-called "historic bays" other than recognising their
existence . ^ ^ ^ Needless to say the closing off of certain
(1) Article 7(6) of the TSCZ Convention in referring to 
the rules for closing off bays the coasts of which 
belong to a single State, points out, "the foregoing 
provisions shall not apply to so-called historic bays".
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coastal waters on the grounds that they are "historic", 
thereby enjoying the status of internal waters, would 
push the outer limits of offshore boundaries further sea­
ward and this would no doubt affect the total extent of 
offshore waters over which a coastal State may claim 
jurisdiction.
The first type of jurisdictional claims relates to 
the waters considered as part of the territorial sea over 
which coastal States exercise jurisdiction, as well as 
over the airspace above these waters. The legal status 
and the extent of the areas within the territorial sea 
affords little difficulty. As far as the seaward extent 
of the territorial sea is concerned, it seems clear that 
until recent times writers differed in their opinions as 
to the breadth of territorial sea. Whilst a number of 
them considered the three-mile limit as a rule of inter­
national law, others opposed this view, arguing that it 
never was accepted as a general rule; and still others 
believed that it was a rule of international law, but that 
it should be changed according to the times. However, as 
was demonstrated, the three-mile rule was never 
universally adhered to as a general rule of international 
law. No better evidence may be found to enhance this 
suggestion than what was concluded by the International 
Law Commission in its 1956 report with reference to the 
width of the territorial sea: "International practice is
not uniform". It went on further to say that "many States 
have fixed a breadth greater than twelve miles". Indeed,
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the twelve mile limit was recognized by the International
Law Commission in 1956 when it stated that any claim for
territorial sea up to 12 miles would not be regarded as
illegal. However even on the assumption that the limit
of three miles was universally accepted, after analyzing
the various present claims and examining international
evidence (treaties, unilateral acts, etc.), one can only
conclude that the three-mile limit is no longer accepted
as the maximum width of the territorial sea. Instead a
rule of international law entitling coastal States to
determine their territorial seas up to a twelve mile limit
has been well established. The claims of States,
including those who used to adhere to the three-mile limit,
and the impression given by writers would warrant the
above proposition. If further evidence was needed to
prove the establishment of the 12-mile limit, one may look
to the debate of the UNCLOS III. It seems quite clear,
as noted earlier, that the overwhelming majority of States
are prepared to agree on a 12-miles territorial sea. It
is true that the outcome of the Conference is at this time
unclear. If a conventional rule were to emerge from the
Conference, it will have to receive the acceptance of the
necessary majority of States. Moreover, even if a
Convention were signed in 1981, and presently predicted,
it would not immediately be law. It would then have to
be ratified, and it could be some years before the
requisite number of instruments of ratification were 
(2 )
deposited. ^  Correct as that may be, it is equally true
(2) See Articles 298-300 of the ICNT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP. 10/Add 1, p.151.
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that the debates at the international conference reflecting 
the attitudes of various governments are of great value. 
There is no better quotation in this regard than a passage
C3
from Elihu Root^ in which he indicated that;
"Not only the conventions signed and ratified, 
but the steps taken towards conclusions which 
may not reach practical and effective form for 
many years to come, are of value.
Concerning the definition of the continental shelf,
it is important to emphasize that critics of the Continental
Shelf Convention have pointed out one of its shortcomings
as failing to prescribe a definite outer limit of the
continental shelf. How far out may coastal States make
claims over areas of the seabed pursuant to the Convention?
Article 1 defines the continental shelf as an area
adjacent to the coast out to a depth up to 200 metres or
beyond that limit to the extent that the depth of the
water permits exploitation of the natural resources. This
is a double-barrelled definition; depth of 200 metres or
depth of exploitability, make ambulatory the limit to
seaward of the sovereign rights recognized by the
Convention. Several qualified observers have maintained
that no determined proponent of this interpretation of the
Convention will be embarrassed either by its language or
by such legislative history as is available. Neither is
it apparently confined by the term "adjacent to the coast".
(3) A "well known jurist and statesman, one of the framers 
of the Statute of the PCIJ" See ICJ Reports, 1969, the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Koretsky, p.157.
(4) "Note to the Texts of the Peace Conferences at the 
Hague, 1899 and 1907, Boston 1908" cited in ibid.
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Undoubtedly, this is an undesirable conclusion but 
it is a possible interpretation of the Convention as it 
is, and not as it should be. At least the 200 metre depth 
and the exploitability tests, despite their drafting 
history, may well be viewed as being independent of one 
another. This interpretation, one may suggest, is not 
only theoretical, but there is even the possibility that 
States are going to extend control beyond 200 metre depth 
since the resources of the zone claimed could be exploited 
by the application of new technological skills. This 
has already occurred in a number of instances. The U.S. 
Department of the Interior has already leased land for 
resources extending on the outer portion of the continental 
shelf to a depth beyond 200 metres which, in a conceptual 
sense, is beginning down the slope towards the deep ocean 
floor. So has the U.K. and many other States.
Despite the strong argument which has been presented 
by a number of leading authorities in the field for holding 
that the Convention imposes a limit on the shelf, neverthe­
less one may be entitled to suggest that there may be a 
number of possible interpretations of the exploitability 
criterion. It is submitted that due to the under sea 
technology and States' maritime ambitions and greed, the 
exploitability test will be resorted to more and more to 
justify an extensible movement far out into the oceans.
This is a possibility which, at the time of reviewing and 
revising the continental shelf convention every effort 
should be made to avoid. Greater precision in defining 
the outer limit is desirable. Surely, the outer limit of
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the continental shelf under the ICNT is precise. Never­
theless, it is proposed that the present criteria in being 
exchanged for a 200 miles limit at least, would permit the 
extension of national jurisdiction to areas which should 
be part of the high sea.
We may now turn to the problems relating to the estab­
lishment of boundaries in areas of sea shared by two or 
more States. While these matters do not raise problems 
of principle, they do cause problems of practical importance 
which are both difficult and of immediate concern to the 
States involved.
As noted earlier. Article 6 of the Continental Shelf 
Convention provides that in the case of States lying 
opposite or adjacent to each other, the boundary on the 
shelf between them - in the absence of agreement or unless 
another line is justified by special circumstances - should 
be a median or an equidistance line. As regards the 
importance that is to be attached to the equidistance rule, 
strictly speaking, it is worth asserting that there is no 
objection to this rule as a method of dividing up 
continental shelf areas. It is not intended here to 
repeat all that has been said. Particular attention will 
be paid only to the following points. The chief flaw 
appears in the application of the equidistance rule to 
particular situations. For present purposes, it is 
enough to suppose that two States, (A) and (B) are opposite 
or adjacent to each other, and they both are parties to 
the Continental Shelf Convention, but only (A) is a party 
to the TSCZ Convention. If (B) measured its territorial
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sea from a baseline further seaward than it should have 
been according to the TSCZ Convention, then the results 
would be inequitable; that is to say (B) would acquire 
substantially more shelf area than (A). It may be 
contended, that this problem relates to baselines, rather 
than to the rules of delimiting marine zones. True as 
this may be, it is equally valid that this argument would 
not lessen the shortcoming attributed to the equidistance 
rule in this respect. It may be observed that, instead 
of removing, or at least reducing, the hardship caused by 
the different ways of establishing baselines, the 
application of the equidistance method in this situation, 
would increase the allotment of continental shelf areas 
to be given to one State at the expense of another.
Another type of difficulty appears to be in cases 
where islands exist on the continental shelf. Surely, 
this difficulty is a result of geographical factors, rather 
than legal principles, but such a situation brings us to 
the question of what position is to be held by islands in 
establishing the equidistance line, a question to which 
Article 6 fails to furnish an adequate answer. Bearing 
in mind that the Convention affirms only that islands 
also possess shelf areas, the presence of islands can make 
a great difference particularly in narrow seas.
At this point, it should be added that Article 6 of 
the Continental Shelf Convention, under which the equi­
distance rule is to be excluded where circumstances 
necessitate special treatment, fails to define the scope 
of these circumstances. Of course, the omission of such 
a list is not only understandable, but also reasonable.
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Nevertheless, such a broad term leaves the way open for 
invoking all kinds of allegations as "special circumstances^
However, all these considerations could perhaps be 
observed and overcome since the Convention prescribed 
agreement among the parties concerned. The ICJ, in the 
North Sea Cases, laid stress on the importance of agreement 
in solving marine boundary problems. Admittedly, this is 
not an automatic solution. However, one may be entitled 
to assume that even Article 6 of the Continental Shelf 
Convention does not provide such a solution, nor does the 
Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf 
Case. The equidistance-special circumstances rule, which 
has acquired the status of a general rule, at least in the 
Court of Arbitration's view, could not possibly enable a 
State to fix unilaterally its continental shelf boundary 
if the other State objected to such a boundary because 
there were no circumstances preventing the application of 
the equidistance rule. Therefore, there must be an 
agreement amongst the States concerned, otherwise the 
question falls to be settled by some other means.
As far as the boundaries of the Iraqi territorial 
sea are concerned, from the outset, there could be no 
sdoubt as to the position of the Iraqi Government, at least 
in principle, conforming with the rules of international 
law. Law No. 71 clearly points out that the Iraqi base­
line is "the low-water mark following the sinuosities of 
the Iraqi coast". Iraq has explicitly maintained that 
the width of her territorial sea is twelve miles. It is 
perfectly clear from the context in which Iraq claims her
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rights regarding her territorial sea that she wants to 
show thereby that her claims correspond to the rules of 
international law. More important is the fact that both 
Iran and Kuwait have maintained their adherence to a twelve 
mile limit for the territorial sea. It remains to be 
stressed that no agreement is in force establishing the 
territorial boundaries between Iraq, Kuwait and Iran.
The reason appears to be attributed to the differences 
between Iraq and her neighbours concerning the boundaries 
on land. That is to say the final point on the boundary 
line on land is decisive and affects the location of the 
territorial sea boundaries. No doubt, the rules 
according to which territorial sea boundaries are to be 
drawn are well accepted, as laid down in the Geneva 
Convention on the TSCZ. Moreover, the course of 
constructing such boundaries should not present great 
difficulties, nor involve any issues of principle. Never­
theless, the necessity for definite territorial sea 
boundaries between Iraq and her neighbours can naturally 
be understood from the fact that differences concerning 
marine boundaries may involve disputes between the nations 
concerned as serious as in the case of conflicts over land 
boundaries. This suggests that a workable solution for 
all boundary disputes is desirable.
Two difficulties have arisen concerning the delimit­
ation of territorial sea zones between Iraq and Iran. The 
first that exists in deciding the legal status of the new 
land which is constantly being built up by the annual 
volume of sediment deposited by the Shatt al-Arab. The
502
Shatt al-Arab as noted earlier is building new land at 
the head of the Arabian Gulf. It is observed that no 
specific rule is laid down in the Geneva Convention on the 
TSCZ dealing with this difficulty. It is concluded that 
the general rules of international law according to which 
newly emerged land belongs to the coastal State cover the 
question well.
A more important problem is the effect to be given to 
the alteration of the location of the Iraqi baseline which 
is extending further seaward due to the above reason.
The comment on this question confirms that there is no 
trace in the TSCZ Convention of a solution to this matter. 
For reasons given, it is submitted that an agreement on 
periodical revision of baselines may operate as a workable 
solution.
On the question of continental shelf boundaries, it 
should be mentioned in introduction, that this matter is 
of exceptional importance to Iraq. This is due partly to 
the huge petroleum deposits which are found throughout the 
seabed of the Arabian Gulf and partly to the fact that Iraq 
is in a geographical position of particular configuration^^) 
Certainly, the difference between areas of the continental 
shelf of a State with a concave coastline and a convex 
coastline is multiplied as the limits of national juris­
diction are moved further seaward. Here again, the 
attitude of Iraq conforms with the rules of international 
law pertinent to the subject. The very strong assertion 
in the declaration of 1957 that areas of continental shelf
(5) Geographically disadvantages State.
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shared by Iraq and her neighbours are to be determined by 
agreement between Iraq and the nation concerned is a clear 
indication in this respect. Under general rules of 
international law, the determination of the continental 
shelf boundary is left to the agreement of the parties. 
Although it may be true that there are cases in which the 
parties have to accept the strict equidistance line, 
namely if it is equitable, it is equally true that in 
other cases there is no obligation on the nations concerned 
to accept a boundary based on the equidistance rule. The 
arguments in support of this are mainly contained in 
chapters three and five. Therefore, it is not intended 
to repeat what has been said there, but it is worthwhile 
to stress the following. Even the Court of Arbitration 
in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case confirmed that 
equity must be taken into consideration in any delimitation 
of continental shelf areas between States opposite or 
adjacent to each other. The Court is surely of the opinion 
that the equidistance-special circumstances, as one rule, 
has gained the status of a general rule of international 
law. Indeed, it repeatedly stressed that this rule or any 
other method ought to be used whenever such an application 
would result in equitable solution. It may be added that 
not only the ICJ in the North Sea Cases and the Court of 
Arbitration in the Anglo-French Case, laid stress on 
equitable principles. In fact, the emphasis placed upon 
this concept seems consistent with past practice. In the 
case of Diversion of Water from the Meuse, for instance, 
Judge Hudson, stated that "under Article 38 of the Statute, 
if not independently of that Article, the Court has some
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freedom to consider principles of equity as part of the 
international law which it must apply". Among the
writings of leading authorities, the following passage may 
seem worth citing: "... international judicial institutions
act within their range in giving full rein ... to 
considerations of reasonableness and good faith". Such
institutions, goes on the same author, "may find that, if 
not expressly, then at least by implication, parties to a 
dispute have authorised them to supplement in this way 
established rules on international law". To support this 
suggestion, the author invokes the rules on the minimum 
standard in favour of foreigners and on international 
responsibility as "pertinent illustrations both of the 
incorporation of jus aequum into actual rules of inter­
national customary law and of the application of such
rules in the spirit of jus aequum by international courts
(7 )and tribunals". Perhaps the rules concerning the
delimitation of the continental shelf may now be added.
Another related point deserves comment before going 
on further. There remains the allegation that the concept 
of "equitable principles" is vague and subjective and that 
the concept of "special circumstances" is more restricted.
Of course, the concept of "equitable principle" is not 
very clear, seen in terms of boundary delimitation. However, 
the recognition of the ICJ that it could not render an 
automatic solution should be appreciated. Indeed, the 
main responsibility, as the ICJ decided, was always upon
(6) PCIJ. Series A/B No. 70, p.77 (1937).
(7) Schwarzenberger, G., "International Law", 3rd ed,,
1957, pp.52-53,
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the nations concerned to negotiate to reach agreement. In 
referring this dispute to the parties, the ICJ focused on 
the principles which ought to be taken into consideration 
and which may be welcomed as a clear advance.
One final point is worth special mention. It is 
suggested, for reasons already given, that the word 
"equidistance" alluded to in the 1957 Proclamation should 
not be exploited to construct the acceptance of Iraq to 
apply the strict equidistance rule. It was pointed out 
in this connection that this word should not be over­
weighted, since it had been phrased in such a manner as to 
show that the equidistance rule would find application in 
accordance with the rules of international law. This 
suggestion might find strong support in the decision of 
the Court of Arbitration which repeatedly asserts that 
there is not and never has been a rule of equidistance, but 
always an equidistance-special circumstances rule. It 
may be added that the present attitude of Iraq in the 
UNCLOS III might well reveal the policy of the Iraqi 
Government in vigorously supporting equitable principles 
and strongly opposing the adoption of any proposal to give 
the equidistance rule any primacy. It may be added that 
Kuwait and Iran both declare by some means their adherence 
to the rules of international law and equity in particular. 
Whilst this step is of great importance on the way towards 
successfully resolving the whole problem, there is still 
much more to be done as it is well known that unilateral 
acts by coastal States can lead only to international 
conflicts. If that is correct, then the need for an
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agreement between Iraq and her neighbours becomes imperative. 
The pertinent problems relating to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between Iraq and her neighbours are 
examined. The difficulty likely to arise is that of 
international common oil fields which lie across the 
marine boundaries or in a position near these boundaries 
where they may be exploited from the other side. Examples 
of state practice are given showing that no rule of 
customary law prescribing the use of a specific rule for 
the exploitation of such deposits has been established.
The most that can be said is that international law forbids 
unilateral exploitation of such deposits. Therefore, a 
sort of understanding between the parties concerned is 
indispensible.in solving the problem.
As there are ample reasons for expecting practical 
conflicts and disputes to exist, there appears a need to 
establish an authoritative body entitled to solve any 
controversy which might arise.
It is pertinent to end this conclusion with the 
suggestion that instead of the separate negotiation 
resulting sometimes in agreement binding only between the 
nations concerned and sometimes even in failure to agree, 
there should be a multilateral Conference of all the 
Arabian Gulf States, or alternatively, only of Iraq,
Kuwait and Iran, at which the marine boundaries of all 
would be simultaneously agreed upon. The proposal 
agreement should
1, Define the position of the points which indicate exactly 
the dividing lines in the light of equitable principles
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Otherwise, in the absence of such a precise definition, 
there could afterwards arise disputes which might have 
been avoided by more careful drafting of the agreement. 
There should be some mechanism for compulsory settlement 
of any dispute in the future.
As the general legal rules and the existence of the 
continental shelf are designed to meet various economic 
interests, the suggested agreement should contain a 
provision or provisions to regulate the exploitation of 
common deposits which have already been discovered or 
may be discovered in the future.
Finally, some provision ought to be made with respect 
to the alterations which might be caused by the Shatt 
al-Arab.
APPENDIX No. 1*
OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION OF NOVEMBER 23, 1957 
CONCERNING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF IRAQ
The Government of Iraq being anxious to exploit the 
natural resources of Iraq to the fullest possible extent, 
and being convinced that a considerable amount of such 
resources lies at the bottom of the maritime zone extending 
outwards to the sea and contiguous to the Iraqi territorial 
sea, and being further confident that the exploitation of 
such resources in such a way as will bring benefit to the 
Iraqi people has become possible in view of modern 
scientific progress;
It therefore declares that all natural resources 
existing on the sea-bed and the sub-soil beneath it are 
the property of Iraq and that Iraq has exclusive general 
jurisdiction over such resources and over their preservation 
and exploitation. It has likewise the exclusive right to 
take all measures necessary for the exploration of such 
resources and their exploitation in such a way as it deems 
suitable. It has also the right to take such administrative 
and legislative measures as are necessary for the protection 
of all constructions required by the process of exploration 
and exploitation.
The Government of Iraq wishes to assert that the sole 
purpose of its issue of this proclamation is the exercise 
of rights established by international practice. It also 
wishes to assert that nothing in this proclamation shall 
infringe the established rules pertaining to the freedom 
of navigation,
APPENDIX No, II**
SUPPLEMENTARY PROCLAMATION OF APRIL 10, 1958
CONCERNING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF IRAQ
In affirmation of the proclamation of the Government 
of Iraq made on 23rd November 1957 establishing the rights
» Source; ST/LEG/SER.B/15(1970) pp.368-369,
K» Source: ST/LEG/SER,B/15(1970) p,369.
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of the Iraqi State to the waters contiguous to Iraqi 
territorial waters; the Government of Iraq declares that 
its full sovereignty extends to Iraqi territorial waters 
and to the air-space over these waters and to the surface 
and subsoil of the sea-bed beneath them. The Government 
of Iraq wishes to assert that such works and constructions 
as have been or will be undertaken in this zone or the 
zone encompassing the waters contiguous to it are subject 
to the sovereignty of the Iraqi State, and that the under­
taking of such works and constructions is permissible to 
none other than the Iraqi authorities or to such quarters 
as may be duly authorized by Iraqi authorities. While 
declaring this in establishment of its rights, the 
Government of Iraq declares also its adherence to inter­
national practice in this respect and to the principle of 
equidistance which guarantees to Iraq freedom of passage 
into and out of the high seas.
While declaring the above, the Government of Iraq 
declares also its non-recognition of any proclamation, 
declaration, legislation or planning pertaining to 
territorial waters or to contiguous waters issued by any 
neighbouring country in contradiction with the contents of 
this proclamation,
APPENDIX No. Ill*
REPUBLICAN ORDINANCE NO. 435 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1958
1, The Iraqi territorial sea, its bed and subsoil 
and the air space above it shall be under the sovereignty 
of the Iraqi Republic, subject to the rules recognized by 
International Law pertaining to the innocent passage of 
the ships of other countries through the said sea.
2, The Iraqi territorial sea extends twelve nautical 
miles (a nautical mile is equivalent to 1852 metres) in 
the direction of the high sea, measured from the low-watet 
line of the Iraqi coast,
3, In case the territorial sea of another State inter
H Source: ST/LEG/SER, B/15 (1970) pp.89-90,
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laps with the Iraqi territorial sea, the limits between 
the two territorial seas shall be determined by agreement 
with the State concerned in accordance with the recognized 
rules of international law or with such understanding as 
may be reached between the two States.
4. No provisions in this Ordinance shall infringe 
Iraq's other internationally recognized rights in the two 
maritime belts known as the contiguous zone and the 
continental shelf following the Iraqi territorial sea in 
the direction of the high sea. Nor shall any provisions 
in this Ordinance infringe the official announcements 
previously issued by the Iraqi Government in this respect
APPENDIX No. IV*
LAW NO. 71 OF 1958 DELIMITING THE IRAQI 
TERRITORIAL WATERS
Article 1
The Iraqi territorial sea, its bed and subsoil and 
the air space about it shall be under the sovereignty of 
the Iraqi Republic, subject to the rules recognized by 
International Law pertaining to the innocent passage of 
the ships of other countries through the said sea.
Article 2
The Iraqi territorial sea extends twelve nautical 
miles (a nautical mile is equivalent to 1852 metres) in 
the direction of the high sea, measured from the low-water 
mark following the sinuosities of the Iraqi coast.
Article 3
In case the territorial sea of another State inter­
laps with the Iraqi territorial sea, the limits between 
the two territorial seas shall be determined by agreement 
with the State concerned in accordance with the recognized 
rules of International Law or with such understanding as 
may be reached between the two States.
M Source: ST/LEG/SER B/15 (1970) p.90.
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Article 4
No provisions in this Law shall infringe Iraq's other 
internationally recognized rights in the two maritime 
belts known as the contiguous zone and the continental 
shelf following the Iraqi territorial sea in the direction 
of the high sea. Nor shall any provisions in this Law 
infringe the official proclamations previously issued by 
the Iraqi Government in this respect.
APPENDIX No. V*
ACT OF 18 JUNE 1955 ON THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOIT­
ATION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF OF IRAN
Article 1. The term "Falate Gharreh" used in this 
Act, shall have the same meaning as the term "Continental 
Shelf" in English or "Plateau continental" in French.
Article 2. The (submarine) areas as well as the 
natural resources of the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof, 
up to the limit of the continental Shelf adjacent to the 
Iranian coast and to the coasts of Iranian islands in the 
Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman have belonged and shall 
continue to belong to Iran and shall remain under its 
sovereignty.
Note: In respect of the Caspian Sea, the principles 
of International Law relating to closed seas shall remain 
applicable.
Article 3. In case where the Continental Shelf 
referred to above extends to the shores of another State 
or neighbours upon the territory of a state bordering upon 
Iran, any eventual differences concerning delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf of Iran are ruled by the principles 
of equity and the government shall take the necessary 
measures for the settlement of such eventual differences.
X ST/LEG/SER. B/16 (1974) p.151. Articles 3 and 5 are 
reproduced from text of the Act published in Petroleum 
Legislation Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts: 
Middle East, Supplement No. XXXIII, p. Iran A-1.
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Article 5. This law shall not contravene status 
governing superjacent waters insofar as same apply to the 
rights of free navigation and the installation of submarine 
cables.
The government may construct necessary installations 
on the continental shelf to explore and exploit its 
natural resources and shall take the necessary measures 
for security of such installations.
APPENDIX No. VI*
ACT OF 12 APRIL 1959 AMENDING THE ACT OF 15 JULY 
1934 ON THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND THE CONTIGUOUS
ZONE OF IRAN
Article 1. The sovereignty of Iran extends, beyond 
its land territory and internal waters, to a belt of the 
sea adjacent to its coast, referred hereto as the 
"territorial sea".
Article 2. The said sovereignty extends to the air 
space over the territorial sea as well as to the sea-bed 
and subsoil thereof.
Article 3. The breadth of the territorial sea of 
Iran is 12 nautical miles from the baseline of the said 
sea. The baseline will be determined by the Government 
with due regard to the established rules of public 
international law.
Note: One nautical mile is equal to 1,852 metres.
Article 4. Wherever the coast of Iran is adjacent 
to or opposite the coast of another State, the dividing 
line between Iran's coastal waters and those of the other 
State shall be, unless otherwise agreed between the 
parties, the median line every point of which is equi­
distant from the nearest point on the baselines of both 
States.
Article 5. Every island belonging to Iran, situated 
within or outside the territorial sea of Iran, shall have 
its own territorial sea determined in accordance with the
X Source: ST/LEG/SER. B/16 (1974) p.10.
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provisions of the present Act. The islands situated 
at a distance not exceeding 12 nautical miles from one 
another, shall be considered as a single island and the 
limit of their territorial sea shall be determined from 
the islands remotest from the centre of the archipelago. 
Article 6. The waters between Iran's coast and 
baseline, as well as the waters between the islands 
belonging to Iran situated at a distance not exceeding 
12 nautical miles from one another, shall constitute the 
internal waters of Iran.
Article 7. Fishing and other rights of Iran beyond 
the limits of its territorial sea, shall remain unaffected
APPENDIX No. VII*
Proclamation of the Sheikh of Kuwait with respect to the 
seabed and the subsoil of the high seas of 12 June 1949.
Whereas it is desirable to encourage any effort which 
will lead towards the greater utilisation of the world's 
natural resources;
And whereas it is possible that there may be there 
valuable resources lying under parts of the waters of the 
Persian Gulf at a distance from the coast of Kuwait and 
the wish is expressed to realise the utilization of such 
submerged resources ;
And whereas it is desirable in the interests of 
protection, conservation and orderly development that such 
exploitation shall be placed under control in the proper 
manner ;
And whereas it is right and just that the seabed and 
the subsoil extending to a reasonable distance from the 
coast should appertain to and be controlled by the littoral 
state to which it is adjacent;
And whereas the right of the state in the exercise of 
its authority over the natural resources of the seabed and 
the subsoil adjacent to its coasts has been decided and 
established in international practice by the action of 
other states;
» Source: ST/LEG/SER. B/1 (1951) p.26.
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Now, therefore, we Ahmed al Jabir al Subah, Ruler of 
Kuwait, in pursuance of all powers enabling us in that 
behalf, are pleased to publish the following proclamation:
The Ruler of Kuwait hereby proclaims that the seabed 
and the subsoil lying beneath the waters of the sea in the 
middle of the sea of the Persian Gulf delimited as follows 
become part of the principality of Kuwait and are subject 
to its administration and authority. The seabed and the 
subsoil referred to above are those which adjoin the 
coastal territorial waters of the principality of Kuwait 
and extend in the direction of the sea to limits which will 
be decided upon more precisely as the resulting situation 
may demand, and on equitable principles, by the Ruler of 
Kuwait after consulting the neighbouring countries.
Nothing in this Proclamation shall be deemed to affect 
the sovereignty of the islands or the status of the seabed 
and the subsoil underlying any part of the territorial waters 
Nothing in this Proclamation shall be deemed to affect 
the ways of sea navigation of the waters of the Persian 
Gulf above the seabed and outside the limit of the 
boundaries of the territorial waters or the status of air 
navigation above the waters of the Persian Gulf outside 
the limit of the boundaries of the territorial waters or 
the traditional fishing rights and pearling rights in such 
waters.
APPENDIX No. VIII*
DECREE OF 17 DECEMBER 1967 REGARDING THE DELIMITATION 
OF THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE 
STATE OF KUWAIT
We, Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait,
Having noted Articles 1 and 65 of the Constitution, and 
Annex III to Law No, 12 of 1964 regarding the Prevention 
of the Pollution of Navigable Waters by Oil, and
Law No, 48 of 1966 approving the Agreement of 7th July, 
1965, concluded between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom
K Source: ST/LEG/SER. B/15 (1970) pp.96-98.
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of Saudi Arabia concerning the Partition of the Neutral 
Zone between them, and
The International Convention on "The Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone" approved by the Geneva Conference 
and dated 29th April, 1958 and
The Concession Agreements concluded between the 
Government of Kuwait and the Oil Companies operating in the 
territory of Kuwait, the (Partitioned) Neutral Zone, or in 
the sea-bed areas appertaining to each, and
Pursuant to the recommendation of the President of 
the Council of Ministers, and
After approval by the Council of Ministers,
Have decreed as follows:
Article 1
The territorial sea of the State of Kuwait extends 
seaward for a distance of twelve miles from the baselines 
of the mainland and of Kuwaiti islands as hereinafter 
defined in Article 2 of this Decree.
Article 2
The base-lines from which the territorial sea of the 
State of Kuwait is measured are established as follows:
(a) Whereas the shore of the mainland or of a Kuwaiti 
island is fully exposed to the open sea, the low-water 
line along the coast is the baseline;
(b) Where there is a port or harbour, the outer-most 
permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the 
harbour system are considered as forming part of the coast;
(c) Where there is a low-tide elevation situated not 
more than twelve miles from the mainland or from a Kuwaiti 
island, the outer edge of the said low-tide elevation 
constitutes the baseline for measuring the territorial sea 
of the mainland or, as the case may be, of the island off 
which the elevation is situated;
(d) In the case of Kuwait Bay, the waters of which 
are internal waters, the base-line is the closing line 
across the entrance to the Bay established in Annex III to 
Law No. 12 of 1964 regarding Prevention of the Pollution 
of Navigable Waters by Oil.
OlO
Article 3
In this Decree, the expression "island" means a 
naturally formed area of land surrounded by water, which 
is above water at mean high-water tides.
The expression "low-tide elevation" means a naturally 
formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water 
at low-tide but submerged at high-tide.
Article 4
If the territorial sea of Kuwait measured in accordance 
with the provisions of this Decree overlaps the territorial 
sea of another State or of the Zone partitioned by the 
Agreement relating to the Partition of the Neutral Zone 
dated 7th July 1965, the boundary shall be determined in 
conformity with the provisions of Article 12 of the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 
referred to in the Preamble of this Decree.
Article 5
The enforcement of the provisions of this Decree 
shall not be understood as affecting in any way any rights 
of the interested parties in the submerged area to seawards 
of the Zone partitioned under the Partition Agreement of 
the Neutral Zone hereinabove mentioned.
Nor shall it be understood to detract in any way from 
any rights provided for in existing Concession Agreements 
between the Government of Kuwait and the Oil Companies 
operating in the territory of Kuwait, in the Partitioned 
Zone or in the sea-bed areas appertaining to each, 
particularly as regards the acreage of concession area as 
defined in the said agreements.
Article 6
Nothing in the provisions of this Decree shall 
prejudice the rights of the State of Kuwait to an area 
contiguous to its territorial sea to be delimited later on, 
or to the exploitation of fish resources.
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Article 7
The President of the Council of Ministers and the 
Ministers shall, each within his competence, execute the 
provisions of this Decree which shall come into force as 
from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.
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